ADDITIONAL CASES Nabil Kotbi, Plaintiff v. Farid Najjar, Defendant; 654263/2019 The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 009) 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 428 were read on this motion to/for DISM ACTION/INCONVENIENT FORUM. The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 44, 45, 47, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136 were read on this motion to/for SUMMARY JUDGMENT. This combined decision and order resolves the following: (1) a non-jury trial conducted in Kotbi v. Najjar, Index No. 153147/2013 (“Action 1″); (2) Motion Sequence (Mot. Seq.) No. 009 in Action 1; (3) Mot. Seq. No. 002 in Kotbi v. Najjar, Index No. 654263/2019 (“Action 2″). Factual and Procedural History: The parties in this action were two participants in a project seeking to develop real property located in Marrakech, Morocco (the “Property”). In 2005, non-party Deborah Thompson purchased the Property, located in an agricultural zone of Marrakech, with the registration number 1222/43. In 2010, plaintiff Nabil Kotbi and defendant Farid Najjar entered into an agreement with Thompson to purchase a 24 percent interest for Kotbi and 27 percent interest for Najjar, intending to convert the Property into a tourism venture. Subsequently, the business relationship deteriorated between all participants, with Kotbi and Thompson alleging that Najjar failed to utilize funds he was provided to make improvements upon the Property. In early 2012, Kotbi and Thompson filed criminal charges in Morocco against Najjar. In April 2012, Kotbi and Najjar entered into a conciliatory agreement (the “Conciliation Agreement”), where Najjar agreed to pay $242,000 to Kotbi (with 1 percent monthly interest if paid after August 24, 2012), and in exchange, Kotbi waived all his rights deriving from the original agreement for the Property. When Najjar failed to pay pursuant to the Conciliation Agreement, Kotbi brought an action against Najjar in the Court of First Instance in Marrakech in February 2013 (the “Marrakech Action”). Kotbi originally prevailed in the Marrakech Action, but the Marrakech Court of Appeals vacated the Court of First Instance’s order and directed Kotbi to commence a new action. On April 8, 2013, Kotbi commenced Action 1 by filing a summons with a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc Nos. 1-5). This motion was based upon an assertion that the Conciliation Agreement itself conformed with all the requirements of CPLR 3213. On July 11, 2013, Kotbi sought a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Najjar from selling real property located in Montauk, New York, on the grounds that Najjar was attempting to render himself judgment-proof (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 8-30). The motion was withdrawn after Najjar agreed to pay $268,000 into an attorney escrow, which would be released to Kotbi either by agreement between the parties that the Conciliation Agreement was complied with or court order (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 31). On November 27, 2013, the Court (Singh, J.) denied Kotbi’s motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 40). On July 30, 2014, Kotbi filed a Note of Issue without a demand for a jury trial (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 45). On April 2, 2015, the Court (Singh, J.) granted Najjar’s request to stay this action to permit litigation filed in Casablanca, Morocco (the “Casablanca Action”) to proceed on issues surrounding the Conciliation Agreement (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 75). On May 31, 2017, Kotbi prevailed in the Casablanca Action. On March 22, 2018, this determination was affirmed by the Casablanca Court of Appeals. In view of that decision in Casablanca, the Court (d’Auguste, J.), in an order dated October 10, 2019, granted Kotbi’s motion to vacate the stay of proceedings (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 135). However, on January 10, 2019, the Marrakech Court of Appeals issued a decision in the Marrakech Action conflicting with the Casablanca Court of Appeals. As a result of seemingly dueling Moroccan appellate decisions, the parties sought appellate review of both determinations from the Moroccan Court of Cassation, which is the high court of that nation. In the meantime, the Court proceeded to conduct a bench trial commencing on June 17, 2019, and continuing on non-consecutive days. In view of the defaulted-upon Conciliation Agreement, the main arguments advanced by Najjar at trial were affirmative defenses of duress, impossibility, and lack of consideration (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 472 at 7) (“Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case of the existence of a valid contract rendering the subject conciliation agreement…void and unenforceable due to duress, impossibility and illegality”). The Court considered these arguments to be advanced by Najjar despite his corrected answer failing to contain any of these affirmative defenses (Action No. 