The following papers have been read on these motions: Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause dated November 29, 2022 x Defendant’s Notice of Cross-Motion dated January 6, 2023 x Affirmation of Attorney for the Children dated January 10, 2023 x Plaintiff’s Opposition & Reply dated January 14, 2023 x Defendant’s Reply dated January 20, 2023 X DECISION AND ORDER PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The Plaintiff moves by Order to Show Cause dated November 29, 2022 (Motion Sequence No.: 007) seeking an Order: (i) Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 231(c) [sic] and 238, 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a), directing Defendant to pay counsel fees and expenses in the sum of $5,000.00 to Defendant’s attorneys within ten (10) days of the date of the Order entered to herein for services and expenses incurred in connection with the enforcement motion (Motion Sequence 006) with leave to request additional counsel fees, if warranted; (ii) For such other and further relief which the Court may deem just and proper. The Defendant cross-moves by Notice of Cross-Motion dated January 6, 2023 (Motion Sequence No.: 008) seeking an Order: (1) terminating Defendant’s pendente lite maintenance obligation to Plaintiff; (2) precluding Plaintiff from offering any testimony or evidence at trial regarding money owed to her father being a marital debt; (3) precluding Plaintiff from offering any testimony or evidence at trial regarding a claim for maintenance; (4) awarding counsel fees to Defendant as a result of the need to bring a motion for failure to comply with discovery demands; (5) denying Plaintiff’s motion for counsel fees related to the legal work for Motion Sequence 6; and (6) for such other and further relief as to this Court seems just and proper. BACKGROUND On February 17, 2022, this Court issued a Decision and Order (hereinafter referred to as the “February Order”). In the February Order, this Court, inter alia, directed the Defendant to pay temporary maintenance in the sum of $895.37 per month, temporary child support in the sum of $522.30 per month (with retroactive sums paid at a rate of $100.00 per month), and the sum of $2,500.00 as and for interim counsel fees. The Defendant thereupon moved by Notice of Motion seeking renewal and reargument of the February Order. This Court denied that application by Decision and Order dated July 11, 2022 (hereinafter referred to as the “July Order”). On October 24, 2022, this Court issued a Decision and Order (hereinafter referred to as the “October Order”). In the October Order, this Court, inter alia, adjudicated the Defendant to be in contempt of court with respect to his temporary child support obligation and with respect to his temporary maintenance obligation. The total arrears found in the October Order with respect thereto were $6,066.02. Also in the October Order, the Court denied the Plaintiff’s application to adjudicate the Defendant to be in contempt of court with respect to his $2,500.00 counsel fee obligation as set forth in the February Order, and denied, without prejudice and with leave to renew upon submission of proper papers, the Plaintiff’s application for additional counsel fees. These applications ensued. THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS Plaintiff’s Contentions: The Plaintiff argues that since the Defendant was found to be in contempt, the Court may award her counsel fees. She argues, in effect, that she incurred legal fees in connection with her contempt application (which resulted in the October Order), and that she should be reimbursed for same. She sets forth that she has incurred upwards of $25,000 in legal fees in connection with this litigation, and that she incurred “roughly” $10,300 in connection with the contempt motion, review of the opposition papers, and the reply on that application. Defendant’s Contentions: The Defendant sets forth that he borrowed money to pay the maintenance owed pursuant to the Court’s order, and as of that payment, he paid nine months of maintenance, which he sets forth is the “mid way” between the statutory duration for post-judgment maintenance. He sets forth that the parties are married only three years, and the Court should consider the short length of the parties’ marriage to terminate maintenance. He argues that his personal expenses are $1,650 per month. He argues that the court-ordered expenses exceed his income. He sets forth that he paid the arrears by borrowing money from a friend. He argues that this motion was necessitated by the Plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery demands, and that he should be awarded counsel fees therefor. He argues that since the Court did not find him to be in willful contempt, that is a precursor to counsel fees, and her request for counsel fees in connection with her prior application should be denied. He argues there are “other” defects in the application for counsel fees in the billing statements. He argues his income is $23,411.24. AFC’s Position: The Attorney for the Children (hereinafter and hereinbefore referred to as the “AFC”) sets forth that her clients are well and healthy, and that she takes no position on the motions. Plaintiff’s Opposition & Reply: The Plaintiff argues that she has demonstrated the need for child support and maintenance and the