People v. Hanlon

The following papers were read and considered on the omnibus motion (Mot. Seq. 1) made by JEFF T. HANLON (hereinafter defendant): PAPERS: Notice of Motion, Affirmation in Support, Attachment People’s Affirmation in Response Unredacted Certified Copy of the Stenographic Transcript of the Grand Jury Proceedings on January 21, 2022, January 28, 2022, and February 18, 2022 29 Grand Jury Exhibits DECISION & ORDER Upon review of the foregoing papers, the Court finds and determines as follows: In February 2021, defendant was charged in a 14-count indictment (hereinafter the original indictment), with various crimes based on allegations that he brutally assaulted his spouse, Desiree Hanlon (hereinafter the victim), and his two children, over the course of several days in December 2020. A pretrial hearing ensued and, thereafter, this case was set for a bench trial to commence in January 2022. Prior to the commencement of trial, the District Attorney advised that the People would be re-presenting the case to a different grand jury since some of the charges in the original indictment were “problematic.” The foregoing resulted in the instant superseding indictment — which the People may file “at any time before entry of a plea of guilty to an indictment or commencement of a trial” (CPL 200.80; see People v. Brunner, 151 AD3d 651, 652 [1st Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1058 [2017]; People v. Lyons, 178 AD2d 552, 553 [2d Dept 1991], lv denied 79 NY2d 950 [1992]; see generally CPL 190.75 [3]).¹ The superseding indictment,² filed February 23, 2022, contains 11 total counts: one count of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of Penal Law §135.20; one count of attempted assault in the first degree (see Penal Law §§110.00, 120.10 [1]); five counts of assault in the second degree in violation of Penal Law §120.05 (1) and (2); two counts of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation in violation of Penal Law §121.11 (a) and (b); and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child in violation of Penal Law §260.10 (1). Defendant now moves for various relief by omnibus motion filed on April 11, 2022. The People filed their response papers on April 25, 2022. No reply papers were submitted by defendant. Oral arguments were heard on May 18, 2022 with respect to those branches of defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of insufficient legal evidence and defective grand jury proceedings. The Court will address each branch of defendant’s motion, in turn, and will dispose of it as follows: I. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR INSPECTION OF THE GRAND JURY MINUTES, DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT BASED ON LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND/OR DEFECTIVE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS a. Inspection of the Grand Jury Minutes Initially, defendant moves, pursuant to CPL 210.30 (3), for the Court to inspect the grand jury minutes to determine whether the evidence before the grand jury was legally sufficient. The People have provided a copy of the minutes to the Court for such purpose. Accordingly, this branch of defendant’s motion is granted (see People v. Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d 389, 394-395 [1980]; People v. Monserrate, 24 Misc 3d 1229[A], *1 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2009]; see also CPL 210.30 [3]; cf. People v. Harris, 82 NY2d 409, 413-414 [1993]; People v. Mitchell, 276 AD2d 822, 823 [3d Dept 2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 803 [2001]). b. Legal Sufficiency and Integrity of the Grand Jury Proceedings Turning next to his challenge of legal sufficiency relative to the grand jury proceedings, defendant claims that there are several evidentiary issues with the prosecutor’s presentation to warrant dismissal of the indictment, including admission of several photographs without laying a proper foundation including a crowbar, a samurai sword, and multiple physical injuries the victim had allegedly suffered; statements allegedly made by the victim; hearsay testimony from the victim’s younger sister, Denise Mattesi, who testified, among other things, that one of the children “could not breathe,” thereby resulting in defendant improperly being charged with criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation; and testimony by Mattesi as to alleged statements the victim had made to her. Defendant further contends that the prosecutor failed to introduce certain exculpatory evidence, including a letter from the victim. Lastly, defendant argues that no proper chain of custody was established concerning the crowbar, which defendant allegedly struck the victim with. It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss an indictment based on the alleged legal insufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, the court must determine whether there is “competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof” (CPL 70.10 [1]; see People v. Jensen, 86 NY2d 248, 251- 252 [1995]). “Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction” (People v. Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord People v. Wisey, 133 AD3d 799, 799-800 [2d Dept 2015]). “In the context of a [g]rand [j]ury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The reviewing court’s inquiry is limited to whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes, and whether the [g]rand [j]ury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference. That other, innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from those facts is irrelevant to the sufficiency inquiry as long as the [g]rand [j]ury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference” (People v. Wisey, 133 AD3d at 800 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Deegan, 69 NY2d 976, 979 [1987]). Importantly, “[i]t is sufficient if the [prosecutor] provides the [g]rand [j]ury with enough information to enable it intelligently to decide whether a crime has been committed and to determine whether there exists legally sufficient evidence to establish the material elements of the crime. The People have wide discretion in presenting evidence to establish their case and do not have the obligation to present to the [g]rand [j]ury every piece of evidence which they possess against a suspect, nor must every matter which may have a tendency to reflect upon the credibility of a witness be revealed. The [g]rand [j]ury proceeding is not intended to be adversarial in nature or a minitrial of the individual suspected of committing a crime” (People v. Shahzad, 71 AD3d 704, 705-706 [2d Dept 2010] [internal quotations marks and citations omitted] [emphasis added]; see People v. Colucci, 32 AD3d 1044, 1045 [2d Dept 2006]; People v. Suarez, 122 AD2d 861, 862 [2d Dept 1986], lv denied 68 NY2d 817 [1986]). As for the integrity of grand jury proceedings, “[a] grand jury proceeding is ‘defective,’ warranting dismissal of the indictment, where the ‘proceeding fails to conform to the requirements of CPL article 190 to such degree that the integrity thereof is impaired and prejudice to the defendant may result’” (People v. Sealy, 181 AD3d 893, 894 [2d Dept 2020], lv denied, 35 NY3d 1070 [2020] [internal brackets and ellipses omitted], quoting People v. Huston, 88 NY2d 400, 409 [1996]; see People v. Moffitt, 20 AD3d 687, 688 [3d Dept 2005]). “Dismissal of an indictment under CPL 210.35 (5) must meet a high test and is limited to instances of prosecutorial misconduct, fraudulent conduct[,] or errors which potentially prejudice the ultimate decision reached by the grand jury” (People v. Elioff, 110 AD3d 1477, 1477 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1040 [2013] [internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted]). “As the Court of Appeals has stated, ‘not every improper comment, elicitation of inadmissible testimony, impermissible question or mere mistake renders an indictment defective. Typically, the submission of some inadmissible evidence will be deemed fatal only when the remaining evidence is insufficient to sustain the indictment’” (People v. Elioff, 110 AD3d at 1477-1478, quoting People v. Huston, 88 NY2d 400, 409 [1996]); see People v. Miller, 110 AD3d 1150, 1151 [3d Dept 2013]). In urging dismissal of the indictment, defendant assails that there were several errors committed by the prosecutor during the grand jury presentation, including those of an evidentiary nature, which, in the aggregate, fundamentally flawed the proceeding and impaired its integrity. The Court will address each of defendant’s arguments, in turn, regarding his claimed grounds on legal insufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury and whether the integrity of the proceedings was impaired. 