DECISION AND ORDER The above parties are the parents of R.A., born [redacted]. On April 20, 2021, petitioner mother, A.C., filed a petition alleging that the respondent father, A.A., is chargeable with the support of the parties’ minor child. On December 22, 2021, the matter came on to be heard for a virtual fact-finding hearing before a support magistrate of this Court (Jordan, S.M.). Both parties appeared with retained counsel. Counsel for the petitioner called the petitioner and the respondent as witnesses. Counsel for the respondent did not call any witnesses. By an Order of Support with Findings of Fact dated January 20, 2022 (Jordan, S.M.), the respondent was ordered to pay the sum of $3,000.00 per month for basic child support, plus $1,310.40 per month for childcare expenses, plus $137.58 per month for health insurance premiums. Retroactive support was set in the amount of $42,115.62 and counsel fees were awarded to the petitioner in the amount of $2,700.00. All of the above were payable directly to the petitioner. The respondent, by his counsel, filed timely written objections to an order of the support magistrate dated January 20, 2022. In its Decision and Order Upon Filing of Objections, this Court found, in part, as follows: In reviewing the Findings of Fact in conjunction with the transcript of the fact-finding hearing, this Court finds no merit to the respondent’s argument that the support magistrate should have imputed rental income to the mother. As such, that point of objection, as well as that which relates to a recalculation of the parties’ pro rata share of add-on expenses based upon imputation of such rental income, are denied. … The support magistrate found it appropriate to consider income above the statutory cap. This Court finds the reasoning for this is sound and does not constitute an error of law or fact. However, it is not clear how the support magistrate arrived at the sum of $3,000 per month for basic support, which is more than a calculation up to the statutory cap but less than an order on the full combined income. For this reason, the matter must be remanded to the support magistrate for an amended or clarified findings of fact and, if necessary, an amended order. The matter was remanded to the support magistrate consistent with this Court’s decision. The support magistrate issued an Amended Order of Support on Remand After Objections and an Amended Findings of Fact on Remand After Objections. By this amended order, the basic support obligation was changed to $5,342.00, payable monthly by the father directly to the mother, and retroactive support was recalculated accordingly. The father, by his attorney, filed timely written objections to the amended order of the support magistrate. By his objections, the father alleged, in sum and substance, that (1) the support “magistrate went far beyond the scope of the Judge’s order and modified almost every aspect of the prior support order” and her order is contrary to New York law by increasing the father’s basic support obligation; (2) the amended order and findings failed to provide any clarity as to the prior support order and findings; (3) the father’s share of child care should have been based upon the mother’s actual expenses; (4) the support magistrate should not have awarded child support above the statutory cap; (5) the support magistrate’s amended calculation of retroactive support is improper because the Judge’s decision remanding the matter did not permit the support magistrate to modify retroactive support. The mother, by her attorney, filed a timely rebuttal to the father’s objections. By her rebuttal, the mother offered counter arguments to each of the father’s points of objection and asked that his objections be denied. Now after examination into the facts and circumstances of the case, review of the objections, rebuttal and the contents of the file, the respondent’s objections are denied for the reasons set forth below: The father claims that the support magistrate should not have awarded child support above the statutory cap. In its prior Decision and Order, this Court already found the support magistrate’s reasoning for considering income above the statutory cap to be sound. The issue was with the manner in which the specific dollar amount was calculated. This point of objection has already been denied. The issuance of an amended order does not give the father a second opportunity to relitigate an issue that has been decided. As such, this point of objection is denied. The father also argues that the support “magistrate went far beyond the scope of the Judge’s order and modified almost every aspect of the prior support order” and her order is contrary to New York law by increasing the father’s basic support obligation. He further asserts that the support magistrate’s amended calculation of retroactive support is improper because the Judge’s decision remanding the matter did not permit the support magistrate to modify retroactive support. This Court has compared the “Obligation Summary” of the original and amended orders in this matter. Contrary to the father’s argument that the support magistrate modified “almost every aspect of the prior order,” a side-by-side review belies such an assertion. The only substantive changes were to the basic support amount and, therefore, the corresponding calculation of retroactive support. The remaining portions, those pertaining to childcare, health insurance, and counsel fees, were unchanged except for the placement of the last two on the page. The recalculated change to the father’s basic support obligation was well within the support magistrate’s authority upon remand. The father appears to have misunderstood the purpose of this Court’s use of the word “limited” in its remand of the prior order. This signaled to the support magistrate that she was not required