Court agreed in this regard. She argues that the duration of marriage is not the only factor considered in determining temporary maintenance, and the Defendant never even attempted to make any payment on maintenance until after the October Order. She sets forth that notwithstanding his “cure” under the October Order, the Defendant has continued to not pay the ordered amounts, which she sets forth he admits. She argues, in this vein, that he has not paid the amounts due for December 2022 or January 2023, and he does not pay unless forced by the Court. She argues that the Defendant left his position at the mosque during the pendency of litigation, refused to find a full-time job, and only enrolled in college after being court ordered to pay child support and maintenance, as this was an attempt to limit his support obligations. She argues that the Defendant’s payment of $110 per week, amounting to $440 per month, is an arbitrary amount he determined to be sufficient, and the Defendant should be paying, pursuant to court order, $522.30 per month. She appends documents regarding the pre and post wedding expenses, but concedes she does not have a signed agreement. She sets forth his request for counsel fees should be denied, as he has not complied with discovery demands, and she has not received his 2021 tax return. Defendant’s Reply: The Defendant sets forth, in correction of his prior Affidavit, that his total income in 2022, before expenses and taxes, for nine months, was $23,411.24. He argues that he never worked for the mosque with pay as he was never on the payroll and never received money directly from the mosque. He sets forth that he resigned from the trustee position, which was unpaid. He argues that both parties graduated from Islamic school and she is incorrect about college. He argues he is going to college to be able to support himself and the children. He argues that he purchases many things for the children. He sets forth that he does not receive any money from his father. DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS Motion Sequence No.: 007: COUNSEL FEES In the October Order, the Court notes that it denied the Plaintiff’s application for reimbursement of counsel fees without prejudice and with leave to renew upon the submission of proper papers inasmuch as her retainer agreement with her counsel was not appended to those moving papers. The Court notes that the Plaintiff has now supplied a copy of her retainer agreement with her counsel to the Court (see NYSCEF Document No.: 154). Domestic Relations Law §238, empowers the Court, in its discretion to require either party to pay counsel fees and expenses to the other party for legal services rendered in the prosecution or defense in a proceeding to enforce certain provisions of matrimonial orders and judgments. In exercising its discretion, the Court shall consider the circumstances of the case. Furthermore, in Mollah v. Mollah, the Second Department held that where a party was compelled to bring a motion to enforce the terms of an order, the court therein providently exercised its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees, considering, inter alia, the relative merits of the parties’ positions at the time and the documented time, effort, and skill of counsel. See generally Mollah v. Mollah, 136 A.D.3d 992 (2d Dept. 2016). The Court finds that since the Plaintiff was compelled to bring application to enforce the terms of the February Order, the Plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement of counsel fees incurred therewith. Further buttressing the Court’s conclusions is that the Defendant undoubtedly purged his contempt only after this Court adjudicated him to be in contempt of Court. The Court therefore finds that the impetus of the Defendant’s compliance was the Plaintiff’s application. The Court has reviewed the Plaintiff’s billing statements with her counsel (see NYSCEF Document No.: 169), and after a careful and scrutinized review of same, the Court notes that the total sum of counsel fees and expenses incurred therewith total $6,731.60. The Court finds that sum to be reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, based upon the prevailing case-law, the facts and circumstances of this case, the Plaintiff’s retainer agreement, her billing statements, the Defendant’s noncompliance with the February Order, it is hereby: ORDERED, that Branch (i) of the Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause dated November 29, 2022 be and is hereby GRANTED TO THE EXTENT that the Defendant shall pay directly to the Plaintiff’s counsel, AMINA RASHAD & ASSOCIATES, P.C., the sum of $6,731.60, within thirty (30) days of the date of service of the within Decision and Order with Notice of Entry; and it is further ORDERED, that upon the failure of Defendant to pay the Plaintiff’s counsel as set forth herein above, the Plaintiff’s attorneys may file an Affidavit of Non-Compliance with the Clerk of the County, who shall enter a judgment, with statutory interest thereon as of the date of this Decision and Order, in favor of AMINA RASHAD & ASSOCIATES, P.C., attorneys for the Defendant, and against the Defendant, S.A., without further proceedings. Motion Sequence No.: 008: TERMINATION OF MAINTENANCE The Court is called upon to determine whether or not, during the pendency of a matrimonial action, to