Recitation as required by CPLR 2219(a) of the papers consideredin the review of this Motion: Papers Numbered Notice of Motion/Affts. EF40 — F61 Cross Motion EF64 — EF90 Defs’ Aff. in Opp EF91 — EF119 Reply (Plaintiff) EF120 — EF131 Reply (Defs) EF132 — EF133 DECISION AND ORDER Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on plaintiff’s motion pursuant to CPLR §3212 for summary judgment on its fourth and fifth causes of action seeking monetary damages and legal fees only as against its former tenant, R All Management (hereinafter “Management”) and upon defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 2215, 3211(a)(1),(2),(4),(7),(8) and (10), as well as CPLR §301, CPLR §311 and RPAPL §735 is as follows: On or about September 14, 2020, plaintiff commenced the instant ejectment action against the defendants seeking to recover the commercial premises located at 17-31 Seagirt Boulevard, Far Rockaway, New York (hereinafter “subject premises”) and obtain a money judgment for rent arrears of $305,142.13, together with such other additional rent/use and occupancy as may accrue to the date of judgment and attorney’s fees. The defendants interposed a verified answer dated October 12, 2020. Their defenses consisted of allegations that the plaintiff lacks standing; the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Lalendra Sinha (hereinafter “decedent”) due to his demise approximately three months before this action was commenced; O’Neil Sinha never acted as an agent or officer of Management and therefore cannot be held personally liable for Management’s debts; the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action because it is based on a rent claim that was “frozen” by an executive order of the NYS Governor; plaintiff’s predicate notices were issued during a purported “rent freeze” and therefore they are “stale”; plaintiff’s rent claims are barred by res judicata, waiver and/or collateral estoppel; and finally, that the plaintiff’s claims for attorney’s fees against Lalendra and O’Neil Sinha have no basis in law or fact, but rather require that sanctions be imposed against the plaintiff. Plaintiff brought on the instant motion for partial summary judgment against Management only. The plaintiff’s motion is supported by an attorney’s affirmation as well as the affidavit…of Matthew Finkle, president of the real estate management company that manages the subject premises, together with his calculation of the sum due and various relevant documentary exhibits. Plaintiff is pursuing its claims against the decedent’s estate in Nassau County Surrogate’s Court. Defendants opposed the instant motion and cross-moved to dismiss the action. The plaintiff submitted its opposition to the cross-motion and reply on its motion in a single submission. Inexplicably, defendants separately submitted their cross-motion and opposition to the plaintiff’s motion. The defendants’ opposition and cross-motion are supported by a duplicative affirmation of defendants’ counsel, an affidavit of O’Neil Sinha submitted as an exhibit (NYSCEF #74) and several other exhibits. Without leave of Court and in contravention of CPLR 2214(b), the defendants also served and submitted a reply affirmation of counsel on their cross-motion. The motion and cross-motion are consolidated for disposition. Though both counsels have disputed the timeliness and propriety of each other’s papers, the Court will consider them all, to allow the Court to provide the complete basis for its decision and order after having considered all of the submissions by the parties. It is noteworthy however, that despite the plethora of documents submitted by the defendants, they failed to submit a counter statement to plaintiff’s 202.28-G statement (ECF #41); and therefore, pursuant to Rule 202.28-G(c), the material facts alleged in plaintiff’s statement are deemed admitted. The plaintiff is the owner and landlord of the subject premises pursuant to a deed dated February 17, 2005. Although Management was involuntarily dissolved in 2003, Management entered into and was the tenant of the subject premises pursuant to a ten-year Lease agreement dated January 1, 2011, commencing on even date and ending December 31, 2020 (hereinafter “Lease”). The fixed rent for the period of January 2019 through December 31, 2019 was $25,248.62 per month and subsequently for the period of January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020 was $26,006.07 per month. Pursuant to §1.3 of the Lease, Management was responsible for a proportionate share of real estate taxes and assessments, for assessments on the subject premises in excess of the base tax for the given year. Management defaulted in its rental obligations and is liable to the plaintiff for unpaid rent and additional rent in the sum of $435,172.48 through January 2021. The decedent, who was also the principal of Management, passed away on June 24, 2020. Management surrendered the subject premises on February 2, 2021. Pursuant to §18.1 of the Lease, Management is also responsible for plaintiff’s legal