MEMORANDUM AND ORDER In this action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, plaintiffs bring claims on behalf of themselves and a putative class against Suffolk County, various employees and officials thereof and the Acting Superintendent of the New York State Police Department relating to certain recently-enacted New York State pistol licensing provisions and a bevy of County policies and practices implementing those provisions. Presently before the Court is an application for a preliminary injunction1 directing a broad spectrum of measures, ranging from enjoining officials from enforcing criminal statutes to extending the operations of the Suffolk County Police Department Licensing Bureau beyond the hours of 9 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.2 to render obtaining a pistol permit more convenient. For the reasons that follow, none of the plaintiffs can satisfy the demanding requisites for preliminary relief, and the motion must be DENIED. Procedural History This action was commenced through the filing of a “Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief” on August 15, 2022. DE 1. Summonses were issued on August 23, 2022. DE 5. On October 28, 2022, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding the state defendant3 as well as asserting constitutional challenges to the state statutory scheme. DE 8. Defendants were served in late November 2022. DE 16-23. On December 9, 2022, defendant Steven Nigrelli, Acting Superintendent of the New York State Police (the “Superintendent”), initiated a motion to dismiss by filing a pre-motion letter arguing that plaintiffs lack standing, no injury was traceable to the Superintendent and that the claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. DE 25. On December 11, 2022 — about four months after the case was commenced — plaintiffs filed the instant motion for a preliminary injunction. DE 27. Relevant Facts The pertinent facts relating to each plaintiff include the following: Plaintiffs Giambalvo, Mougios, Mashkow & McLaughlin Each of these four plaintiffs, between February 2020 and July 2022, completed and filed an “Applicant Questionnaire” with the Suffolk County Police Department (“SCPD”), paying a $10 fee. See DE 27-8 through 27-11. This questionnaire initiated the licensing procedure to obtain a New York State handgun carry permit. Id. Each was advised that the next step in this process involves fingerprinting and an interview. Id. Representatives of the SCPD advised each of these four plaintiffs — both orally and in writing — that the wait for an appointment to complete these steps was somewhere between one and three years. Id. In sworn statements, each of these plaintiffs also averred that they have not and would not comply with various aspects of the licensing process. See Giambalvo Decl., DE 27-8 14 (indicating refusal to provide social media account information and identity of cohabitants or submit to an interview), id. 15 (refusal to submit affidavits from character references); Mougios Decl., DE 27-9 12 (refusal to attend firearms training), id. 15 (refusal to provide character references), id. 16 (refusal to provide social media accounts, personal relationships and family information or submit to an interview); Mashkow Decl., 27-10 7 (will not comply with disclosure of personal information, training or interview requirements); McLaughlin Decl., DE 27-11 7 (“objects” to all requirements and will not comply with firearms training requirements). Plaintiff McGregor In November 2020, Michael McGregor, a practicing physician, completed an “Applicant Questionnaire” and paid the $10 fee to seek a handgun permit under the previous statutory scheme. DE 27-12 5. He contacted the Licensing Bureau in October 2021 for an update and was advised that there was a substantial backlog. Id. 6. Unsatisfied with the response, in December 2021, McGregor’s attorney filed a “mandamus proceeding” in state court because of the perceived failure of authorities to comply with the statutory six-month deadline for issuing a permit or denial. Id. 8. McGregor reports that the County moved to dismiss, arguing that the 6-month clock does not commence until the applicant is interviewed by the SCPD. Id. 9. In January 2022, McGregor was contacted by an investigator to schedule an interview. Id. 10. McGregor applied for, and received, a “concealed carry handgun license restricted to sportsman” in March 2022, permitting him only to carry in furtherance of target shooting and competitive activities. Id. 18. In August 2022, McGregor applied for an amendment to remove the “sportsman” restrictions of his license. Id. 20. He has not yet received the amendment. Part of the requirements for the amendment to the license is an 18-hour firearms training class. Dr. McGregor avers that he will not take the training required by state law. Id. 24. He also refuses to provide state authorities with his social media accounts or identify his marital partner or other cohabitants. Id. 25. He also avers that he intends to carry a handgun “outside of my sportsman restriction on a regular basis — with or without being issued an amended license.” Id. 26. Plaintiffs Melloni and Renaissance Firearm Instruction, Inc. (RFI) Melloni, the President of RFI, is an NRA-certified firearms instructor who offers training through the company. DE 27-13 3. Melloni created an 18-hour curriculum that complies with the New York State Concealed Carry Improvement Act (CCIA) and includes two hours of live-fire training. Id. 4. Melloni avers that in October 2022, he had to cancel an agreement with four individuals who had registered for the class because they did not currently hold a pistol permit. Id. 10. Melloni reports that the basis for this cancellation was a statement made by defendant Michael Komorowski advising that the SCPD would arrest individuals taking live-fire training if they did not hold a permit. Id. 11. According to Melloni, Komorowski stated that the SCPD would “not honor[]” an exemption contained in NY Penal Law §265.20(3-a) which allows for live-fire training before a permit is issued, as such training is part of the permitting process. Id. 12. Melloni avers that he and RFI have suffered “economic loss” because of these circumstances. Id. 22. Based on these facts, plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction that seeks two categories of relief. The first category, broadly