The common issue in these appeals is whether, under Workers’ Compensation Law (WCL) §15, a claimant’s schedule loss of use (SLU) award must always be reduced by the percentage loss determined for a prior SLU award to a different subpart of the same body “member” enumerated in section 15. We hold that separate SLU awards for different injuries to the same statutory member are contemplated by section 15 and, when a claimant proves that the second injury, “considered by itself and not in conjunction with the previous disability” (WCL §15 [7]), has caused an increased loss of use, the claimant is entitled to an SLU award commensurate with that increased loss of use. I. Matter of Johnson v. City of New York Claimant Thomas Johnson, a patient care technician, suffered work-related injuries to both of his knees in 2006 while employed by respondent City of New York (the City). His claim for workers’ compensation benefits was established but the SLU award for the injury to his knees was not made until after he sustained a second injury and an SLU award had been made for the subsequent injury. In the second workplace accident, which occurred in 2009, Johnson injured both of his hips. Johnson was awarded, as relevant here, a 50% SLU of his left leg and 52.50% SLU of his right leg as a result of the 2009 injuries. Johnson thereafter reached maximum medical improvement with regard to the 2006 knee injuries. He submitted medical evidence regarding the permanency of his injuries, including a report from his expert, who was also his treating physician, opining that Johnson sustained an 80% SLU of his left leg and a 40% SLU of his right leg. Johnson’s expert later testified that the knee injuries did not exist in isolation from the hip injuries. Although Johnson’s expert acknowledged that it was fair to say, under the guidelines, that Johnson had suffered a 130% loss of use of his left leg and 92% loss of use of his right due leg to the separate injuries, the expert refused to opine as to whether those numbers translated to the actual loss of use for the legs. The Workers’ Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) ultimately credited the opinion of Johnson’s expert on the degree of impairment caused by the knee injuries, determining that Johnson had an 80% loss of use of his left leg and a 40% loss of use of his right leg. The WCLJ concluded, however, that the then-recent decision in Matter of Genduso v. New York City Dept. of Educ. (164 AD3d 1509 [3d Dept 2018]) required that any SLU awards based on the knee injuries be offset by the previously awarded SLU for each leg in connection with his hip injuries. The WCLJ reduced the 80% SLU of the left leg by 50% to account for the prior SLU award for that leg and reduced the 40% SLU of the right leg by the prior 52.50% SLU awarded for that leg, leaving Johnson with an “additional” SLU award of 30% for the left leg and 0% for the right leg. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed, concluding that Johnson’s injuries to the hips and knees were both encompassed “by a leg schedule,” such that the second SLU award for the legs must be reduced by his prior SLU award for the legs, regardless of which subpart of the leg was injured. Upon Johnson’s appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed (180 AD3d 1134 [3d Dept 2020]). The Court reasoned that separate SLU awards for a member’s subparts are not authorized by the statute and would amount to a monetary windfall that would compensate claimants beyond the degree of impairment actually sustained to the statutorily enumerated member (see id. at 1136-1137). This Court granted Johnson’s motion for leave to appeal. Matter of Liuni v. Gander Mountain Claimant Joseph D. Liuni also sustained successive work-related injuries to different subparts of the same body member enumerated in Workers Compensation Law §15 (3). Liuni first injured his left elbow in 2007, for which he received an SLU award of 22.5% for his left arm. After a 2014 accident, Liuni developed a consequential injury to his left shoulder. His expert, a consulting physician, opined that Liuni had a 20% SLU of his right arm and a 27.5% SLU of his left arm due to the 2014 injury. The expert opined that, in light of the previous 22.5% SLU award for his left arm, “Liuni warrants a total of 50% [SLU] of the left arm associated with both of his injuries,” with 22.25% attributable to the 2007 injury and 27.5% related to his 2014 injury. At his subsequent deposition, the expert elaborated that the impairments to Liuni’s left arm “shouldn’t be subsumed or combined,” because “they were separate