fees generated as the result of enforcing the Lease, which are being sought herein. Plaintiff claims, inter alia, that it is entitled to summary judgment against Management, because the defendant breached the Lease agreement by failing to pay its base rent of $26,006.07, and various items of additional rent. After having failed to cure its default pursuant to the notice to cure served upon the defendant; and similarly having failed to vacate and surrender the subject premises upon the expiration of the notice of termination also served upon the defendants, the plaintiff commenced the instant action. Ultimately, the subject premises were surrendered to plaintiff on February 2, 2021. By that time, Management’s arrears totaled $435,172.48. Pursuant to Article 20 of the Lease, if Management did not surrender possession within 24 hours of the expiration date of the Lease, i.e. January 1, 2021, Management was required to pay the lessor 2x the amount of rent which had been payable under the Lease during the last month of the Lease term. (Although it arguably could have sought an additional $52,012.14 for the month of February, since payments was due on the first of the month, plaintiff chose not to do so.) Therefore, in calculating the amount due for the month of January 2021, the plaintiff correctly doubled $26,006.07 in its motion papers. The amount of use and occupancy for that month was $52,012.14. In its opposition papers to the motion for summary judgment and in support of their cross- motion, defendants’ counsel makes seemingly endless irrelevant and baseless assertions. After her client derived the benefit of the Lease through its tenancy and the decedent’s resulting ability to conduct a large medical practice at the subject premises, she has the temerity to claim the proffered Lease is defective, because the plaintiff allegedly did not obtain approval from the New York State Housing Finance Agency (hereinafter “HFA”). Management accepted the full benefit of the Lease, which ratified it and precludes its recission. Scarfone v. Village of Ossining, 23 AD3d 540, 806 NYS2d 604 (2nd Dept 2005). To raise such an issue at this juncture is mere falderol. Moreover, if there was a valid issue with respect to whether the plaintiff obtained approval, that dispute would be between the plaintiff and the HFA, not the defendant. Similarly, defendants’ attorney points to some minor inconsistencies in the Lease provisions and tries to mislead this Court into believing the Lease is invalid as to the defendants, because she alleges it is a Lease for a different tenant, when clearly it is not. The Lease references to sales of particular grocery items and the home address of another tenant which defense counsel points to, are inconsequential here. The Lease clearly states the subject premises were to be utilized as “first class, medical and dental offices and/or group medical center only (including X-ray services) (the “Primary Use”) and for no other purposes.” See §2.1. The fact that §37.8 of the Lease proclaims the address for tenant notices as an address belonging to a third party does not negate the fact that Article 26 of the Lease provides that notices to the tenant can be addressed to the tenant “(b) at any place where Tenant or any agent or employee of Tenant may be found if mailed subsequent to Tenant’s vacating deserting, abandoning or surrendering the Premises…” The relevant documents were served at the address stated in the Lease, not instead of the defendants’ actual addresses, but in addition to the erroneous one contained in the Lease. Most importantly, the Lease appears to have been executed by the decedent on behalf of Management. The defendants are obviously attempting to throw everything at a wall to see if anything sticks. It doesn’t. While there are some errors in the Lease, they were obviously caused because the plaintiff had a form lease it used for a previous tenant and failed to make all the necessary changes to adjust all the terms to be relevant to Management. This does not invalidate the Lease. Those irrelevant portions are simply ignored pursuant to §37.10(B), which provides: If any term, covenant, condition or provision of this Lease, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, shall ever be held to be invalid or unenforceable, then in such event the remainder of this Lease or the application of such term, covenant, condition or provision to any other Person or any other circumstance (other than those as to which it shall be invalid or unenforceable) shall not thereby be affected, and each term, covenant, condition or provision hereof shall remain valid and enforceable to the fullest extent permitted by law. The Court finds the additional assertions raised by the defendants to be baseless for the following reasons: Contrary to defendants’ de novo argument, service was not required to be effectuated as per RPAPL §735. Defendants claim that the plaintiff failed to comply with service pursuant to RPAPL §735. However, that statute is inapplicable to the instant case. That section