terminate an award of temporary maintenance. Notwithstanding the parties’ thirty-nine (39) month marriage, and notwithstanding that the order of temporary maintenance was issued in February, 2022, the Court concludes, based upon the specific facts of this case, that a termination of temporary maintenance during the pendency of this action would be improper at this time. The relevant provisions regarding temporary maintenance are contained within the ambit of DRL §236(B)(5-a), which reads, in relevant part: 5-a. Temporary maintenance awards. a. Except where the parties have entered into an agreement providing for maintenance pursuant to subdivision three of this part, in any matrimonial action the court, upon application by a party, shall make its award for temporary maintenance pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision. * * * e. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subdivision, where the guideline amount of temporary maintenance would reduce the payor’s income below the self-support reserve for a single person, the guideline amount of temporary maintenance shall be the difference between the payor’s income and the self-support reserve. If the payor’s income is below the self-support reserve, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that no temporary maintenance is awarded. f. The court shall determine the duration of temporary maintenance by considering the length of the marriage. g. Temporary maintenance shall terminate no later than the issuance of the judgment of divorce or the death of either party, whichever occurs first. * * * n. The temporary maintenance order shall not prejudice the rights of either party regarding a post-divorce maintenance award. * * * (emphasis added). The Court notes that the parties were married on XXX XX, 2018, and that this action for divorce and ancillary relief was commenced on August 13, 2021, by the filing of a Summons with Notice with the Nassau County Clerk’s Office (see NYSCEF Document No.: 01). To this end, the Court notes that the length of this marriage is approximately three (3) years, three (3) months, and seventeen (17) days, or approximately thirty-nine (39) months. The gravamen of the Defendant’s argument is, in effect, that since he paid nine months of temporary maintenance, this is the “mid way” between the statutory duration for post-divorce maintenance (see S. Ahmed Affidavit Paragraph “4″). The Defendant therefore argues, in effect, that since he has reached the “midpoint” of the statutory advisory guidelines, the Court should adopt them for purposes of this application, and terminate his temporary maintenance obligation. His counsel posits that given the length of this marriage, the duration for maintenance “…would be 6 months to 1 year…” (see J. Goody Affirmation Paragraph “10″). The Court declines to adopt the arguments proffered for the reasons set forth hereinafter. The Court notes that pursuant to DRL §236(B)(5-a)(f): f. The duration of post-divorce maintenance may be determined as follows: (1) The court may determine the duration of post-divorce maintenance in accordance with the following advisory schedule: Length of the marriage Percent of the length of the marriage for which maintenance will be payable 0 up to and including 15 years 15 percent-30 percent More than 15 up to and including 20 years 30 percent-40 percent More than 20 years 35 percent-50 percent It is initially undisputed that this matter has not concluded. The Court initially rejects, as unavailing, the Defendant’s contention that his maintenance should be terminated because the length of his payments have equated to the “midpoint” of the statutory provisions regarding post-divorce maintenance. The plain language of DRL §236(B)(5-a)(f) clearly provides that the “durational” advisory schedule is not only advisory pursuant to DRL §236(B)(5-a)(f)(1), but that such advisory schedule applies to post-divorce maintenance (emphasis added). Additionally, DRL §236(B)(5-a)(n) provides that “…[t]he temporary maintenance order shall not prejudice the rights of either party regarding a post-divorce maintenance award…” (emphasis added). The Court therefore finds that the legislature clearly intended a differentiation between awards of temporary maintenance and post-divorce maintenance, and the Court does not find that the “ advisory schedule” applies to awards of temporary maintenance. As the February Order directed the Defendant to pay temporary maintenance, the Court does not find that it is bound by the “advisory schedule” when determining an application for, or termination of, an award of temporary maintenance.1 As for the Defendant’s argument in footnote “1″ of his counsel’s Affirmation that “…there are some judges who will put in duration of temporary maintenance in the Order…” (see J. Goody Affirmation Paragraph “10″, footnote “1″), the Court rejects this argument inasmuch as no such duration for the temporary maintenance award was fixed within the February Order. In the Court’s analysis of the plain language of the statute, the Court notes that DRL §236(B)(5-a)(g) provides that temporary maintenance shall terminate no later than the issuance of the judgment of divorce or the death of either party, whichever occurs first. The Court interprets this provision to mean that the only time that an award of temporary maintenance must terminate