aimed at procedural and administrative mechanisms surrounding applications for handgun permits (together, the “Procedural Provisions”), seeks to direct defendants to: (i) provide the New York State PPB-3 application on the Suffolk County Police Department website and local police precincts; (ii) accept the PPB-3 for filing from all applicants upon presentment; (iii) fingerprint applicants upon presentment of the completed PPB-3 or, in the alternative, publish the Suffolk County Police Department ORI number (Originating Agency Identifier) on its website and in local precincts for applicants to submit their fingerprints directly to the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and accept the resulting DCJS Report upon presentment of the PPB-3; (iv) photograph applicants upon presentment of the completed PPB-3 or, alternative, accept 2 statutorily required photographs from applicants upon presentment of the PPB-3; (v) provide hours of public accessibility outside of the Licensing Bureau’s currently restricted hours of Monday-Friday from 9:00 — 4:30 p.m.; and (vi) within 30 days of the presentment of the completed PPB-3 application, issue a handgun license to all applicants eligible to possess firearms under state and federal law. DE 27 at 2. Relatedly, plaintiffs seek an order barring Suffolk County from implementing the following procedures: (iii) a licensing process that exceeds 30 days between presentment of the completed New York State Pistol/Revolver License Application (PPB-3) and issuance of a license (or denial thereof); (iv) a policy that requires applicants to be personally interviewed; Id. at 2-3. The second category of relief sought by defendants (collectively, the “Enforcement Provisions”) seeks to enjoin Suffolk County from “implementing and enforcing” certain aspects of the CCIA, including the following: Suffolk County shall be enjoined from implementing and enforcing (i) Penal Law sections 400.00(1)(b), 400.00(1)(o), 400.00(19), that portion of section 400.00(4-a) allowing statutory licensing officers 6 months to either issue a license or deny an application made thereunder; (ii) Penal Law section 400.00(15) against handgun licensees who carry a handgun registered thereon outside of their license restriction;[and] (v) a policy that subjects unlicensed individuals who participate in live-fire training with a duly authorized instructor, and their instructors, to criminal penalties including arrest and incarceration… Id. This opinion follows. Discussion Standard for the Award of a Preliminary Injunction It is axiomatic that a preliminary injunction represents an extraordinary exercise of a court’s authority and thus requires an exacting showing. The Second Circuit recently reiterated the standard of review for a motion for preliminary relief in the face of allegations that government regulation impinged on constitutional rights: Issuance of a preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” that is “never awarded as of right.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) (quoting 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2948, at 129 (2d ed. 1995)). Preliminary injunctive relief “should not be routinely granted.” Hanson Tr. PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Medical Soc. of State of N.Y. v. Toia, 560 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1977)). When deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, courts “should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24, 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). To obtain a preliminary injunction that “will affect government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statute or regulatory scheme, the moving party must demonstrate (1) irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, (2) a likelihood of success on the merits, and (3) public interest weighing in favor of granting the injunction.” Agudath Israel of Am. v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620, 631 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). The movant must also show that the balance of equities supports the issuance of an injunction. See Yang v. Kosinski, 960 F.3d 119, 127 (2d Cir. 2020). We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266, 279-80 (2d Cir. 2021) (denying preliminary relief to plaintiffs claiming religious challenge to COVID-19 vaccine mandate). That decision further noted that “we have consistently applied the likelihood-of-success standard to cases challenging government actions taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme, including in cases involving emergency regulations and orders.” Id. at 279 n.13 (citing Agudath Israel of Am. v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620, 631 (2d Cir. 2020); Alleyne v. New York State Educ. Dep’t, 516 F.3d 96, 99–101 (2d Cir. 2008)). Finally, plaintiffs face a “‘heightened standard where [ ] an injunction is mandatory’ — in other words, it seeks a change to the status quo, as opposed to a prohibitory preliminary injunction that merely maintains the status quo.” Yafai v. Cuccinelli, No. 20 Civ. 2932 (AT), 2020 WL 2836975, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2020) (quoting New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d Cir. 2015)). As plaintiffs seek largely mandatory injunctive relief, this heightened standard plainly applies to such requests. DE 13 at 4-6. The Failure of Plaintiffs Giambalvo, Mougios, Mashkow, McLaughlin and McGregor to Establish Likelihood of Success as to the Procedural Provisions While the parties have taken a “kitchen sink” approach to this litigation, urging the Court to consider, among other things, the propriety of centuries-old regulatory measures as analogues for New York’s CCIA, the instant application may be resolved on far more narrow grounds. Plaintiffs Giambalvo, Mougios, Mashkow, McLaughlin and McGregor each have unequivocally expressed their intent, in sworn declarations, to refuse to comply with various requisites of New York’s handgun permit process, including their unambiguous refusal to participate in mandated (1) firearms training, (2) disclosure of the identity of cohabitants and family members and (3) disclosure of their social media accounts. DE 27-8 through 27-12. Indeed, even in their complaint, plaintiffs state that they will not submit to the requirements of the State’s permit scheme. See, e.g., DE 13