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 49). Kobti testified at trial, but Najjar did not testify at trial, despite asserting that the Conciliation Agreement was entered into under duress. The parties called two expert witnesses, which the Court has considered in rendering this determination. On December 22, 2020, the Court of Cassation issued two opinions determining the central issues in this action (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 430-431). The Court of Cassation determined that the Conciliation Agreement is enforceable under Moroccan law. Consistent with the Court’s position, as articulated on the record (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 464 at Tr. 60:22-26), the two documents were entered into evidence (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 446). On March 28, 2022, the Marrakech Court of Appeals, upon remitter from the Court of Cassation, issued a final order in Kotbi’s favor (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 476). On October 5, 2020, Najjar filed a motion asserting forum non-conveniens and res judicata (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 392). Kotbi opposed the motion on the grounds that the application was made years after the completion of discovery and the filing of the Note of Issue. (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 408). During the trial, the Court indicated that it might await a decision of the Court of Cassation, but the motion to dismiss would be denied. (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 464 at Tr. 63:4-8). In any event, the Moroccan courts, which Najjar asserts in the motion to be his preferable venue for adjudicating this dispute, have now definitively ruled against him on the merits. In view of the Court of Cassation’s determinations in favor of Kotbi, the Court vacated its sua sponte stay of Action 2, with permission to again seek summary judgment in that proceeding. (Action 2, NYSCEF Doc. No. 19). On May 3, 2022, Kotbi filed an amended motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint based upon the decisions of the Court of Cassation dated December 22, 2020 (Action 2, NYSCEF Doc. No. 47). On June 29, 2022, Najjar filed a cross-motion (Action 2, NYSCEF Doc. No. 57), which was superseded by a subsequently filed cross-motion on July 22, 2022 (Action 2, NYSCEF Doc. No. 69). Having considered the credible evidence adduced at trial, together with the decisions of the Court of Cassation, the Court grants a monetary judgment to Kotbi. However, for the reasons set forth below, the monetary judgment contemplates the 9 percent statutory simple interest rate from the date of the breach of contract, rather than the 1 percent monthly interest contemplated in the Conciliation Agreement. Discussion Forum Non-Conveniens and CPLR 5304(a): As an initial matter, Najjar failed to demonstrate an entitlement to dismissal of this action pursuant to the doctrine of forum non-conveniens. Although CPLR 327 provides that: “[w]hen the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum, the court, on the motion of any party, may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just,” the First Department has held that “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Anagnostou, v. Stifel, 204 A.D.61, 61 (1st Dept. 1994) (reversing dismissal for inconvenient forum sought three years after commencement of action). The instant motion was made at trial, approximately five years after discovery was completed and the Note of Issue was filed. Najjar failed to identify a single fact witness that was inconvenienced or unable to testify at the trial conducted in New York, and Najjar himself did not testify, despite being a New York resident. Rather, it appears that Najjar’s application is an effort to secure withdrawal of the escrow funds being held as surety for the judgment that is now be entered against him. Moreover, Najjar’s forum non-conveniens argument is irreconcilable with the substance of his CPLR 5304(a) assertion that the courts of Morocco do not comport with American notions of due process. See, Envtl. Concern, Inc. v. Larchwood