DECISION and ORDER Currently before the Court, in this citizen’s suit under the Clean Water Act filed by Riverkeeper, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) against Coeymans Recycling Center, LLC, and Coeymans Recycling Center II, LLC (“Defendants”), are the following three motions: (1) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and, in the alternative, motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); (2) Plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment on one of its eight claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; and (3) Plaintiff’s motion to strike portions of an affirmation submitted in support of Defendants’ motion to dismiss and/or for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Local Rule 7.1 of the District’s Local Rules of Practice and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). (Dkt. Nos. 47, 49, 50.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is denied, Plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment is denied, and Plaintiff’s motion to strike is denied. I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND A. Plaintiff’s Complaint Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed on September 1, 2020, alleges that Defendants discharged polluted industrial stormwater from the industrial park they own and operate in the Village of Ravena and the Town of Coeymans into Coeymans Creek in violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §1251, et seq. (the “Clean Water Act” or “CWA”) and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“SPDES”) Multi-Sector General Permit for Stormwater Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity (“General Permit”). (Dkt. No. 1.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’ wrongdoing came in five forms. First, Plaintiff alleges that, although Defendants sought coverage under the General Permit to discharge polluted industrial stormwater at certain locations, they discharged polluted industrial stormwater at other locations (not allowed by the General Permit). (Id.) Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants also failed to implement an adequate Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plan (“SWPPP”) required by the joint New York State and federal permitting scheme, including Stormwater Pollution Control Measures required by the General Permit. (Id.) Third, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to comply with the monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements of the permitting scheme, including providing to Plaintiff, upon request, a copy of the SWPPP in effect on May 12, 2020. (Id.) Fourth, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to conduct adequate site inspections and take appropriate corrective actions required by the General Permit. (Id.) Fifth and finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant also failed to comply with the terms of the SPDES General Permit for Stormwater Discharges from Construction Activity (the “Construction Permit”) by failing to implement adequate control measures. (Id.) Attached to Plaintiff’s 43-page Complaint are Plaintiff’s 20-page Notice of Violation & Intent to Sue Letter (“Notice Letter”), a 10-page table of precipitation data, and a 13-page document entitled “Physiochemical Characteristics of Runoff and Surface Waters of Lower Coeymans Creek,” which was created by Jeremy Dietrich (the “Third-Party Report”). (Id.) Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts eight claims: (1) a claim of unlawful discharge of pollutants in violation of 33 U.S.C. §§1311 and 1342; (2) a claim of failure to implement the best available and best conventional treatment technologies under the General Permit, in violation of 33 U.S.C. §§1311 and 1342; (3) a claim of failure to develop, implement, and make available an adequate storm water pollution prevention plan in accordance with the General Permit, in violation of 33 U.S.C. §§1311 and 1342; (4) a claim of failure to conduct routine site inspections and comply with general monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements under the General Permit, in violation of 33 U.S.C. §1311 and 1342; (5) a claim of failure to implement the best available and best conventional treatment technologies under the Construction Permit, in violation of 33 U.S.C. §§1311 and 1342; (6) a claim of failure to develop, implement, and make available an adequate storm water pollution prevention plan in accordance with the Construction Permit, in violation of 33 U.S.C. §§1311 and 1342; (7) a claim of violations of water quality standards, under 33 U.S.C. §§1311 and 1342; and (8) a claim of violations of effluent standard of limitation, under 33 U.S.C. §§1311 and 1342, by failing to make a copy of the SWPPP available to the public within 14 days of receipt of a written request for it. (Id.) Familiarity with Plaintiff’s claims, and the factual allegations supporting them, is assumed in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for review by the parties. (Id.) B. Undisputed Material Facts on Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Generally, the following facts were asserted by Plaintiff in support of its cross-motion for partial summary judgment and either expressly admitted or denied without an adequate citation to admissible record evidence by Defendants in their response thereto. (Compare Dkt. No. 48, Attach. 