INTRODUCTION Defendant in this action was arrested for driving while intoxicated under NY Vehicle and Traffic Law [VTL] §§1192(2) and 1192(3) after he was stopped for driving with his vehicle’s high beams engaged in violation of VTL §375(3). On October 13, 2022, the Court held a pretrial hearing to determine whether the evidence of defendant’s intoxication and the statements he made to the New York State Trooper who stopped him should be suppressed. The issue of first impression in this case is whether probable cause existed for the police to stop defendant’s vehicle for the alleged traffic violation absent any evidence that the high beams of defendant’s car interfered with the driver of any approaching vehicle. The Court holds that under the circumstances of this case, the police had probable cause to stop defendant’s vehicle for a violation of VTL §375(3). FACTS New York State Trooper Justin Statt was the sole witness at defendant’s probable cause and Huntley hearings. Trooper Statt testified that while he was driving his patrol car northbound on Culver Road in Rochester, New York at about 9:55 p.m. on July 27, 2022, he observed a gray Pontiac traveling southbound on Culver Road with its high beams engaged. The Pontiac, later determined to be driven by defendant, passed several other vehicles as it approached and then passed Trooper Statt on Culver Road. According to Trooper Statt, the area of Rochester in which he observed the Pontiac was “well lit.” At that point, Trooper Statt made a U-turn and conducted a traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle on the Culver Road on-ramp to I-490 eastbound. In response to the Trooper’s questions, defendant produced his driver’s license and said he was driving home from work. As he talked with defendant, Trooper Statt observed that defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and watery, that he had droopy eyelids and slurred speech, and that an odor of an alcoholic beverage was emanating from defendant’s car. When Trooper Statt asked defendant if he had had anything to drink, defendant initially replied, “No,” but then told the Trooper that he had consumed alcohol while golfing earlier. While talking with defendant, Trooper Statt did not have his weapon drawn, and did not make any promises or coerce him in any way to induce defendant to talk to him. Based on his observations, Trooper Statt asked defendant to exit his car to perform field sobriety tests. With respect to the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, defendant demonstrated lack of smooth pursuit, distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation, and the onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees in both eyes. According to Trooper Statt, the existence of these involuntary eye movements indicated that defendant’s central nervous system was affected by a chemical depressant such as alcohol. In performing the walk and turn test, defendant exhibited seven of the eight clues of intoxication for which Trooper Statt was watching. In performing the standardized one-legged stand test, defendant demonstrated three of the four clues of intoxication for which Trooper Statt was watching. Defendant properly performed the “C” through “Q” alphabet test that Trooper Statt also asked him to perform.1 Based on his training, experience, and observations, Trooper Statt came to the opinion that defendant was intoxicated and arrested him for driving while intoxicated. LEGAL DISCUSSION A law enforcement officer is constitutionally permitted to stop a vehicle if he or she has probable cause to believe that the vehicle’s drive has committed a traffic violation. See People v. Guthrie, 25 NY3d 130, 133 (NY 2015); People v. Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349 (2001). Importantly, probably cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, probable cause exists where the officer has “information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed.…” People v. Guthrie, 25 NY3d at 133, citing People v. Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 (1985). Consequently: [a] police officer who can articulate credible facts establishing reasonable cause to believe that someone has violated a law has established a reasonable basis to effectuate a [traffic] stop. People v. Guthrie, 25 NY3d at 133, citing People v. Robinson, 97 NY2d at 353-54. See Deveines v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles Appeals Bd., 136 AD3d 1383, 1384 (4th Dep’t 2016). At the hearing, Trooper Statt testified that he stopped defendant’s car because it had its high beams on in violation of VTL §375(3). Defendant contends that the People failed to demonstrate probable cause to stop defendant’s car because there was no evidence that either Trooper Statt or any other driver had to avert their eyes or were otherwise impeded in their ability to drive as a result of the high beams on defendant’s car. VTL §375(3) prohibits, in part, the engagement of a vehicle’s high beams if the beams’ “dazzling light…interfere[s] with the driver of [another] vehicle.” Although Trooper Statt testified that defendant’s car passed several other vehicles while its high beams were engaged, there was no evidence that the light from the high beams hindered the driver of any other vehicle. Consequently, Trooper Statt lacked probable cause to stop defendant’s car for a violation of this subsection of VTL §375(3). See Barr v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 155 AD3d 1159, 1160 (3rd Dep’t 2017), lv. denied 31 NY3d 907 (2018); People v. Allen, 89 AD3d 742, 743-44 (2d Dep’t 2011), lv. dismissed 19 NY3d 993 (2012). However, VTL §375(3) also prohibits the use of a vehicle’s high beams in two other distinct situations. As elucidated in People v. Meola, 7 NY2d 391, 393 (1960), the engagement of a vehicle’s high beams is proscribed in the following two additional and separate situations: (2) when the highway is so lighted that headlamp illumination for [more than two hundred feet ahead] ‘is unnecessary or impracticable’, and (3) when the traffic on the highway is such that headlight illumination ‘is unnecessary or impracticable.’ At the hearing, Trooper Statt testified that as he drove northbound on Culver Road within the City of Rochester, New York, he observed defendant’s vehicle traveling northbound towards him on Culver Road, with its high beams engaged, “passing several other vehicles in a well lit area.” Though his testimony was terse, Trooper Statt articulated facts establishing the existence of the essential elements of the proscribed use of high beams in both situations. First, the city road was well lit, and the fact that defendant’s car passed “several other vehicles” is circumstantial evidence that the use of high beams for more than two hundred feet ahead was “unnecessary or impracticable” for more than two hundred feet ahead as defendant drove past the several other cars.” VTL §375(3). Second, the fact that defendant drove past “several other cars” likewise demonstrated that traffic on the road was such that the use of high beams was “unnecessary or impracticable. VTL §375(3). Once the People introduced credible evidence that Trooper Statt had reasonable cause to believe that defendant’s use of his car’s high beams violated VTL §375(3), the burden then shifted to defendant to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that probable cause did not exist to stop defendant’s car for the alleged traffic violation. See People v. Baldwin, 25 NY2d 66, 70 (1969); People v. Thomas, 291 AD2d 462, 463 (2d Dep’t 2002). Although defendant’s attorney cross-examined Trooper Statt, he asked the Trooper Statt no questions regarding his observations of defendant’s use of his vehicle’s high beams, other than asking the Trooper whether he had stopped defendant’s car because defendant had his high beams engaged. As a result, defendant failed to satisfy his burden of showing that Trooper Statt did not have probable cause to stop his car for a violation of VTL §375(3). Based on his observations of defendant after he stopped defendant’s car, defendant’s responses to his questions, defendant’s performance of several field sobriety tests, and his training and experience, Trooper Statt had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving while intoxicated under VTL §1192(3). The hearing evidence proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant’s statements to Trooper Statt were made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See People v. Drouin, 115 AD3d 1153, 1156 (4th Dep’t), lv. denied 23 NY3d 1019 (2014). CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of his intoxication on the ground that the stop of his vehicle for a traffic violation was made without probable cause and on the ground that his arrest for driving while intoxicated was made without probable cause is denied. Defendant’s motion to suppress the statements he made to the police is denied. SO ORDERED. Dated: November 30, 2022
