Papers Considered: 1) Respondents’ Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated December 22, 2021; Affidavit of Melissa L. Gross dated August 16, 2020; Affidavit of Christine M. Marriner dated August 16, 2020; Affidavit of Philip A. DiGiorgio dated August 19, 2020; Affidavit of Kenneth Crounse dated October 17, 2020; Affidavit Linda Diana Dalton dated October 31, 2020; Affidavit of Zvi S. Klopott dated December 28, 2020; Affidavit of William Hofelich dated September 22, 2021; Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 2) Petitioner’s Affirmation of William S. Nolan in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated February 28, 2022, with exhibits A-K; Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment dated February 28, 2022. 3) Respondents’ Reply Brief. DECISION AND ORDER Pending before this Court is respondents’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 for an order dismissing the petition, vacating the notice of pendency affecting the real property that is the subject of this proceeding and awarding attorneys’ fees to respondents’ attorneys for the fees incurred in making this motion. Petitioner opposed the motion and it is now submitted for decision. Decedent died testate a resident of Albany County on April 10, 2020, with a will dated April 25, 2008, that left his entire estate to his significant other, Ann Conlon. Shortly before his death, decedent executed a deed conveying his 400-acre rural real property in the Town of Berne to respondent Melissa Gross, subject to a retained life estate, as well as a health care proxy and a power of attorney appointing Gross as his agent. In July 2020, decedent’s will was admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued to Conlon, who commenced the instant discovery proceeding pursuant to SCPA 2103 and 2104 seeking the return of certain property that she alleged belonged to the estate and that was being wrongfully held by respondents Gross, Christine Marriner and Kenneth Crounse.1 Specifically, Conlon alleged that certain property, including cash kept in decedent’s home totaling between $30,000.00 and $50,000.00; a valuable antique firearm; a lawn tractor; and the real property valued at approximately $800,000.00, was being wrongfully held by respondents Gross and Crounse. Conlon sought an order directing respondents to turn over the property to the estate and to compensate the estate for the value of any property which had been disposed of improperly. Essentially, petitioner argued that decedent lacked capacity to execute the deed transferring the real property to Gross, and that he executed the deed as a result of undue influence exercised upon him by respondents. Conlon died on May 14, 2021, and the executor of her estate, petitioner Patrick Conlon, was appointed as administrator CTA of decedent’s estate, and has been substituted for Conlon in this proceeding. Following joinder of issue, the parties engaged in discovery and motion practice. Respondents have now moved for summary judgment dismissing the petition. Petitioner has opposed the motion and the matter is submitted for decision. At issue here is whether decedent had capacity when he executed the deed, whether he executed the deed as a result of respondents’ undue influence, whether the deed was duly executed due to decedent’s diagnosis as legally blind, and whether respondents are in possession of certain items of decedent’s personal property. In support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition, respondents submit their own affidavits, as well as affidavits by Philip A. DiGiorgio, Esq., Kenneth Crounse, Linda Dalton, Zvi S. Klopott, and William Hofelich. Respondents argue that there are no questions of fact as to decedent’s capacity or whether respondents exercised undue influence over decedent. They assert that their affidavits establish that decedent was competent, aware, cognizant of his surroundings and knew what he was doing when he executed the deed on March 23, 2020 and in the days after. They argue that petitioner’s proof does not refute the events set forth in DiGiorgio’s affidavit or decedent’s capacity at the time. Turning first to the issue of decedent’s capacity at the time he executed the deed, “[a] party’s competence is presumed and the party asserting incapacity bears the burden of proving incompetence”(Feiden v. Feiden, 151 AD2d 889, 890 [3d Dept 1989]; see Matter of Nealon, 57 AD3d 1325, 1327 [3d Dept 2008]; Sears v. First Pioneer Farm Credit, ACA, 46 AD3d 1282, 1284 [3d Dept 2007]; Matter of Gebauer, 79 Misc 2d 715, 719 [Sur Ct, Cattaraugus County 1974], affd 51 AD2d 643 [4th Dept 1975]). A medical diagnosis such as dementia or Alzheimer’s disease, “standing alone, does not create a triable issue of fact as to mental capacity”(Matter of Nealon, 57 AD3d at 1327; see Feiden v. Feiden, 151 AD2d at 890; Matter of Friedman, 26 AD3d 723, 725 [3d Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 711 [2006]). “Instead, it must be demonstrated that the individual was incompetent at the specific time of the