Const. Corp., 101 AD2d 591 (2d Dept. 1984) (discussing the “doctrine of estoppel against inconsistent positions”) (internal citations omitted). Specifically, Najjar argues that Moroccan judges are not sufficiently independent of the Moroccan monarchy and references reports from the United States Department of State for the proposition that the Moroccan judiciary is corrupt. However, Najjar’s claims regarding alleged inadequacies of the Moroccan judiciary are merely general assertions, and he does not provide any concrete examples of instances where his due process rights were violated. In New York, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment has long been largely a ministerial act of the courts, provided that the foreign judgment to be enforced conforms to basic norms of foundational due process. See, Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 A.D. 120 (3d Dept.), affd. for reasons stated below, 246 N.Y. 603 (1927). Pursuant to CPLR 5304(a), there are 3 grounds upon which the Court must decline recognition, only one of which is at issue in this action: namely, CPLR 5304(a)(1), that “the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law.” In order to meet that standard, the judgment must be “tainted with fraud, or with an offense against the public policy of this state.” Cernich v. Athene Holding, 2019 NY Slip Op 32874(U), *13 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 2019) (citing Cowans and declining to enjoin litigation in Bermuda). Supporting evidence must be specific and compelling, as “New York cannot breezily disregard documented facts and facially regular records based on generalized and significantly belated claims,” because “[s]uch a course of action would seriously undermine the ‘rare’ public policy exception to the appropriate application of the doctrine of comity,” and instead “substitute an amorphous and inadvisably open-ended escape valve.” Gotlib v. Ratsutsky, 83 N.Y.2d 696, 701 (1994) (finding that a Soviet divorce decree was enforceable in New York). To the extent Najjar’s motion is premised upon the argument that their individual due process rights were or would be violated in Morocco due to particularized circumstances of the case such that discretionary non-recognition of CPLR 5304(b) would be appropriate, the result would not change. In DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl. SA., 935 F3d 381, 392-5 (5th Cir 2019), as rev (Aug. 16, 2019) — which both sides cite — the Fifth Circuit affirmed a finding that plaintiff was not afforded due process in Morocco because he was litigating against a business interest of the Moroccan royal family. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff DeJoria could not travel to Morocco due to credible threats to his safety, he was unable to retain a lawyer in Morocco because his case was averse to the royal family, and the Moroccan court manipulated several damages experts to ensure that Maghreb Petroleum Exploration, S.A. received their preferred opinion. Id. The unique circumstances present in DeJoria — litigation against the business interests of the Moroccan royal family — are not present in this action and, absent such unique circumstances, courts have previously recognized Moroccan courts to be capable tribunals. See, e.g., Ivaldi v. Ivaldi, 672 A.2d 1226, 1233 (N.J. App. Div.), revd. in part on other grounds, 685 A.2d 1319 (1996) (Moroccan court able to fairly adjudicate child custody proceeding). Najjar has not reached the high burden necessary to bar recognition of the Court of Cassation’s judgment. This case, at its core, is a common breach of contract action that courts throughout the world routinely and competently adjudicate. Denying recognition of foreign judgments based on general allegations of corruption in that jurisdiction’s judiciary (as Najjar attempts here) would open the door to routine and broad-sweeping non-recognition based on isolated incidents; despite the high ethical standards of this profession, no judiciary is completely immune from scandal, and absent evidence of pervasive corruption or specific threats to justice in the case at bar, the Court sees no reason to rule that the Moroccan courts are incapable of fairly interpreting their own laws. Res Judicata: The branch of Najjar’s motion seeking dismissal based on res judicata is denied. The res judicata doctrine is premised upon a prior final judgment, and a judgment pending appeal is “by its terms…not a final determination on the merit” of the issue on appeal. Landau, P.C. v. LaRossa, Mitchell & Ross, 11 N.Y.3d 8, 13 (2008) (discussing res judicata doctrine). The instant motion is premised upon the Marrakech Court of Appeals’ now-reversed decision in Najjar’s favor in the Marrakech Action. However, as discussed above, on December 22, 2020, the Court of Cassation resolved the split between the Marrakech and Casablanca courts in Kotbi’s favor regarding the claims in this action. Prima Facie Case: Najjar also moves to dismiss based on Kotbi’s alleged failure to make a prima facie case during the September 2020 trial. This branch of the motion is, in effect, a motion for a directed verdict, arguing that Kotbi failed to provide proper consideration in the Conciliation Agreement under Moroccan law. “[A] directed verdict is appropriate when, upon the evidence presented, there is no rational process by which the fact trier could base a finding in favor of the non-moving party.” Miller v. Carter, 212 A.D.3d 918, 920 (3d Dept. Jan. 5, 2023) (quotation and citations omitted). That is not this case. As addressed infra, Kotbi has demonstrated that he provided sufficient consideration in the Conciliation Agreement under Moroccan law, and established liability and damages prima facie. Accordingly, the branch of Najjar’s motion seeking dismissal for failure to establish a prima facie case is denied. Lack of Finality: In addition, Najjar argues that the line of cases presented for enforcement under Article 53 in Action 2, Mot. Seq. 002, two judgments of the Casablanca Court of First Instance, dated May 31, 2017, and July 19, 2017; two judgments of the Casablanca Court of Appeals, dated March 22, 2018, and May 25, 2018; and the opinion of the Court of Cassation, dated December 22, 2020, are not final for purposes of enforcement under this action. Specifically, Najjar argues that the Casablanca Court of Appeals’ judgment from March 22, 2018, lacks the royal stamp and necessary executory language, the calculations in the Casablanca Court of Appeals judgment (dated March 22, 2018) were incorrect and mandated complete dismissal, and Najjar’s petition for review of the March 28, 2022, order remanding the matter to the Marrakech courts renders this line of cases to be non-final for CPLR Article 53 purposes. Najjar also attempts to challenge the judgments filed in connection with Mot. Seq. 002 by stating that the judgment lacks the proper authenticating stamps. The Court disagrees and finds the judgment to be final for the purpose of satisfying Article 53. {See Action 2, NYSCEF Doc. No. 102). At the outset, the admission of foreign government documents, including copies of foreign decisions and orders of courts, is governed by CPLR 4542. See, e.g., Barry v. Association des Senegalais d’Amerique, ASA, Inc., 77 Misc. 3d 1222(A), *1-2 (Civ. Ct., Bronx Co. Jan. 6, 2023) (discussing certification requirements for foreign government documents). Strict compliance with certification requirements may be excused in proper circumstances though, “if reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of the documents.” Peters v. UBS Trustees (Bahamas) Ltd., 2018 NY Slip Op 31644(U), *8 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 2018). The parties have had such an opportunity, and no reasonable questions have been raised about the documents’ authenticity. That Kotbi’s attorney made a minor error in offering a copy without full authentication (Action 2, NYSCEF Doc. No. 107, at p.4) was inconsequential because the Court had previously admitted both copies of the judgment — the version with an apostille and version with the royal stamp — as Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits 21 and 21A during the non-jury trial. Najjar also identifies an instance where the Moroccan courts did not report the judgment amount in Morocco correctly. (Action 2, NYSCEF Doc. No. 97, at p.3). First, the issue appears to be little more than a scrivener’s error, which was subsequently addressed as the Casablanca Court of Appeals corrects the alleged error in a subsequent paragraph. (Action 2, NYSCEF Doc. No. 97, at p.3). Second, given that the Court is enforcing only the underlying judgment pursuant to the Conciliation Agreement of $242,000, and is not granting judgment for 1 percent monthly interest, as discussed later in this decision, the Court does not need to address this issue in depth. Trial Decision: Even if the Court did not consider the rulings of the Court of Cassation as preclusive of the parties’ dispute, “any decision is by definition a precedent,” and “even where decisions of other courts may not be entitled to res judicata effect, they may nevertheless be persuasive, informative