DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS Defendants move for the imposition of sanctions against Plaintiff for filling a frivolous lawsuit. That motion is GRANTED. STATEMENT OF FACT On April 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging three causes of action against Defendants: (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) fraud. (Compl.). The claims arose out of Defendants’ provision of an engine part to Plaintiff, a part that allegedly caused the engine owned by Plaintiff to fail. The Complaint in this action affirmatively alleges that Plaintiff knew the part was defective on December 12, 2016 (See Order, Dkt. No. 29 at 6). Plaintiff submitted a claim under the warranty that covered the part in December 2017; that claim was denied on January 11, 2018, on the ground that the claim had been submitted 36 weeks late and did not include all relevant invoices. (Id.) On May 6, 2022, Defendants sent Plaintiff’s counsel a so-called “safe harbor letter” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). The letter described the Plaintiff’s claims as baseless and without any arguable basis in law or fact, and advised that Defendants intended to move for sanctions unless the lawsuit was withdrawn within the 21-day period provided by the Rule. (Dkt. No. 33-1) (the “Safe Harbor Letter”). The letter, which was six single spaced pages long and included four lengthy footnotes, explained in copious detail the reasons why Defendants alleged that each of the claims in the complaint was frivolous and should be withdrawn. (Id.) It included citations to legal authority in support of the arguments made. Attached to the Safe Harbor Letter was a Notice of Motion for Sanctions, which stated as follows: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney for defendant INNIO Waukesha Gas Engines Inc. (INNIO) herein, will move this court….for an order granting INNIO’s Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 11, and imposing sanctions against Plaintiff Charles Equipment Energy Systems and/or counsel for Plaintiff. This motion is based on the fact that the claims in the complaint are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying or reversing existing law or for establishing new law, are not based on factual contentions for which there is evidentiary support, and have been filed to harass INNIO and needlessly increase the cost of litigation. In particular: 1. The first and second causes of action are time-barred pursuant to N.Y.U.C.C. 2-725; 2. The second cause of action fails to state a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; and 3. The third cause of action fails to state a claim for fraud. (Dkt. No. 33-1 at 8-9). Plaintiff neither responded to the Safe Harbor Letter nor withdrew the lawsuit. (Dkt. No. 32 at 6). Therefore, on June 15, 2022, Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Dkt. No. 21), to which was attached a brief that repeated all of the legal arguments, citing all of the authority, that appeared in the Safe Harbor Letter (Dkt. No. 22). The court granted the motion and directed that the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice on October 24, 2022. (Dkt. No. 29). It agreed with every argument propounded by the Defendants: the two contract-based claims were time barred and the fraud claim (as well as the duplicative claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing) failed to state a claim. The court rejected as utterly lacking in merit Plaintiff’s contention that its claims had been equitably tolled. (Dkt. No. 29).1 Following through with their intention, Defendants filed their Notice of Motion for Sanctions on November 11, 2022. (Dkt. No. 31). Defendants allege Plaintiff’s claims were not merely unsuccessful, but constitute “frivolous, unfounded and vexatious pleading[s].” (Dkt. No. 32, at 2). Plaintiff argues it “advanced good faith, colorable arguments under existing authority, and their interpretation of the factual record.” (“Opp.” or “Opposition Brief,” Dkt. No. 37 at 5). DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard for Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 11 Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the mechanism for imposing sanctions, providing in relevant part that: By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper…an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needlessly increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversing of existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information or belief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Rule 11 sanctions are a coercive mechanism, available to trial court judges, to enforce ethical standards upon attorneys appearing before them, while being careful not to rein in zealous advocacy. Pannonia Farms, Inc. v. USA Cable, 426 F.3d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 2005). While the imposition of sanctions is within the province of the district court, “any such decision [should be] made with restraint and discretion.” Schlaifer Nance & Co., Inc. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 1999). The decision of whether to award sanctions under Rule 11 rests firmly within the discretion of the trial court, Perez v. Posse Comitatus, 373 F.3d 321, 325 (2d Cir. 2004); Amorosa v. Ernst & Young LLP, 2010 WL 245553, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2010). The implementation of Rule 11 requires a careful balancing of two interests of the court: reprimanding egregious behavior and avoiding restraint of creative legal arguing. However, that required balance does not undermine Rule 11′s imposition on counsel of the “affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law before filing, and that the applicable standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances.” Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Comm ‘ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991). In the Second Circuit, “[a]n argument constitutes a frivolous legal position for the purposes of Rule 11 sanctions if, under the objective standard of reasonableness, it is clear…that there is no chance of success and no reasonable argument to extend, modify, or reverse the law as it stands.” Morley v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 66 F.3d 21, 25 (2d. Cir.1995) (quoting Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole-CNCA v. Valcorp, Inc., 28 F.3d 259, 264 (2d. Cir.1994)). “Accordingly, courts in the Second Circuit have found sanctions appropriate in cases where a plaintiff files a claim that is clearly deficient and where he advances no plausible argument in favor of validity.” de la Fuente v. DCI Telecommunications, Inc., 259 F.Supp.2d 250, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). A. Defendant satisfied Rule 11′s Safe Harbor requirements Before imposing sanctions, the court must be satisfied that the requirements of Rule 11 were strictly followed. Plaintiff argues that they were not; I disagree. Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part: A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b). The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within another time the court sets. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not comply with Rule 11′s safe harbor provision, in that it did not serve Plaintiff with a “motion” for sanctions 21 days prior to filing said motion with the court. It urges that the request for sanctions be denied on that basis. The safe harbor provision was added to Rule 11 “with the intention of affording a party a “‘safe harbor” against motions under Rule 11′ whereby that party would ‘not be subject to sanctions…unless, after receiving the motion, it refuse[d] to withdraw that position or to acknowledge candidly that it d[id] not…have evidence to support a specified allegation.’” Safe-Strap Co v. Koala Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 407, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee’s Notes (1993 Amendments)). It requires a party who believes his opponent has filed a paper without having a good faith basis for doing so to serve the non-moving party with a “motion” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)) at least 21 days before actually filing the motion in court. The purpose of serving the motion in advance is to give the non-moving party time to withdraw the offending pleading. The requirement is absolute; a court may not grant a motion for sanctions if the moving party fails to serve the “motion” at least 21 days before filing it with the court. Moreover, “[a]n informal warning…letter without service of a separate Rule 11 motion is not sufficient to trigger the 21-day safe harbor period.” Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Key Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Star Mark”). The relevant facts here are as follows: Defendants’ lawyer sent Plaintiff’s counsel a safe harbor letter, to which Defendants attached a Notice of Motion for sanctions that not only parroted the language of Rule 11, but explained precisely why each claim in the complaint was deficient. (See Dkt. No. 33-1). Defendants did not attach a brief or any affidavit to the Notice of Motion that was delivered with the Safe Harbor Letter; however, as noted above, the text of the lengthy letter was the equivalent of a brief, in that it explained in detail the arguments summarized in the Notice of Motion and cited authority in support of those arguments. (Id.) When Plaintiff failed to withdraw the Complaint after 21 days, Defendants moved to dismiss the action, which motion was granted. (Dkt. No. 21; Dkt. No. 29). Then, having convinced the court that the case was meritless, the Defendants filed, separate from any other motion, the identical Notice of Motion for sanctions that had been attached to the Safe Harbor Letter — which spelled out each of Defendants’ arguments for why the claims lacked merit and were sanctionable. (Dkt. No. 31). The Safe Harbor Letter itself, which went into even greater details about why the claims had to be dismissed, was attached to the Notice of Motion — just as it had been when the Notice of Motion was served on Plaintiff’s counsel. Added to what had already been served was a brief that argued why sanctions were appropriate in this case. The actual Notice of Motion for Sanctions was concededly filed with the court more than 21 days after it was first sent to the Plaintiff’s lawyer. The only question is whether what was delivered to Plaintiff’s counsel comported with the requirements of Rule 11(c). It did. In the Second Circuit, a party can “attach[] to its [safe harbor] letter a copy of its notice of motion for sanctions,” and that form of delivery satisfies Rule 11. See Star Mark. Moreover, the fact that Defendants did not send Plaintiff’s counsel a fully briefed motion for sanctions is of no moment, because — again in the Second Circuit — a party can “[meet] the procedural requirements of the safe harbor provision of Rule 11(c)(2)…even [if] it d[oes] not serve at that time supporting affidavits or a memorandum of law.” (Id.) Or, put otherwise, Defendants need only to “serve[] its notice of motion,” not a fully brief motion, “more than 21 days before it files the motion with the district court; the motion [is] made separately from any other motion; and the notice of motion describe[s] the specific conduct that allegedly violated Rule 11(b).” (Id.) (emphasis added). The controlling case, from which the above quotations are taken, is Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Key Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2012). The facts in Star Mark are virtually indistinguishable from the facts in this case — so much so that is appears to the court that Defendants’ lawyers used Star Mark as their guide in preparing the relevant papers. In Star Mark, the defendant sent the plaintiff a safe harbor letter, to which was attached a Notice of Motion for Rule 11 sanctions. The notice of motion listed six separate grounds justifying defendant’s assertion that plaintiff’s complaint was frivolous. While no brief or affidavits were attached to the notice of motion, the safe harbor letter itself contained citations to legal authorities supporting defendant’s assertion that the lawsuit was frivolous. The district court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the defendant had not complied with Rule 11 by attaching its Notice of Motion for sanctions, but no brief or other supporting papers, to a safe harbor letter. The Court of Appeals affirmed.2 In this case, Defendants did all of the following: (a) served the Notice of Motion for Sanctions via U.S. mail on May 6, 2022, (b) did not serve any other motion at that time, although Defendants, in reliance on Star Mark, did enclose the Notice of Motion for Sanctions in the Safe Harbor Letter, (c) described the claims in the Complaint as “not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument…[and] are not based on factual contentions for which there is evidentiary support;” and (d) identified and explained the specific reasons why the claims were deficient. In short, Defendants did exactly what the defendant who successfully moved for sanctions in Star Mark did. The two cases are effectively indistinguishable.3 This means that Defendants complied with all the requirements of Rule 11. B. The Motion for Sanctions is timely. Plaintiffs argument that this motion is untimely depends for its force on the contention that Defendants did not comply with Rule 11. Since that argument lacks merit, there is no basis to conclude that this motion is untimely. II. Application of Rule 11(b) to the Claims Plaintiff asserted two causes of actions against Defendants related to the contract-warranty between the parties: (1) breach of contract for rejecting Plaintiff’s warranty claim and (2) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealings (Compl.,
