ORDER Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to vacate the default entered by the Clerk in this case where Plaintiff alleges employment discrimination. See dkt. # 49. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, opposes the motion. This is the second time that Defendant has addressed whether an entry of default by the Clerk should be vacated. See dkt. # 31. This case arises out of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant Saratoga Center for Care, LLC. See Complaint (“Complt.”), dkt. # 1. Plaintiff alleges that she worked for the Defendant, which operates a 237-bed nursing facility, as a registered nurse supervisor. Plaintiff alleges discrimination because of her race and retaliation for reporting that discrimination. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis with her Complaint. Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel gave the Complaint an initial review after Plaintiff filed the motion. See dkt. # 4. Judge Hummel granted the motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Id. He also recommended that the Court dismiss any Title VII claims against an individual defendant with prejudice and recommended service of the Complaint on Saratoga Center for Care, the remaining Defendant. Id. The Court adopted the Report-Recommendation on November 21, 2019. See dkt. # 5. The Clerk of Court entered default against the Defendant on March 20, 2021. See dkt. # 25. T he Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment with a motion to vacate the default. See dkt. # 31. Despite that such a motion was not a proper response to the motion for default judgment, the Court granted Defendant’s motion, vacated the entry of default, and permitted Defendant time to respond to the Complaint. See dkt. # 35. Defendant responded by filing a motion to dismiss, contending that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. See dkt. # 36. The Court denied that motion without prejudice to refiling on April 25, 2022. See dkt. # 41. The Court concluded that Plaintiff’s reply to Defendant’s motion raised issues that precluded finding that she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Noting that Defendant had not filed a reply brief, which could have cleared up such issues, the Court concluded that Defendant should be permitted to file a renewed motion to dismiss. The Court directed Defendant to file any renewed motion within 14 days. If Defendant did not file such a motion within 14 days, the Court directed, Defendant should file an answer within 21 days. Defendant did not file a renewed motion within 14 days or an answer within 21 days. Judge Hummel scheduled a status conference for June 15, 2022. Neither party appeared. See docket entry for 6/15/22. Judge Hummel rescheduled the conference for July 21, 2022. See dkt. # 43. Only Plaintiff appeared for the conference, and Judge Hummel noted on the record that Defendant appeared to be in default. See minute entry for July 21, 2022. Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default. See dkt. # 45. The Clerk of Court entered default on July 22, 2022. See dkt. # 48. Defendant filed an answer to the Complaint on August 1, 2022 and a motion to vacate the entry of default on August 4, 2022. Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment on August 8, 2022. See dkt. # 50. Plaintiff filed a response to the motion to vacate the entry of default. See dkt. # 52. Defendant responded to the motion for default judgment and replied to Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s motion to vacate. See dkt. #s 53, 54. A “court may set aside an entry of default for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). That rule does not define “good cause,” but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has “‘established three criteria that must be assessed in order to decide whether to relive a party from default or from a default judgment.’” Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry & Constr., LLC, 779 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993)). A court addressing this issue looks to “‘(1) the willfulness of default, (2) the existence of any meritorious defenses, and (3) prejudice to the non-defaulting party.’” Id. (quoting Guggenheim Capital, LLC v. Birnbaum, 722 F.3d 444, 455 (2d Cir. 2013)). Defendant’s motion to vacate offers an explanation for Defendant’s failure to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint after the Court’s initial decision.1 Defendant relates that, after Plaintiff filed her response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the attorney who had represented Defendant left the law firm that still represents the Defendant. See dkt. # 49 at 6. Due to “a failing of communication” between the former attorney and the law firm, no one filed a substitute entry of appearance for the Defendant. Id. at 7. Defendant contends hat “[t]his error was due, in part, to on-going issues relating to work-from-home, and other irregularities caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic and responses thereto.” Id. Defendant admits that the failing was defense counsel’s, but insists that such conduct “was completely unintentional.” Id. Defense counsel contends that counsel did not receive notice of the Court’s April 25, 2022 order denying the motion to dismiss with leave to refile or provide an answer. Id. at
8-9. Counsel also did not receive notice of the telephone conference scheduled for June 8, 2022 or the rescheduled conference for July 21, 2022. Id. at