to recalendar the matter for appearances, arguments, or a new hearing. It did not indicate that her authority on remand was narrowly restricted in the manner the father suggests. The directive to issue an amended or clarified order and findings provided the support magistrate with the opportunity to review the file and either leave the order as is with additional clarification, or issue an amended order with amended findings of fact to support the amended order. By definition, an amended order could include changes from the original. In reviewing the two orders, the support magistrate determined it appropriate to exercise the latter option. As such, it would not have made sense for her to have supported her reasoning for a support award of $3,000.00 per month as she reviewed the matter and, after consideration, determined that a full income calculation was appropriate. The findings of fact would need to support the new determination. As this Court stated in its prior decision, “[t]he court shall make its award for child support pursuant to the provisions of [Family Court Act §413]. This calculation “presumptively result[s] in the correct amount of child support to be awarded” (Family Court Act §413 [1] [h]). The court may vary from the amount of the basic child support obligation…only in accordance with [Family Court Act §413 (1) (f)]” (Family Court Act §413 [1] [a]). Those factors are used in a support magistrate’s determination of whether “the non-custodial parent’s pro-rata share of the basic child support obligation is unjust or inappropriate” (Family Court Act §413 [1] [f]). A determination regarding whether the presumptively correct statutory calculation of basic child support is within the discretion of the support magistrate. “Great deference should be given to the determination of the Support Magistrate, who is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and evidence proffered” (Matter of Musarra v. Musarra, 28 AD3d 668, 669 [2d Dept 2006]). The Support Magistrate is given “broad discretion in weighing the relative financial positions of the parties and evaluating testimony” (Creem v. Creem, 121 AD2d 676 [2d Dept 1986]). Review of the Support Magistrate’s order is essentially equivalent to an appellate review of such an order (Matter of Green v. Wron, 151 Misc.2d 9, 11 [Fam Ct, New York County 1991]). “The scope of that review, however, is narrow, confined to whether the Support Magistrate, as the trier of fact, has made the necessary findings of fact and an order and whether, upon review of the record, the findings of fact present a reasonable basis for that order” (Creem at 677). The determination of the Support Magistrate should not be disturbed on appeal unless no fair interpretation of the evidence can support the findings (see Parmigiani v. Parmigiani, 250 AD2d 744 [2d Dept 1998]). In this Court’s review of the amended findings of fact, it finds that the support magistrate appropriately exercised her discretion in her decision to issue an order based on a calculation using the parties’ full combined income with sufficient consideration of the relevant statutory factors. While the father proffers arguments against this determination, this Court’s review is limited to whether the support magistrate exercised appropriate discretion based upon the relevant law and facts. This Court would not usurp the support magistrate’s authority and autonomy and consider what it might have done if presented with the same facts and evidence. For the same reasons set forth above, the father’s assertion that the support magistrate was without authority to modify the amount of retroactive support is without merit. Despite his concern that the support magistrate failed to specify any particular start date or payment schedule, the Family Court Act is clear regarding the start date for the final calculation. Pursuant to §449 (2), an order of child support “shall be effective as of the earlier of the date of the filing of the petition therefor, or, if the children for whom support is sought are in receipt of public assistance, the date for which their eligibility for public assistance was effective. Any retroactive amount of support due shall be support arrears/past-due support and shall be paid in one sum or periodic sums, as the court shall direct…”. In this case, the final calculation dates back to the date upon which the petition was filed as if the final support obligation began on that date. When the basic support amount was amended, the calculation of any retroactive support would necessarily change as well. Absent a mathematical error not alleged or found here, the increase in retroactive support corresponding to the increase in basic support would necessarily follow. The support magistrate followed the statute by directing such retroactive support to be paid directly to the mother. Finally, the father alleges that his share of childcare should have been based upon the mother’s actual expenses rather than a fixed amount. Family Court Act §413 (1) (c) (4) states that “the court shall determine reasonable childcare expenses and such expenses, where incurred, shall be prorated in the same proportion as each parent’s income is to the combined parental income.” When an order is payable via the Support Collection Unit, childcare expenses are set at a fixed dollar amount. The support magistrate did not abuse her discretion in doing the same thing in this matter. If the parties are unable to work together regarding payment of the retroactive support or the childcare expenses, they have the continued option to utilize the services of the Support Collection Unit. For all of the reasons set forth above, the father’s objections are denied. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the respondent’s objections are denied. This Constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.