is either upon issuance of a judgment or divorce or death. This leads the Court to the inescapable conclusion that it has discretion as to whether or not to terminate an award of temporary maintenance during the pendency of an action prior to the issuance of a judgment or the death of a party. In furtherance of the aforesaid, DRL §236(B)(5-a)(f) provides that “…[t]he court shall determine the duration of temporary maintenance by considering the length of the marriage…” Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines “considering” as “…: in view of : taking into account…”2 Therefore, a fair reading of DRL §236(B)(5-a)(f) leads this Court to the conclusion that while the Court shall consider (and take into account) the length of the marriage, it need not consider the length of the marriage as the dispositive or controlling factor in the duration of temporary maintenance. Put differently, this Court is not mandated to terminate an award of temporary maintenance based upon the length of a marriage, notwithstanding and irrespective of how short (or long) that marriage may be. The Court has additionally analyzed pertinent case-law. The Second Department has held that the amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its unique facts. D’Alauro v. D’Alauro, 150 A.D.3d 675 (2d Dept. 2017) (emphasis added); see also Gafycz v. Gafycz, 148 A.D.3d 679 (2d Dept. 2017); see also Carr-Harris v. Carr-Harris, 98 A.D.3d 548 (2d Dept. 2012); see also Wortman v. Wortman, 11 A.D.3d 604 (2d Dept. 2004); see also DiBlasi v. DiBlasi, 48 A.D.3d 403 (2d Dept. 2008); see also Kaprov v. Stalinsky, 145 A.D.3d 869 (2d Dept. 2016). Additionally, the Court notes that the purpose of pendente lite maintenance is to ensure that a needy spouse is provided with funds for his or her support and reasonable needs pending trial. Jin c. v. Juliana L., 137 A.D.3d 1063 (2d Dept. 2016); see Coven v. Coven, 82 A.D.3d 1144 (2d Dept. 2011); see Fales v. Fales, 102 A.D.3d 734 (2d Dept. 2013); see Cooper v. Cooper, 7 A.D.3d 746 (2d Dept. 2004). The Court has given consideration to the parties’ approximate thirty-nine (39) month marriage, and the Court recognizes that while short in duration, the Court determines that termination is improper. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court exercises its discretionary authority and considers the unique facts (see supra and see infra) of this case (see D’Alauro v. D’Alauro, supra; see Gafycz v. Gafycz, supra). Indeed, the Court has given substantial weight to the specific unique facts and circumstances of this case, which is that the Defendant — indisputably — previously failed (and is currently failing) to comply with so much of this Court’s February Order directing the payment of temporary maintenance. The Court notes that the Plaintiff was previously compelled to file an application seeking to adjudicate the Defendant to be in contempt of Court. Indeed, when the Court issued the October Order, it found: ORDERED, that so much of Branch (a) of the Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause dated September 8, 2022 with respect to maintenance arrears and Branch (d) of the Plaintiff’s Order to Show Cause dated September 8, 2022 be and are hereby GRANTED TO THE EXTENT that Defendant, S.A., is hereby adjudicated and deemed to be in contempt of court of this Court’s Decision and Order dated February 17, 2022; and it is further ORDERED, that Defendant is directed to appear before this Court in person for sentencing on December 7, 2022 at 11:00 a.m., however, the contemnor may purge his contempt if he pays the sum of $5,372.22 directly to the Plaintiff and provides proof of payment to this Court by the filing of same on NYSCEF on or before December 6, 2022 at 9:30 a.m.; and it is further ORDERED, that the Defendant is on notice that in the event he fails to purge himself of contempt as provided, he is subject to additional penalties, including a period of incarceration… The Defendant’s argument: which is, in effect, that since he paid the temporary maintenance lump-sum, it equates to nine (9) months of payments and therefore should be terminated, is as troubling as it is flawed. While the Defendant may have purged his contemptuous conduct by his lump sum payment, he only did so only after such time as he was adjudicated to be in contempt of the February Order (see supra), and did so only after he was faced with the prospect of incarceration for civil contempt (see supra). The Defendant’s past historical and continued noncompliance with the February Order — which provides clear and unequivocal directives for the support of his spouse — begs the question: if the purpose of pendente lite maintenance is to ensure that a needy spouse is provided with funds for his or her support and reasonable needs pending trial, what purpose does a temporary support order of maintenance serve if the temporary support is not timely paid? The answer is quite simple: it does not serve or further that purpose. A needy spouse should not be required to “chase” the payor spouse for timely payments. Inherent in a temporary order of support is that support should be received on a timely basis so as to enable the needy spouse to support himself or herself. If such support is not timely paid, the noncompliance fails to serve or further the purpose of the support order. The Defendant’s logic