challenged transaction, i.e., he or she was ‘so affected as to render him [or her] wholly and absolutely incompetent to comprehend and understand the nature of the transaction’”(Matter of Nealon, 57 AD3d at 1327, quoting Feiden v. Feiden, 151 AD2d at 890 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). In his affirmation, DiGiorgio explained that he has been an attorney since 1991 and concentrates his practice in the area of trusts, estates and elder law. Due to the nature of his practice, he has considerable experience working with senior citizens. He explained that he received a telephone call from Marriner, one of his clients, before the weekend of March 21-22, 2020. She asked if he was available to speak with decedent and DiGiorgio informed her that he was available. Shortly thereafter, decedent called DiGiorgio and they made arrangements for DiGiorgio to visit decedent at his home, which he did on Saturday, March 21, 2020, for approximately 75 minutes. DiGiorgio averred that decedent knew he was sick and wanted to get his affairs in order. DiGiorgio learned from decedent that his primary assets were financial accounts and the real property. Decedent made it clear to DiGiorgio that he wanted the property to go to Gross because she had been his neighbor and friend for over 20 years, and he knew that she would treat the property as he wanted it kept. According to DiGiorgio, decedent told him that Conlon was elderly and not in good health, and decedent did not want the property to end up with her children. DiGiorgio stated that decedent did not mention any cash in his home. DiGiorgio left with decedent’s existing will, the deed to the property, and a tax bill so that he could prepare the documents necessary to record the deed. He then prepared a new will, a deed and accompanying papers, a power of attorney and a health care proxy for decedent based on his requests. On Monday, March 23, 2020, DiGiorgio returned to decedent’s house. He asked Gross to leave and told her he would call her when he needed her to sign the power of attorney. DiGiorgio then met with decedent for a period of time. He observed that decedent was alert, coherent and fully involved in their conversation. DiGiorgio showed decedent the new will he had prepared which left everything to Gross. DiGiorgio recalled that decedent was concerned that he might want to leave something to his brother, and that he wanted Conlon to receive something as well. DiGiorgio affirmed that decedent was emphatic that he wanted Gross to have his real property. Accordingly, decedent did not sign the will, stating that he needed to think some more about his investment account and his brother. Decedent signed the deed, which conveyed the property to Gross while reserving a life estate for himself. DiGiorgio stated that Gross then returned to decedent’s house to sign the documents necessary to record the deed and the power of attorney. Before DiGiorgio left, decedent reaffirmed his strong desire to leave the property to Gross. DiGiorgio emphasized in his affidavit that decedent was competent, aware, and not under duress when he signed the deed and communicated to DiGiorgio that he wanted his property to go to Gross. DiGiorgio stated that if he had any doubts about decedent’s competence, he would not have allowed him to execute the documents. In addition, the other affidavits submitted by respondents similarly establish that decedent was competent at the time he executed the deed. Gross averred that she knew decedent for over 25 years, having lived next door to him during that time. She described herself as his friend, tenant, and housecleaner,2 and she interacted with him almost daily. Gross stated that decedent was not blind, and he was coherent and aware in February and March 2020. As for her 2 Gross’s occupation is a housecleaner, a business she has engaged in for 41 years. involvement with executing the deed, Gross stated that she did not know DiGiorgio before March 21, 2020 and that decedent had an opportunity to discuss his plans with DiGiorgio privately. She stated that she was not in decedent’s home while he met with DiGiorgio to discuss and sign the deed. She explained that she was called in later to sign additional documents to record the deed, and to sign as agent on the power of attorney document. In her affidavit, Marriner averred that she began to work for decedent as a home health aide on March 12, 2020, a position which continued until he was transferred to inpatient hospice at the Department of Veteran’s Affairs Medical Center on April 6, 2020. Marriner would go to decedent’s home in three shifts a day for two to three hours each. She described decedent as alert and good company, finding that he did not have any trouble participating in and following a conversation. She observed Crounse assist decedent with check payments by preparing the check but noted that decedent would sign the checks and designate the payee and the amount paid. Marriner explained that she suggested DiGiorgio as an attorney who could assist decedent with his estate