OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff commenced this action in New York State Supreme Court, Westchester County, against defendant Cabrini of Westchester d/b/a St. Cabrini Nursing Home (“Cabrini”), as well as its unidentified corporate owners and operators. On behalf of her father’s estate, plaintiff alleges Cabrini did not implement sufficient COVID-19 protocols to prevent her father from contracting and dying from COVID-19. Cabrini timely removed the case to this Court. (Doc. #1). Now pending is plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Doc. #6). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED. BACKGROUND In considering a motion to remand, the Court accepts as true all relevant allegations in the complaint and construes all factual ambiguities in the moving party’s favor. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 2d 357, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The Court may also consider materials outside the complaint, “such as documents attached to a notice of removal or a motion to remand that convey information essential to the court’s jurisdictional analysis.” Romero v. DHL Express (U.S.A), Inc., 2016 WL 6584484, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2016), aff’d, 719 F. App’x 80 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order).1 Plaintiff is an administrator of the estate of her father, Felice Palma, who died from COVID-19 on May 7, 2020, when at Cabrini. Plaintiff alleges Cabrini failed to implement appropriate policies, procedures, and staffing prior to the COVID-19 pandemic; failed properly to respond to the pandemic once it began; and failed properly to treat Mr. Palma, which resulted in his death. Plaintiff brings claims under the New York Public Health Law and for negligence, negligence per se, gross negligence, conscious pain and suffering, wrongful death, and nursing home malpractice. Cabrini argues removal is proper on three grounds: First, it contends defendants were acting at the direction of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) when implementing Cabrini’s COVID-19 protocols, and therefore removal is proper under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1). Second, it contends the Court has original jurisdiction because plaintiff’s claims are completely preempted by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§247d-6d(a)(1), (b)(8), (d)(1), (e)(1), such that removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. §1441(a). And third, it argues plaintiff’s complaint raises substantial questions of federal law that should be adjudicated by a federal court pursuant to Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005). DISCUSSION Several courts have considered whether state law claims arising from a health-care facility’s implementation of COVID-19 protocols may be removed to federal court based on the federal officer removal statute, the PREP Act, or the Grable doctrine. See, e.g., Rivera v. Eastchester Rehab. & Health Care LLC, 2022 WL 2222979, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2022) (collecting cases). “To date every Circuit court and dozens of other district courts considering these questions” have determined “that removal in cases such as this one is improper and remand is required.” Ranieri v. Providence Rest, Inc., 2022 WL 2819411, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2022) (collecting cases); accord Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC, 27 F.4th 679, 683 (9th Cir. 2022). The Court agrees. I. Federal Officer Removal Statute First, Cabrini was not “acting under” a federal officer such that removal is proper under the federal officer removal statute. That nursing homes were declared critical infrastructure businesses at the beginning of the pandemic is insufficient to establish that Cabrini was “carrying out” the duties or tasks of a federal officer. See Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC, 27 F.4th at 685 (“It cannot be that the federal government’s mere designation of an industry as important — or even critical — is sufficient to federalize an entity’s operations and confer federal jurisdiction.” (quoting Buljic v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 22 F.4th 730, 740 (8th Cir. 2021)). Cabrini’s reliance on recent cases in which district courts declined to remand actions by employees alleging Tyson Foods failed to implement sufficient COVID-19 protocols is unavailing. Not only was Tyson Foods designated a critical infrastructure business, it “work[ed] directly with the Department of Agriculture and the [U.S. Food Safety and Inspection Service] to guarantee that there was an adequate food supply” for the country during the pandemic, thereby “exhibit[ing] an effort to help assist, or carry out, the duties and tasks of the federal superior.” Wazelle v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2021 WL 2637335, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2021); accord Fields v. Brown, 519 F. Supp. 3d 388, 392 (E.D. Tex. 2021). Nursing homes like Cabrini, on the other hand, were obviously not “congregate housing isolation and quarantining units” for the federal government, as Cabrini argues. (Doc. #1, at 11). That Cabrini implemented protocols based on CDC guidance for “Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of Facemasks” and “Using Personal Protective Equipment” does not constitute the carrying out of the acts of the federal government. (Id. at 11 n.8); see Watson v. Phillip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 153 (2007) (“A private firm’s compliance…with federal laws, rules, and regulations does not by itself fall within the scope of the statutory phrase ‘acting under’ a federal ‘official’…even if the private firm’s activities are highly supervised and monitored.”). In fact, the nearly 800 pages of exhibits submitted by Cabrini with its opposition papers support this conclusion. For example, the declaration of Bonita Burke, an administrator at Cabrini, states Cabrini “kept abreast of all federal…and local regulations concerning [COVID-19]” and “ relied entirely on the guidance provided by these governmental agencies” in “develop[ing] it[s] policies, protocols, and staff education program.” (Doc. #10-2