and conduct, taken together, ostensibly countermands the intent of the February Order. His conduct, therefore, militates against termination of his temporary maintenance obligation. Dovetailed with the aforesaid, the Court notes that a married person is chargeable with the support of his or her spouse. See Family Court Act §412(1). Not only that, but a party is not free to disregard a court order and decide for himself the manner in which to proceed (see generally Skripek v. Skripek, 239 A.D.2d 488 (2d Dept. 1997)), and the importance of obedience to orders of a trial court cannot be overstated. Balter v. Regan, 63 N.Y.2d 630 (1984) (Kaye, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The Court additionally notes that any perceived inequities in the pendente lite award can be best remedied by a speedy trial, at which the parties’ financial circumstances can be fully explored (see Sinanis v. Sinanis, 67 A.D.3d 773 (2d Dept. 2009); see also Swickle v. Swickle, 47 A.D.3d 704 (2d Dept. 2008)), and the Court at the time of trial has the discretion to retroactively modify pendente lite maintenance, after hearing the facts and circumstances established at trial. See Emmanuel D. v. Ximena D., 2021 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5161 (Supreme Court Kings County 2021). The Court cannot overstate the inexorable conclusion: the Defendant’s historical and continued noncompliance with so much of the February Order with respect to his temporary maintenance has thwarted the Plaintiff’s right to timely receive the temporary maintenance as ordered, thereby prejudicing her rights to ensure that her needs are timely met; the Defendant’s conduct has undermined the intent and purpose of so much of the February Order which provided for the support of the Defendant’s spouse. Accordingly, based upon the plain language of the statute, the prevailing and relevant case- law, and the Defendant’s conduct under and noncompliance with the February Order, it is hereby: ORDERED, that Branch (1) of the Defendant’s Notice of Cross-Motion dated January 6, 2023 be and is hereby DENIED. DISCOVERY SANCTIONS The nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is generally a matter left to the discretion of the Supreme Court. Kingsley v. Kantor, 265 A.D.2d 529 (2d Dept. 1999). The Court of Appeals has repeatedly stressed the importance of party compliance with court orders issued for the purpose of overseeing discovery. Kohan v. Nehmadi, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2216 (Supreme Court New York County 2017). CPLR §3126, entitled “[p]enalties for refusal to comply with order or to disclose”, provides: If any party, or a person who at the time a deposition is taken or an examination or inspection is made is an officer, director, member, employee or agent of a party or otherwise under a party’s control, refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed pursuant to this article, the court may make such orders with regard to the failure or refusal as are just, among them: 1. an order that the issues to which the information is relevant shall be deemed resolved for purposes of the action in accordance with the claims of the party obtaining the order; or 2. an order prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, from producing in evidence designated things or items of testimony, or from introducing any evidence of the physical, mental or blood condition sought to be determined, or from using certain witnesses; or 3. an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party. Case law dictates that “… the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 against a party who refuses to comply with court-ordered discovery is a matter within the discretion of the court” (Green v. Green, 32 AD3d 898, 899; quoting Mahopac Ophthalmology, P.C. v. Tarasevich, 21 AD3d 351, 352; Casey v. Casey, 2007 NY Slip Op 3089, 2 [N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 2007]). Preclusion is a drastic remedy. See generally Pepsico, Inc. v. Winterthur Intl. Am. Ins. Co., 24 A.D.3d 742 (2d Dept. 2005); see generally Assael v. Metro. Transit Auth., 4 A.D.3d 443 (2d Dept. 2004); see generally Moog v. City of New York, 30 A.D.3d 490 (2d Dept. 2006). A preclusion order effectively results in the striking of a pleading. See Vancott v. A&P, 271 A.D.2d 438 (2d Dept. 2000); see Partterson v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 284 A.D.2d 516 (2d Dept. 2001); see Goodmanm Rackower & Agiato v. Lieberman, 260 A.D.2d 599 (2d Dept. 1999). To invoke the remedy of a preclusion order, the court must determine that the party’s failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate and contumacious conduct or its equivalent. See Cianciolo v. Trism Specialized Carriers, 274 A.D.2d 369 (2d Dept. 2000); see Florio v. Newmark & Lewis, 248 A.D.2d 504 (2d Dept. 1998). While preclusion is obviously a harsh remedy, it is clearly warranted where repeated, legitimate demands on the part of an adversary, as well as orders of the court, are met with dissimulation rather than compliance. Santini v. Alexander Grant & Co., 245 A.D.2d 30 (1st Dept. 1997). The trial court is vested with broad discretion to supervise disclosure. See generally Bertalo’s Restaurant v. Exchange Ins. Co., 240 A.D.2d 452 (2d Dept. 1997); see Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Occidental