planning. She stated that DiGiorgio came to decedent’s house on Saturday, March 21 and Monday, March 23, 2020. Decedent spoke privately with DiGiorgio during both visits. Crounse averred that he had known decedent for 27 or 28 years; they had a professional relationship initially, which evolved into a personal and close friendship in the late 1990s. Crounse stated that he was a constant companion and devoted fried to decedent during the last few months of his life, during which Crounse acted as a caretaker for decedent. He stated that decedent remained lucid and coherent during March and the beginning of April 2020. Crounse specifically recalled that decedent would approve checks to payees that Crounse would fill out and decedent would sign, and that decedent discussed his fear of contracting the coronavirus due to his risk factors. Respondents submitted an affidavit by decedent’s neighbor Linda Diana Dalton. Therein, Dalton stated that she had been decedent’s neighbor for about six years, during which time they became friends and she would bring him meals. She would visit him at his home, staying for 30 to 60 minutes. She visited with him four or five times in 2020; the last visit, in March 2020, was shortened due to coronavirus concerns. She stated that decedent was fully aware, lucid, clear and fully cognizant and competent during each conversation they had in 2020. She noted that she is a geriatric board-certified nurse practitioner and has been a registered nurse for over 50 years. She averred that decedent was able to express himself clearly and fully in March 2020, that he was able to make his own decisions and showed no signs of confusion. William Hofelich, another one of decedent’s neighbors and tenants, also submitted an affidavit in support of respondents’ motion. Hofelich stated that he had been decedent’s tenant and neighbor for 16 years and was familiar with decedent’s mannerisms and behavior. Hofelich averred that, on April 1, 2020, he personally delivered his rent payment to decedent and visited with him at that time. Hofelich stated that decedent did not appear confused or disoriented; rather, he was able to have a conversation with Hofelich as usual. Based on the foregoing evidence,3 respondents have established entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of decedent’s capacity, thus shifting the burden to petitioner to raise a material question of fact. In opposition, petitioner asserts that decedent’s certified medical records from the Veteran’s Affairs Hospital are sufficient to raise an issue as to his capacity to execute the deed because, according to petitioner, the records demonstrate that decedent “suffered from cognitive impairment, dementia, memory loss, [and] disorientation.” Based on a review of the records, the Court does not find that they raise an issue as to decedent’s capacity.4 Decedent received homebased medical visits on February 13, 2020 and March 10, 2020. During the February visit, the provider administered a memory test and noted that decedent “did relatively well.” The provider indicated that decedent “clearly has a slow deterioration of memory” in response to the dementia prompt in the provider notes. The note regarding the March visit restates this information, modifying it only to say that decedent “cont[inues] to have slow deterioration of memory,” and later states “mild dementia” with a reference to the memory test results. A note from the March visit states that decedent “showed good understanding of the current plan; asked appropriate questions.” Of the 153 pages of medical records, the references to cognitive impairment, dementia and memory loss occur on 6 pages. All references to decedent being disoriented occurred between April 6, 2020 and April 10, 2020, while decedent was in inpatient hospice. Moreover, none of the records reflect decedent’s condition on March 23, 2020, the date he executed the deed, or the days immediately preceding and following March 23, 2020. In addition, petitioner relies upon affidavits by decedent’s friend Robert Messercola and Conlon’s son, Martin Conlon. Neither Messercola nor Martin Conlon interacted with decedent on the date that he executed the deed; accordingly, their observations of decedent fail to raise an issue of fact as to his capacity at the time the deed was executed. Moreover, significant parts of their affidavits are alleged “on information and belief,” and therefore are without probative value (see Waddy v. Genessee Patrons Coop. Ins. Co., 164 AD3d 1055, 1058 [3d Dept 2018]; Oswald v. Oswald, 107 AD3d 45, 49 [3d Dept 2013]). As petitioner’s proof fails to raise a material question of fact as to decedent’s capacity at the time the deed was executed, the Court finds that respondents are granted summary judgment on this issue (see Matter of Nealon, 57 AD3d 1325, 1327 [3d Dept 2008], supra). Turning next to the issue of undue influence, petitioner first asserts that respondents were in a confidential relationship with decedent. “‘In order to demonstrate the existence of a confidential relationship, there