1. Admission of Certain Photographs Initially, defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly admitted 22 photographs into evidence during the grand jury presentation — including, photos of a crowbar, sword, and multiple pictures of the victim’s body and face displaying injuries she had suffered — without laying a proper foundation, inasmuch as the victim did not state or confirm that the photographs shown to her during her grand jury testimony were a true, accurate, or fair depiction. The People counter that those words are not absolute requirements in order to lay a proper foundation for admitting a photograph into evidence. “CPL 190.30 (1) provides: ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, the provisions of [CPL article 60], governing rules of evidence and related matters with respect to criminal proceedings in general, are, where appropriate, applicable to grand jury proceedings.’ In addition, CPL 190.65 (1) provides that an indictment must be based upon ‘legally sufficient’ and ‘competent and admissible’ evidence before the [g]rand [j]ury” (People v. Smith, 258 AD2d 245, 247 [4th Dept 1999]). “[A]part from the specific exceptions set forth in CPL 190.30 (2) through (7), ‘general criminal trial court evidentiary rules normally apply to [g]rand [j]ury proceedings’” (People v. Smith, 258 AD2d 245, 247 [4th Dept 1999], quoting People v. Mitchell, 82 NY2d 509, 513 [1993]; see People v. Baker, 183 Misc 2d 650, 652 [Co Ct, Oneida County 2000]; see also CPL §§60.10; 70.10 [1]; People v. Dunn, 248 AD2d 87, 93-94 [1st Dept 1998]). “With respect to photographs, [courts] have long held that the proper foundation should be established through testimony that the photograph accurately represents the subject matter depicted” (People v. Price, 29 NY3d 472, 477 [2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted]). “Rarely is it required that the identity and accuracy of a photograph be proved by the photographer. Rather, since the ultimate object of the authentication requirement is to insure the accuracy of the photograph sought to be admitted into evidence, any person having the requisite knowledge of the facts may verify…that the photograph has not been altered” (id.; see People v. Byrnes, 33 NY2d 343, 347 [1974]; People v. Swift, 185 AD3d 1442, 1443-1444 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 976 [2020]). “Properly authenticated photographs are admissible whenever relevant to describe the physical characteristics of a person, place, or thing” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence §4-213, at 148-149 [Farrell 11th ed.]). “Photographs are properly authenticated when ‘a competent witness possessing knowledge of the matter’ identifies the subject depicted therein and verifies that the photographs accurately represent the subject depicted” (People v. Marra, 96 AD3d 1623, 1625-1626 [4th Dept 2012], affd 21 NY3d 979 [2013], quoting see People v. Byrnes, 33 NY2d at 347). Contrary to defendant’s contentions, the Court concludes that the prosecutor laid a proper foundation for admitting the photographs of the victim depicting her injuries, the samurai sword, and certain areas of the marital home where she resided with defendant. These particular photographs consist of grand jury exhibit Nos. 1, 2, and 4 through 22. “Photographs are properly authenticated by the testimony of any witness familiar with the subject portrayed that the photograph is a correct representation of the person, place, object or condition depicted” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence §4-213). Here, the victim, who herself was depicted in most of the photographs, testified as to the accuracy of their depiction. The victim detailed in her grand jury testimony how the alleged attack by defendant unfolded and the injuries she had allegedly sustained as a result therefrom. The victim’s various responses to the prosecutor’s questions regarding the photographs substantiated as much since she recognized “the injuries to [her] face” which were depicted therein (regarding grand jury exhibit No. 1) and responded there was “no question” that they were taken as a result of the injuries she suffered from defendant’s alleged attack (regarding grand jury exhibit No. 2). As for grand jury exhibit No. 4, the victim testified that she recognized the photo as an “injury,” describing it as a “bruise of…[her] shoulder with a cut right in the center of my shoulder,” further confirming that she recalled the picture being taken as a result of the injury she had sustained. With respect to grand jury exhibit No. 5, the victim again confirmed that she recognized the photograph as “another bruise and cut…on the back of [her] shoulder.” As to grand jury exhibit No. 6, the victim acknowledged that she recognized the picture which depicted a “bruise with a cut” on the back of her right calf that she suffered as result from the subject incident. The victim identified grand jury exhibit No. 7 as a photograph of a “big bruise on the outside of [her] right thigh.” She described grand jury exhibit No. 8 as a photograph portraying “more bruises on the back of [her] shoulder with cuts in the middle of the bruising.” With respect to grand jury exhibit No. 9, the victim testified that the photo displayed “more bruising on the other side of [her]…left shoulder.” The victim stated that she recognized grand jury exhibit Nos. 10 and 11 as depictions of “more bruises…on the outside of [her] arms…[with] cuts in the middle.” The victim stated that grand jury exhibit No. 12 is a photograph showing “a long straight bruise down the side of [her] torso,” which was an injury she sustained “during the attack” — although she could not remember the exact day/date that she sustained it. The victim recognized grand jury exhibit No. 13 and described it as a photograph portraying “a huge bruise…on the upper thigh of [her] leg,” confirming that she did not have the bruise prior to the incident in question. When asked, the victim explained that grand jury exhibit No. 14 was a photograph that appeared to show “cuts on [her] head” with blood, and she confirmed that she recalled that picture being taken and having cuts on her head when the photo was taken. As for grand jury exhibit No. 17, the prosecutor asked the victim if she “recognize[d] what is depicted in that photograph?,” to which she responded, “it’s where [defendant] stabbed me in my hand with the samurai sword or jabbed me in the hand with it.” Finally, turning to grand jury exhibit No. 18, the victim was asked to look at the photograph and described what she recognized. The victim responded that “it’s a picture of my mouth with missing teeth,” and she then acknowledged that she recalled that photograph being taken. Addressing grand jury exhibit Nos. 15 and 16, the prosecutor asked the victim to examine the two photographs and advise her if she “recognize[d] what is [depicted] in those photographs.” The victim unequivocally responded that “it’s the samurai sword that [defendant] had [used] that day” during the alleged attack. She then confirmed that both pictures were of the samurai sword. Importantly, the victim had testified earlier about defendant using that particular weapon on her, stating that defendant “pulled out a samurai sword and he put it up to my face” while he was screaming at her. The victim further testified that she tried to cover her face with her hand and defendant “stabbed me in my hand with the samurai sword.” As for grand jury exhibit No. 19, the victim stated that the photograph was a “picture of the front of [her] house,” upon being questioned what was depicted therein. She further testified about the window depicted on the right side of the home regarding that exhibit. When asked whether she recognized what was depicted in grand jury exhibit No. 20, the victim unambiguously answered that “it’s a picture of a pillow from my house…covered in blood,” further identifying the blood as being hers. As to grand jury exhibit No. 21, the victim testified that “it’s a picture of the bedsheet that was on the bed…covered in blood,” adding that it was her blood, and confirming that she recognized what was portrayed in that photograph. And lastly, as for grand jury exhibit No. 22, the victim was asked to take a look at such photograph and stated it “is a picture of my shower curtain” in the bathroom of the marital home, containing her blood on it from the injuries she had allegedly sustained at the hands of defendant. Generally, “photographs are admissible if they tend ‘to prove or disprove a disputed or material issue, to illustrate or elucidate other relevant evidence, or to corroborate or disprove some other evidence offered or to be offered’” (People v. Wood, 79 NY2d 958, 960 [1992], quoting People v. Pobliner, 32 NY2d 356, 370 [1973], cert denied 416 US 905 [1974]). Given the victim’s foregoing testimony about the various photographs which the prosecutor had showed her and asked her to identify, the Court concludes that the prosecutor’s questions and the victim’s testimonial responses thereto reflect that a proper foundation was laid as to the photographs consisting of grand jury exhibit Nos. 1, 2, and 4 through 22. In short, the vast majority of those photographs are indeed “relevant with respect to the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries” (People v. Woodworth, 111 AD3d 1368, 1369 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 23 NY3d 969 [2014]; see People v. Fernandez, 115 AD3d 977, 978 [2d Dept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 1201 [2015]). Crucially, the testifying victim was a competent witness who had knowledge of, and ably identified, the subject matter contained in the photographs. The victim corroborated that those photographs accurately represented what was being shown to her and what was depicted therein (see People v. Byrnes, 33 NY2d at 347; People v. Marra, 96 AD3d at 1625-1626). 