MEMORANDUM AND ORDER A.S.A.P. Logistics, Ltd. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. (“Defendant”) seeking relief for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) prima facie tort. Defendant moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. BACKGROUND1 On or about April 16, 2020, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into the Global Air Charter Services Agreement (the “Agreement”). (Am. Compl. 5, ECF No. 10.) Pursuant to the Agreement, Defendant was obligated to charter one or more aircrafts from unspecified third-party carriers, for four flights on April 25, 2020, May 1, 2020, May 5, 2020, and May 8, 2020. (Id.) The flights were arranged to transport Plaintiff’s goods between China and the United States. (Id.) The purpose of chartering planes in this manner was to control the cost of freight, the quantity of goods shipped, and the delivery dates of the goods. (Id. 11.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant “failed and refused to timely ship” Plaintiff’s goods on the dates listed in the Agreement. (Id. 12.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends Defendant “bump[ed]” Plaintiff’s freight and put “ someone else’s freight ahead” of Plaintiff’s. (Id. 13.) As a result, Plaintiff’s customers canceled orders for those goods. (Id. 12.) STANDARD OF REVIEW To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the alleged facts allow the court to draw a “reasonable inference” of a defendant’s liability for the alleged misconduct. Id. While this standard requires more than a “sheer possibility” of a defendant’s liability, id., “[i]t is not the Court’s function to weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial” on a motion to dismiss, Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d 556, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Instead, “the Court must merely determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient, and, in doing so, it is well settled that the Court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true.” Id. (citations omitted). DISCUSSION Defendant maintains that all of Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the Montreal Convention and are thus ripe for dismissal. Plaintiff does not appear to take issue with Defendant’s argument that its tort claims are pre-empted by the Montreal Convention. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis on this argument focuses only on Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. By way of background, the Montreal Convention is the successor to the Warsaw Convention, whose “cardinal purpose…[was] to ‘achieve [international] uniformity of rules governing claims arising from international air transportation.’” El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 169 (1999) (alteration omitted) (quoting Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991)). To that end, the Warsaw Convention “created a comprehensive liability system to serve as the exclusive mechanism for remedying injuries suffered in the course of the international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft.” King v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 356-57 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). This “remedial system [was] designed to protect air carriers against catastrophic, crippling liability by establishing monetary caps on awards and restricting the types of claims that may be brought against carriers.” Id. at 357. In 1987, the Warsaw Convention was supplanted by the Montreal Convention. The Montreal Convention largely “unifies and replaces the system of liability that derives from the Warsaw Convention.” Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 371 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); see also Dep’t of Homeland Security, Letter of Submittal of Strobe Talbott (June 23, 2000) (Talbott Letter), reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL 33292734, at *6 (“Upon entry into force, the [Montreal] Convention will take precedence over the Warsaw Convention and any of its amendments and related instruments, and as a practical matter will supersede the private inter-carrier agreements, when the State or States relevant in a particular accident are party to the new Convention.”). Notably, however, the Montreal Convention extended coverage to “contracting carriers” that arrange for a third party to transport carriage, whereas the Warsaw Convention applied only to actual carriers2 See Best v. BWIA W. Indies Airways Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 359, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he Montreal Convention…extended liability to what it characterizes as ‘contracting’ carriers for harms incurred during carriage by ‘actual’ carriers[.]“). Nonetheless, Plaintiff persists in its contention that the Montreal Convention applies only to “air carriers,” which Plaintiff defines as “those airlines that actually transport passengers or baggage.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 8-9, ECF No. 20.) According to Plaintiff, because Defendant arranged for the transport of goods between parties, Defendant is not an “air carrier” covered by the Montreal Convention. (Id.) Rather, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant was acting as a “charter broker” that “procur[ed] a specific amount of space on the aircraft for a flat fee” and was thus not covered by the Montreal Convention. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff is wrong. That is, the Montreal Convention applies when: a person (hereinafter referred to as the ‘contracting carrier’) as a principal makes a contract of carriage governed by this Convention with a passenger or consignor or with a person acting on behalf of the passenger or consignor, and another person (hereinafter referred to as ‘the actual carrier’) performs, by virtue of authority from the contracting carrier, the whole or part of the carriage[.] Art. 39, Convention for Int’l Carriage by Air, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL 33292734 (“Montreal Convention”). Plaintiff’s allegations make clear that Defendant was acting as a “contracting carrier” that contracted with Plaintiff to transport Plaintiff’s goods, the actual transport of which was undertaken by a third party. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant agreed to charter for Plaintiff “one or more aircraft from an unspecified third-party carrier…for the purpose of transporting” Plaintiff’s goods. (Am. Compl. 5.) Defendant is thus plainly covered by the Montreal Convention. See, e.g., In re W. Caribbean Airways, S.A., 619 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1307-08 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding tour operator that packages and resells air transportation under a “charter contract” to be a “contracting carrier” covered by the Montreal Convention).3 This conclusion, however, does not end the Court’s inquiry. The Court must now determine whether Plaintiff’s claim otherwise falls within the Montreal Convention. It does. With respect to the “carriage of passengers, baggage, and cargo,” an action for “damages, however founded, whether under [the Montreal Convention] or in contract or in tort or otherwise” may only be brought subject to “the conditions and such limits of liability as [set out] in [the Montreal Convention].” Art. 29, Montreal Convention. A Plaintiff may recover under the Montreal Convention for only the following: “1) death or bodily injury suffered by an airline passenger or the destruction, loss of or damage to [] baggage…; 2) loss or destruction of baggage or other cargo sustained during carriage by air…; and 3) delay in the carriage of passengers, baggage or cargo.” Seagate Logistics, Inc. v. Angel Kiss, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 2d 499, 506 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal citation omitted). If an action for damages falls within one of those three provisions, the Montreal Convention provides the sole vehicle through which a plaintiff may bring its claim. See New Fortune Inc. v. Apex Logistics Int’l (CN) Ltd., No. 21-262-cv, 2021 WL 5499464, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 24, 2021) (the Montreal Convention “preempts” any claim that “falls within its substantive scope.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). As Defendant rightly maintains, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is based on Defendant’s “alleged delay of the shipments at issue.” (Def. Mem. at 4, ECF No. 15.) Specifically, Plaintiff complains that Defendant “intentionally failed and refused to timely ship” Plaintiff’s goods and that “Defendant knowingly kept bumping [P]laintiff’s freight…and putting someone else’s freight ahead.” (Am. Compl.