of the RPAPL is applicable to summary eviction proceedings, of which this is not one. Interestingly, the defendants also relied upon the wrong statute pertaining to service of process in an earlier case between these parties, which was a summary eviction proceeding (L&T 71437/19) (hereinafter “Civil Court proceeding”). On that occasion, Management erroneously attempted to invoke CPLR §311, when RPAPL §735 was the availing statute. In the case at bar, CPLR §311 would have been the proper statute to rely upon, had it been raised timely and in proper form. However, that ship sailed and an attempt to claim defective service under CPLR §311 now is also unavailing. An affirmative defense alleging lack of in personam jurisdiction was not raised in the verified answer and therefore was waived pursuant to 3211(e). Moreover, this defense found in 3211(a)(8), as well as those 3211(a)(1) and (4) were waived ages ago, because they were not raised in their verified answer, which was interposed in October 2020. Plaintiff has standing. In their first affirmative defense, the defendants allege the plaintiff does not have standing to maintain this action. The plaintiff is the lessor as stated in the Lease. The plaintiff owns the subject premises as demonstrated by the deed. Therefore, defendants’ first affirmative defense is stricken. The instant motion does not pertain to the decedent. In their second affirmative defense, the defendants allege that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, because the decedent died prior to the commencement of this litigation. No relief is sought against the decedent here. Therefore, this second affirmative defense is irrelevant to the instant motion. However, given the fact that this defendant died a few months before this action was commenced, this is not the appropriate forum for any relief against him as an individual. The claim must be dismissed as to the decedent, to be litigated in Nassau Surrogate’s Court, where it apparently is already being litigated. The defendants are subject to estoppel with respect to O’Neil Sinha. The defendants’ third affirmative defense pertains to O’Neil Sinha and states he never acted as an agent or an officer of Management and that he has never attempted to utilize Management as a shield. O’Neil Sinha submitted an affidavit, sworn to on the 29th day of January, 2020, in support of Management’s motion to vacate a default judgment against it in the Civil Court proceeding referenced above. On that occasion, he stated he was the Chief Operating Officer for South Island Medical Associates, P.C. (hereinafter “South Island”) which, according to him was a large medical practice. “Through South Island’s sister company, R All Management Services, Inc., South Island entered into a lease with Ocean Park Acquisition, L.P. to rent space at 17-31 Seagirt Boulevard, Far Rockaway, New York” He then proceeded to discuss Management’s finances in such great detail, that it was clear the entities were utilized interchangeably. He discussed past and then current negotiations with the landlord, the cash flow status of Management, etc. Moreover, at no time did he admit that Management was no longer a viable corporation (NYSCEF #86 — submitted by defendants herein). In the case at bar, in his affidavit opposing the main motion and in support of the cross-motion (NYSCEF #74), in direct contradiction of his Civil Court affidavit, O’Neil Sinha proclaims “At no time during my employment [of 26 years], was I ever an officer of South Island Medical Associates, nor have I ever been employed by R All Services Management, Inc., in any capacity”. He continues in 6 of that affidavit “R All Management Services, Inc., was never a tenant at 17-31 Seagirt Boulevard, Far Rockaway, N.Y., during the lease period of January 1, 2011 to December 31, 202[0][sic] as purported by the Plaintiff”. Both statements, i.e. that he was never an officer of South Island and that Management was never a tenant at the subject premises are complete falsehoods, as demonstrated by the very documents defendants submitted in the instant motion practice. In their gamesmanship to promote the fiction that Management was not the tenant of the subject premises, the defendants have gone so far as to attempt to shift the responsibility of Management’s actions to the plaintiff. Throughout their papers, defendants continually alleged that plaintiff either knew or should have known that Management was not in possession and was a “defunct corporation”. The reality is that Management should have taken the responsibility of acting as a law abiding corporation, instead of engaging in deceptive business practices. Moreover, if the decedent and Management did not intend for Management to be the tenant under the Lease, that ought to have been communicated and the Lease could have been amended at the time. Management seems to believe it can escape liability in this action because of the corporate dissolution in 2003. However, generally, where a corporation’s term of existence has expired but the corporation