2. The Crowbar Turning next to the admissibility of the photograph of the crowbar (grand jury exhibit No. 3), defendant argues that the victim was unable to independently state on her own accord as to whether the crowbar depicted therein was involved in the alleged attack and her injuries. When initially questioned during the proceeding about the crowbar depicted in grand jury exhibit No. 3, the victim acknowledged that she “recognize[d] it” and testified it is “a crowbar from [defendant's] tools.” When asked if that crowbar was involved in any way with her injuries, the victim expressed that she could not remember if it was, and responded “I was told it was, yes.” She then confirmed a second time that she recognized the crowbar in the photograph. Later that same day, the prosecutor called Brian Forde, a detective with the Carmel Police Department, to testify before the grand jury. Forde testified that he went to Jacobi Medical Center in Bronx County to interview the victim about the incident. Forde stated that he saw the victim’s “extensive visible injuries” when he arrived at the hospital to question her. Forde testified that when he spoke to the victim at the hospital, he took notes to ensure that the police investigation substantiated the victim’s version of events. Forde explained that he initially took handwritten notes which were later entered into a computer system and inserted into his official case narrative report — which reflected everything the victim had stated to him when she was interviewed at the hospital. The prosecutor then showed Forde page two of Forde’s “Detective Narrative Report” and asked him if he recognizes it,³ to which Forde confirmed that he did, stating it was “typed…after taking the handwritten notes in speaking with [the victim].” The prosecutor questioned Forde whether the victim had told him if she was “injured with any particular object,” to which he responded in the affirmative. The prosecutor then directed Forde to read from his narrative report what the victim had conveyed to him at the hospital and Forde proceeded to do as much. When so doing, Forde read from his narrative report that defendant retrieved “a crowbar from an unknown location” and struck the victim “in the back of the head with the crowbar at least one or two times,” causing “severe…lacerations and bruising.” Forde’s report states that “[t]he crowbar is described as being metal, white in color, with a curved end that is red in color.” After Forde read the aforesaid portion from his narrative report, the prosecutor instructed the grand jury that such was read to them as a “joint past recollection recorded,” that Forde “was obligated to take what he heard,” and that his report was “being offered for joint recollection recording, which is an exception to the hearsay rule.” Thereafter, the prosecutor again instructed the grand jury about Forde’s report, during the course of Forde’s testimony, stating that page two of the report was read to them as a “past joint recollection recorded”; and the prosecutor advised the grand jury that it was being marked into evidence. The prosecutor then had Forde re-read the same relevant portion to the grand jury from his narrative report. Forde continued his testimony that police later obtained and executed a search warrant of defendant and the victim’s marital residence, situated in the Town of Carmel, where they were searching for, among other things, the crowbar that the victim had described to him at the hospital. Forde testified that the crowbar was discovered in the home and appeared to contain “dry blood” on it. When Forde was shown a photograph of the crowbar, as is depicted in grand jury exhibit No. 3, Forde confirmed that he recognized such as “the crowbar that [was] recovered from the house.” While the prosecutor’s grand jury presentation regarding the initial admission of the photograph of the crowbar shown to the victim was not entirely free from error, the Court is still unconvinced with respect to defendant’s argument that no proper foundation was laid by the prosecutor with respect to the picture of the crowbar. Detective Forde’s narrative report describing the victim’s statements about the crowbar served to lay a proper foundation — albeit that such was belated. Initially, the People concede that the photograph of the crowbar was prematurely introduced into evidence during the victim’s testimony; however, they rely on People v. Taylor (80 NY2d 1 [1992]), in asserting that it was later properly admitted based on a “joint past recollection recorded” since the victim was unable to remember how she sustained her injuries, but was later able to recall that she told Detective Forde about the crowbar at the hospital. Parenthetically, Taylor is distinguishable insofar as that case involved a trial court judge’s admission of a telephone message, as a past recollection recorded, during the course of an ensuing trial.⁴ The People further contend that even if the photograph of the crowbar was not properly introduced into evidence, the crowbar itself was properly admitted into evidence, thereby rendering any error harmless and not impairing the integrity of the grand jury proceedings. The Court agrees. The Court of Appeals has expressed that CPL 210.35 (5) establishes a “high test” to qualify for the “exceptional remedy” of dismissing an indictment: “[t]he statutory test is very precise and very high” (see People v. Darby, 75 NY2d 449, 455 [1990]). “[M]ere flaw, error[,] or skewing” is not enough (id.). “In general, this demanding test is met only where the prosecutor engages in an ‘overall pattern of bias and misconduct’ that is ‘pervasive’ and typically willful, whereas isolated instances of misconduct, including the erroneous handling of evidentiary matters, do not merit invalidation of the indictment” (People v. Thompson, 22 NY3d 687, 699 [2014], quoting People v. Huston, 88 NY2d at 408; see People v. Landtiser, 222 AD2d 525, 526 [2d Dept 1995], lv denied 88 NY2d 982 [1996]). Of import, the Court notes that the standard for indicting a person at a grand jury proceeding — legally sufficient evidence establishing that an offense is committed (see CPL 190.65 [3]) — is clearly lower than the standard to convict: guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Mindful of defendant pressing that there are evidentiary issues in relation to the prosecutor’s claimed errors during the grand jury presentation regarding the photograph of the crowbar, the grand jury proceeding itself is not a minitrial (see People v. Shahzad, 71 AD3d at 705-706). Assuming, arguendo, that the prosecutor erred by prematurely admitting the photograph of the crowbar during the victim’s testimony which was taken before Detective Forde was called to testify, the Court finds that such did not have a significant and decisive impact on the grand jury’s resolution of the key issue raised during the presentation — whether defendant had attacked and assaulted the victim in the presence of the children given the apparent injuries that the victim suffered and testified about. It does not appear that the foregoing resulted in any meaningful prejudice to defendant, nor impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceedings (see CPL 210.35 [5]; People v. Banner, 59 AD2d 621, 621-622 [2d Dept 1977]; cf. People v. Mitchell, 55 AD3d 1048, 1050 [3d Dept 2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 856 [2009]; People v. Beckwith, 289 AD2d 956, 956-957 [4th Dept 2001]; People v. Smith, 215 AD2d 940, 941 [3d Dept 1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 802 [1995]; People v. Moore, 165 AD2d 884, 885 [2d Dept 1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 898 [1990]). Also, whether the People needed the photograph of the crowbar, standing alone, to meet their evidentiary burden that defendant committed a criminal offense is also highly questionable. Even taking defendant’s perceived error into account and disregarding the victim’s testimony about the crowbar and the photograph depicting it, the grand jury may well have considered Forde’s testimony about such, his narrative report containing a brief summary of the victim’s statements