2 with Dkt. No. 54, Attach. 3.) 1. Since at least May 12, 2020, Defendants have been authorized by the New York State DEC to discharge stormwater associated with industrial activities from certain outfalls at Defendants’ industrial park (“Industrial Park”) in accordance with the terms of the DEC’s SPDES General Permit, Permit No. GP-0-17-004. 2. Authorization to discharge was sought and obtained under SPDES permit ID NYR00F372. The authorized permittee is Coeymans Recycling Center, LLC. 3. Part III.C.2. of the General Permit states the following about a permittee’s obligation to make a copy of its stormwater pollution prevention plan (“SWPPP”) publicly available: The owner or operator must make a copy of the SWPPP available to the public within fourteen (14) days of receipt of a written request. Copying of documents will be done at the requester’s expense. (Note: A facility may withhold justifiable portions of the SWPPP from public review that contain trade secrets, confidential commercial information or critical infrastructure information in accordance with 6 NYCRR 616.7 and 750-1.22). 4. Plaintiff’s Notice Letter was dated May 12, 2020, and stated as follows: “Riverkeeper requests CRC to send a copy of its SWPPP to the undersigned attorney.” The footnote to this sentence reads, “Note that under Part III.C.2 of the General Permit, the owner or operator of a facility ‘must make a copy of the SWPPP available to the public within 14 days of receipt of a written request.’” 5. Defendants received Plaintiff’s Notice Letter on or about May 15, 2020.1 6. Defendants did not provide to Plaintiff a copy of the SWPPP within 14 days of receiving Plaintiff’s Notice Letter. 7. Defendants did not provide a copy of a SWPPP to Plaintiff until December 11, 2020, when they uploaded the July 2020 SWPPP to the Court’s CM/ECF system as an attachment to Defendants’ Answer. 8. The July 2020 SWPPP provided on December 11, 2020, was a “native electronic document,” meaning an electronic document stored in the electric format in which it was originally created by a word-processing program. 9. The July 2020 SWPPP had been prepared initially on August 19, 2013, and then revised multiple times, including by July 8, 2020. 10. At the time Defendants received Plaintiff’s Notice Letter on or about May 15, 2020, Defendants had a SWPPP in effect.2 11. It appears that, at the time Plaintiff’s Notice Letter was received, the SWPPP was available in the form of an electronic document.3 12. In their motion, Defendants refer to the most-current version of their SWPPP as the “September 2021 SWPPP.” Defendants did not provide a copy of the September 2021 SWPPP to Plaintiff until they attached a copy to their motion to dismiss on February 25, 2022.4 C. Parties’ Briefing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and/or for Judgment on the Pleadings Generally, in support of their motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (specifically, lack of standing), Defendants assert two arguments: (1) Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges facts plausibly suggesting only a conjectural or hypothetical injury, because (a) when Plaintiff filed its Complaint on September 1, 2020, the SWPPP required by the General Permit was the July 2020 SWPPP, and (b) the Complaint acknowledges that Plaintiff failed to review the July 2020 SWPPP before filing its Complaint, ignoring the fact that the alleged violations had therefore ceased; and (2) all of Plaintiff’s eight claims are moot and not likely to reoccur because (a) before filing them, Plaintiff had not reviewed the July 2020 SWPPP, which Defendants instituted after receiving Plaintiff’s Notice Letter of May 12, 2020, and (b) as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Claim, Plaintiff’s request for the SWPPP then-in effect was defective in that it failed to contain advanced payment, or an offer to pay, for the production of the SWPPP, and in any event the SWPPP was subsequently provided with Defendants’ Answer. (See generally Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 1, at Part I [Defs.' Memo. of Law].) In support of their alternative motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendants assert three arguments: (1) Plaintiff cannot allege facts plausibly suggesting a claim for relief because it did not review the July 2020 SWPPP before it filed its Complaint on September 1, 2020, and therefore could not know whether the alleged violations were ongoing at the time; (2) the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint were made in bad faith because Plaintiff’s counsel has acknowledged Plaintiff’s failure to review the July 2020 SWPPP before filing the Complaint, and because Plaintiff has filed a separate lawsuit alleging that the