carries on its business affairs and exercises its corporate powers as it did prior to the dissolution, it is a de facto corporation (see, Garzo v. Maid of Mist Steamboat Co., 303 N.Y. 516, 104 N.E.2d 882 (1952). “A corporation continues to exist as a legal entity after dissolution, at least for purposes of actions and proceedings.” Independent Investor Protective League v. Time, Inc., 50 NY2d 259, 428 NYS2d 671 (1980). To allow the corporate defendant to be shielded from responsibility based upon its own underlying malfeasance, i.e., failure to pay franchise taxes, would make a mockery of our system of justice. In the case at bar, Management continued to operate and held itself out as a viable corporate entity despite its corporate dissolution, by entering into the Lease approximately seven years thereafter. “A corporation may be held liable on a cause of action that accrues after dissolution if the corporation continued its operations, operated its premises, and held itself out as a de facto corporation, notwithstanding its dissolution.” (Emphasis added) Bruce Supply Corp. v. New Wave Mechanical, Inc., 4 AD3d 444 (2nd Dept 2004), citing Ludlum Corp. Pension Plan Trust v. Matty’s Superservice, Inc., 156 AD3d 339, 548 NYS2d 292 (2nd Dept 1989). Therefore, Management is most certainly liable to the plaintiff for rent at least until its surrender of the subject premises. Also, without any substantiation defendants’ counsel irresponsibly accused the plaintiff, “upon information and belief” of using a signature page from an earlier lease to have Management as the named tenant in the disputed Lease. Upon what information? Based on what credible belief? Without dignifying this fallacy, but merely to point out the absurdity of it, one need only look to the deed for the subject premises. The subject premises was transferred in 2005. The prior lease alluded to by defendants’ counsel from which plaintiff allegedly used the signature page was from 2000, which pre-dated plaintiff’s ownership of the subject premises by five years. Moreover, both the signatures of plaintiff and defendant are contained on the same page. Clearly, the Lease is not a forgery and was executed by an agent of Management. Management did not extinguish its debt to the plaintiff simply because it was dissolved. There is no doubt that Management was the tenant of the subject premises, despite the defendants’ de novo claims to the contrary. Management’s status as a tenant is made clear beginning with the title page of the Lease which references Management as the tenant of the very Lease defendants are now asserting is not the Lease of Management’s (NYSCEF #45 and #95). The subject premises is also referenced on the title page of the Lease. Further, the landlord is defined as the plaintiff herein, the leased building is defined as the subject premises and the tenant is defined as R All Management Services Incorporated, a defendant herein. Certainly, defendants could not be quibbling over the fact that the tenant’s name has the word “incorporated” spelled out in the Lease, whereas Management’s name is actually abbreviated as a means of denying the tenancy. Moreover, as stated above, the decedent apparently signed the Lease on behalf of Management as tenant. Defendants also state in their motion papers that the judgment amount was paid. Are the defendants suggesting that the payment was a charitable donation? The same judge who ruled on the motion to vacate the default judgment in the Civil Court proceeding is the one ruling on the instant motion and cross-motion. O’Neil Sinha will not be permitted to utilize an officer’s title when he is attempting to derive a benefit for the corporation from that role and then deny his role when it would benefit him individually to make such denial. Nor will the defendant’s misrepresentations be condoned. O’Neil Sinha’s conduct is nothing less than an attempt to perpetrate a fraud upon this Court. The fact that defendants’ counsel would submit such documents in support of this attempted deception is reprehensible. The answer in the case at bar is verified by O’Neil Sinha. In the third affirmative defense, it is alleged that O’Neil Sinha never acted as an agent or an officer of Management. Not only did he act in such capacity, he did so before the same judge who is ruling on this motion and cross-motion. In his application to vacate a default judgment in the Civil Court proceeding at a minimum, O’Neil Sinha was acting as an agent of Management. The title he anointed upon himself was that of Chief Financial Officer of South Island, but the entire affidavit was submitted in support of a motion of Management. At a minimum, the defendant is engaging in sharp practice, although he is balancing on the fine line of perjury. Therefore, not only is the defendants’ third affirmative defense irrelevant to the instant motion for summary judgment against Management, it is stricken, based upon his untruthful statement and estoppel. The Governor’s Executive Order 202.28 is inapplicable to the case at bar. The defendants’ fourth affirmative defense alleges that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, because the rent claim was frozen by an unidentified executive order of the New York State Governor. The court can only speculate as to which executive order, the defendants believe they have protection. Presumably, it is Governor’s Executive Order 202.28. However, that executive order only pertained to cases in which a tenant was eligible for unemployment insurance or otherwise was facing financial hardship due to Covid-19. As a corporate entity, Management was not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Moreover, defendants’ answer is devoid of any claim of financial hardship due to the pandemic. Additionally, the Lease provides the subject premises are to be used for medical and dental offices and/or group medical center. Medical facilities were deemed essential services and were not shut down during the entire pandemic pursuant to Governor’s Executive Order 202.6. Furthermore, even if the defendants were subject to Executive Order 202.28, the purpose of the executive order was merely to delay the commencement of nonpayment summary eviction proceedings. It did not obviate the tenants’ obligation to pay rent. Executive Order 202.68 was also terminated in June 2021. Therefore, the fourth affirmative defense is devoid of merit and is stricken. The doctrine of stale rent is inapplicable in the case at bar. For their fifth affirmative defense, the defendants allege that due to some fictitious “rent freeze”, the rent claims made in the predicate notices are stale. Putting aside for a moment that the Court was unable to locate a single case in which the doctrine of stale rent was an issue in any commercial landlord tenant proceeding, the defendants erroneously attempt to raise yet another baseless defense for other reasons. While there isn’t a set period of time after which rent automatically becomes stale, this Department generally has disallowed a possessory judgment based upon rent arrears which are more than six months old. Levister Redevelopment Co., LLC v. Montgomery, 12 Misc 3d 1188A, 824 NYS2d 763 (Table) (NY City Ct. 2006). This principle is premised upon the potential prejudice that could result from a landlord’s lengthy delay in commencing a summary proceeding, because as a result of the delay the tenant lacks the funds to pay the large amount of arrears that accrued. (see Marriott v. Shaw, 151 Misc 2d 938, 574 NYS2d 477 (Civil Ct. Kings Co 1991). It is well settled law that where a landlord allows arrears to accumulate and fails to commence a summary proceeding to the detriment of the tenant, the landlord is not entitled to summary relief as to the “stale rent claims”, but is only entitled to a possessory judgment based upon the six months of rent arrears immediately preceding the commencement of the summary eviction proceeding (City of New York v. Betancourt, 79 Misc 2d 907, 362 NYS2d 728 (AT1 1974). There a few major and key deficiencies in the defendants’ stale rent/laches argument. Defendants fail to recognize they are in Supreme Court. This is not a summary eviction proceeding. Moreover, the defendants surrendered possession of the subject premises in February 2021. Therefore, possession is no longer an issue and prejudice could not attach. Further, the arrears that are claimed in the complaint of this action accumulated over a time period that was barely over six months. The Court finds there was no prejudice to the defendant. In the case at bar, defendants failed to establish that the arrears claimed by the plaintiff were stale under the laches doctrine. This doctrine bars the enforcement of a right where there has been an unreasonable and inexcusable delay that results in prejudice to an opposing party. Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 100 NY2d 801, 816, 766 NYS2d 654 (2003), cert den 540 US 1017, 124 SCt 570, (2003); In this ejectment action, which was commenced in or about September of 2020, plaintiff began by only seeking arrears of eight and a half months preceding the commencement of this action, i.e. December 2019 through September 2020. The defendants failed to show there was any unreasonable inexcusable delay in commencing this action. The additional amounts sought in this motion resulted from arrears that accrued after the commencement of this action. This is but another attempt to make ridiculous conclusory allegations and hope they will resonate. They do not. The fifth affirmative defense is equally lacking in any merit and is stricken. The defenses of collateral estoppel, res judicata and waiver are unsupported. In their sixth and seventh affirmative defenses, the defendants allege in conclusory fashion, that the plaintiff’s rent claims are barred by res judicata, waiver and/or estoppel. The defendants did not elaborate on these stated defenses with any facts whatsoever, leaving them as an espousal of empty legal terms. If this Court is to speculate that perhaps the defendants are attempting to allege that the plaintiff sued for the same relief