OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Marcus Andre Dodd, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this employment discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (“Section 1981″), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”). Plaintiff claims defendants My Sisters’ Place, Inc. (“MSP”), MSP’s Chief Executive Officer Karen Cheeks-Lomax, and Thomas Rice, co-chair of MSP’s Board of Directors (the “Board”), unlawfully discriminated against him when he was MSP’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) and terminated him in retaliation for complaining about such discrimination. He also contends defendants Robert R. Gheewalla, Suzanne Seiden, Barbara Raho, and Linda Purvis (the “Board Defendants”) participated in the unlawful discrimination and retaliation. Now pending is a motion to dismiss the claims against defendants Gheewalla, Seiden, Raho, Purvis, Evan J. Cohen, Cheryl Greenberg, Peter Cutaia, Maria Faustino, Dania Jones-Brown, and Christina Debonis (the “Moving Defendants”), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).1 (Doc. #47). Defendants MSP, Cheeks-Lomax, and Thomas Rice have filed an answer with counterclaims (Doc. #46) and do not join in the motion to dismiss. Nor does defendant Hilary Tuohy, who has not yet been served. Also pending is plaintiff’s cross-motion for leave to amend his complaint, which plaintiff asserted in his opposition. (Pl. Opp. at 7). For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and plaintiff’s cross-motion for leave to amend is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1367. BACKGROUND For the purpose of ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the amended complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, as summarized below. Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court also considers allegations made for the first time in plaintiff’s opposition to the motion. See, e.g., Vlad-Berindan v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit, 2014 WL 6982929, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2014). I. Plaintiff’s Employment at MSP From November 2020 to July 2021, plaintiff, an African American man, was employed as the CFO at MSP, a not-for-profit corporation headquartered in White Plains, New York, whose mission is to provide services to victims of domestic violence and human trafficking. As CFO, plaintiff allegedly reported to the Board’s Finance Committee, which included defendants Gheewalla, Raho, Purvis, and Rice. Rice and defendant Seiden are co-chairs of the Board. In addition, defendant Tuohy served as a Board member until she resigned due allegedly to “race-related concerns.” (Doc. #37 (“Am. Compl.”) 184). II. Alleged Discrimination Around January 2021, plaintiff led his first Finance Committee meeting, during which Rice allegedly “question[ed] Plaintiff unnecessarily and challeng[ed] many of Plaintiff’s statements without reason.” (Am. Compl. 44). Plaintiff alleges Cheeks-Lomax, who is also African American, told him Rice did this because plaintiff “was not Betsy, the white woman CFO” who preceded him. (Id. 46). Plaintiff further alleges Cheeks-Lomax told him “she had endured race-based harassment from multiple members of the Board,” including Rice. (Id. 40). According to the amended complaint, plaintiff complained to Cheeks-Lomax nearly weekly about Rice’s behavior, including Rice’s efforts to “derail[] the budget process by unfairly questioning” plaintiff via email before a Finance Committee meeting. (Am. Compl. 67). In addition, during a May 2021 meeting with Cheeks-Lomax and MSP’s Chief Program Officer plaintiff described “a few of the forms of unfair scrutiny and disrespect” to which Rice subjected him. (Id. 57). Plaintiff further alleges Tuohy complained to Cheeks-Lomax about MSP’s handling of race-related matters, including its anti-racism training, and consequently resigned from the Board. Rice, Seiden, Gheewalla, Raho, and Purvis also allegedly complained to Cheeks-Lomax about the training. However, MSP allegedly failed to address discrimination and did not investigate Rice’s conduct until June 2021. On June 1, 2021, plaintiff emailed Cheeks-Lomax and her executive assistant, complaining about the ongoing discrimination. Two days later, plaintiff received an email from Tracey Levy, an independent investigator retained by MSP to look into his allegations. Around June 2, 2021, plaintiff was allegedly diagnosed with high blood pressure and costochondritis, and, on doctor’s orders, did not return to work until June 14, 2021. On the evening of June 14, he developed heart palpitations shortly after receiving an email from Cheeks-Lomax indicating she and the Finance Committee were concerned about the delay in the budget process resulting from plaintiff’s absence. The next day, a cardiologist ordered plaintiff not to return to work until July 6, 2021. The Finance Committee extended the budget deadline from June 23 to July 27, 2021, to enable plaintiff to participate in the process. On July 13, 2021, plaintiff met with Levy to discuss his June 1 complaint. Levy was allegedly surprised to learn plaintiff had discussed Rice’s behavior with Cheeks-Lomax before June 1. After the meeting, plaintiff sent Levy copies of emails from Rice and Cheeks-Lomax and a summary of the complaints he wanted her to investigate. The same day, plaintiff allegedly met with MSP’s controller, defendant Cutaia, to prepare for a July 15 Finance Committee meeting, including by reviewing transactions related to consultants hired through the Upwork agency. Over the next week, MSP’s billing manager, defendant Faustino, asked plaintiff for details about work performed by Upwork consultant Matinah Drew. Plaintiff could only give her invoices showing the number of hours Drew worked. According to plaintiff, because Drew complied with Upwork’s requirements, he did not ask her to maintain detailed accounts of her work. On July 19, 2021, plaintiff allegedly met again with Levy, who said her investigation revealed “no basis for racial discrimination” by Rice. (Am. Compl. 136). After speaking to “a variety of people” and considering “various documentation,” Levy concluded Rice “questioned everyone.” (Id.