and most helpful to an understanding of what here has been litigated.” Isaly v. Garde, 2022 NY Slip Op 34108(U), *4 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 2022) (quotations and citations omitted). The Court of Cassation is the court of last resort of the Kingdom of Morocco, and the Court is, at the least, persuaded according to comity principles by the Court of Cassation’s holdings regarding a conciliation agreement executed pursuant to Moroccan law. In addition, Kotbi provided credible evidence at trial supporting the enforceability of the Conciliation Agreement in the form of an expert, Mahmoune Kettani, who testified as follows: “to really simplify things into the maybe the extreme, if I have a right to be sitting in this chair, and I have someone who comes to me and tells me, I would like to be sitting in this chair, but I tell him I have the right to be sitting here, and there’s a conflict between us, and then the person comes to me and tells me, how about you waive your right to be sitting in this chair, because I really want you to waive this right in exchange of that I value your waiver to be sitting in this chair to $10, and we sign a conciliation agreement by which I say I waive, I agree to waive my right to be sitting — I consider it’s my right…. This is the exact same thing here. You will not — Dr. Kotbi agrees that he will not have any links and waives any rights that he has under this project that is over in exchange of getting the value that Mr. Najjar agreed was the value of this waiver in the amount of $242,000″ (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 373, at pp. 52-53). When pressed by the Court, Kettani was unsure why the agreement was structured in a manner where Kotbi merely waived his rights to the Property, as opposed to Kotbi transferring any rights that might exist to Najjar. Kettani asserts that, while the Conciliation Agreement is unorthodox under Moroccan law, a waiver of a right is valid consideration under the laws of that nation. As long as the item being exchanged — in this case, Kotbi’s waiver — is itself legal and has real value of any amount — the courts’ role in scrutinizing the parties’ judgment in making their agreement largely stops. Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 470, 476 (1993); and Whittemore v. De Pasquale, 15 Misc. 2d 648, 649 (Sup. Ct., New York Co. 1958). The Court of Cassation has determined that the consideration under the Conciliation Agreement — specifically Kotbi’s waiver of his rights in the subject property- is sufficient consideration for a contract to be enforceable under Moroccan law. This contract was executed in Morocco pursuant to Moroccan law, and the Court of Cassation is the highest authority on the application of Moroccan law. The judgment of the Marrakech Court of Appeals dated March 28, 2022, (a judgment on remand in the Marrakech line of cases following the decision of the Court of Cassation) states explicitly: “This obligation [under the Conciliation Agreement] on [Kotbi] does not require any positive intervention on performance on his side as he only has to abandon 24 percent that he waived to his benefit in said Property Title for the terms of the [Conciliation Agreement] entered into by the parties to be fulfilled, which makes of the claims thereof that [Kotbi] is in breach of the obligations thereof for the simple reason that the Property Title is not in the name thereof legally groundless so long as the same was unequivocally aware upon entering into the settlement agreement what was due to the latter under the Protocol of Agreements [Conciliation Agreement].” (Action 2, NYSCEF Doc. No. 53, at 7). Therefore, the Moroccan courts have rejected Najjar’s argument that Kotbi’s waiver of his interest in the subject property is legally insufficient to be consideration. It is not the appropriate role of the New York courts to determine if Kotbi’s waiver of rights in the Conciliation Agreement is appropriate consideration under Moroccan law, when the Moroccan courts have determined this waiver to be sufficient to sustain the contract. See, Mandel v. Liebman, 303 N.Y. 88, 93-4 (1951) (discussing that courts will not challenge the adequacy of consideration unless “so grossly unreasonable or unconscionable.. .as to be unenforceable according to its literal terms”) (internal citations omitted). In a post-trial briefing, Najjar claims that he entered into the Conciliation Agreement under duress, and therefore, the agreement is void (Action 1, NYSCEF Doc. No. 472, at p.29). Specifically, Najjar argues that he entered