and a description of the crowbar, and Forde’s identification of the crowbar that he retrieved and collected as part of evidence recovered from the marital home. As such, Detective Forde’s narrative report, coupled with his testimony, about the crowbar and the circumstances surrounding defendant’s arrest, thereby provided sufficient evidence tending to connect defendant to the crowbar, especially considering the fact that it was retrieved from defendant’s home; and given the other evidence presented to the grand jury, including the victim’s independent testimony before the grand jury detailing the allegedly violent attack. In sum, the overall presentation before the grand jury relative to the crowbar was not so fundamentally flawed to necessitate the drastic remedy of dismissing the entire indictment. Next, defendant argues that the admission into evidence of the crowbar “was not legally established” and therefore prejudiced him. Defendant also asserts that no chain of custody was established as to the crowbar since it is a piece of physical evidence, including any information about how it was secured by the police, stored, and whether it was in the same condition at all times upon being transferred and analyzed. According to defendant, this rendered the grand jury presentation defective. The People respond that any issues regarding chain of custody as to the crowbar go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The Court likewise agrees with the People’s position in this respect. It is well established that “[a]ny deficiencies in the chain of custody affect[] only the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility” (People v. Elwell, 202 AD3d 817, 819 [2d Dept 2022]; see People v. Martin, 197 AD3d 955, 955 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1162 [2022]; People v. Wakefield, 175 AD3d 158, 171 [3d Dept 2019], affd ____ NY3d ___ [2022]). “Where…an object possesses unique characteristics or markings and is not subject to material alteration that would not be readily apparent, a simple identification is sufficient to warrant admission” (People v. Weiler, 194 AD2d 894, 895 [3d Dept 1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 728 [1993]). Here, the crowbar is undisputedly a distinct, tangible piece of physical evidence. Contrary to defendant’s contention, the mere fact that Detective Forde did not testify that the crowbar was in the same condition as its initial discovery, or give testimony of who had access to a police evidence locker where it was stored, would not affect the crowbar’s admissibility, but rather could create an issue concerning the weight of the evidence for the factfinder to evaluate (see People v. Weiler, 194 AD2d at 895; People v. Sarmiento, 168 AD2d 328, 328-329 [1st Dept 1990], affd 77 NY2d 976 [1991]). Forde testified before the grand jury that police went to the marital residence, pursuant to the execution of a search warrant, to look for the crowbar that the victim had described. Forde stated that he found the crowbar located in the master bedroom inside “a plastic storage bin.” Forde added that there “appeared to be dry blood” on the crowbar upon its initial discovery. Forde continued that after he discovered the crowbar, while wearing latex gloves, he placed the crowbar into an “evidence box,” which was sealed with tape, initialed, and dated. Forde stated that the evidence box containing the crowbar was secured in an evidence locker at the Carmel Police Department stationhouse. Additionally, Forde confirmed that he maintained continuous custody and control of the crowbar until he stored it in the evidence locker. In addition, Alicia Farkas, a forensic scientist employed at the State Police Forensic Investigation Center, testified that she is a specialist in serology for examining biological things such as blood. Farkas stated that the evidence box containing the subject crowbar was mailed as a package from the Carmel Police Department — which, according to her, was initially sent to the Center’s “evidence receiving section” and forwarded to her for examination. Farkas acknowledged that the box was sealed and had not been tampered with. She testified that she unsealed the package which contained a crowbar “with a straight claw side and a bent claw side.” Farkas explained the process regarding how the crowbar was tested for blood, which requires using “cotton swabs” that are similar to a Q-tip. Farkas continued that after she finished testing the crowbar for blood, it was returned to its original packaging, that she sealed it with tape, dated and initialed it, and it was then forwarded by her to the Center’s “evidence receiving section” for return to the agency. Critically, the People have to simply establish that the circumstances provided reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the crowbar (see People v. Singletary, 176 AD3d 1237, 1239 [2d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1082 [2019]). As such, the Court is unpersuaded by defendant’s argument about claimed deficiencies in the chain of custody as to the crowbar, since it pertains to the weight to be accorded to such evidence and not its admissibility (see id.). 3. Denise Mattesi’s Testimony Defendant further claims that Mattesi’s testimony about certain statements that the victim made to her, including that one of the children “could not breathe,” was inadmissible hearsay based on the nature and content of the victim’s statements, and such did not fall within the prompt outcry exception to the hearsay; or, as the People claim, an excited utterance as an exception to the hearsay rule. Dismissal of an indictment, ordinarily, may be based on significant errors that potentially prejudice the ultimate decision reached by the grand jury (see People v. Huston, 88 NY2d at 409). “The likelihood of prejudice turns on the particular facts of each case, including the weight and nature of the admissible proof adduced to support the indictment and the degree of inappropriate prosecutorial influence or bias” (id. at 409; accord People v. Moffitt, 20 AD3d 687, 688 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 854 [2005]). “Generally, hearsay evidence is inadmissible before the Grand Jury” (People v. Dunn, 248 AD2d 87, 94 [1st Dept 1998], appeal withdrawn 93 NY2d 1002 [1999]; see People v. Huston, 88 NY2d at 406-407). However, “hearsay evidence may be admitted before the g]rand [j]ury so long as the resulting indictment[] [is] not founded on hearsay which the [g]rand [j]ury ‘may not have understood as such’” (People v. Perry, 199 AD2d 889, 893 [3d Dept 1993], quoting People v. Pelchat, 62 NY2d 97, 106 [1984]). Errors in admission of hearsay evidence must be of a significant magnitude to impair the integrity of grand jury proceedings (see People v. Carey, 241 AD2d 748, 750-751 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 1010 [1997]). Even “isolated instances of hearsay testimony, which were accompanied by appropriate limiting instructions, do not warrant dismissal” of the indictment (People v. Miller, 110 AD3d at 1150-1151), so long as there is otherwise legally sufficient and admissible evidence to sustain the counts of the indictment. Here, Mattesi’s grand jury testimony reveals that she lives in the Village of Pelham, in Westchester County, and the victim lives in Mahopac — approximately “40 to 45 minutes” away by “a car ride.” Mattesi testified that on the morning of December 19, 2020, the victim called her cellphone around 7:15 a.m. to 7:20 a.m. and that she woke up “about 45 minutes” later when she heard repeated “very loud…urgent” banging on the front door of her home. Mattesi continued that she proceeded to open the door and saw the victim standing there with the children: her two young nieces. Mattesi described the condition of her sister as “horrific,” based on her testimony that the victim had “two dark blue eyes,” “a slice/cut across her nose,” “bruises all over her body,” and “dried up blood across the front of her hair…[/] hairline.” Mattesi added that after the victim and the children entered her home, the victim sat next to her on the couch and “began to sob hysterically.” Mattesi stated that the victim continued to cry for about 20 to 30 minutes, and the victim did not speak during that time and “just cried.” Mattesi further testified that the victim, while still crying, then described to her what had transpired the “past three days” between her, defendant, and the children when he had held them “hostage in [their] house.” The prosecutor had Mattesi provide a narrative as to what the victim had told her regarding the details of defendant allegedly attacking and assaulting the victim. Based on what the victim had told her, Mattesi described in length what transpired during the alleged attack and testified that at one point, defendant “lunged” at the younger child, M.H., “took his hands and put them around [M.H.'s] neck and she was crying and screaming…[and] could not breathe.” Mattesi