DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiffs Florida State University and the Florida State University Board of Trustees (together “FSU”) move for entry of a default judgment against 133 defendants1 (collectively, the “Defaulting Defendants”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) and Local Civil Rule 55.2(b).2 (See Dkt. Nos. 50-53.) As remedies for the Defaulting Defendants’ alleged conduct, FSU also makes an application to the Court for entry of a permanent injunction, heightened statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1117(c), and permission to serve asset restraining notices on certain entities. Although FSU does not cite authority for the asset restraining notices, the Court construes the request as being made pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section 5222 (“Section 5222″). FSU filed its complaint in this matter on December 13, 2021, alleging trademark infringement and counterfeiting pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1114 (“Count One”), false designation of origin pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1125(a) (“Count 2″), and unfair competition pursuant to New York Common law. (See Compl.” or “Complaint,” Dkt. No. 1.) One day later, on December 14, 2021, the Court entered a temporary restraining order against the Defaulting Defendants. (See Dkt. No. 21.) Despite proper service of process, Defaulting Defendants never answered the Complaint or otherwise appeared. (See “Hutchinson Decl.” Dkt. No. 51 15; “Clerk’s Certificate of Default,” Dkt. No. 45.) Accordingly, the Court now authorizes entry of default judgment for Count One and Count Two against the Defaulting Defendants for trademark counterfeiting and trademark infringement. Further, as discussed below, upon consideration of FSU’s written evidence as to its requested remedies, the Court enters a permanent injunction against the Defaulting Defendants, awards FSU a judgment in the amount of $50,000 against each Defaulting Defendant, and denies in part, without prejudice, FSU’s request for permission to serve asset restraining notices against certain third-party service providers and financial institutions. I. REMEDIES A. PERMANENT INJUNCTION To prevent further trademark violations, the Lanham Act provides the Court authority to grant injunctive relief. See 15 U.S.C. §1116. An injunction should issue where a plaintiff has succeeded on the merits and has demonstrated that (1) it suffered irreparable harm; (2) that remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) the balance of hardships between the parties warrants such a remedy; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by the issuance of an injunction. See U.S. Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 515, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 511 F. App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2013). FSU has demonstrated that all of these factors favor issuance of the requested permanent injunction. As to the first factor, FSU alleges a loss of goodwill and confusion (see Compl.
31-32), which establishes irreparable harm.3 See U.S. Polo Ass’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 539. Second, the Defaulting Defendants’ past conduct and continued infringement creates a high likelihood that they will continue to infringe FSU’s marks. See Mattel, Inc. v. 162275894, No. 18 Civ. 8821, 2020 WL 2832812, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2020) (finding probability of continued infringement based on past conduct establishes second factor). The third factor is also met because “it is axiomatic that an infringer…cannot complain about the loss of ability to offer its infringing product.” WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 287 (2d Cir. 2012). Finally, granting injunctive relief would not disserve the public interest because the public has an interest in being assured of goods’ origin and quality, as well as an avoidance of confusion and deception. See Mattel, 2020 WL 2832812, at *5. Accordingly, having met all four factors, FSU is entitled to a permanent injunction against the Defaulting Defendants. B. STATUTORY DAMAGES When the Court enters a default judgment, it must “accept[] as true all of the factual allegations of the complaint,” Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981), but “the amount of damages are not deemed true.” Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA) v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 152 (2d Cir. 1999). The Court must “conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damage with reasonable certainty.” Id. The amount of damages to award in connection with a default judgment may be decided by the court without a hearing. See Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[I]t [is] not necessary for the District Court to hold a hearing, as long as it ensured that there was a basis for the damages specified in the default judgment.” (internal quotation omitted)). FSU seeks statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. Section 1117(c), instead of actual damages. The Lanham Act allows plaintiffs to recover between $1,000 and $200,000 for a defendant’s use of a counterfeit mark, or if the violation was willful, up to $2,000,000 per mark. See 15 U.S.C. §1117(c). Within these bounds, courts have broad discretion to issue an appropriate award. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Artex Creative Int’l Corp., 687 F. Supp. 2d 347, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Since the Lanham Act “does not explicitly provide guidelines for courts to use in determining an appropriate award…courts have looked to an analogous provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. Section 504(c), which provides statutory damages for willful infringement.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. LY USA, No. 06 Civ. 13463, 2008 WL 5637161, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2008) (quotation marks omitted). Applying this framework, courts determining damages pursuant to Section 1117(c) typically consider the following seven factors: (1) the expenses saved and the profits reaped; (2) the revenues lost by the plaintiff; (3) the value of the [trademark]; (4) the deterrent effect on others besides the defendant; (5) whether the defendant’s conduct was innocent or willful; (6) whether a defendant has cooperated in providing particular records from which to assess the value of the infringing material produced; and (7) the potential for discouraging the defendant. All-Star Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Media Brands Co., Ltd., 775 F. Supp. 2d 613, 622-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). FSU seeks heightened statutory damages in the amount of $150,000 against each Defaulting Defendants for trademark counterfeiting and trademark infringement. (See “MOL,” Dkt. No. 53 at 10-11.) By virtue of the default, the Defaulting Defendants’ infringement is deemed willful, and therefore the Court has discretion to award up to $2,000,000 per type of good sold. See 15 U.S.C. §1117(c)(2). After considering the relevant factors, the Court finds that FSU’s requested award of $150,000 in damages per Defaulting Defendant is too high. Instead, it awards $50,000 in damages per Defaulting Defendants based on the reasons discussed below. Because of the default, FSU does not have evidence to quantify the Defaulting Defendants’ expenses or sales of the counterfeit products, and so cannot determine Defaulting Defendants’ profits. Additionally, the Defaulting Defendants have a history of concealing their identities. (See MOL at 9.) Without the benefit of discovery, FSU recognizes that there exists a “lack of information regarding Defaulting Defendants’ sales and profits” rendering it effectively impossible to measure actual damages. (Id. at 8.) Factors one, two, and six weigh in favor of FSU — a plaintiff should not be deprived of its right to recover damages based on defendants making it impossible to discern their expenses saved and profits reaped. See Off-White LLC v. ^ ^Warm House^ ^ Store, No. 17 Civ. 8872, 2019 WL 418501, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2019). FSU has submitted evidence that the FSU marks are considered a famous mark and that FSU expends substantial resources developing consumer recognition, awareness, and goodwill. (Compl.
