The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 16, 17, 18, 19, 31, 35, 43, 44, 45, 55, 63 were read on this motion to/for DISMISSAL. The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 32, 36, 46, 47, 48, 56, 64 were read on this motion to/for DISMISS. The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 004) 27, 28, 34, 38, 52, 53, 54, 58, 62 were read on this motion to/for DISMISSAL. Upon the foregoing documents, all defendants move to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).1 BACKGROUND Plaintiff commenced the instant action on December 19, 2019 pursuant CPLR 214-g of the Child Victims Act (CVA)2 asserting a cause of action for battery against Weinstein and a cause of action for negligence against defendants Robert Weinstein (RW), The Walt Disney Company and Disney Enterprises Inc. (together, Disney), Miramax Holding Corp. (MHC), and Miramax Film NY, LLC (Miramax).3 The facts set forth in the complaint are as follows: In the late 1970s, defendants Harvey and Robert Weinstein created an independent film-distribution company named Miramax, which grew in prominence in the film industry throughout the 1980s and subsequent years for producing and distributing “films that achieved both critical attention and commercial success” (see NYSCEF Doc No 1, complaint at 22-26). By the time of plaintiff’s alleged assault in 2002, the brothers “had become enormously powerful and influential producers in the film and television industry” (id. at 27). Plaintiff also alleges that, by 2002, Weinstein “developed a propensity for sexually harassing, sexually assaulting, and/or attempting to sexual assault women who worked or were seeking to work in the film industry” (id. at 28). “Using the power, influence and resources of his position at Miramax, Harvey Weinstein often met privately with women who were seeking acting roles in Miramax productions. During many of these meetings, which were supposed to be for business purposes, Harvey Weinstein sought sexual contact with the women whom he had induced to see him, using promises of career assistance, threats of career destruction and physical force to overcome the resistance of women who did not wish to have sexual contact with him” (id. at 29). In or about September of 2002, plaintiff Kaja Sokola met defendant Harvey Weinstein (Weinstein) at an event in Manhattan associated with her modeling agency. Plaintiff, then 16 years old, told Weinstein she wanted to become an actress and Weinstein allegedly said that they will have lunch to discuss her career. Approximately three days later, Weinstein called plaintiff advising that he would pick her up for lunch. They did not go to a restaurant for lunch but to Weinstein’s apartment instead. “Once alone with Sokola, Harvey Weinstein wasted no time in aggressively and threateningly demanding sex. He told her that if she wanted to be an actress, she would have to be comfortable doing whatever the director told her to do-including losing her inhibitions and getting naked. He then instructed Sokola to take off her clothes” (id. at 39). The complaint continues to allege that he proceeded to forcibly touch her and made her touch herself; plaintiff alleges she did not consent and continually stated the same. During the alleged assault “Harvey Weinstein threatened and pressured Sokola, saying that he had ‘made’ the careers of Penelope Cruz and Gwyneth Paltrow, and that neither would be working without him. He intimated that Sokola would never work as an actress unless she acquiesced to his demands” (id. at 42). After Weinstein ejaculated on the floor, plaintiff “tried to leave the apartment, but she could not get out because Weinstein was blocking the door, holding her arms and yelling at her to calm down” (id. at 46). “Weinstein insisted that what had just happened was normal. [Plaintiff] began to scream at Harvey Weinstein, telling him that she did not want to touch him or do what he wanted of her,” which allegedly made Weinstein angry (id. at 46). Weinstein contacted plaintiff a week later to ask how she was doing, and plaintiff alleges that he “thereafter persisted in his pursuits against [her] and took every opportunity to make sure that she understood that he was the only person who could help her become an actress” (id. at 50). DISCUSSION When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a plaintiff’s “allegations are presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference”; however, “conclusory allegations…consisting of bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity” will not suffice (Godfrey v. Spano, 13 NY3d 358, 373 [2009]; see Goldfarb v. Schwartz, 26 AD3d 462, 463 [2d Dept 2006]). “[T]he sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]). Additionally, “[w]hether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss” (EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]). Negligent Retention & Supervision “It is well established that before a defendant may be held liable for negligence it must be shown that the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff” (Pulka v. Edelman, 40 NY2d 781, 782 [1976]). “In the absence of duty, there is no breach and without a breach there is no liability” (id.). There is generally no duty to control the harm-producing conduct of a third party (i.e., the tortfeasor) absent a special relationship either between the defendant and the plaintiff or the defendant and the tortfeasor (see Pulka, 40 NY2d at 783; Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 NY2d 222, 233 [2001], op after certified question answered, 264 F3d 21 [2d Cir 2001]). “The key in each is that the defendant’s relationship with either the tortfeasor or the plaintiff places the