ORDER Plaintiff Hartford-Jackson, LLC brings this action against Defendant Hound’s Tree Wines, LLC alleging trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1114; unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1125(a); unfair competition and anti-dilution under New York General Business Law (“GBL”) §§349, 360-1; and common law infringement and unfair competition. (See Complaint, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).) Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment seeking injunctive relief, treble damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. (See ECF No. 15.) For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. I. DISCUSSION A. Defendant Defaulted The record reflects that Defendant was properly served in this action but has not answered, appeared in this action, responded to the instant motion for default judgment, or otherwise defended this action. Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant has defaulted. B. Liability When a defendant defaults, the Court is required to accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009).1 However, the Court also must determine whether the allegations in the complaint establish the defendant’s liability as a matter of law. Id. Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff alleging trademark infringement “must demonstrate that (1) it has a valid mark that is entitled to protection and that (2) the defendant’s actions are likely to cause confusion with [that] mark.” Tiffany & Co. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 971 F.3d 74, 84 (2d Cir. 2020). Here, Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a valid, protectable trademark. Plaintiff’s HIGHWIRE VINEYARD mark is registered (U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2,435,694) and has been used in commerce by Plaintiff in association with wine, (see Compl.
7-13), thus satisfying the first prong of the inquiry. See Tiffany, 971 F.3d at 84 (explaining that the Lanham Act “treats trademark registration as conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark,” and concluding that “the first prong of the infringement inquiry [was] presumptively satisfied” based on the plaintiff’s registration of the mark). In addition, Plaintiff has established that Defendant used the HIGHWIRE mark in commerce and without Plaintiff’s consent. (See Compl.