pollution in Coeymans Creek alleged in this lawsuit was caused by another party located within the geographic area of the Industrial Park (i.e., TCI of NY, LLC); and (3) as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Claim, Plaintiff’s request for a SWPPP was defective in that it failed to contain advanced payment, or an offer to pay, for the production of the SWPPP. (See generally Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 1, at Part II [Defs.' Memo. of Law].) Generally, in response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff essentially asserts two arguments: (1) Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is actually a motion for summary judgment, which asks this Court to decide the merits of this case, and which should be denied as premature and in any event is without merit (especially given the Third Party Report attached to the Complaint); (2) even if this motion were truly one for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, it should be denied because (a) Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a right to relief arising under federal law, (b) Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that it possesses constitutional standing to bring its claims, (c) Plaintiff has sufficiently supported it claims that Defendants are violating the Clean Water Act; and (d) Plaintiff made its allegations in good faith, after a reasonable inquiry. (See generally Dkt. No. 48, Attach. 1 [Plf.'s Opp'n Memo. of Law].) Generally, in response to Defendants’ alternative motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff essentially asserts two arguments: (1) Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is actually a motion for summary judgment, which (again) asks this Court to decide the merits of this case, and should be denied as premature and in any event as without merit (especially given the Third Party Report attached to the Complaint); and (2) even if this motion were truly a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court should deny it because the Complaint’s factual allegations — including those contained in the Third Party Report — plausibly suggest claims entitling them to relief. (See generally Dkt. No. 48, Attach. 1 [Plf.'s Opp'n Memo. of Law].) Generally, in their reply, Defendants assert five arguments: (1) their motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction does not ask the Court to render a decision on the merits, but rather argues the Court cannot rule in Plaintiff’s favor because Plaintiff has not suffered actual harm; (2) Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege facts but legal conclusions; (3) the Third-Party Report attached to, and referenced in, Plaintiff’s Complaint is impermissible hearsay, which the Court should ignore; (4) Plaintiff has raised new issues about salt storage, a potential settlement agreement, Discharge Monitoring Reports, Defendants’ 2021 SWPPP removing 11.8 acres from coverage, and general questions from Plaintiff’s consultant in the Declarations of Edan Rotenberg (Dkt. No. 48, Attach. 3), Christina Falk (Dkt. No. 48, Attach. 4), and Barbara Heinzen (Dkt. No. 48, Attach. 5), for which new Notice of Intent to Sue Letters should have been issued to meet the 60-day notice requirement of the General Permit; and (5) the new issue regarding salt storage is precluded by the Clean Water Act because the EPA previously took administrative action on it. (See generally Dkt. No. 54 [Defs.' Reply Memo. of Law].) Generally, in its sur-reply, filed with prior leave of the Court, Plaintiff asserts three arguments: (1) the EPA’s prior administrative enforcement action regarding salt storage does not bar Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief; (2) Plaintiff has continued to obtain new evidence about the Clean Water Act violations regarding salt storage on Defendants’ property, and is not raising new issues; and (3) Plaintiff gave Defendants adequate notice of their ongoing violations. (Dkt. No. 58.) D. Parties’ Briefing on Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment Generally, in its cross-motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that it should be granted judgment as a matter of law on its Eighth Claim for two reasons: (1) Defendants failed to make a copy of the controlling SWPPP available within 14 days of Plaintiff’s request for it in its Notice Letter of May 12, 2020, a violation of the General Permit, which contains no requirement that a public request include an explicit offer to pay costs (especially up-front costs); and (2) Defendants have no defense to this violation of the General Permit, because they could have fulfilled their duty to provide the SWPPP three ways but did not do so (i.e., email it as an electronic attachment at no cost to themselves, make it available for copying by Plaintiff at a specific time and place, or mail a copy with an invoice for costs). (Dkt. No. 48, Attach. 