both in terms of dates of injury and in terms of findings on physical examination,” and that the two injuries were “completely separate pathologies” that were “not in any way related.” Consistent with the expert’s testimony, the WCLJ determined that Liuni had a 20% SLU of the right arm and an “overall 50% SLU of the left arm, which is an increase of 27.5% overall.” The Board, however, modified the WCLJ’s decision, concluding that Liuni had a 5% SLU of the left arm, for an overall left arm SLU of 27.5%. Although the Board credited the opinion of Liuni’s expert that the second accident resulted in a 27.5% SLU of his left arm, it concluded that the two SLU awards for the left arm could not be treated as separate under Genduso.1 The Appellate Division affirmed (188 AD3d 1403 [3d Dept 2020]). The Court reasoned, as in Johnson, that separate SLU awards for a member’s subparts are not authorized—i.e., the elbow and shoulder are not enumerated as separate body members in the statute but encompassed by the arm—and concluded that the SLU awards arising from the two injuries were both encompassed by awards for the loss of use of the left arm (see id. at 1404-1405). This Court granted Liuni’s motion for leave to appeal. II. The WCL establishes four classifications of disability: (1) permanent total, (2) temporary total, (3) permanent partial, and (4) temporary partial (see WCL §15 [1]-[3], [5]; Matter of LaCroix v. Syracuse Exec. Air Serv., Inc., 8 NY3d 348, 353 [2007]). “[T]the claimant generally has the burden in the first instance of proving facts sufficient to support [a] claim for compensation” for the disability (Matter of Kigin v. State of New York Workers’ Comp. Bd., 24 NY3d 459, 468 [2014]). Claimants who suffer a permanent partial disability, like Johnson and Liuni, “typically qualif[y] for one of two broad categories of primary award under WCL [§] 15 (3)—referred to colloquially as a ‘schedule loss of use’ award or a ‘non-schedule’ benefit—depending on the nature of the injury” (Mancini, 32 NY3d at 525). SLU awards are “compensation allowed for specified permanent partial disabilities in which the loss or the loss of use of a member of the body listed in [WCL §15 (3)] has occurred” (Mancini, 32 NY3d at 526 n [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Estate of Youngjohn v. Berry Plastics Corp., 36 NY3d 595, 599 [2021]). For SLU awards, WCL §15 (3) “‘assigns—as by a “schedule”—a fixed number of lost weeks’ compensation according to the bodily member [or sensory organ] injured’” (Mancini, 32 NY3d at 526, quoting LaCroix, 8 NY3d at 353).2 An SLU award is calculated by multiplying a percentage of the employee’s weekly wages by the number of weeks specific to the enumerated member that is injured (see Youngjohn, 36 NY3d at 599-600). The purpose of an SLU award is to compensate for loss of earning power, rather than the time that an employee actually loses from work or the injury itself (see id. at 600; Matter of Landgrebe v. County of Westchester, 57 NY2d 1, 6 [1982]). The members currently listed in the statutory schedule include the arm and leg, but knees, hips, elbows and shoulders are not separately listed (see WCL §15 [3]). It is undisputed that impairments to those subparts of the arm and leg are encompassed by SLU awards for the loss of use of the arm or leg. WCL §15 (3) (r) provides that compensation for total loss of use is the same as for loss of a member, and section 15 (3) (s) provides that compensation for “[p]artial loss or partial loss of use” of a member is based on the “proportionate loss or loss of use of the member.” As relevant here, WCL §15 (3) (u) also provides that “[i]n any case in which there shall be a loss or loss of use of more than one member or parts of more than one member set forth in…this subdivision but not amounting to permanent total disability, the board shall award compensation for the loss or loss of use of each such member or part thereof.”3 In determining the extent to which SLU awards for successive injuries to the same enumerated member must be offset, we are presented with a question of pure statutory interpretation, the starting point for which “must always be the [statutory] language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof” (Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998]). Inasmuch as the provisions of WCL §15 constitute “an integrated statutory scheme,” they “must be considered as a whole, with each component viewed in relation to the others” (Matter of Mancini v. Office of Children & Family Servs., 32 NY3d 521, 525 [2008]; see McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §97, Comment