in the prior Civil Court proceeding between the plaintiff herein and Management, the defendants’ position would be erroneous. While defense counsel alleges in her affirmation that the plaintiff is seeking arrears for January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2019, she is simply wrong. The misstatement resulting in this fabricated defense is readily determined. The order and judgment issued in the Civil Court proceeding was entered in December 2019 (hereinafter “judgment”). The Civil Court proceeding was based upon rental arrears through November 2019 (NYSCEF #54 and #55). The claims in the case at bar commence with December 2019 (NYSCEF #48). There is no overlap in the claims of the two cases. The sixth and seventh affirmative defenses of the verified answer are completely lacking in raising any meaningful meritorious defense. These defenses fail to raise any specific facts relevant to this case. It is filled with boilerplate conclusory statements, which fail to shed any light on the defendants’ defenses. Such conclusory statements in a pleading, without any specific allegations at all, make them inadequate as a matter of law. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Seon Yeong Kang, 2011 WL 5295014, 201 NY Slip Op 32828(U)(NY Sup). See also Becher v. Feller, 64 AD3d 672, 884 NYS2d 83 (2nd Dept, 2009); Cohen Fashion Optical, Inc. v. V&M Optical, Inc., 51 AD3d 619, 858 NYS2d 260 (2nd Dept, 2008); Brody v. Saroka, 173 AD2d 421, 570 NYS2d 57 (2nd Dept, 1991). Therefore, the defendants’ sixth and seventh affirmative defenses are stricken. The notion that a claim against the estate of the decedent in Surrogate’s Court will defeat the action against Management is unavailing. The defendants seek dismissal of this action against Management, a corporate entity, on the fictional basis that there is another action pending. However, dismissal is only warranted pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) when both actions are between the same parties. Also erroneous is defendants’ assertion that the case should be dismissed for failure to name a necessary party. The parties to the Lease were the plaintiff and Management. Therefore, it was appropriate to name the tenant under the Lease as defendant, as a party to the contract. Leonard v. Gateway II, LLC,68 AD3d 408, 890 NYS2d 33 (1st Dept, 2009). Moreover, contrary to defendants’ position that substitution of Management by the decedent’s estate is necessary, this would not be possible, because the substitution statutes under the CPLR have the basic requirement that the action must have been commenced against a living person. See CPLR §1015. The decedent expired before the commencement of this action and therefore, the decedent’s estate cannot be substituted for Management. The claim against the decedent’s estate is appropriately being pursued in the Surrogate’s Court. The defendants’ rent obligations continued past the issuance of the warrant of eviction. Defendants also make a baseless argument that they are under no further rent obligation, because the plaintiff obtained a warrant of eviction in the Civil Court proceeding and, according to defendants, pursuant to RPAPL §749, the issuance of the warrant terminated the Lease. If that were so, Management would still be obligated to pay money to the plaintiff, but it would have simply been defined as use and occupancy, the amount of which would have been subject to numerous factors weighed and determined by this Court. Nonetheless, defendants fail to recognize that under the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act, which took effect in June 2019, i.e. over a year prior to the commencement of this action, a tenancy is no longer terminated upon issuance of a warrant of eviction. This was also alluded to in the Civil Court order of April 27, 2020, wherein I stated “The Court notes that pursuant to RPAPL §749, as amended, the respondents are permitted to pay the entire amount due to satisfy the $63,324.20 money judgment, up until the time of the marshal’s execution of the warrant of eviction.” In their opposition papers, the defendants threatened the plaintiff with an application for sanctions if the plaintiff did not withdraw the instant action and all others. They also have the temerity to seek legal fees for defending this action. The Court has already discussed the disgraceful behavior of O’Neil Sinha as well as defense counsel and reminds them the Court is authorized to sua sponte sanction a party and/or its attorney. The defendants have no basis for a claim to legal fees. With respect to the attorney’s fees demanded by defendants, New York follows the American Rule pertaining to attorney’s fees. Stated simply, the American Rule is that generally, absent a specific statutory authority or contractual provision, each party to litigation pays their own legal fees. See Baker v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 98 NY2d 80, 88, 745 NYS2d 741 (2002); Hooper Assoc. v. AGS Computers, 74 NY2d 487, 491, 549 NYS2d 365 (1989); A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 69 NY2d 1, 5, 511 NYS2d 216 (1986); Green v. Potter, 51 NY2d 627, 629-630, 435 NYS2d 695(1980). Nonetheless, without reference to any statutory authority or lease provision, the defendants proclaim their entitlement to legal fees for their defense of this action. Once again, the defendants are attempting to fabricate a right which is not accorded to them. Management agreed to pay the plaintiff’s legal fees in the event of its default. The defendants’ eighth affirmative defense alleges that the plaintiff’s “claim for legal fees against the individual defendants have no basic [sic] in law or fact” and therefore, the defendants are seeking sanctions in the amount of $20,000.00. The Lease obligates Management to pay plaintiff’s legal fees and disbursements if the lessor institutes, prosecutes or defends any action or proceeding as the result of Management’s default under the Lease. Management is also responsible for the payment of interest on both rent arrears and legal fees. See §18.1 of the Lease. Management is also responsible for the interest on the rent arrears as well as the interest on its legal fee obligations. See §18.2 of the Lease. Based upon the documents presented and the defendants’ utter failure to demonstrate that the plaintiff is not entitled to legal fees, the defendants’ eighth affirmative defense is stricken. Nonetheless, it will be necessary for the court to conduct a hearing to determine the reasonable attorneys’ fees to be awarded to the plaintiff. The court must possess sufficient information upon which to make an informed assessment of the reasonable value of the legal services rendered. It is imperative that the court take quantum meruit proof of the value of services rendered rather than apply an arbitrary formula. First Nat. Bank of East Islip v. Brower, 42 NY2d 471, 398 NYS2d 875 (1977); Brauer v. Central Trust Co., 77 AD2d 239, 433 NYS2d 304 (4th Dept 1992); Mead v. First Trust & Deposit Co.,60 AD2d 71, 400 NYS2d 936 (4th Dept 1977). As the court stated in Morgan & Finnegan v. Howe Chem. Co., 210 AD2d 62, 63, 619 NYS2d 719 (1st Dept 1977). The reasonableness of an attorney’s fees can be determined only after consideration of the difficulty of the issues and the skill required to resolve them; the lawyers’ experience,…ability and reputation; the time and labor; the amount involved and benefit resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee charged for similar services; the contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained and the responsibility involved (Matter of Freeman, 34 NY2d 1, 9, 355 NYS2d 336 (1974); Matter of Schaich, 55 AD2d 914, 391 NYS2d 135 (2nd Dept 1977), lv. Denied 42 N.Y.2d 802, 397 NYS2d 1026 (1977); Marshall v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 186 AD2d 542, 543, 588 NYS2d 364 (2nd Dept 1992); Gutin v. Gutin, 155 AD2d 586, 587,548 NYS2d 34 (2nd Dept 1989). For the reasons stated above, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s fourth cause of action against R All Management Services, Inc., is granted and the plaintiff is awarded a money judgment. Moreover, the defendants’ baseless first, third through eighth defenses are stricken. The defendants’ allegations regarding the alleged inability to hold O’Neil personally liable, the rent freeze and stale notices are all as wholly lacking in merit. The last two teeter on frivolity. The plaintiff is awarded a money judgment of $435,172.48 in rent arrears against R All Management Services, Inc. Additionally, plaintiff is awarded summary judgment against R All Services, Inc., on plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for legal fees against R All Management Services, Inc. A hearing will be conducted to determine the amount of legal fees, together with interest to be awarded to the plaintiff on August 3, 2022 at 2:15pm. Counsel shall contact the Court for a link to conduct a virtual hearing on Teams. Defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss is denied, except for the claims against the decedent. Dismissal is granted as to those claims against Lalendra Sinha, which evidently are being pursued against his estate in Nassau County Surrogate’s Court. The Court has reviewed the defendants’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. The defendants and their counsel have been playing it fast and loose in this action and elsewhere. The Court takes a dim view of such antics. While the Court acknowledges its ability to sanction either or both defendants, Management and O’Neil Sinha by financial sanctions, the Court declines to do so at this juncture. The Court does not wish to delay the progress of this action further. However, should any of the defendants and/or their counsel continue down this road, there will be severe consequences. The plaintiff shall serve a copy of this decision/order and judgment on the defendants within thirty (30) days of entry and shall file proof of service thereof with the Clerk of the Court. This constitutes the decision and order of this Court. Dated: May 26, 2022