defendant in the best position to protect against the risk of harm” (Hamilton, 96 NY2d at 233; see, e.g., 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods v. Finlandia Ctr., 96 NY2d 280, 289 [2001] ["Landowners, for example, have a duty to protect tenants, patrons and invitees from foreseeable harm caused by the criminal conduct of others while they are on the premises, because the special relationship puts them in the best position to protect against the risk"]).”That duty, however, does not extend to members of the general public”; thus, circumscribing liability “because the special relationship defines the class of potential plaintiffs to whom the duty is owed” (532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, 96 NY2d at 289). However, in the case of the special relationship at issue here, between an employer and employee, the focus is not on the potential plaintiff, but on the employer and its relationship with the defendant-tortfeasor (see Waterbury v. New York City Ballet, Inc., 205 AD3d 154, 161 [1st Dept 2022]). This is because “[t]he negligence of the employer…arises from its having placed the employee in a position to cause foreseeable harm, harm which the injured party most probably would have been spared had the employer taken reasonable care in making its decision concerning the hiring and retention of the employee” (Sheila C. v. Povich, 11 AD3d 120, 129 [1st Dept 2004]; see Roe v. Domestic & Foreign Missionary Socy. of the Prot. Episcopal Church, 198 AD3d 698, 699-702 [2d Dept 2021], quoting Johansmeyer v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 165 AD3d 634, 634-37 [2d Dept 2018]; see also Doe v. Congregation of the Mission of St.Vincent De Paul in Germantown, 2016 NY Slip Op 32061[U] at *6 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2016] [hereinafter Doe v. Congregation]). Thus, “the duty of care in supervising an employee extends to any person injured by the employee’s misconduct” (Waterbury, 205 AD3d at 162). With these principles in mind and as explained below, this Court finds that, to state a claim for negligent hiring, retention or supervision under New York law, a plaintiff must plead, in addition to the elements required for a claim of negligence:4 (1) the existence of an employee-employer relationship; (2) “that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for the conduct which caused the injury” (Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 AD2d 159, 161 [2d Dept 1997]; Sheila C., 11 AD3d at 129-30); and (3) “a nexus or connection between the defendant’s negligence in hiring and retaining [or supervising] the offending employee and the plaintiff’s injuries” (Roe, 198 AD3d at 701; Gonzalez v. City of New York, 133 AD3d 65, 70 [1st Dept 2015] ["what the plaintiff must demonstrate is a connection or nexus between the plaintiff's injuries and the defendant's malfeasance"]; see Waterbury, 205 AD3d at 161-62; Anonymous v. Dobbs Ferry Union Free School Dist., 290 AD2d 464, 464-65 [2d Dept 2002]; K.I. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 256 AD2d 189, 189-192 [1st Dept 1998]; see also Farrell v. Maiello, 38 AD3d 592, 592-93 [2d Dept 2007]; R. v. R., 37 AD3d 577, 578-79 [2d Dept 2007]; Lemp v. Lewis, 226 AD2d 907, 907-08 [3d Dept 1996]). Employment Relationship5 “Broadly speaking, an employee is someone who works for another subject to substantial control, not only over the results produced but also over the means used to produce the results” (Castro-Quesada v. Tuapanta, 148 AD3d 978, 979 [2d Dept 2017], quoting Matter of O’Brien v. Spitzer, 7 NY3d 239, 242 [2006] [internal quotations omitted]). A predominant factor of whether an employment relationship exists is the extent of the employer’s power to order and control the employee’s performance of work (Castro-Quesada, 148 AD3d at 979, quoting Barak v. Chen, 87 AD3d 955, 957 [2d Dept 2011]; Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., 29 NY3d 174, 185-86 [2017]). Factors include “‘(1) the selection and engagement of the servant; (2) the payment of salary or wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power of control of the servant’s conduct’” (Griffin, 29 NY3d at 186, quoting State Div. of Human Rights v. GTE Corp., 109 AD2d 1082, 1083 [4th Dept 1985]). Defendant MHC Plaintiff alleges that MHC was a subsidiary of one of the Disney entities but does not allege a specific employment relationship between MHC and Weinstein or duty of care owed on the part of MHC, particularly in comparison to the detailed allegations of the other defendants. Based on plaintiff’s own allegations in the complaint that Miramax (Miramax Film NY, LLC) assumed the liabilities of Miramax Film Corp., and that Weinstein had employment agreements with Miramax and Disney, but not MHC, the Court finds that any suggestion that MHC should be held liable as an employer is contradictory and, accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim against MHC (see, e.g., Greene v. Doral Conference Ctr. Assoc., 18 AD3d 429, 430 [2d Dept 2005]). The Court rejects plaintiff’s contention in opposition that discovery would be necessary to show whether MHC is a proper defendant (see Kornfeld v. Chen Hua Zheng, 185 AD3d 420, 421 [1st Dept 2020]; HT Capital Advisors v. Optical Resources Group, 276 AD2d 420 [1st Dept 2000]). Disney Defendants Contrary to defendants’ contentions, the complaint sufficiently alleges an employment relationship with Disney, including the existence of employment agreements between Weinstein and the Disney entities (see complaint at
15-17, 89) and specifically named Disney executives or employees that exercised oversight over Miramax and Weinstein, and to whom Weinstein directly reported (id. at