at 213–214, 216 ["(W)ords, phrases, and sentences of a statutory section should be interpreted with reference to the scheme of the entire section…and the meaning of a single section may not be determined by splitting it up into several parts"]). WCL §15 (3) plainly contemplates SLU awards based on the loss of use of the relevant “member,” not awards based on injuries to the various subparts of such “members.” At the same time, section 15 also expressly provides that claimants may receive additional awards, subject to certain limitations, if more than one workplace accident occurs. In particular, WCL §15 (3) must be read in the context of section 15 (7), which governs in cases, such as these, involving successive awards for separate injuries to the same member. WCL §15 (7) states: “Previous disability. The fact that an employee has suffered previous disability or received compensation therefor shall not preclude [the employee] from compensation for a later injury nor preclude compensation for death resulting therefrom; but in determining compensation for the later injury or death his average weekly wages shall be such sum as will reasonably represent [the employee's] earning capacity at the time of the later injury, provided, however, that an employee who is suffering from a previous disability shall not receive compensation for a later injury in excess of the compensation allowed for such injury when considered by itself and not in conjunction with the previous disability except as hereinafter provided in subdivision eight of this section.”4 This Court has interpreted section 15 (7) as “specify[ing] that (1) a previous disability does not disqualify an employee from receiving compensation benefits for a later work-related injury…; (2) the measure of compensation…in this situation is the employee’s earning capacity at the time of the later work-related injury, which would necessarily reflect any diminished earning capacity due to the previous disability; and (3) generally, the employee shall not receive compensation benefits in excess of those allowed for the later work-related injury considered by itself, which insures that the award is based solely on the diminished earning capacity attributable to the later injury rather than from all disabilities” (Matter of Hroncich v. Con Edison, 21 NY3d 636, 645 [2013]). Thus, section 15 (7) provides that a claimant may receive more than one SLU award in connection with successive injuries to the same statutory body member enumerated in section 15 (3). But section 15 (7) also imposes limits on a subsequent award. Specifically, the statute mandates that the wage rate used in calculating the subsequent SLU award must measure “any diminished earning capacity due to the previous disability” and that “generally” the award should not exceed the benefits “allowed for the later work-related injury considered by itself” (Hroncich, 21 NY3d at 645). These statutory requirements “insure[] that the [subsequent] award is based solely on the diminished earning capacity attributable to the later injury rather than from all disabilities” (id.).5 This is in keeping with the purpose of an SLU award, which “is to compensate for loss of earning power” that results from the diminished use of a statutorily enumerated member (LaCroix, 8 NY3d at 353 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). In short, the limitations set forth in WCL §15 (7), taken together, mandate that awards for successive injuries to subparts of the members set forth in section 15 (3) be limited to the loss of earning power caused by the second injury.6 Finally, although claimants are correct that this Court’s decision in Matter of Zimmerman v. Akron Falls Park—Erie County (29 NY2d 815 [1971]) is relevant to the issues raised on this appeal, their reading of that case misses the mark. In Zimmerman, the claimant received separate SLU awards for a 1924 amputation of his hand, and a 1967 injury to his arm, specifically the shoulder (Zimmerman, 35 AD2d 1030, 1030 [3d Dept 1970]). The Workers’ “Compensation Law in effect in 1924…authorized benefits for [the] claimant’s injury only for the loss of his hand (Workmen’s Compensation Law, §15, subd. 3, par. o [1924]), and…the 1924 award was only for the loss of a hand” (Zimmerman, 35 AD2d at 1031 [Herlihy, J. dissenting]).7 The 1967 award, in contrast, was for “a 50% [SLU] of the left arm” (id. at 1030)—a separately enumerated member (see Workers’ Compensation Law §15 (3) (a), (c)—and the claimant was left more severely disabled after the 1967 accident, which caused “a separate and