1.) Generally, in their reply, Defendants assert three arguments: (1) Plaintiff’s request for the SWPPP in effect on May 12, 2020, was null and void because it did not arrange to pay for the production of the document before, or at the time of, requesting it; (2) the SWPPP in effect on May 12, 2020 (which was the November 2018 SWPPP) was publicly available from the New York State DEC (and which indeed had already been obtained by Plaintiff when it made its request on May 12, 2020); and (3) Plaintiff failed to provide the required 60-day notice of Defendants’ alleged failure to provide the SWPPP in effect on May 12, 2020, in violation of both the General Permit and 33 U.S.C. §1365. (Dkt. No. 54.) E. Parties’ Briefing on Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Generally, in its motion to strike portions of Defendants’ “Castiglione Affirmation In Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss” (Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 2), Plaintiff asserts two arguments: (1) the Castiglione Affirmation contains Attorney Castiglione’s opinion on the sufficiency of Defendants’ July 2020 SWPPP without setting forth his qualifications to render such an opinion, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); and (2) portions of Attorney Castiglione Affirmation contain legal arguments and conclusions in violation of Local Rule 7.1(b)(2) of the District’s Local Rules of Practice, and improperly exceed the 25-page limit set forth in Local Rule 7.1(b)(1) when they are considered together with Defendants’ memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 49, Attach. 1.) In their opposition to this motion, Defendants assert two arguments: (1) the Castiglione Affirmation does not contain opinions on the sufficiency of Defendants’ SWPPP, but rather quotes from and summaries of the relevant documents; and (2) the Castiglione Affirmation contains only “factual arguments.” (Dkt. No. 54, Attach. 4.) II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS A. Legal Standard Governing Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction “It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). Generally, a claim may be properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where a district court lacks constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate it. Makarova v. U.S., 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). A district court may look to evidence outside of the pleadings when resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing Malik v. Meissner, 82 F.3d 560, 562 [2d Cir. 1996]). When a court evaluates a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, all ambiguities must be resolved, and inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113). Where a defendant proffers evidence beyond the pleadings in challenging subject-matter jurisdiction, that plaintiff is said to have made a fact-based challenge. Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 2016). “A court reviewing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion…can look to evidence outside the pleadings, including affidavits, to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts.” Glob. Art Exhibitions, Inc. v. Kuhn & Bulow Italia Versicherungsmakler GmbH, 20-CV-1395, 2022 WL 2159823, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2022) (emphasis added) (citing Tandon v. Captain’s Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 [2d Cir. 2014]). B. Legal Standard Governing Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings “The standard for granting a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is identical to that of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). In evaluating such motions, district courts must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor. Patel, 259 F.3d at 126 (citing Irish Lesbian and Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 644 [2d Cir. 1998]). For the sake of brevity, the Court will not recite, in this Decision and Order, the well-known legal standard governing dismissals for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), but will direct the reader to the Court’s decision in Wade v. Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc., 05-CV-1458, 2009 WL 3629674, at *3-5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2009) (Suddaby, J.). Finally, a few words are appropriate regarding what documents are considered when a dismissal for failure to state a claim is contemplated. Generally, when contemplating a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the following matters outside the four corners of the complaint may be considered without triggering the standard governing a motion for summary judgment: (1) documents attached as an exhibit to the complaint or answer, (2) documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and provided by the parties), (3) documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the complaint, or (4) any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.5 C. Legal Standard Governing Motions for Summary Judgment Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment is warranted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is “genuine” if “the [record] evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the [non-movant].