137-38). When plaintiff expressed concerns about potential retaliation, Levy said he should contact Cheeks-Lomax or Gheewalla if he was subject to any retaliatory acts. III. Plaintiff’s Termination Plaintiff alleges on July 20, 2021, during a meeting attended only by Cheeks-Lomax, Gheewalla, and plaintiff, Cheeks-Lomax “abruptly informed [him] that he was terminated effective immediately” for spending company funds on two Upwork consultants for personal purposes. (Am. Compl. 147). Cheeks-Lomax and Gheewalla said they had acquired evidence of the purported misconduct, although they did not previously ask plaintiff about it. Plaintiff allegedly told Cheeks-Lomax and Gheewalla he used the consultants for legitimate business purposes — they updated his resume and LinkedIn profiles for his application to speak at a conference sponsored by one of MSP’s largest funders, and engaging with funders was an important part of his job — but Cheeks-Lomax told him “You are still terminated” and ended the meeting. (Id. 157). This immediate termination, without prior warnings or discipline, allegedly deviated from MSP’s typical progressive discipline model. At some point, Cheeks-Lomax allegedly retained AlixPartners to investigate plaintiff “to try to find and create evidence” to “later…cover-up the retaliatory termination.” (Am. Compl. 82).2 Rice, Seiden, Raho, and Purvis approved the retention of AlixPartners. IV. Procedural Background On October 25, 2021, plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). He received a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC on December 2, 2021. Plaintiff initiated this action on December 21, 2021. (Doc. #2). On April 27, 2022, after most of the defendants moved to dismiss, plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming two additional defendants, Purvis and Tuohy. Thereafter, the Moving Defendants filed the instant motion. DISCUSSION I. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard of Review In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the operative complaint under the “two-pronged approach” articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).3 First, a plaintiff’s legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to the assumption of truth and are thus not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678; Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations in the complaint must meet a standard of “plausibility.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his submissions liberally and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). That said, “a pro se plaintiff’s factual allegations must at least be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Karupaiyan v. CVS Health Corp., 2021 WL 4341132, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2021). Even in the pro se context, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). Nor may the Court “invent factual allegations” plaintiff has not pleaded. Id. II. Discrimination Claims Against the Board Defendants The Board Defendants argue plaintiff’s Section 1981 discrimination claims against them must be dismissed because plaintiff has not plausibly alleged they were personally involved in discriminatory conduct. The Court agrees. A. Legal Standard Section 1981 provides a cause of action for employment discrimination based upon disparate treatment or a hostile work environment. Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 312, 320 (2d Cir. 2015). To state a claim for disparate treatment, a plaintiff must plausibly allege he suffered an adverse employment action and his employer would not have taken adverse action against him “but for [his] race.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020). Accordingly, a plaintiff must allege facts from which the Court can infer an intent to discriminate on the basis of race. See Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam). An inference of discrimination can arise from circumstances including “the employer’s criticism of the plaintiff’s performance in ethnically degrading terms[,] invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected group[,] more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group[,] or the sequence of events leading to the” alleged adverse action. Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d at 312. To state a claim for a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “the complained of conduct: (1) is objectively severe or pervasive — that is, creates an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive; (2) creates an environment that the plaintiff subjectively perceives as hostile or abusive; and (3) creates such an environment because of the plaintiff’s [protected status].” Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007). “The incidents complained of must be more than episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive.” Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2014). To state a claim against an individual under Section 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts that plausibly “demonstrate some affirmative link to causally connect the actor with the” disparate treatment or hostile work environment. See Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 2000). The individual defendant must be personally involved in the discriminatory conduct. Id. Personal involvement “includes not only direct participation in the alleged violation but also gross negligence in the supervision of subordinates who committed the wrongful acts and failure to take action upon receiving information that [Section 1981] violations are occurring.” Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir. 2004). B. Application Here, plaintiff fails to state discrimination claims against the Board Defendants because he fails plausibly to allege they were personally involved in discriminatory conduct. Plaintiff does not allege the Board Defendants treated him differently because of his race or made any discriminatory comments to him.4 Rather, his assertions, whether construed to claim disparate treatment or a hostile work environment, center on Rice’s discriminatory and “harsh treatment” of plaintiff. (Pl. Opp. at 3). Even liberally construed, plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the Board Defendants had “the authority to affect the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment or to otherwise influence the decision-making regarding same” (Am. Compl.