distinct injury” (Zimmerman, 35 AD2d at 1031 [Herlihy, J. dissenting]). This Court held that it was not necessary to reduce the 1967 award for the injury to the claimant’s left arm by the 1924 award for his forearm amputation because the “[c]laimant’s 1924 accident did not affect his left shoulder which was injured in the 1967 accident causing the 50% loss of use of the left arm” (29 NY2d at 817 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). In essence, offset was unnecessary because there was evidence that the amputation addressed in WCL §15 (3) (o) did not affect the claimant’s shoulder, which was addressed in the separate subdivision (a) of section 15 (3). Specifically, “[t]here was substantial medical evidence that claimant suffered a 50% loss of use of his arm attributable solely to the 1967 accident” (id.). Zimmerman therefore does not provide support for claimants’ argument that SLU awards for successive injuries to different subparts of the same enumerated body member may never be offset. Rather, it establishes that offset is not required when the claimant demonstrates that a subsequent injury increased the loss of use of a body member beyond that resulting from the prior injury. III. Here, each claimant had the opportunity to present evidence regarding the degree of loss of use attributable solely to the accident in question. Because Liuni submitted evidence regarding the loss of use of his left arm that was attributable solely to the injury to his shoulder and demonstrating that the second injury resulted in a greater degree of loss of use of the body member in question, reversal and remittal to the Board to make an SLU award in light of that evidence is warranted. Because Johnson did not submit any such evidence, the Appellate Division order in his case must be affirmed. Johnson’s expert, whom the WCLJ credited, declined to offer an opinion on the question of whether the injury to Johnson’s knees caused a further loss of use of his legs in addition to the loss that was addressed in the first SLU award. In fact, despite the initial conclusion of the City’s orthopedic consultant that there was no further injury to the hips as a result of the knee injuries, Johnson’s expert testified that the knee and hip injuries were not isolated from one another, leaving it unclear whether any or how much loss of use of Johnson’s legs was solely related to his knee injuries. The Board was entitled to credit that testimony.8 In contrast, Liuni did offer evidence that the injuries to his elbow and shoulder were separate pathologies that each individually caused a particular amount of loss of use of his arm. Specifically, his expert testified that Liuni’s later injury constricted the range of motion in his shoulder by 27.5% and that this loss of use was based solely on findings related to shoulder. The prior 22.5% loss of use of the arm was based solely on findings at the elbow and the expert testified that those impairments “shouldn’t be subsumed or combined” in determining the loss of use because the impairments were “completely separate” and “not in any way related.” Overall, the expert explained, claimant had a 50% loss of use of his arm, with 27.5% of that loss attributable solely to the later injury. Although Liuni’s employer attacked the credibility of the expert’s testimony, stating that it was not based on an examination of the separate sites but a simple assertion that the two injuries were separate, credibility determinations are within the sole province of the Board (see Matter of Axel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 47 NY2d 1, 8 [1979]). IV. In sum, in Johnson, the claimant failed to adduce evidence sufficient to permit the Board to determine the degree of impairment to his legs caused solely by his knee injury and, thus, the degree of any increased loss of use to that member due to that particular injury. Therefore, the Board’s decision to reduce the SLU awarded to Johnson for his knees by the prior SLU award for his legs was not irrational. In Liuni, however, reversal is warranted—as the Board and City, as employer, concede—to permit the Board to consider the extent to which, if any, the evidence indicated that claimant’s second injury resulted in an increased loss of use of his left arm. Accordingly, in Johnson, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs. In Liuni, the order should be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted to the Appellate Division, Third Department, with directions to remand to the Workers’ Compensation Board for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
