ORDER & OPINION Plaintiff Calltrol Corporation (“Plaintiff” or “Calltrol”) brings this action against Loxysoft AB (“Defendant” or “Loxysoft”), alleging breach of contract with respect to a reseller agreement for software and hardware products. (ECF Nos. 5, 27.)1 Presently before the Court is Loxysoft’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 43.) For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED. BACKGROUND The facts below are taken from the complaint, the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements, affidavits, declarations, and exhibits, and the complaint, and are not in dispute except where so noted. All rational inferences are drawn in the non-moving party’s favor. A. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is a corporation formed under the laws of the State of New York having itsheadquarters in New York. (ECF No. 46. (“Def.’s 56.1″) 1.) Loxysoft is a business formed under the laws of Sweden. (Def.’s 56.1 2.) Calltrol and Loxysoft entered an agreement (ECF No. 44 (“Wrobel Decl.”) Exh. E (hereinafter, the “Reseller Agreement”) on or around March 29, 2002 whereby Calltrol granted Loxysoft a non-exclusive non-transferable right and license to market and resell Plaintiff’s contact center software products, software developer kits, and related support services (the “Products”). (Def.’s 56.1 4.) Under the Reseller Agreement, Loxysoft would make a written order for a quantity of the Products it sought from Plaintiff, and Plaintiff would ship the requested Products and provide an invoice to Loxysoft for the price of that order and associated shipping costs. (See Reseller Agreement §2.2 and Schedule B: Prices and Payment.) According to the Reseller Agreement, Calltrol had the ability to enable and disable the use of its Products via a Calltrol-furnished dongle. (Def.’s 56.1 6; Reseller Agreement §1.1.) Paragraph 6.1 of the Reseller Agreement provides a “best efforts” clause, whereby Defendants agreed “to use its best efforts to promote the sale of the Products.” (Reseller Agreement 6.1.) Paragraph 6.2 of the Reseller Agreement states that “Reseller may not sell Products except with concurrent sale of reseller products or services of significant value. Reseller may not make any contracts or commitments on behalf of CTV and/or Calltrol.” (Reseller Agreement 6.1.) Paragraph 6.3 of Reseller Agreement states that “[d]uring the term of this Agreement” LoxySoft AB “will not directly or knowingly indirectly participate in the development or commercialization of software products competitive to the [Plaintiff's] Products.” (Reseller Agreement §6.3.) Paragraph 7.1 of the Reseller Agreement provides “an initial term of two (2) years” which is “thereafter automatically renew[ed] for successive one (1) year periods (each a ‘Renewal Period’) unless earlier terminated in accordance with the terms” therein, which included “written notice” to the other party. (Reseller Agreement §7.1.) Finally, the Reseller Agreement’s Attachment 1, referred to as the “Exclusion” to paragraph 6.3, acknowledges that Defendants have developed and marketed and intends to develop certain call support systems, but also indicates that “[i]f Reseller begins to develop the Existing Product or any new products into a switching platform or predictive dialer or implements a published API substantially similar to or modeled after the Calltrol products, it will be deemed a violation of the restrictions in paragraph 6.3.” (Attachment 1 to Reseller Agreement”).2 At some unspecified point, Loxysoft began to market and sell its own contact center products and services (“Competing Products”) that competed with the products and services it used to purchase and resell from Plaintiff. (Complaint 20.) Plaintiff became aware that Loxysoft was doing so sometime in 2018. (ECF No. 50 (“Pl.’s 56.1″) 7.) Loxysoft claims that the Reseller Agreement was mutually abandoned in July 2012 after Defendant stopped providing payment to Plaintiff and Defendants were cut off from the Products; however, Loxysoft did not provide Plaintiff written notice that it intended to terminate the Reseller Agreement. (Complaint 21.) Plaintiff claims that Loxysoft also sold Plaintiff’s intellectual property while alleging it originated the products. (Complaint 22.) B. Procedural Background Plaintiff initiated the instant lawsuit on October 6, 2018. (ECF No. 5.) Defendants Loxysoft and Loxysoft Inc. filed an answer to the Complaint on January 7, 2019. (ECF No. 10.) On March 5, 2019, the Defendants requested leave to brief on a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 15), which the Court granted on January 25, 2021. (ECF No. 19.) The motion to dismiss was fully briefed on April 12, 2021 (ECF No. 20), and the Court rendered a decision on December 16, 2021. See Calltrol Corp. v. LoxySoft AB, No. 18 CV 9026 (NSR), 2021 WL 5967888 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2021). In the Court’s decision, the Court granted dismissal of Plaintiff’s tortious interference and Lanham Act claims, without prejudice, but denied dismissal of Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against LoxySoft. Id. at *4. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its causes of action for unfair competition and deceptive business practices under New York State General Business Law §349. See Calltrol Corp., 2021 WL 5967888, at 1 n.1. Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint by the January 18, 2022 deadline set by the Court, and therefore, Plaintiff’s tortious interference and Lanham Act claims were deemed dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 27.) On May 13, 2022, Loxysoft sought leave to file a summary judgment motion on Plaintiff’s surviving breach of contract claim (ECF No. 28), which the Court granted on May 17, 2022 (ECF No. 31.) The parties completed briefing on the summary judgment motion on August 2, 2022. (ECF No. 43.) The parties are still undertaking discovery and have encountered several discovery disputes. An order of reference to Magistrate Judge Paul E. Davison (“Judge Davison”) was issued on July 18, 2022. (ECF No. 32.) On August 10, 2022, Judge Davison held a hearing on Defendant’s refusal to produce certain financial documents requested by Plaintiff in connection with Loxysoft’s sales of non-exempt competing contact center products under the Reseller Agreement. (See ECF No. 66.). On August 26, 2022, Loxysoft moved to have discovery stayed pending the pending summary judgment motion (ECF No. 62), which Magistrate Judge Davison denied on September 16, 2022. (See Minute Entry for Sept. 16, 2022 proceedings.) Loxysoft was granted leave to make the application for a stay of discovery before this Court, which Loxysoft did so on September 23, 2022 (ECF No. 65.) On October 5, 2022, this Court denied Defendant’s motion to stay and directed Defendants to comply with Judge Davison’s discovery orders. (ECF No. 67.) On February 1, 2023, Judge Davison so-ordered a stipulated confidentiality agreement and protective order. (ECF No. 70.) LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of pointing to evidence in the record, “including depositions, documents…[and] affidavits or declarations,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), “which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party may support an assertion that there is no genuine dispute of a particular fact by “showing…that [the] adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the moving party fulfills its preliminary burden, the onus shifts to the nonmoving party to raise the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Gen. Star Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Universal Fabricators, Inc., 585 F.3d 662, 669 (2d Cir. 2009); Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2008); Benn v. Kissane, 510 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order). Courts must “draw all rational inferences in the non-movant’s favor,” while reviewing the record. Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Importantly, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,” nor is it to determine a witness’s credibility. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see also Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010). Rather, “the inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Summary judgment should be granted when a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Critically, in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment, “[s]tatements that are devoid of any specifics, but replete with conclusions” will not suffice. Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 452 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”); FDIC v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010) (nonmoving party “may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation”) (quoting Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998)). DISCUSSION The sole remaining claim in this action is Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against Loxysoft. (See ECF No. 27.) Plaintiff bases its breach of contract claim on the allegations that (i) Loxysoft failed to use best efforts to market Calltrol’s products, in violation of paragraph 6.1 of the Reseller Contract; (ii) Loxysoft has sold products as encompassed by the Reseller Contract, without concurrent sale of Plaintiff’s products or services, in violation of paragraph 6.2 of the Reseller Contract; and (iii) Loxysoft violated paragraph 6.3 of the Reseller Agreement by directly or knowingly indirectly participating in the development or commercialization of software products competitive to Plaintiff’s products. (Compl.
31-33.) To prevail on a breach of contract claim, a party must prove the following elements: (1) a valid contract existed between the parties; (2) the defendant breached the contract; (3) the plaintiff performed its obligations under the contract; and (4) the plaintiff was damaged as a result of the breach. Clear Choice Enters., Inc. v. Cellebrite USA, Inc., No. 14-CV-3372 (ADS) (SIL), 2015 WL 1469298, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2015). Loxysoft seeks to dismiss the breach of contract claim by arguing that (i) the claim is time-barred) and (ii) Plaintiff has no proof of damages. (See ECF No. 45 (“Defs.’ Br.”)). Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the motion for summary judgment should be denied because genuine issues of material fact exist as to (i) whether the contract at issue is still in force; (ii) whether Loxysoft sold competing, non-excluded products in violation of the Reseller Agreement; and (iii) whether the applicable statute of limitations expired on Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. (ECF No. 49 (“Pl.’s Opp.”) at 1-8.) Plaintiff also argues that the motion should be denied because Loxysoft has purportedly failed to respond to various discovery requests relevant to determining whether there are genuine issues material of fact. (Pl.’s Opp. at 2, 7.) I. Whether Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim is Time-Barred Loxysoft argues that Plaintiff’s breach of contact claim is completely time-barred. Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. §213(2), the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim is six years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §213(2). “The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense as to which Defendants carry the burden of showing that Plaintiffs failed to plead timely claims.” Doubleline Cap. LP v. Odebrecht Fin., Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 3d 393, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir. 2008)). Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on October 6, 2018, which Loxysoft argues is more than six years after the termination of the contract. (Id.) Loxysoft states, without pointing to anything on the record, that the Reseller Agreement terminated on July 10, 2012, which is “when Loxysoft made its last payment to Plaintiff.” (Defs.’ Br. at 5.) As previously noted in the December 16, 2021 Order and Opinion, this allegation, made broadly and without support on the record, is insufficient to meet the burden of showing Plaintiff’s claim is untimely. See Calltrol Corp. v. LoxySoft AB, No. 18 CV 9026 (NSR), 2021 WL 5967888, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2021) (citing Smith v. City of New York, 1 F. Supp. 3d 114, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Dismissing claims on statute of limitations grounds at the complaint stage ‘is appropriate only if a complaint clearly shows the claim is out of time.’”) (citing Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1999)). Loxysoft also points to the discovery made as of the date that the motion papers were filed and indicates that “not one of the documents evidence a relationship between the parties beyond May 2010, much less do they contradict LoxySoft’s assertion that the Reseller Agreement and the parties’ relationship terminated in July 2012.” (Defs.’ Br. at 5.) The Court puts little weight on this argument, considering that discovery is still ongoing. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that Loxysoft never terminated the contract and therefore, pursuant to paragraph 7.1 of the Reseller Agreement, the contract is still ongoing. Paragraph 7.1 of the Agreement states as follows: “This Agreement shall have an initial term of two (2) years from the date last signed below (the “Initial Term”) and shall thereafter automatically renew for successive one (1) year periods (each a ‘Renewal Term’), unless earlier terminated in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. Either party may terminate this Agreement effective on the last day of the Initial Term, or the end of the Renewal Term, by serving written notice of such termination on the other party at least ninety (90) days prior to the effective date therof.” Plaintiff argues that Loxysoft never gave the requisite written 90-day notice per paragraph 7.1, nor did Loxysoft advise Plaintiff that it was terminating the agreement. (Pl.’s Opp. at 6 (citing Pl.’s 56.1
