DECISION/ORDER Nature of the Action This action arises from the City taking custody of claimant’s 2003 Acura TL Type S sedan and the City’s subsequent handling of the car. Although the parties dispute the basis for the seizure, the parties do not dispute that the City seized and towed the vehicle from near in front of claimant’s home on January 18, 2018. (Aff. in Supp., Ex. A). Claimant alleges that he contacted the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) after the seizure to retrieve the vehicle (which claimant asserts was mistakenly towed rather than a different presumably abandoned nearby vehicle), and that, on June 10, 2019, the City informed claimant that the car had been “lost” in City custody. As discussed later in this decision, the City did not in fact “lose” the car (with an estimated value of $2,850.00 and additional contents worth $2,000.00) but instead sold the car at auction to a scrap breaker for $75.00 on May 14, 2018. (Aff. in Supp., Exs. B and D). Claimant then commenced the instant action seeking money damages for the value of the car and its contents. (Statement of Claim, at 1). The Instant Motion On July 22, 2022, the instant action was scheduled for a hearing on the City’s motion to dismiss (Motion Seq. No. 001) and (depending upon the outcome of the City’s motion to dismiss) a bench trial on claimant’s allegation that the City lost claimant’s vehicle after having taken possession of it. While claimant appeared as directed, the City did not, and by separate orders dated July 22, 2022, the Court denied the City’s motion to dismiss for non-appearance, proceeded to hold an inquest upon the City’s default, and granted claimant judgment against the City. By notice of motion dated August 9, 2022, the City seeks an order vacating the default judgment in this action, restoring this action to the calendar for the purpose of granting the City leave to renew and reargue Motion Seq. No. 001 and, upon reargument or renewal, dismissing this action.1 For the reasons set forth below, the instant motion is denied in all respects. Discussion Procedurally, the Court notes at the outset that while the City moves both to vacate its default and for leave to renew and reargue its earlier motion to dismiss, the City’s motion does not sound in reargument or renewal as contemplated in CPLR 2221. The question before the Court is not whether the Court “overlooked any relevant facts or misapplied any controlling principle of law,” in denying the City’s motion to dismiss this action however, but whether the Court should vacate the City’s default in both the motion to dismiss and the trial. People v. Oriol, Ind. No. 2744-2014, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4906, *1 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. Jan. 19, 2016) (citations omitted); and compare, CPLR 2221(a) with CPLR 2221(d)-(f). The Court did not misapprehend the City’s non-appearance on July 22, 2022: the City did not answer the calendar call because it did not appear (which the City does not dispute) and the Court acted accordingly.2 Gerald Lebovits, Small Claims Manual, at 2 (6th ed. 2022) (noting that “[i]f a party fails to appear for the scheduled hearing, the court should enter a default, and…refer the matter for an immediate inquest”); and, e.g., Definitive Healthcare v. Sun Knowledge Inc., 68 Misc. 3d 1218(A), *5 (Civ. Ct., Kings Co. 2020) (discussing denial of motion on default for movant’s non-appearance). Rather, the City seeks, at bottom, to vacate the Court’s decision to find the City in default in both its motion to dismiss and in the instant action itself because of that non-appearance, based upon the City’s post hoc explanation of why it failed to appear.3 As to the underlying merits of the City’s motion to dismiss, they are now before the Court in considering whether the City has asserted a meritorious defense sufficient to vacate a default, rendering reconsideration under CPLR 2221 unnecessary. Accordingly, the Court construes the instant motion as seeking to vacate a decision on default pursuant to CPLR 2221(a)(1) and 5015(a)(1) and, to the extent necessary or in the alternative for clarity, denies the branch of the instant motion seeking leave to renew or reargue pursuant to CPLR 2221(d)-(f).4 Turning to that branch of the City’s motion seeking to vacate its default for non-appearance, the controlling test is the traditional one: that the “party seeking to vacate a judgment on the basis of excusable default must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse and a meritorious defense.” Manhattan Telecom. Corp. v. H & A Locksmith, Inc., 109 A.D.3d 699, 701 (1st Dept. 2013) (citation and quotation omitted). Both elements are equally necessary. Benson Park Assoc., LLC v. Herman, 73 A.D.3d 464, 465 (1st Dept. 2010) (affirming denial of motion to vacate default). While it is of course true that “the established policy of this State [is] that disputes be resolved on their merits rather than default and inquest whenever practical,” and that courts often then vacate defaults, exceptions also arise in practice that “demonstrate[] why court approval should not be taken for granted.” Koonce v. N.Y.S. Dept. of Finance, Index No. CV-021587-19/BX, slip op, at *2 (Civ. Ct., Bronx Co. May 4, 2022) (internal quotation and citation omitted); and Lane v. Konnovich, Dkt. No. 16-cv-1245, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65816, at *9 n. 3 (S.D.W.V. May 19, 2016). Looking at each element in turn, the Court finds that the City has established neither a reasonable excuse for its default nor a meritorious defense necessary to vacate the City’s default. The City Does Not Establish a Reasonable Excuse for Default In arguing that it has a reasonable excuse for defaulting on July 22nd, the City relies upon two related, but separate, allegations: 1) that the City never received prior notice of the July 22nd appearance; and/or 2) the City’s default was due to law office failure. (Aff. in Supp.,
3, 6-9, 12, 14, 16; and Aff. in Reply, 3). In essence, the former would presumably be the fault of others, while the latter would be attributable to the City itself. In considering both, the Court finds that the City’s default sounds principally in law office failure, but addresses both. As noted in the court file for this action, the Court sent two notices of the July 22nd appearance (one each for the City’s motion and for the trial) dated July 1, 2022 to each of the parties, to the addresses on file in this action. The notices were generated close in time according to the Court’s electronic records, and claimant confirms that he received the copies sent to him. (Aff. in Opp., at 2). Nothing was returned to the clerk’s office by the United States Postal Service, and mere denial of receipt is insufficient to overcome the presumption of mailing and receipt. See, e.g., Burr v. Eveready Ins. Co., 253 A.D.2d 650, 651 (1st Dept. 1998) (discussing presumption of mailing standard); and Benson Park Assoc., supra. (noting that movant “offered nothing to substantiate” its position in moving to vacate a default). Accordingly, the Court finds that a presumption of mailing and receipt of the notices for July 22, 2022 is appropriate. Turning to the City’s other ground — law office failure — courts have consistently held that more than “conclusory references to law office failure…without detail or evidentiary support,” are necessary to excuse a default. Urban D.C. Inc. v. 29 Green St. LLC, 205 A.D.3d 634, 634 (1st Dept. May 26, 2022). The City’s moving papers consist primarily of repeating that the City was not aware of the July 22nd appearance. (Aff. in Supp.,
