MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs, fourteen gun industry members and a trade association, initiated this action on December 16, 2021, against Defendant Attorney General Letitia James. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiffs’ complaint generally alleges that N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§898-a-e is unconstitutional. See id. Along with the complaint, Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on December 16. 2021. See Dkt. No. 2. On February 18, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Dkt. No. 35. For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted and Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is denied. II. BACKGROUND On July 6, 2021, New York enacted a law to hold gun industry members1 civilly liable for “public nuisance[s].” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§898-a-e (“§898″). Specifically, the law states as follows: 1. No gun industry member, by conduct either unlawful in itself or unreasonable under all the circumstances shall knowingly or recklessly create, maintain or contribute to a condition in New York state that endangers the safety or health of the public through the sale, manufacturing, importing or marketing of a qualified product. 2. All gun industry members who manufacture, market, import or offer for wholesale or retail sale any qualified product in New York state shall establish and utilize reasonable controls and procedures to prevent its qualified products from being possessed, used, marketed or sold unlawfully in New York state. Id. §898-b. Violation of either provision resulting in “harm to the public,” regardless of “whether the gun industry member acted for the purpose of causing harm to the public,” is deemed by the statute a public nuisance. Id. §898-c(1), (2). Section 898 is enforced by the New York Attorney General, “a city corporation counsel on behalf of the locality,” or “[a]ny person, firm, corporation or association that has been damaged as a result of a gun industry member’s acts or omissions in violation of this article.” Id. §§898-d, e. On December 16, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a complaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 2. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that §898 is unconstitutional and an injunction enjoining Defendant from enforcing the act. Id. Plaintiffs argue that §898 is unconstitutional for three reasons: (1) it is preempted by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”), 15 U.S.C. §5921; (2) it violates the dormant Commerce Clause; and (3) it is void for vagueness. See Dkt. No. 2-1 at 17. III. DISCUSSION A. Failure to State a Claim 1. Standard of Review A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the party’s claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In considering the legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the pleading and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption of truth, however, does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Although a court’s review of a motion to dismiss is generally limited to the facts presented in the pleading, the court may consider documents that are “integral” to that pleading, even if they are neither physically attached to, nor incorporated by reference into, the pleading. See Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead “a short and plain statement of the claim,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual “heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]‘” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (quotation omitted). Under this standard, the pleading’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level,” see id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are “plausible on [their] face,” id. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”‘” Id. (quoting [Twombly, 550 U.S.] at 557). Ultimately, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 or where a plaintiff has “not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed[,]” id. at 570. 2. Preemption The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, “‘invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to federal law.’” Air Transport Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim that §898 is preempted by the PLCAA. There are three different types of preemption: (1) express preemption, where Congress has expressly preempted local law; (2) field preemption, where congress has legislated so comprehensively that federal law occupies an entire field of regulation and leaves no room for state law; and (3) conflict preemption, where local law conflicts with federal law such that it is impossible for a party to comply with both or the local law is an obstacle to the achievement of federal objectives. N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Clarkstown, 612 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiffs argue that §898 is expressly preempted and conflicts with federal objectives. See Dkt. No. 1 at
