The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31 were read on this motion to/for DISMISSAL. DECISION ORDER ON MOTION Upon the foregoing documents, defendants Yeshiva University (YU), Yeshiva University High Schools s/h/a Marsha Stern Talmudical Academy-Yeshiva University High School For Boys (YUHS), Pat Doe 1-30, Members of the Board of Trustees of Yeshiva University (the YU Trustees), and James Doe 1-30, Members of The Board of Trustees of Marsha Stern Talmudical Academy — Yeshiva University High School For Boys (the YUHS Trustees) (collectively, defendants) move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), (7), and (11). Plaintiff alleges that he was a student at YUHS and was sexually abused by George Finkelstein, a school administrator, and Rabbi Macy Gordon, a teacher, between 1976-1977, when plaintiff was approximately fourteen (14) years old. Plaintiff commenced the instant action pursuant to CPLR 214-g asserting the following causes of action against all defendants: (1) negligent supervision; (2) negligent retention; (3) negligent failure to provide a safe and secure environment; (4) negligence for failure to terminate; (5) negligence for failure to recognize and investigate sexual abuse; and (6) negligence for failure to train relating to child abuse. Initially, the Court finds that CPLR 214-g enacted under the Child Victims Act (CVA) is not unconstitutional. “[A] claim-revival statute will satisfy the Due Process Clause of the State Constitution if it was enacted as a reasonable response in order to remedy an injustice” (Matter of World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 30 NY3d 377, 400 [2017]). Based on the legislative materials describing the purpose and justification for the CVA, this Court agrees with many other courts that have decided that the CVA is a reasonable response to remedy innumerous injustices of past child sexual abuse and does not run afoul of the due process protections afforded by the State Constitution (see PB-36 Doe v. Niagara Falls City School Dist., 72 Misc 3d 1052, 1058-60 [Sup Ct, Niagara county 2021]; Kaul v. Brooklyn Friends School, index no. 512634/2020, 2022 WL 987843 [Sup Ct, Kings County March 31, 2022] [citing cases]). In determining dismissal under CPLR Rule 3211 (a) (7), the “complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction” (Goldfarb v. Schwartz, 26 AD3d 462, 463 [2d Dept 2006]). The “allegations are presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference” (Godfrey v. Spano, 13 NY3d 358, 373 [2009]). “[T]he sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]). “Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss” (EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]). To state a claim for negligent supervision and/or retention under New York law, a plaintiff must plead, in addition to the elements required for a claim of negligence:1 (1) the existence of an employee-employer relationship; (2) “that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for the conduct which caused the injury” (Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 AD2d 159, 161 [2d Dept 1997]; Sheila C. v. Povich, 11 AD3d 120, 129-30 [1st Dept 2004]); and (3) “a nexus or connection between the defendant’s negligence in [supervising and/or retaining] the offending employee and the plaintiff’s injuries” (Roe v. Domestic & Foreign Missionary Socy. of the Prot. Episcopal Church, 198 AD3d 698, 701 [2d Dept 2021]; Gonzalez v. City of New York, 133 AD3d 65, 70 [1st Dept 2015] ["what the plaintiff must demonstrate is a connection or nexus between the plaintiff's injuries and the defendant's malfeasance"]). Although defendants claim that the notice or propensity element was insufficiently plead, “[t]here is no statutory requirement” that such cause of action “be pleaded with specificity” (Kenneth R., 229 AD2d at 161). The Court finds that the allegations in the complaint, which are to be taken as true, adequately state this element (see, e.g., NYSCEF Doc no 1 at
