DECISION & ORDER In accordance with CPLR 2219(a), this decision is made upon consideration of all papers filed in NYSCEF in connection with Motion Sequence No. 1, comprising plaintiff MELANIE BROWN’s (“Brown”) motion, defendant UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’s (“Uber”) two cross-motions, and Brown’s cross-motion. Brown’s motion seeks an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting her summary judgment against defendant JUAN ALMONT (“Almont”) and Uber on the issue of liability and striking their affirmative defenses of comparative negligence. Uber cross-moved to stay Brown’s motion for summary judgment in light of Uber’s intent to arbitrate Brown’s claims. Brown, in turn, cross-moved to stay the arbitration pursuant to CPLR §7503(c). Finally, Uber cross-moved once again to compel arbitration of Brown’s claims and stay the action pursuant to CPLR §7503(a). Oral argument on the motion and cross-motions was heard before the Court virtually via Microsoft Teams on March 28, 2022. For the reasons discussed below, Brown’s motion is GRANTED IN PART, Uber’s cross-motions are DENIED, and Brown’s cross-motion is GRANTED. In this action, Brown seeks compensation for alleged personal injuries suffered during a motor-vehicle accident that occurred on May 10, 2019, at 42nd Street and Second Avenue in New York, New York. Brown was a passenger in the rear seat of a vehicle driven by Almont that came into contact with another vehicle. At the time of the accident, Almont was operating his vehicle as an Uber taxi. Brown initiated this action by the filing of a Summons and Complaint on July 6, 2020. [NYSCEF Doc. 1] On July 22, 2021, Brown filed her instant motion for summary judgment. [Id. Docs. 10-13] On August 25, 2021, more than a year after Brown filed her Complaint, Uber served on Brown a CPLR §7503(c) notice of intention to arbitrate, dated August 11, 2021 (the “Arbitration Notice”). [Id. Docs. 22 & 23] The Arbitration Notice stated that Brown agreed to an arbitration agreement when she registered an account through the Uber rider application (the “Rider App”) on September 13, 2014. [Id. Doc. 22] According to the Arbitration Notice, the arbitration agreement provides, in relevant part: 2. Arbitration Agreement By agreeing to the Terms, you agree that you are required to resolve any claim that you may have against Uber on an individual basis in arbitration, as set forth in this Arbitration Agreement…. Agreement to Binding Arbitration Between You and Uber. You and Uber agree that any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to (a) these Terms or the existence, breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof, or (b) your access to or use of the Services at any time, whether before or after the date you agreed to the Terms, will be settled by binding arbitration between you and Uber, and not in a court of law. You acknowledge and agree that you and Uber are each waiving the right to a trial by jury or to participate as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class action or representative proceeding…. [Id.] Based on this arbitration agreement, Uber requested that Brown agree to transfer this action to arbitration. Uber also noted that, pursuant to CPLR §7503(c), Brown’s failure to file an application to stay arbitration within 20 days after service of the Arbitration Notice would preclude her from objecting to arbitration on the basis that a valid agreement had not been made or had not been complied with. On September 17, 2021, Uber filed its cross-motion to stay the motion for summary judgment. [NYSCEF Doc. 19] On October 15, 2021, approximately 51 days after delivery of the Arbitration Notice, Brown filed her cross-motion to stay arbitration. [NYSCEF Doc. 32] On November 15, 2021, Uber filed its cross-motion to compel arbitration. [NYSCEF Doc. 39] In support of its cross-motion, Uber submitted copies of the Arbitration Notice and its U.S. Terms of Use effective December 13, 2017 (the “2017 Terms”), neither of which were annexed to an authenticating affidavit or affirmation. I. THE CROSS-MOTIONS The parties’ arguments on the cross-motions to stay and to compel arbitration can be summarized as follows. Uber contends that Brown agreed to the arbitration agreement referred to and quoted in the Arbitration Notice when she created a Rider App account on September 13, 2014, and further agreed to the 2017 Terms “by continuing to use [the Rider] App up until and including on May 10, 2019 (the date of the subject accident).” [NYSCEF Doc. 40, 22] The relevant provisions of the 2017 Terms are identical to the relevant provisions of the arbitration agreement quoted in the Arbitration Notice;1 accordingly, the Court will hereinafter refer to both agreements collectively as the “Arbitration Agreement.” Uber further contends that, because Brown failed to move to stay arbitration within 20 days after delivery of the Arbitration Notice (i.e., by September 14, 2021), Brown is precluded from disputing the validity of the Arbitration Agreement. Brown contends that Uber has failed to submit any evidence — admissible or otherwise — establishing that Brown agreed to the Arbitration Agreement. Thus, according to Brown, her application falls within the exception to CPLR §7503(c) articulated in Matarasso v. Continental Casualty Co., 56 N.Y.2d 264 (1982). Uber, in turn, disputes Matarasso’s applicability and argues instead that the facts of this case are more aligned with Fiveco, Inc. v. Haber, 11 N.Y.3d 140 (2008). Here, there is no dispute that the Arbitration Notice complied with the requirements of CPLR §7503(c), that Uber served it on Brown in compliance with §7503(c), and that Brown did not move to stay arbitration within the 20 days mandated by §7503(c). Thus, Brown is indisputably precluded from arguing that “a valid agreement was not made or has not been complied with.” CPLR §7503(c). As Brown correctly points out, however, the Court of Appeals held in Matarasso that a court may consider an untimely petition to stay arbitration where “its basis is that the parties never agreed to arbitrate, as distinct from situations in which there is an arbitration agreement which is nevertheless claimed to be invalid or unenforceable because its conditions have not been complied with.” 56 N.Y.2d at 266; see also id. at 267-68 (“However, this rule barring judicial intervention into the arbitral process operates only when an agreement to arbitrate exists…. [W]e cannot impute to the Legislature an intent to bind persons to the arbitral process by their mere inaction for 20 days where no agreement to arbitrate has ever been made.” (internal citations omitted)). Brown’s cross-motion, which effectively disputes that she agreed to the Arbitration Agreement insofar as Uber has failed to produce or present any evidence establishing that fact, falls squarely within the Matarasso exception. Indeed, the First Department recently considered a nearly identical scenario involving Uber and reached the same conclusion. See Castro v. Jem Leasing, LLC, 183 N.Y.S.3d 744 (1st Dep’t 2023). Uber, for its part, misreads Fiveco. In that case, the Court of Appeals first restated and reaffirmed its holding in Matarasso. See 11 N.Y.3d at 144. It next explained why the Matarasso exception was inapplicable to the facts and arguments then before the court: “Fiveco does not assert that the parties never entered into an arbitration agreement; rather, it simply attacks the present viability of the contracts containing the agreement to arbitrate.” Id. at 145. Fiveco lends no support, therefore, to Uber’s opposition theory that because the contract relied on in the Arbitration Notice indisputably contains an arbitration agreement, Brown is barred from asserting the Matarasso exception. [NYSCEF Doc. 49,