continued that the victim then “jumped” on [defendant's] back to get him off of [M.H.],” and eventually defendant backed away from M.H. after the older child, A.H., “stepped in front” of him. Parenthetically, defendant does not squarely point to particular out-of-court statement(s) that the victim made to Mattesi and to which Mattesi improperly testified about — except for Mattesi’s statement that the victim told her that M.H. “could not breathe.” In any event, the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule permits out-of-court statements that “‘are the product of the declarant’s exposure to a startling or upsetting event that is sufficiently powerful to render the observer’s normal reflective processes inoperative’ preventing the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication” (People v. Carroll, 95 NY2d 375, 385 [2000], quoting People v. Vasquez, 88 NY2d 561, 574 [1996]; see People v. Hernandez, 28 NY3d 1056, 1057 [2016]; People v. Johnson, 1 NY3d 302, 306 [2003]). The Court of Appeals has noted that “[u]nderlying this [hearsay] exception is the assumption that a person under the influence of the excitement precipitated by an external startling event will lack the reflective capacity essential for fabrication and, accordingly, any utterance he [or she] makes will be spontaneous and trustworthy” (People v. Johnson, 1 NY3d at 306 [2003]; see People v. Edwards, 47 NY2d 493, 497, [1979]). Among other things to consider are “the nature of the startling event, the amount of time between the event and the statement, and the activities of the declarant in the interim” (People v. Hernandez, 28 NY3d at 1057). Here, given the context, recency of events, and the circumstances surrounding various statements the victim made to her sister Mattesi, the grand jury minutes indicate that Mattesi’s testimony relative to the victim’s statements tend to establish that the victim was still under the influence of the stress of a terrifying incident with the children (see People v. Hasquins, 184 AD3d 529, 530 [1st Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 973 [2020]; People v. Forde, 140 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2d Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 929 [2016]; People v. Lewis, 93 AD3d 1264, 1267 [4th Dept 2012]; see also People v. Monserrate, 24 Misc 3d 1229[A], *1-2 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2009]). The victim was the first person to testify before the grand jury, recounting in detail what happened. Her testimony, for the most part, tended to corroborate Mattesi’s version. Mattesi was the last individual to testify before the grand jury. Mattesi’s testimony before the grand jury reflects that the victim was injured at the hands of defendant, that the victim had experienced a traumatic event, and that the victim was in a frantic and hysterical state. Further, the Court of Appeals has expressed that there is no time limit within which the statement(s) must be made because “[t]he imposition of an arbitrary time limit would run counter to the assumptions underlying the admissibility of excited utterances” (People v. Brown, 70 NY2d 513, 520-521 [1987] [holding that 30 minutes between the incident and the victim's statement was not long]). Here, the victim testified before the grand jury that she was planning to escape from defendant and leave the marital home with the children during the early morning hours of December 19, 2020. She stated that she offered to defendant, and he accepted, taking Xanax since he said to her that “his back hurt him [because] has had to drag [her] fat ass up the driveway into the house.” The victim explained that after she gave defendant a Xanax pill so he could try to sleep and rest, she quietly told the children to get dressed, as she tried to figure out a reason for herself to get dressed without raising defendant’s suspicions. The victim continued that she and the children got dressed as defendant was “falling in and out of sleep,” that she called an Uber taxi to the house, and as soon as the Uber vehicle pulled up to the house, she told the children to “run out the front door,” and then she and the children “jumped” into the car while defendant was “out cold sleeping.” The victim testified that she told the Uber driver to take them to her father’s residence in Pelham, where Mattesi also apparently lived. The victim stated that when she reached her father’s house, Mattesi was there and opened the front door; and the victim acknowledged that she told Mattesi much of what had happened. Given Mattesi’s testimony that she lived about “40 to 45 minutes” away by car ride from the victim, the grand jury minutes do not reveal that Mattesi’s testimony about the victim’s statements and responses to her were made in such a manner that were fabricated or would illicit studied reflection. Mattesi described the victim as visibly upset, sobbing, hysterical, and crying, with apparent injuries on her face and body. Under these circumstances, the victim’s out-of-court statement to Mattesi that M.H. could not breathe was made while the victim was likely still suffering from trauma. Thus, that statement may arguably qualify as an excited utterance (see People v. Brown, 70 NY2d at 520-521; People v. Hasquins, 184 AD3d at 530; People v. Forde, 140 AD3d at 1087; People v. Monserrate, 24 Misc 3d 1229[A] at *2).⁵ Of course, defense counsel has the right to challenge such an admissibility ruling at trial (see generally People v. Chin, 148 AD3d 925, 925-926 [2d Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 978 [2017]; People v. Young, 308 AD2d 555, 555-556 [2d Dept 2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 583 [2003]). Whether it was an error or incumbent upon the prosecutor to instruct the grand jury about statements which would normally be considered inadmissible hearsay, and any arguable exception to the hearsay rule with respect thereto, is somewhat questionable. Alternatively, even if accepting defendant’s argument in connection with Mattesi’s hearsay testimony, this evidentiary error in the prosecutor’s presentation to the grand jury would not warrant the drastic remedy of outright dismissing the indictment in its entirety. Although allowing hearsay testimony is generally improper, the Court concludes that “the [g]rand [j]ury proceeding was not infected to the point that its integrity was impaired” (People v. Steans, 187 AD2d 741, 741 [2d Dept 1992], lv denied 81 NY2d 847 [1993] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see CPL 210.20 [1]; 210.35 [5]). Indeed, “the receipt of evidence which might not be admissible at trial does not necessarily impair the integrity of a [g]rand [j]ury proceeding” (People v. Diaz, 209 AD2d 1, 4 [1st Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 972 [1995]). Here, to the extent that the prosecutor may have erred in allowing Mattesi’s testimony as to several out-of-court statements purportedly made by the victim, which defendant maintains constitute inadmissible hearsay, any such error was not so significant (see People v. Darby, 75 NY2d at 455; cf. People v. Thompson, 22 NY3d at 693-701). Even discounting a portion or much of Mattesi’s testimony and certain statements that the victim made to her on the morning of December 19, 2020, there was ample evidence apart from the hearsay testimony to support the charges against defendant, considering all of the other admissible proof supporting the indictment (see e.g. People v. Addimando, 197 AD3d 106, 121 [2d Dept 2021]; People v. Melendez, 70 AD3d 860, 860 [2d Dept 2010], lv denied 70 AD3d 860 [2010]; People v. Butcher, 11 AD3d 956, 957 [4th Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 755 [2004]; compare People v. Gordon, 101 AD3d 1473, 1474-1476 [3d Dept 2012]). “While the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice before an indictment is considered defective, but rather, must merely show the ‘possibility’ of prejudice from the conduct of the prosecutor, this possibility of prejudice must follow from some identifiable misconduct on the part of the prosecutor such as would have impaired the integrity of the [g]rand [j]ury process” (People v. Johnson, 282 AD2d 309, 310 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 903 [2001] [internal citation omitted] [emphasis supplied]). In the present matter, assuming, without ruling, that Mattesi’s testimony was replete with hearsay statements, the Court, nevertheless, finds that defendant was not prejudiced by such hearsay evidence, nor did the claimed hearsay evidence render the indictment defective (see People v. Boddie, 126 AD3d 1129, 1130 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1085 [2015]; People v. Arbas, 85 AD3d 1320, 1321 [3d Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 813 [2011]; cf. People v. Coker, 121 AD3d 1305, 1306 [3d Dept 2014], lv denied 26 NY3d 927 [2015]).