OPINION & ORDER Before the Court is Plaintiff Helio Logistics, Inc. d/b/a NextMed’s (“Plaintiff” or “NextMed”) application for a Renewed Order to Show Cause for a Temporary Restraining Order, Expedited Discovery, and Preliminary Injunction (the “Renewed Application”) (ECF Nos. 58-61), which Plaintiff submitted to the Court on January 27, 2023. Plaintiff requests that the Court temporarily restrain the defendants in this action from using or disclosing Plaintiff’s trade secrets as well as seeks limited, expedited discovery of the defendants. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s Renewed Application is GRANTED. BACKGROUND On December 20, 2022, Plaintiff submitted to the Court an Order to Show Cause for a Temporary Restraining Order, Expedited Discovery, and Preliminary Injunction (the “Initial Application”). (ECF No. 26.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s Initial Application that same day and set a Show Cause Hearing for December 22, 2022 (the “Initial Hearing”). (ECF No. 26.). Defendants Apoorva Mehta (“Mehta” or “Defendant”), Cloud Health Systems LLC d/b/a Sunrise Health (“Sunrise” or “Defendant”), and Tejasvi Singh (“Singh” or “Defendant”) (collectively, “Defendants”) each opposed Plaintiff’s Initial Application, filing separate Cross Motions to Immediately Dissolve the December 20 Order to Show Cause. (ECF Nos. 27 and 30, respectively). Following the Initial Hearing, in an opinion and order dated January 3, 2023 (the “Opinion”) (ECF No. 43), the Court dissolved Plaintiff’s Initial Application for failure to demonstrate a likelihood of success on its claim that the Court has personal jurisdiction over all Defendants, without prejudice to renew upon an adequate showing of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Verified Second Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) on January 18, 2023 (ECF No. 49.). On January 27, 2023, Plaintiff then submitted to the Court the Renewed Application. The Court held a hearing via teleconference on February 1, 2023 (the “Hearing”). Defendants Mehta and Sunrise, and Defendant Singh, each opposed Plaintiff’s Renewed Application, arguing that Plaintiff again failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success for its claim that the Court possesses personal jurisdiction over all Defendants, and that Plaintiff did not show irreparable harm or a likelihood of success on its central claim that Defendants misappropriated its trade secrets. (See ECF Nos 62-66.) Specifically, Plaintiff’s Renewed Application seeks to temporarily restrain Defendants and anyone acting in concert with them, from: (1) Using, disclosing, selling, copying, duplicating, or otherwise employing Plaintiff’s trade secrets (i.e., Plaintiff’s business strategies, client list, web traffic data, advertising data analytics, revenue and products mix, sales patterns, churn data, customer emails and customer demographic information, customer lifetime values, and information related to Plaintiff’s intake flow, pricing structure, average revenue per unit data, insurance authorization process, vendor relations, and Plaintiff’s customer acquisition costs and channel-by-channel marketing analysis), including through using or employing any documents, files, platforms, websites, systems, or other information that is derived from Plaintiff’s trade secrets; and (2) Defendants, and anyone acting in concert with Defendants, are enjoined from erasing, replacing, destroying, transferring, moving, or otherwise disposing of Plaintiff’s trade secrets (i.e., Plaintiff’s business strategies, client list, web traffic data, advertising data analytics, revenue and products mix, sales patterns, churn data, customer emails and customer demographic information, customer lifetime values, and information related to Plaintiff’s intake flow, pricing structure, average revenue per unit data, insurance authorization process, vendor relations, and Plaintiff’s customer acquisition costs and channel-by-channel marketing analysis) from their present location, absent further order of this Court. The Renewed Application also requests limited, expedited discovery, including (3) depositions and up to ten (10) requests for the production of documents on Defendants. Following expedited discovery, Plaintiff further seeks a preliminary injunction restraining Defendants from (1) and (2), supra, in addition to restraining Defendants from: (1) making available or otherwise providing their websites, currently at https://www.findsunrise.com/ and https://app.findsunrise.com/, or any variations thereof, to the public, including to former, current, and prospective customers and investors, absent further order of this Court. The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions and considered the arguments that each party made at the Hearing. For the following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on its claim that the Court has personal jurisdiction over all Defendants. Accordingly, and in light of Plaintiff’s showing of irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on its claim for misappropriation of trade secrets as against all Defendants, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Renewed Application, as set forth in the Conclusion, infra. LEGAL STANDARD The Court applies the same standard to applications for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Local 1814, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. New York Shipping Ass’n, Inc., 965 F.2d 1224, 1228 (2d Cir. 1992) (the “standards which govern consideration of an application for a temporary restraining order [] are the same standards as those which govern a preliminary injunction.”). Additionally, in deciding a motion for [a] preliminary injunction, a court may consider the entire record including affidavits and other hearsay evidence. Park Irmat Drug Corp. v. OptumRx, Inc. 152 F.Supp.3d 127, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); see also 725 Eatery Corp. v. City of New York, 408 F.Supp.3d 424, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Charette v. Town of Oyster Bay, 159 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir. 1998)). Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the [movant] is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate: (1) ‘a likelihood of success on the merits or…sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the plaintiff’s favor’; (2) a likelihood of ‘irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction’; (3) that ‘the balance of hardships tips in the plaintiff’s favor’; and (4) that the ‘public interest would not be disserved’ by the issuance of an injunction.” Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 895 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2010)). “A showing of irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Faively Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2009); see Singas Famous Pizza Brands Corp. v. N.Y. Adver. LLC, 468 F. App’x 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2012). “To satisfy the irreparable harm requirement, Plaintiff[ ] must demonstrate that absent a preliminary injunction [it] will suffer an injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent, and one that cannot be remedied if a court waits until the end of trial to resolve the harm.” Faively, 559 F.3d at 118 (quoting Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007)). The “mere possibility of irreparable harm is insufficient to justify the drastic remedy of a preliminary injunction.” Borey v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1991). DISCUSSION I. Plaintiff has Demonstrated a Likelihood of Success on its Claim that the Court has Personal Jurisdiction Over All Defendants As the Court noted in its Opinion, it may exercise personal jurisdiction over a given defendant if it possesses either general or specific personal jurisdiction over that defendant. Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010); Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2010); Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 732 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2013)). General personal jurisdiction may apply if the criteria of N.Y. C.P.L.R. §301 (“§301″) are met. Additionally, specific personal jurisdiction may apply if the criteria of N.Y.C.P.L.R. §302(a)(1) (“§302(a)(1)”), N.Y.C.P.L.R. §302(a)(2) (“§302(a)(2)”), or N.Y.C.P.L.R. §302(a)(3) (“§302(a)(3)”) are met. A. Defendant Sunrise In its Opinion, the Court concluded that Plaintiff did not show a likelihood of success on its claim that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Sunrise primarily because Plaintiff failed to allege that Sunrise had at least one customer in New York. See Spin Master Ltd., 463 F.Supp.3d at 364–65; Alibaba Grp. Holding, 2018 WL 2022626, at *4; Savage Universal Corp., 2004 WL 1824102, at *9; (see also Opinion, at 17.) In its Second Verified Amended Complaint (“SAC”), however, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sunrise represented on its website in November of 2022 that it had at least one customer in New York. For instance, Plaintiff notes that Sunrise’s website highlighted several of its “Real members” with “Real stories” and “Real results,” one of whom was “Sonia T from New York City.” (SAC 30.) As Plaintiff has alleged that Sunrise has at least one customer in New York and that Sunrise intentionally targets New York customers through its highly interactive website, the Court finds that it has shown a likelihood of success on its claim that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Sunrise pursuant to §302(a)(1). (SAC 3); see Fahey v. Breakthrough Films & Television Inc., No. 21 CIV 3208 PAESLC, 2022 WL 4547438, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2022) (noting that a single transaction in New York may be sufficient for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant where the defendant’s activities were purposeful and a substantial relationship existed between the transaction and the claim asserted); see also PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1109 (2d Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 467, 527 N.Y.S.2d 195, 522 N.E.2d 40 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).1 B. Defendants Mehta and Singh The Court likewise concluded in its Opinion that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on its claim that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Mehta and Singh. However, Plaintiff now offers allegations that Defendants Mehta and Singh both worked to obtain (and ultimately did obtain) funding for Sunrise from Thrive Capital, a venture capital firm based in New York, and that in order to solicit this funding both Defendants likely divulged in communications with Thrive Capital the trade secrets they purportedly misappropriated from Plaintiff. (See, e.g., SAC
9-11, 25, 37, 129-33, 138.) Plaintiff further claims that Mehta continues to engage “frequent and sustained communications” with Thrive Capital in connection with the firm’s investment in Sunrise. (Id. 3.) This Court has previously found that such fundraising activities constitute “business transactions” and are thereby sufficient to satisfy §302(a)(1). See Porco v. Phoenix Bldg. Corp., No. 18 CV 5938 (NSR), 2019 WL 2210659, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2019) (noting that fundraising activities undertaken by a defendant outside of New York with a third-party in New York constituted business transactions and were sufficient to satisfy §302(a)(1) where the plaintiff’s claims partly arose out of those transactions); see also Suber v. VVP Servs., LLC, No. 21-2649, 2023 WL 115631, at *3 (2d Cir. Jan. 10, 2023) (finding that “fundraising activities in New York amounted to a business transaction” for purposes of §302(a)(1)); Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Kumar, 721 F.Supp.2d 166, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that personal jurisdiction existed as to the defendant pursuant to §302(a)(1) where the defendant purposefully availed himself of the “privilege[] of…conducting sales to residents of New York”).2 II. Plaintiff has Shown Irreparable Harm From, and a Likelihood of Success on the Merits of, its Claim for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets as Against All Defendants Plaintiff has shown for purposes of its request for a temporary restraining order that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a temporary restraining order from Defendants’ alleged misappropriation of its trade secrets. “Irreparable harm is presumed where a trade secret has been misappropriated.” Estee Lauder Companies Inc. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have already misappropriated and used its trade secrets to start a competing business. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendant Singh misappropriated its trade secrets while working with its CEO, Robert Epstein, and that he disclosed them to Defendant Mehta, who purportedly used them to start, and obtain venture capital funding for, a competing business (i.e., Sunrise). (SAC