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).6 As for the materiality requirement, a dispute of fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law…. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. In addition, “[the movant] bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the…[record] which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). However, when the movant has met its initial burden, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c), (e). Implied in the above-stated burden-shifting standard is the fact that, where a non-movant willfully fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, a district court has no duty to perform an independent review of the record to find proof of a factual dispute.7 Of course, when a non-movant willfully fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he fact that there has been no [such] response…does not…[by itself] mean that the motion is to be granted automatically.” Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1996). Rather, as indicated above, the Court must assure itself that, based on the undisputed material facts, the law indeed warrants judgment for the movant. Champion, 76 F.3d at 486; Allen v. Comprehensive Analytical Group, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (Scullin, C.J.); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b)(3). What the non-movant’s failure to respond to the motion does is lighten the movant’s burden. For these reasons, this Court has often enforced Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) by deeming facts set forth in a movant’s statement of material facts to be admitted, where (1) those facts are supported by evidence in the record, and (2) the non-movant has willfully failed to properly respond to that statement.8 D. Legal Standards Governing Plaintiff’s Claims Because the parties to this action have demonstrated, in their memoranda of law, an accurate understanding of the relevant points of law contained in the legal standards governing Plaintiff’s claims in this action, the Court will not recite, in their entirety, those legal standards in this Memorandum-Decision and Order, which (again) is intended primarily for review by the parties. (See generally Dkt. No. 47 [Defs.' Memo. of Law]; Dkt. No. 48 [Plf.'s Opp'n Memo. of Law]; Dkt. No. 54 [Defs.' Reply Memo. of Law]; Dkt. No. 58 [Plf.'s Sur-Reply].) III. ANALYSIS A. Whether Plaintiff’s Complaint Should Be Dismissed for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the negative for the reasons stated in Plaintiff’s opposition memorandum of law and sur-reply. (Dkt. No. 48, Attach. 1 [Plf.'s Opp'n Memo. of Law]; Dkt. No. 58 [Plf.'s Sur-Reply].) To those reasons, the Court adds four points. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges only conjectural or hypothetical injury, because, by the time that Plaintiff filed its Complaint, the violations alleged in the Complaint had ceased (as indicated in Defendants’ July 2020 SWPPP). This argument requires the Court to make findings of fact as to whether the alleged violations in fact exist and/or are ongoing. See Carter, 822 F.3d at 57 (“If the extrinsic evidence presented by the defendant is material and controverted, the district court will need to make findings of fact in aid of its decision as to standing.”). This argument thus “essentially collapse[s] the standing inquiry into the merits.” Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 642 (2d Cir. 2003); SM Kids, LLC v. Google LLC, 963 F.3d 206, 212 (2d Cir. 2020); Lerman v. Bd. of Elections, 232 F.3d 135, 143 n.9 (2d Cir. 2000). At the pleading stage, the ultimate question of whether the defendants committed the violations alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint is premature. Baur, 352 F.3d at 642, see also Fair Hous. in Huntington Comm., Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 316 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 2003). Second, Defendants relatedly argue that Plaintiff’s claims are moot, because, before filing its Complaint, Plaintiff did not review the July 2020 SWPPP that Defendants had created to resolve the issues alleged in Plaintiff’s Notice Letter. For the sake of brevity, the Court will not linger on the fact that Defendants have acknowledged that they received, but did not respond to, Plaintiff’s request for the SWPPP in effect on May 12, 2020. (Dkt. No. 19, at 7; Dkt. No. 54, Attach. 3, at 6.) Nor did Defendants (either before or after the expiration of the 60-day period following their receipt of Plaintiff’s Notice Letter on May 15, 2020) advise Plaintiff of their issuance of the July 2020 SWPPP. More important is the fact that, again, this argument requires the Court to make findings of fact as to whether the July 2020 SWPPP (which totals 279 pages) indeed resolved all of the issues alleged in the 20-page Notice Letter (and the 88-page Complaint). Moreover, Plaintiff has alleged violations of the Clean Water Act that are “ongoing” and “continuous.” (Dkt. No. 1, at