Gems, Inc., 11 N.Y.3d 843 (2008); see Flynn v. City of New York, 101 A.D.3d 803 (2d Dept. 2012). Generally, there should be broad financial disclosure in matrimonial actions in which equitable distribution is sought to enable the parties to ascertain the nature and value of marital assets, as well as to uncover potential hidden assets. See generally Antreasyan v. Antreasyan, 245 A.D.2d 405 (2d Dept. 1997); see Kramer v. Kramer, 227 A.D.2d 531 (2d Dept. 1996); see Gape v. Gape, 125 A.D.2d 637 (2d Dept. 1986). The Court has carefully reviewed the conflicting Affidavits of the parties, as well as the conflicting Affirmations of counsel. In addition, the Court has reviewed the exhibits appended to the moving and cross-moving papers. Based upon the limited and conflicting allegations of the parties, the Court is unsure of what documents remain outstanding and what documents have been produced, and the Court is therefore unable to invoke the drastic remedy of preclusion at this time. See Pepsico, Inc., supra. Notably, there is no documentary evidence appended to the Plaintiff’s opposition and reply papers, and no documentary evidence appended to the Defendant’s cross-moving papers, such as either a formalized discovery response or inventory, as to what documents have been produced to the Defendant’s counsel. For instance, the Defendant’s counsel writes that “Plaintiff’s response to the Notice for Discovery and Inspection included the production of little documentation” (see J. Goody Affirmation Paragraph “32″), and further writes that “…to the extent that bank records were produced, the last bank statement produced was from a year prior to March 2021…” (see J. Goody Affirmation Paragraph “32″), but does not specify precisely what documents were produced, or what documents were not produced. In addition, the Defendant does not specify or indicate what further specific documents are sought from what specific accounts. The Court is additionally unsure if the document appended to the Plaintiff’s opposition and reply papers evidencing the debts to her father (see NYSCEF Document No.: 179) is all of the documents with respect thereto, as the production of that document in the Plaintiff’s papers is unaddressed by the Defendant in reply. The Court is likewise unsure, at this time, if all of the documents requested at the Plaintiff’s deposition were ever provided to the Defendant’s counsel. Because there is a paucity of evidence before the Court, which the Court finds to be inconclusive, and because of all of the aforesaid, the Court cannot invoke the drastic remedy of preclusion at this time. See Pepsico, Inc., supra. However, since the Court has broad discretion to supervise disclosure (see Bertalo’s Restaurant, supra), the Court will issue an order to further that purpose. Accordingly, it is hereby: ORDERED, that Branches (2) and (3) of the Defendant’s Notice of Cross-Motion dated January 6, 2023 be and are hereby GRANTED SOLELY TO THE EXTENT as is more fully set forth in this Decision and Order as set forth hereinafter; and it is further ORDERED, that the Defendant’s counsel shall provide directly to the Plaintiff’s counsel, within thirty (30) days of this Decision and Order, an inventory of what documents have not been produced and provided by the Plaintiff as requested in the Defendant’s discovery notice(s), the Preliminary Conference Stipulation & Order, and at the Plaintiff’s Examination Before Trial; and it is further ORDERED, that within thirty (30) days of receipt of the inventory of documents as described in the preceding decretal paragraph of this Decision and Order, the Plaintiff shall produce such documents to the Defendant’s counsel, which thirty (30) days shall not be adjourned, absent just cause; and it is further ORDERED, that should the Plaintiff fail to produce the documents as requested by said inventory within said thirty (30) day time period as set forth aforesaid, then, in that event, the Defendant is granted leave of Court to renew Branches (2) and (3) of his application seeking discovery sanctions. COUNSEL FEES The Court does not find that the Defendant is entitled to reimbursement of his counsel fees in connection with his application to terminate temporary maintenance. With respect to that portion of his application seeking reimbursement of his counsel fees in connection with the requests for discovery sanctions, the Court finds the application premature given that which is set forth aforesaid (see supra) in this Decision and Order. To this end, inasmuch as this Court cannot ascertain on these papers what discovery production has been produced and whether or not discovery remains outstanding, the Court cannot ascertain whether the Defendant is entitled to reimbursement of his counsel fees at this time. Therefore, the Court denies the application without prejudice and at this time, with leave to the Defendant to renew his request if and to the extent he renews that portion of his application seeking discovery sanctions (see supra). Accordingly, it is hereby: ORDERED, that Branch (4) of the Defendant’s Notice of Cross-Motion dated January 6, 2023 be and is hereby DENIED, without prejudice and to the extent as indicated herein. Any other relief requested not specifically addressed herein is hereby DENIED. This constitutes the DECISION AND ORDER of this Court. Dated: January 23, 2023