must be evidence of circumstances that demonstrate inequality or a controlling influence’”(Matter of Nurse, 160 AD3d 745, 748 [2d Dept 2018], quoting Matter of Albert, 137 AD3d 1266, 1268 [2d Dept 2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 910 [2016]). “A confidential relationship is one that is ‘of such a character as to render it certain that [the parties] do not deal on terms of equality’”(Matter of Bonczyk v. Williams, 119 AD3d 1124, 1125 [3d Dept 2014], quoting Matter of Gordon v. Bialystoker Ctr. & Bikur Cholim, 45 NY2d 692, 698- 699 [1978]; see Matter of Nealon, 104 AD3d 1088, 1089 [3d Dept 2013], affd 22 NY3d 1045 [2014]; accord Matter of Kotsones, 185 AD3d 1473, 1475 [4th Dept 2020], affd 37 NY3d 1154 [2022]). The Court finds that neither respondent had a confidential relationship with decedent. Gross did not have a controlling influence over decedent. She did not conduct financial transactions for him or administer medical care. “Without evidence that [Gross] was controlling decedent’s financial decisions, [his] health status, alone, does not establish a confidential relationship”(Matter of Bonczyk v. Williams, 119 AD3d at 1127). Although Gross was appointed as decedent’s health care proxy and his agent under a power of attorney, those documents were executed contemporaneously with the deed on March 23, 2020 and, in any event, “even acknowledged use of a power of attorney to pay the principal’s bills is not necessarily evidence of a confidential relationship”(Matter of Giaquinto, 164 AD3d 1527, 1530 [3d Dept 2018], affd 32 NY3d 1180 [2019]). As for Marriner, she only met decedent in March 2020 after he hired her to help him around the house. She provided assistance to him with respect to his activities of daily living, but did not administer medications, provide medical care or assist with financial transactions. Significantly, Marriner was not a beneficiary of the March 2020 deed. According to the documents submitted by petitioner, decedent paid Marriner $400 in March 2020 for her services, and Gross issued her a final check after decedent’s death for $1500. Thus, the only money Marriner received from decedent was in exchange for the services she rendered. It is also noted that decedent was not isolated from other people in his life; according to the evidence submitted, decedent had phone calls and visits with family, friends and neighbors, including Conlon, in the months before he passed and there is no indication that respondents tried to keep any of those people from decedent. Accordingly, neither of these situations rise to the level of a confidential relationship (see id.; Dwyer v. Valachovic, 137 AD3d 1369, 1371 [3d Dept 2016]). Petitioner next argues that, even in the absence of a confidential relationship, there are numerous issues of fact as to whether respondents unduly influenced decedent. Petitioner bears the burden of establishing undue influence, and he must show that decedent “‘was actually constrained to act against [his] own free will and desire by identifying the motive, opportunity and acts allegedly constituting the influence, as well as when and where such acts occurred’”(Matter of Colverd, 52 AD3d 971, 973 [3d Dept 2008], quoting Matter of Murray, 49 AD3d 1003, 1005–1006 [3d Dept 2008]). “The influence asserted must rise to the level of a moral coercion and mere speculation and conclusory allegations, without specificity as to precisely where and when the influence was actually exerted, are insufficient to raise an issue of fact”(Matter of Stafford, 111 AD3d 1216, 1217 [3d Dept 2013] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). With respect to undue influence, petitioner contends that there are questions of fact as to Gross’s motivations for procuring the transfer of the real property, respondents’ involvement in selecting and procuring the services of attorney DiGiorgio, and with respect to respondents’ credibility. First, as to Gross’s motivations for procuring the transfer of real property, petitioner argues that Gross was concerned that she would lose her home — which she rented from decedent on the property — if Conlon received the property through decedent’s will. Petitioner states that Gross communicated her fears to Conlon’s son, Martin Conlon, shortly before she suggested to decedent that he should leave his property to her. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that decedent transferred the property to Gross after determining that Conlon did not want the property. According to DiGiorgio, decedent told him that Conlon “was elderly and not in good health, and he did not want the real property to end up being owned by her children.”5 Decedent further explained that Gross had been a tenant, neighbor and friend for over 20 years and “[h]e knew that she would treat the property as he wanted it kept.”Gross,6 Marriner7 and Crounse8 provided similar explanations for decedent’s decision in their affidavits. Conlon herself conceded that she would not manage the property, that it was a lot for one person, and that if she had received it she would have given it to her children. She also acknowledged that, although she did not receive the real property, decedent left her approximately $200,000.00 under his will. Even accepting that Gross was motivated to influence decedent in order to preserve her housing situation, petitioner must show that the motivation was accompanied by opportunity and acts constituting the actual exercise of undue influence in order to be successful (see Matter of Haley, 189 AD3d 2000, 2003 [3d Dept 2020]). Here, petitioner has failed to establish that decedent “was actually constrained to act against [his] own free fill and desire”(Matter of Murray, 49 AD3d at 1005). As for respondents’ involvement in selecting and procuring the services of attorney DiGiorgio, petitioner argues that their role in contacting DiGiorgio raises a question of fact as to their undue influence over decedent. Respondents readily conceded their involvement with obtaining the services of DiGiorgio. It is undisputed that decedent’s prior attorney was unavailable to help decedent change his estate plan in March 2020. Accordingly, Marriner suggested DiGiorgio, an attorney she knew because he had done estate planning work for her mother in 2016. DiGiorgio had not done work for Marriner personally, and she had not spoken to him in between 2016 and 2020. Marriner testified that she looked up the number for decedent’s previous attorney; however, the number was disconnected when she tried to call, so she suggested DiGiorgio as an attorney to decedent. Marriner stated that she called DiGiorgio, spoke with him briefly, and then gave the telephone to decedent, who arranged for DiGiorgio to come to his house. Gross testified that she called decedent’s prior attorney, who informed Gross that she was unavailable but provided another attorney’s name. Gross tried to contact that attorney but he did not answer the phone. Gross further testified that Marriner suggested DiGiorgio and that Gross called him and gave the phone to decedent. DiGiorgio averred that he received a phone call from Marriner who inquired whether he was available to speak with decedent, and thereafter he received a call from decedent directly. DiGiorgio met with decedent, initially while Marriner and Gross were present in the house, and then again, when he spent time with decedent alone. As noted, DiGiorgio averred that decedent knew what he wanted to do with his real property and was competent to make that decision at the time. Petitioner contends that there is a question of fact as to respondents’ credibility because Gross and Marriner’s respective version of events leading up to decedent’s meeting with DiGiorgio are “entirely inconsistent and create an issue of fact.” The Court finds that the discrepancies in the recollections of Gross and Marriner as to who called DiGiorgio are immaterial. Given that Gross had no prior relationship with DiGiorgio and Marriner’s relationship with DiGiorgio was limited to services performed for her mother four years earlier, the Court finds that their involvement with contacting DiGiorgio does not raise a material issue as to undue influence. Next, petitioner argues that there is a question as to the due execution of the deed because decedent was “nearly blind.”It is noted that, although petitioner raised issues of lack of capacity and undue influence in the petition, the issue of due execution was not clearly raised. Petitioner now asserts that the fact that, according to the medical records, decedent was legally blind when he executed the deed creates a question of fact as to whether decedent was able to read and understand the contents of the deed at the time of execution. Petitioner does not provide any other evidence establishing that the deed was not properly executed aside from the medical records. Gross averred that decedent was not blind and that he had no difficulty following and participating in conversations in February and March 2020. DiGiorgio’s affidavit establishes that decedent was alert, coherent and fully involved in their conversation when the deed was executed. DiGiorgio recalled that decedent “was emphatic that he wanted [Gross] to have his real property,” and that he “knew exactly what he was doing when he signed the deed conveying the property to her. In addition, the deed contains an acknowledgment listing DiGiorgio as the notary public. “A certificate of acknowledgment attached to an instrument such as a deed raises a presumption of due execution, which presumption, in a case such as this, can be rebutted only after being weighed against any evidence adduced to show that the subject instrument was not duly executed”(Son Fong Lum v. Antonelli, 102 AD2d 258, 260-261 [2d Dept 1984], affd 64 NY2d 1158 [1985]; see Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co. v. City of New York, 99 App Div 327, 333 [1st Dept 1904]). Petitioner failed to come forward with proof of the nature required to rebut the presumption of due execution arising from the notary’s certificate of acknowledgment (see CPLR 4538; Mastrantoni