into the Conciliation Agreement to avoid criminal prosecution in Morocco. (Id. at 4). As a general matter, duress is “established upon the showing of a wrongful threat precluding the exercise of free will.” Yoon Jung Kim v. Gahee An, 150 A.D.3d 590, 593 (1st Dept. 2017), citing Austin Instrument v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 130, (1971). Najjar has woefully failed to demonstrate the existence of duress. While the threat of a criminal prosecution may under certain circumstances constitute duress, the record is devoid of actual evidence supporting its existence in this action. Initially, Najjar did not testify at trial, and he failed to provide any other probative evidence supporting this defense. The mere existence of a criminal investigation into Najjar allegedly pocketing funds designated for the renovation of the Property, without more, is insufficient to demonstrate duress. Moreover, the Conciliation Agreement does not directly resolve the criminal investigation, but appears to have served as a catalyst for Moroccan law enforcement closing the criminal investigation given the parties’ resolution of their underlying dispute. The Court is more persuaded by Najjar’s argument relating to the rate of interest. Najjar asserts that the 1 percent per month interest component as part of the May 31, 2017, judgment is, in effect, a fine or penalty that should not be enforced pursuant to CPLR 5302((b)(2). Specifically, Najjar focuses on the Moroccan Arabic term “gharama,” which directly translates to a “fine” (Action 2, NYSCEF Doc. No. 111, at p.2-3). In New York, “interest is not a penalty. Rather, it is simply the cost of having the use of another person’s money for a specified period…. It is intended to indemnify successful plaintiffs ‘for the nonpayment of what is due to them’ and is not meant to punish defendants.” Love v. State, 78 N.Y.2d 540, 544 (1991). The Court also notes that the Conciliation Agreement’s stated interest rate is also markedly higher than even the statutory interest rate on judgments in New York. Although Kotbi asserts that this provision functions as a contractual late payment provision (see Action 2, NYSCEF Doc. No. 107 at p.11), the Court recognizes the potential ambiguity of this “fine” to be problematic for enforcement of this provision of the judgment under Article 53. Accordingly, while the Court grants Kotbi’s motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, it provides for the entry of judgment in the amount of $242,000, together with statutory interest at the rate of 9 percent per annum, pursuant to CPLR 5004, from the date of breach — August 24, 2012. In addition, the Court decides this non-jury trial in Kotbi’s favor to the extent of awarding a judgment of $242,000 pursuant to the Conciliation Agreement with New York State 9 percent per annum interest, pursuant to CPLR 5004. Although the Court is ruling in favor of Kotbi in both actions, the Clerk shall enter a single judgment in Action 1 for $242,000, with New York State interest of 9 percent per annum from August 24, 2012. This is designed to prevent the entry of two money judgments, with the potential for a double recovery by Kotbi against Najjar. Accordingly, it is hereby, ORDERED that Mot. Seq. 002 for Summary Judgment in Lieu of Complaint under Index Number: 654263/2019 is granted to the extent of entering a single judgment in favor of Kotbi against Najjar in the amount of $242,000, with interest of 9 percent per annum pursuant to CPLR 5004 from August 24, 2012, and it is further, ORDERED that Mot. Seq. 009 under Index Number: 153147/2013 is denied, and it is further, ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter a verdict in the non-jury trial in favor of Kotbi on the terms set forth herein, and it is further, ORDERED that, on the Court’s motion, the action under Index Number: 654263/2019 is consolidated with Index Number: 153147/2013 for purposes of entering a final judgment, and it is further, ORDERED that the $268,000 contained in escrow shall be released to counsel for Kotbi within 30 days of service of a copy of this decision and order with notice of entry, and it is further, ORDERED that, upon receipt of the aforementioned payment from the attorney escrow, Kotbi shall file a Notice of Partial Satisfaction of Judgment with the Court. This constitutes the decision and order of the Court. CHECK ONE: X CASE DISPOSED NON-FINAL DISPOSITION GRANTED DENIED GRANTED IN PART X OTHER APPLICATION: SETTLE ORDER SUBMIT ORDER CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT REFERENCE Dated: April 6, 2023