⁶ The grand jury minutes relative to Mattesi’s testimony do not reflect that the prosecutor intentionally presented inadmissible hearsay or otherwise engaged in an “over-all pattern of bias and misconduct” (People v. Boddie, 126 AD3d 1129, 1130, quoting People v. Huston, 88 NY2d at 408). There was sufficient evidence before the grand jury to support the charges without considering the claimed hearsay statements in Mattesi’s testimony. More to that point, defendant failed to establish “prosecutorial wrongdoing, fraudulent conduct,” or errors sufficiently egregious to “potentially prejudice the ultimate decision reached by the grand jury” (People v. Huston, 88 NY2d at 409; see People v. Palmer, 1 Misc 3d 839, 841-842 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2003]). Thus, it cannot be said that defendant was unduly prejudiced since “the grand jury proceeding did not fail to conform to the requirements of CPL article 190 to such a degree that the integrity thereof was impaired” (People v. Wu, 152 AD3d 802, 803 [2d Dept 2017]; see People v. Winningham, 209 AD2d 461, 462 [2d Dept 1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 1040 [1995]). In sum, the grand jury’s exposure to arguably inadmissible hearsay did not taint the proceedings so as to require dismissal of indictment given the legally sufficient independent proof (see People v. Miller, 110 AD3d at 1140- 1151; People v. Arbas, 85 AD3d at 1321; People v. Moffitt, 20 AD3d at 688-689; cf. People v. Cruz- Rivera, 174 AD3d 1512, 1512-1513 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1127 [2020]). Therefore, the integrity of the grand jury proceeding remained intact, despite the elicitation of arguable hearsay testimony from the victim’s sister, Mattesi. 4. Count Nine of the Indictment (Criminal Obstruction of Breathing or Blood Circulation in Violation of Penal Law §121.11 [a]) Defendant additionally argues that there is insufficient legal evidence regarding count nine of the indictment — that defendant allegedly obstructed the breathing or blood circulation of the younger child, M.H., in violation of Penal Law §121.11 (a) — inasmuch as that charge is supported solely on Mattesi’s testimony and nonhearsay evidence. The younger child, M.H., did not testify at the grand jury proceedings. Defendant overlooks that prior to Mattesi’s testimony, the victim first testified about a physical incident between he and M.H., when defendant allegedly had placed his hands around M.H.’s neck area. The foregoing testimony by the victim reflects as much. Specifically, the victim testified that at one point, defendant was “hitting” her in the living room when her two daughters including M.H. came downstairs. The victim described that defendant had “thrown me to the floor” when M.H. loudly screamed for him to “stop, stop, stop.” The victim continued that defendant pushed M.H. onto the couch and “his hands were…on [M.H.'s] neck area…pushing her down.” The prosecutor immediately asked the victim if defendant’s hands were “around [M.H.'s] neck area,” to which the victim responded affirmatively, “yeah.” The prosecutor then tried to confirm with the victim: “you don’t know if it was actually on her neck,” and the victim responded “no, I don’t know.” The victim continued testifying that when she saw defendant doing as much to M.H., she got up from the ground, “jumped on top of [defendant]” and “ got him away from [M.H.],” until he threw her back on the ground and turned towards M.H. as if he “was going to go back to her.” The victim stated that the older child, A.H., interjected in the scuffle by “stepp[ing] in front of” defendant and “told him to stop.” According to the victim, defendant “just stopped” and “walked…away from” her and the children. The grand jury minutes reflect that Mattesi corroborated some of the victim’s testimony regarding M.H.’s involvement about the scuffle above. Based on what the victim had told her, Mattesi testified that that the victim told her that that “defendant took his hands and put them around [M.H.'s] neck and she was crying and screaming…[and] could not breathe.” At the conclusion of Mattesi’s testimony, one of the grand jurors asked her if any of the children had “any visible injuries.” The prosecutor then interjected, stating he would not allow this question to be answered because it was more appropriate “for a later proceeding, but not for [grand jury] proceedings.” Thereafter, the prosecutor charged the grand jury as to count nine of the indictment with respect to the younger child, M.H. — that being criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation (see Penal Law §121.11). Ultimately, the grand jury voted a true bill on all counts in the indictment, including count nine relative to M.H. The Court again reiterates that “[i]n the context of a [g]rand [j]ury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The reviewing court’s inquiry is limited to whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crime[] (People v. Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 526 [1998] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Further, “[a] grand jury ‘need not be instructed with the same degree of precision that is required when a petit jury is instructed on the law,’ and it is ‘sufficient if the [prosecutor] provides the grand jury with enough information to enable it intelligently to decide whether a crime has been committed and to determine whether there exists legally sufficient evidence to establish the material elements of the crime” (People v. Ruvalcaba, 187 AD3d 1553, 1554 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 1053 [2021] [internal brackets omitted], quoting People v. Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d at 394-395). Based on the victim’s and Mattesi’s testimony, the Court will sustain count nine of the indictment charging defendant with criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation in violation of Penal Law §121.11 (a). A person commits criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation when he or she, “with intent to impede the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of another person[,]…applies pressure on the throat or neck of such person” (Penal Law §121.11 [a]; see People v. Abughanem, 203 AD3d 1710, 1712 [4th Dept 2022]; People v. Haardt, 129 AD3d 1322, 1323 [3d Dept 2015]). “The language of Penal Law §121.11 is clear. The only action required is applying pressure on the throat or neck of another. It does not require that the breathing be completely blocked. It completely fails to mention any requirement of physical injury or impairment” (People v. Figueroa, 40 Misc 3d 1010, 1017-1018 [Rye City Ct 2013]; see People v. Welte, 60 Misc 3d 1228[A], *2 [Just Ct, Town of Webster 2018]). Here, although M.H. did not testify at the proceeding (perhaps given her young and tender age), the grand jury may well have relied on the victim and Mattesi’s testimony that defendant placed his hands around M.H.’s neck and, as a result, she “could not breathe” — given that the grand jury ultimately decided to charge defendant with obstructing the breathing or blood circulation of M.H. (c.f. People v. Ruvalcaba, 187 AD3d at 1555-1556; see generally People v. Bishop, 41 Misc 3d 144[A], *3 [App Term, 2d Dept, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013], lv denied 23 NY3d 960 [2014]). The grand jury essentially concluded that defendant’s conduct in putting his hands around M.H.’s neck interfered with M.H.’s breathing. Viewing this minimal evidence in a light most favorable to the People, and since it was otherwise unexplained and uncontradicted, such could constitute competent evidence which, if proven as true, establishes the elements of Penal Law §121.11 (a) (see CPL 70.10 [1]; People v. Bello, 92 NY2d at 525; see generally People v. Abughanem, 203 AD3d at 1712; People v. Haardt, 129 AD3d at 1323-1324; People v. Briggs, 129 AD3d 1201, 1203-1204 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1038 [2015). And while not at issue, the Court notes that the prosecutor's instructions to the grand jury comported with Penal Law §121.11 (a), since the prosecutor read the statutory text verbatim as is contained in that statute --- which the grand jury apparently construed based on the text's most natural and obvious meaning (see e.g. People v. Ruvalcaba, 187 AD3d at 1554-1555). 5. Non-Admission of Victim's Undated Letter to Defendant Equally unavailing is defendant's contention that the prosecution failed to introduce purported exculpatory evidence to the grand jury --- namely, an undated letter from the victim to defendant which defendant annexed to his omnibus motion as an attachment.