UPON DUE DELIBERATION AND CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT of the foregoing papers, including e-filed documents/exhibits numbered 22 through and including 44, this motion is decided as follows: The Defendant moves by Notice of Motion for an Order (a) declaring that New York’s anti-strategic litigation against public participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute as amended on November 10, 2020, applies retroactively to this action; (b) dismissing the action at bar, and c) awarding attorneys’ fees payable to the Defendant. (Motion Sequence 001) In contrast, Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion and moves by Notice of Cross Motion for an Order pursuant to CPLR §3211(7) for dismissal of the first and second counterclaims in the Verified Answer, for failure to state a cause of action; and also moves for summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor and for dismissal of Defendant’s third and fourth counterclaims in her Verified Answer (motion sequence 002). On November 11, 2019, the Plaintiff filed her summons and complaint with the Court and on December 2, 2019, the Defendant filed her verified answer with counterclaims, with the Plaintiff answering the defendant’s counterclaims on January 6, 2020. There is complete joinder of issue with respect to this lawsuit, notwithstanding the Defendant’s filing of a motion seeking dismissal under CPLR §3211, and a Preliminary Conference was held on October 14, 2020. Sometime after the Preliminary Conference, the parties engaged in the motion practice currently before the Court and these motions are fully submitted to the Court for determination. The Plaintiff’s Complaint provides that the “Defendant, along with a cabal of misguided self-styled animal rights advocates” engaged in a defamatory campaign against the Plaintiff which included accusations of criminality, an accusation that the Plaintiff is a “patronage hire” who lied through the hiring process, including lies about her credentials, and that the Plaintiff committed “criminal acts” and caused “blood baths when she put dogs in play groups.” The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant made these allegedly defamatory remarks at Town of Hempstead Board meetings and in social media posts. The Plaintiff was awarded the position of Animal Behavioral Consultant in January of 2017, and Defendant has criticized the Plaintiff with respect to her performance in that role. In contrast, the Defendant asserts that she was exercising her constitutional rights when criticizing the Plaintiff’s job performance and that her statements before the Hempstead Town Board and on social media platforms regarding the Plaintiff constituted protected speech. The Defendant argues that not only are her rights protected on a constitutional basis, but that she is entitled to relief under the Anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (“anti-SLAPP”) law. (Civil Rights Law §§70-a; 76-a) The Defendant premises her motion on the theory that the 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP Law apply retroactively to the Plaintiff’s defamation lawsuit. However, the Appellate Division has rejected the argument that the 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP law apply retroactively to pending claims. (Kurland & Associates, P.C. v. Glassdoor, Inc. 205 AD3d 545 [1s Dept 2022]; Gottwald v. Sebert, 203 AD3d 488 [1st Dept 2022]) The November 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP statutes, which, among other things, mandate the award of costs and attorneys’ fees to victims of SLAPP suits, do not apply retroactively. (Cisneros v. Cook, 209 AD3d 519, 519-520 [1st Dept 2022]) Prior to the 2020 amendments, the Civil Rights Law did not mandate the imposition of costs and attorneys fees in every situation in which the anti-SLAPP claim is interposed, and the decision to do so is discretionary rather than mandatory. (West Branch Conservation Ass’n v. Planning Board, 222AD2 513 [2nd Dept 1995]). To prevail under the law prior to the 2020 amendments, a movant must demonstrate that a lawsuit was commenced solely to harass, intimidate, punish or otherwise maliciously inhibit the movant’s right to free speech, petition, or association. (Southampton Day Camp Realty, LLC v. Gormon, 118 AD3d 976 [2nd Dept 2014]) With respect to the parties’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7), the Court is bound to accept all facts alleged in the complaint as being true, accord plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Delbene v. Estes, 52 AD3d 647 [2nd Dept. 2008); see also 511 W.232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2D 144 [2002]). Pursuant to CPLR §3026, the complaint is to be liberally construed. (Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]). It is not the court’s function to determine whether plaintiff will ultimately be successful in proving the allegations. (Aberbach v. Biomedical Tissue Services, 48 AD3d 716 [2nd Dept. 2008]; see also EBCI, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 5 NY3D 11 [2005]). The pleaded facts, and any submissions in opposition to the motion, are accepted as true and given every favorable inference (see 511 W. 323nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d at 151-152; Dana v. Malco Realty, Inc., 51 AD3d 621 [2d Dept 2008]; Gershon v. Goldberg, 30 AD3d 372, 373 [2d Dept 2006]). However, a court may consider evidentiary material submitted by a defendant in support of a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7) (see CPLR §3211[c]; Sokol v. Leader, 74 AD3d at 1181). “When evidentiary material is considered” on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7), the criterion is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether they have properly stated one, and unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed is not a fact at all or that no significant dispute exists, the dismissal should not be granted (Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 NY2d at 275; see Sokol v. Leader, 74 AD3d at 1182). Under CPLR §3211 (a) (7), a party may move for dismissal of one or more causes of action on the ground that the pleading fails to state a cause of action. On such a motion, the court is concerned with whether the plaintiff has a cause of action and not whether he has properly stated one. (Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 636 [1976]). “However imperfectly, informally or even illogically the facts may be stated, a complaint, attacked for insufficiency, is deemed to allege ‘whatever can be implied from its statements by fair and reasonable intendment’” (Foley v. D’Agostino, 21 AD2d 60, 65 [1st Dept 1964]. “[W]e look to the substance [of the pleading] rather than to the form” (id.). The court will liberally construe the pleadings in plaintiff’s favor, accept the facts as true, and determine whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable theory. (Cron v. Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366[1998]; see also Colella v. City of NY, 2020 NY Slip Op 31999[U], *1-2 [Sup Ct, NY County 2020]) The elements of a cause of action for defamation are a “false statement, published without privilege or authorization to a third party, constituting fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, and it must either cause special harm or constitute defamation per se” (Salvatore v. Kumar, 45 AD3d 560 [2nd Dept 2007], quoting Dillon v. City of New York, 261 AD2d 34, 38 [1st Dept 1989]). The complaint must set forth the particular words allegedly constituting defamation (see CPLR 3016[a]), and it must also allege the time, place, and manner of the false statement and specify to whom it was made (see Dillon v. City of New York, 261 AD2d at 38). With respect to those branches of the parties’ motions which seek summary judgment, it is well settled that in a motion for summary judgment the moving party bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, submitting sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of a material issue of fact (see Sillman v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395 [1957]; Friends of Animals, Inc. v. Associates Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065 [1979]; Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 5557 [1980]; Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). The failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Winegard v. New York University Medical Center, 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Once this showing has been made, however, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action (see Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 5557 [1980]). The primary purpose of a summary judgment motion is issue finding not issue determination (Garcia v. J.C. Duggan, Inc., 180 AD2d 570 [1st Dept. 1992]), and it should only be granted when there are no triable issues of fact (see also Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 N2d 361 [1974]). For the challenged statements to be susceptible of a defamatory connotation, they must come within the well-established categories of actionable communications. Thus, a false statement “that tends to expose a person to public contempt, hatred, ridicule, aversion or disgrace constitutes defamation” (Thomas H. v. Paul B., 18 NY3d 580, 584 [2012]). “Since falsity is a necessary element of a defamation cause of action and only ‘facts’ are capable of being proven false,…only statements alleging facts can properly be the subject of a defamation action’” (Gross v. New York Times Co., 82 NY2d 146, 152-153 [1993], citing, 600 W. 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 NY2d 130, 139, [1992], and Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 NY2d 235, 254 [1991]; Rosner v. Amazon.com, 132 A.D.3d 835 [2d Dep't 2015] [internal quotations and citations omitted]). (Parker v. Trustees of the Spence Sch. Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 33474[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2020]). Pure opinion is not actionable because “expressions of opinion, as opposed to assertions of fact, are deemed privileged and, no matter how offensive, cannot be the subject of an action for defamation.” (Davis v. Boeheim, 24 N.Y.3d 262, 268; see also, Mann v. Abel, 10 N.Y.3d 271, 276, [2008]). The issue of whether a statement constitutes fact or opinion “is a question of law” to be resolved by the court. (Davis, 24 N.Y.3d at 269; Mann, 10 N.Y.3d at 276; Parker v. Trustees of the Spence Sch. Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 33474[U], *17 [Sup Ct, NY County 2020]) Additionally, defamation actions are subject to a one year statute of limitations. (CPLR §215[3]) The Plaintiff’s complaint provides that the Defendant’s alleged defamatory oral and written statements “have continued unabated since January 2017 right up to the current time.” (Complaint at Paragraph 12). The statute of limitations is applicable to the Complaint insofar as alleged defamatory statements made prior to November 11, 2018. Most of the allegations pled by the Plaintiff in her complaint raise allegations regarding statements made by the Defendant in 2019, with the exception of an allegation made in paragraph 16(vii) of the Complaint, in which the Defendant is accused of making an alleged defamatory remark about the Plaintiff on October 6, 2016. The allegation made in paragraph 16(vii) of the Complaint, if not a typographical error since subsequent allegations address conduct which was alleged to have occurred on October 6, 2019, would not be time barred by the statute of limitations. (Egleston v. Kalamarides, 58 NY2d 682 [1982]). With respect to the statute of limitations, defamatory statements allegedly made by the Defendant against the Plaintiff would not be actionable as defamation if such statements were made prior to November 11, 2018, and this is important to note since the pleadings do imply that the alleged course of conduct engaged in by the Defendant against the Plaintiff had continued for some substantial time and may have commenced before November 11, 2018. The Defendant’s First and Second Counterclaims provide that Plaintiff tortiously interfered with her perspective employment with the Town of Hempstead at the Animal Shelter. The Defendant claims that the current Hempstead Town Supervisor during his campaign public stated that he would “bring the [the Defendant] to the table, and we’re going to work with them to get the change that needs to be done.” The Defendant implies that the defamation action herein “was commenced in whole or in part to prevent Defendant from being ‘brought to the table’ and/or offered [a position with the Town of Hempstead].” (Answer with Counterclaims,