v. Mancini, 171 AD3d 908, 909 [2d Dept 2019]; Son Fong Lum v. Antonelli, 102 AD2d at 261) “or raise questions of fact as to whether [decedent] was unable to read the [deed] or understand its terms”(Matter of Dralle, 192 AD3d 1239, 1242 [3d Dept 2021]). Finally, petitioner argues that there is a question of fact as to the whereabouts of certain items of decedent’s personal property, namely, cash in his house, an antique firearm collection and a lawn tractor. The Court finds that there are no questions of fact regarding these items of personal property. First, with respect to the cash, petitioner points to Conlon’s deposition testimony wherein she stated that decedent kept “a lot of cash” in his home and that he had shown her rolls of cash with rubber bands around them. Conlon acknowledged that decedent would use the cash to purchase items and, in particular, like to attend farmer’s auctions where he would pay for items in cash. She conceded that she did not know if there was any cash in the house at the time decedent died and the last time she saw cash in his house was “[f]ive or six months before he died.” Petitioner also points to Gross’s testimony that she gave decedent cash for her rent payments and that he paid her cash for her cleaning services.9 Gross averred in an affidavit that she had no knowledge of cash in decedent’s home. Marriner similarly averred that she did not have knowledge of cash in decedent’s home and that he never mentioned having cash in the house. Marriner was paid for her services by check. The facts establish that decedent conducted some transactions with cash and others with checks. Although there is evidence that decedent had cash in his home five or six months before his death, the evidence establishes that only Conlon was aware of that cash and there is no evidence that there was cash in his home at the time of his death. Next, with respect to the antique firearm, petitioner contends that decedent’s most expensive antique firearm was missing from his home after his death. Petitioner does not provide any identifying information as to the firearm, such as its type, brand or value. Petitioner points to the testimony of Gross that she was aware of decedent’s firearm collection, that the collection was kept in a locked closet in decedent’s bedroom and that she knew the location of the key to that closet. Petitioner asserts that, since Gross does not dispute that she has knowledge of decedent’s antique firearm collection, there is a question of fact as to the whereabouts of certain guns within the collection. With respect to the firearms collection, Gross testified that she was aware that the collection was locked up in a bedroom closet but that she did not see the collection in the closet. She testified that she did not ever access the closet for any reason and that she gave the key to Martin Conlon on April 11, 2020, the day after decedent passed. Third, petitioner contends that there is a question of fact as to the location of decedent’s orange-yellow lawn tractor. Decedent owned two tractors, a blue tractor and an orange-yellow lawn tractor. Gross testified that decedent’s brother, Keith Mabie, took the lawn tractor shortly after decedent died and that Martin Conlon took the blue tractor in October 2020. There is no other evidence regarding the whereabouts of the tractors; accordingly, there are no questions of fact as to this property. Finally, respondents contend that the estate should be ordered to pay the attorneys’ fees incurred by respondents with respect to this motion. Respondents contend that the evidence procured by August 2021 established that petitioner’s case was frivolous, and respondents, by letter dated August 9, 2021, put petitioner on notice that respondents would pursue an application for expenses as a result. While petitioner’s arguments lack merit, the Court does not find that petitioner’s actions have been so egregious as to rise to the level of frivolous, harassing or false (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1; Nova Info. Sys., Inc. v. Scheidelman, 129 AD3d 1352, 1353 [3d Dept 2015]). In conclusion, respondents have established entitlement to judgment dismissing the petition and petitioner has failed to raise an issue of fact to defeat that entitlement. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that respondents’ motion for summary judgment is granted in part, in that the petition is dismissed and the notice of pendency is vacated, and denied in part with respect to attorneys’ fees. This constitutes the decision and order of the Court. You are hereby notified that this order has been entered this date in the office of the Clerk of Albany County Surrogate’s Court. At the time of the filing of this decision and order, NYSCEF shall transmit by e-mail to the e-mail service addresses of record a notification that the decision and order has been filed and is accessible through NYSCEF. Such notice shall not constitute service of notice of filing or entry by any party (see 22 NYCRR 207.4a [h]). Dated and Entered: June 24, 2022