⁷ The Court notes that the People turned over the letter to defendant as part of discovery. As is relevant in this regard, "[t]he People…are not obligated to search for evidence favorable to the defense or to present all evidence in their possession that is favorable to the accused even though such information undeniably would allow the grand jury to make a more informed determination. Nor do the People have the same obligation of disclosure at the grand jury stage as they have at the trial stage” (People v. Abussalam, 196 AD3d 1000, 1006 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1144 [2021] [internal brackets and citation omitted]). “A prosecutor is required to instruct the grand jury as to complete defenses, but not as to those defenses that may only reduce the degree or gravity of the crime” (People v. Sicilianonunez, 172 AD3d 912, 913 [2d Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 1108 [2019]). “While the prosecutor is not required to advise the grand jury of every possible mitigating defense, the prosecutor must inform the grand jury of exculpatory defenses which have the ‘potential for eliminating a needless or unfounded prosecution.’ Moreover, although the prosecutor does not have the same obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence as required at trial, the prosecutor may not[,] by his or her conduct[,] potentially prejudice the ultimate decision reached by the grand jury” (People v. Goldstein, 73 AD3d 946, 948-949 [2d Dept 2010] [emphasis added], quoting People v. Harris, 98 NY2d 452, 475 [2002]). Contrary to defendant’s argument, the prosecutor’s claimed failure to present the victim’s undated letter to the grand jury as exculpatory evidence does not warrant dismissal of the indictment. First, “[t]he prosecutor was under no obligation to present that evidence, since it was not entirely exculpatory and would not have materially influenced the grand jury’s investigation” (People v. Hubsher, 176 AD3d 972, 973 [2d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1159 [2020]; see People v. Morel, 131 AD3d 855, 859-860 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1147 [2016]; People v. Hutson, 157 AD2d 574, 574 [1st Dept 1990], lv denied 75 NY2d 967 [1990]). Secondly, it cannot be said that the letter and certain written statements therein made by the victim are truly exculpatory in nature or tend to exonerate defendant. The Court agrees with the People that the victim’s statements in the letter that she would not commit perjury, her commenting about a fair, appropriate sentence for defendant, and her inability to recall some of the details, are not, in and of themselves, exculpatory for defendant. What’s more, the victim’s letter contains, arguably, some inculpatory statements such as “I do not want to be a part of this process anymore”; “[a]ll that seems to matter from where I am sitting right now is that [defendant] gets the maximum sentence because that’s what’s good for the prosecution”; and “[t]his may just be another case to you, but this is my family, my life” (see People v. Hutson, 157 AD2d at 575). Further, there is no clear connection that the victim’s letter is linked to an exculpatory defense such as justification or the like (see e.g. People v. Ball, 175 AD3d 987, 988 [4th Dept 2019], affd 35 NY3d 1009 [2020]; People v. Marquez, 8 AD3d 588, 588 [2d Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 709 [2004]). Notably, defendant did not testify before the grand jury. Moreover, the victim’s independent testimony before the grand jury established a prima facie case that a crime had been committed and that defendant was the culprit. It cannot, therefore, be said that the victim’s letter, even if arguably favorable to defendant, would have eliminated a “needless or unfounded prosecution” (People v. Valles, 62 NY2d 36, 38 [1984]); but rather could have raised factual or credibility issues which defendant, at trial, would have opportunity to cross examine the victim about (People v. Gray, 284 AD2d 664, 665 [3d Dept 2001], lvs denied 97 NY2d 681, 682 [2001]). Thus, the prosecutor’s claimed failure to disclose the victim’s letter to the grand jury does not warrant dismissal under CPL 210.35 (5). In view of the foregoing findings and determinations, the evidence presented to the grand jury, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People, was legally sufficient to establish every offense charged, and to sustain the indictment based upon the Court’s review of the minutes of the grand jury proceedings and the evidence adduced thereat (see People v. Spratley, 152 AD3d 195, 198 [3d Dept 2017]; People v. Campbell, 69 AD3d 645, 645-646 [2d Dept 2010]). The indictment is based upon competent and admissible evidence, which is legally sufficient to establish and provide reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed the offenses charged therein (see CPL 190.65 [1]; People v. Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 115 [1986]). Though mentioned at length above, the Court reiterates that the integrity of the grand jury proceedings was not impaired based on the prosecutor’s conduct and presentation of the case. Viewing the totality of the proceeding, the instructions provided to the grand jury, who voted a true bill on all counts, adequately enabled the grand jurors to make an informed and intelligent decision as to whether an indictment was authorized (see People v. Hart, 25 AD3d 815, 816 [3d Dept 2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 834 [2006]). Thus, the integrity of the grand jury proceeding was not impaired (People v. Huston, 88 NY2d at 409; People v. Valles, 62 NY2d at 38; People v. Sealy, 181 AD3d at 894). The Court also finds that the grand jury proceeding was not rendered defective (see CPL 210.20 [1] [b], [c]; 210.35; People v. Arevalo, 172 AD3d 891, 892 [2d Dept 2019]; People v. Burch, 108 AD3d 679, 680 [2d Dept 2013], lvs denied 22 NY3d 1087-1088 [2014]; People v. Walton, 70 AD3d 871, 873-875 [2d Dept 2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 894 [2010]). Accordingly, those branches of defendant’s motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment are denied in their entity. II. DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR BRADY & ROSARIO MATERIAL Defendant’s motion seeking all Brady material is granted to the extent that the People have a continuing obligation to disclose and provide defendant with any material evidence in their possession which is favorable to him, and if withheld, would deprive him of a fair trial — as is constitutionally mandated in Brady v. Maryland (373 US 83 [1963]), its progeny, and Article 245 of the CPL. To whatever extent material that is discoverable pursuant to CPL Article 245 has not already been provided by the People, defendant’s motion for additional discovery is granted, and such discovery, including both Brady and Rosario material, shall be provided to defendant forthwith (see Brady v. Maryland, 373 US at 88; People v. Rosario, 9 NY2d 286, 289-291 [1961]). In short, the People are obligated to turn over all Brady and Rosario material to the defense. If defendant has a particularized reason to believe that there remains any outstanding discovery which he has yet to receive, counsel for defendant shall promptly contact the Putnam County District Attorney’s Office immediately upon receipt of this Decision and Order. If the issue remains unresolved within five (5) days of receipt of this Decision and Order, counsel for defendant shall contact the Court to request a conference to comply with the People’s discovery obligations. Here, the record and motion papers reflect that the People filed their Certificate of Compliance on March 29, 2022. Included in the People’s Certificate of Compliance is their statement of trial readiness (see generally CPL 30.30 [5]; 245.20). The People represent in their response that they have dutifully complied with discovery obligations in all respects and that they will continue to comply as necessary. Emphasis is placed on the People’s continuing obligation with the discovery mandates in accordance with the U.S. Constitution and as set forth in Article 245 of the CPL; and, if necessary, to file supplemental certificates of compliance as may be needed. As for the presentation of expert witnesses and disclosures related to expert opinion evidence, counsel are reminded, and defendant is advised, that expert disclosure is automatic and must be made in compliance with CPL 245.20. III. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO PRECLUDE STATEMENTS Notwithstanding the fact that the People did not serve upon him notice pursuant to CPL 710.30, defendant moves to suppress any statements (presumably oral or written) that he allegedly made to police. Defendant, relying on CPL 710.30 (3), asserts that any potential statements he made must be suppressed because he was not provided with any statements, documents, or other materials in connection thereto and, thus, the People must be precluded from offering into evidence any statements which have not been turned over to him. In response, the People state that they did not serve a CPL 710.30 notice because there were no custodial or non-custodial statements made by defendant stemming from his arrest. The People emphasize that they possess “recorded jail conversations” of defendant speaking to the complaining witness that were made after his arrest. The People represent that such recorded conversations have been provided to the defense. CPL 710.30 (3) provides that “[i]n the absence of service of notice upon a defendant…, no evidence of a kind specified in [CPL 710.30 [1]) may be received against him [or her] upon trial unless he [or she] has, despite the lack of such notice, moved to suppress such evidence and such motion has been denied and the evidence thereby rendered admissible as prescribed in [CPL 710.70 [2]). “However, the notice requirement is excused when a defendant moves for suppression of such evidence” (People v. Johnson, 280 AD2d 613, 614 [2d Dept 2001]; see People v. Kirkland, 89 NY2d 903, 904 [1996]; People v. Laws, 286 AD2d 991, 992 [4th Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 706 [2002]). The general purpose of a Huntley hearing is for the court to review evidence in determining whether statements made by defendant are admissible at trial (see People v. Huntley 15 NY2d 72, 78 [1965]). Here, defendant does not specifically seek to suppress the recorded jail conversations, nor is there any indication that the People intend to offer those statements at trial. Moreover, the People do not squarely address whether defendant is entitled to a Huntley hearing as a matter of right relative to the recorded jail conversations (see generally People v. Brahney, 126 AD3d 1286, 1288 [4th Dept 2015], affd 29 NY3d 10 [2017]; People v. Martin, 70 Misc 3d 1213[A], *4 [Co Ct, Essex County 2021]). Hence, a Huntley hearing is not needed under these circumstances. IV. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANDOVAL AND MOLINEUX/VENTIMIGLIA HEARINGS Defendant moves for the court to conduct a combined Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia hearing on the ground that the People may offer certain evidence to demonstrate that he likely committed the criminal offenses charged in the indictment based on prior arrests, convictions, or bad acts (see People v. Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 375 [1974]). The People consent to such a combined hearing and oppose, in part, arguing that the Court not suppress admission of prior bad acts for introduction at trial. The People request that the Court defer all Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia rulings to immediately before jury selection. “The purpose of a Sandoval hearing is to provide the defendant with ‘definitive advance knowledge of the scope of cross-examination as to prior conduct to which he will be subjected,’ so that the defendant can decide whether to take the witness stand” (People v. Fisher, 104 AD3d 868, 871 [2d Dept 2013], quoting People v. Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 375; see People v. Dokes, 79 NY2d 656, 661-662 [1992]). Insomuch as the People may seek to admit evidence of defendant’s prior arrests and conviction(s) or certain bad acts that he allegedly did in the past, defendant’s motion for a Sandoval hearing is granted to the extent that a pretrial hearing in that regard will take place before trial (see People v. Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 375). Whether or not defendant chooses to testify with the benefit of a Sandoval ruling is needed based upon the circumstances presented here (cf. People v. Delgado, 101 AD3d 1144, 1146 [2d Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1097 [2013]). Defendant also makes an application relative to Molineux/Ventimiglia hearing to determine the admissibility of any of his previous convictions or bad acts (see People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264, 293 [1901]; People v. Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350, 359-360 [1981]), which the People may seek to use at trial for impeachment purposes, or prior charged or uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct which the People may seek to use on their direct case to prove common scheme or plan, intent, modus operandi, or identification. In their response papers, the People list five incidents between 1998 to 2018 involving defendant which they seek to admit at trial, thus noticing him thereof. The People add that they are reserving their right to proffer additional bad acts or convictions until required to do so by CPL 245.20. Based on the foregoing, the Court elects to conduct a combined Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia hearing in short order — before trial dates are selected. Counsel must be adequately prepared on all specified issues on the date of the hearings and must be ready to present post-hearing arguments with supporting caselaw after the proof is closed. Within ten (10) days from the date of this Decision and Order, the People shall notify and provide to defendant, in compliance with Article 245 of the CPL, a copy of defendant’s summary case history in the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and any other documents showing additional criminal convictions, if such has yet to be turned over. Additionally, the People shall notify defense counsel of all specific instances of defendant’s alleged prior uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct of which the People have knowledge and intend to use at trial for purposes of impeaching defendant’s credibility. Such notification shall be made in compliance with CPL Article 245, and in any event, not less than five (5) business days prior to the scheduled date of the pretrial hearing. V. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE FOR PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL MOTIONS Next, that branch of defendant’s motion seeking leave to file an additional motion, if necessary, based on the ensuing investigation by the defense, is granted. The People consent to same and leave it to the Court’s discretion. CPL 255.20 (3) specifically sets forth the circumstances under which motions may be renewed or filed notwithstanding provisions of time or inclusion in the initial omnibus motion. Indeed, this Court may exercise its discretion to “entertain and dispose of the motion on the merits…in the interest of justice[] and for good cause” (CPL 255.20 [3]; see People v. Hughes, 22 NY3d 44, 49 [2013]; People v. Davydov, 144 AD3d 1170, 1172 [2d Dept 2016]; People v. Huang, 248 AD2d 73, 76 [1st Dept 1998]). Nevertheless, while defendant wishes to reserve his right to file a motion in the future, he is cautioned that such a prospective motion must not be based upon grounds which he could have initially raised in this motion, which may likely result in summary denial. Further, any such motion shall be filed by defendant no later than thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. VI. SCHEDULE FOR HEARINGS AND TRIALS Lastly, defendant requests that any pretrial hearings in this matter be held at a minimum of 20 days before trial to allow enough time for transcription of the pretrial hearing minutes. The People did not oppose this branch of defendant’s motion. Accordingly, the foregoing branch of defendant’s motion is granted (see People v. Sanders, 31 NY2d 463, 467 [1973] [defendant "shall…make his request for a transcript of the minutes of any pretrial hearing prior to its conclusion"]; see also People v. Coleman, 178 AD2d 842, 843-844 [3d Dept 1991], revd 81 NY2d 826 [1993]). The trial shall commence with jury selection on a date to be selected by the Court. Counsel must be adequately prepared for the trial prior to commencement. The Clerk of the Court shall notify counsel in advance of the date that the trial shall commence. Pursuant to the provisions of 22 NYCRR 125.1 (g), the trial date will not be adjourned (see People v. Colasanto, 70 Misc 3d 133[A], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2020]). Counsel and defendant are further advised that this matter is subject to advancement if the trial calendar permits. Finally, the Court notes that legal arguments made by defense counsel at oral argument about issues not specifically raised in defendant’s initial motion papers are not properly before the Court. Nor did counsel request additional briefing on those claimed issues. To the extent not specifically mentioned herein, the parties’ remaining contentions have been examined and found to be without merit. Any other relief requested by defendant not addressed herein is denied. Accordingly, it is hereby: ORDERED that the omnibus motion of defendant JEFF T. HANLON (Mot. Seq. 1), is granted in part and denied in part, as is more fully set forth above in this Decision and Order; and it is further ORDERED that this Court shall conduct a combined Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia pretrial hearing in this case; and it is further ORDERED that defendant and counsel shall personally appear in court on July 6, 2022 at 2:00 p.m. for the aforesaid pretrial hearing. The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this Court. Dated: June 3, 2022