FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner Edgar Hernan Parra Saavedra (“Petitioner”) and Respondent Alison Esteffany Jimenez Montoya (“Respondent”) are the parents of a minor child, M.P.J. They are both Colombian citizens, and M.P.J. was born in Colombia. Respondent brought M.P.J. to the United States in September 2020 and has not returned to Colombia with the child since. Petitioner brings this petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, seeking an order directing M.P.J.’s return to Colombia. Respondent concedes that she wrongfully removed the child from Colombia and has retained him in the United States, in violation of Petitioner’s parental rights. She opposes M.P.J.’s return, however, on the ground that the child would face a grave risk of harm if he were returned to Colombia. After careful consideration, and for the reasons set forth in this Memorandum and Order, the Petition is granted, and the child is ordered returned to Colombia. I. Relevant Procedural History On September 29, 2021, Petitioner filed the instant action pursuant to the Hague Convention, requesting, among other relief, an order requiring Respondent to return M.P.J. to Colombia. See Verified Pet., ECF No. 1. On October 4, 2021, the Court issued an order directing Respondent to show cause why the Petition should not be granted. Order to Show Cause 1, ECF No. 8. The Court also prohibited Respondent from removing M.P.J. from the five boroughs of New York City and the counties of Nassau and Suffolk; directed Respondent to bring all travel documents for herself and for M.P.J. to the scheduled show-cause hearing; and authorized the United States Marshal to effectuate service on Respondent. Id. at 2-3. The proceeding was initially delayed by Petitioner’s protracted difficulties in serving Respondent, which included numerous unsuccessful attempts to serve her at physical addresses in New York. See ECF No. 15 (failed attempt by U.S. Marshal at address received from U.S. Department of State); ECF No. 16 (same); ECF Nos. 22, 24; Pet’r Hr’g Ex. 11, ECF No. 51-11 (failed attempt at New York address to which Petitioner had mailed a package for M.P.J.). Service was ultimately accomplished in February 2022 after the Court ordered service by alternative methods. See Mem. & Order dated Feb. 8, 2022 at 2-3, ECF No. 26 (ordering service by, inter alia, the email address and WhatsApp number Petitioner used to communicate with Respondent); Aff. of Service, ECF No. 27. On February 17, 2022, Respondent finally appeared, and the Court set an expedited schedule for an evidentiary hearing on the Petition. See Docket Order dated Feb. 17, 2022, ECF No. 29. The hearing took place over five days in May and September of 2022.1 The Court permitted witnesses who planned to appear to submit direct testimony in writing. Order dated Mar. 29, 2022 at 1, ECF No. 38. Petitioner and Miriam Sofia Atencio Gomez, a Colombian trial attorney retained as an expert witness, submitted testimony on behalf of Petitioner.2 Respondent and Jimmy Fernando Jimenez Meneses, also a Colombian attorney retained as an expert witness, submitted testimony on behalf of Respondent.3 During the hearing, the Court allowed additional direct testimony from these witnesses, and each was cross-examined. M.P.J. did not testify. Neither party introduced any evidence from a clinical or forensic psychologist or other similar professional.4 Respondent and Petitioner submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law after the hearing. See Resp’t Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law (“Resp’t Br.”), ECF No. 147; Pet’r Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law (“Pet’r Br.”), ECF No. 149. The Court heard oral argument on the post-hearing submissions on December 1, 2022, after which the parties made supplemental submissions. See ECF Nos. 157, 160, 161. II. Findings of Fact The Court makes the following findings of fact in accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 As a general matter, the Court credited witnesses’ testimony according to their level of specificity: as noted below, detailed descriptions and particular examples were accorded more weight, while vague statements and generalizations were given less weight. A. Petitioner and Respondent Meet and Begin a Relationship in 2011 Petitioner and Respondent met in Bogota, Colombia in about 2011, when Petitioner was eighteen years old and Respondent was forty-four. Resp’t Aff. 1:13-17, 2:1; Pet’r Aff. 5. When the parties met, Respondent was working as a dancer and sex worker at a “strip club” in Bogota. Id. at 1:13-17. Petitioner, who was married at the time, was a civil engineer. Tr. 246:7, 282:25-283:1.6 At the start of their relationship, Petitioner offered to support Respondent financially and to pay for her university studies if she agreed to quit her sex work, as well as any drug or alcohol use. Resp’t Aff. 1:20-21; Tr. 291:12-13. Shortly after the start of their relationship, Respondent moved back to her hometown of Medellin, where Petitioner provided her with an apartment and covered other living expenses. Resp’t Aff. 2:4-9. She described this as one of his “conditions” for their relationship. Id. Petitioner continued to reside primarily in Bogota. Tr. 30:8-13. He would visit her in Medellin approximately every eight days and stay for two or three days at a time. Id.; Resp’t Aff. 2:19-20. 1. Evidence Concerning Petitioner’s Physical and Verbal Abuse During these first few years of their relationship, between 2011 and 2013, Petitioner engaged in what the Court can only characterize as antisocial (and likely illegal) behavior. Respondent asserted, and Petitioner did not deny, that he would frequently bring her to “strip clubs,” “brothels,” and “sex clubs” where he would engage in sexual acts with sex workers in front of Respondent. Resp’t Aff. 2:20-3:5. According to Respondent, Petitioner would also bring cameras into these clubs — concealed in items like eyeglasses and keychains — to film such acts surreptitiously. Id. at 3:14-17; Tr. 52:5-53:9. Respondent testified that Petitioner showed her “some of the videos he took,” including what she described as a “final presentation of those videos.” Tr. 53:7-9. During these visits to sex clubs, Petitioner would often become physically and verbally abusive toward Respondent. In her written testimony, Respondent asserted that Petitioner “would get drunk” and then “start[] to treat me awful[,] saying things like if I remembered where he got me from and that I was a worthless whore and a bitch.” Resp’t Aff. 3:6-8. Petitioner would then “grab[] me by the neck and start[] cho[king] me,” and he “often bit me to the point of leaving marks and causing me extreme pain and discomfort.…Sometimes he would grab me by the arms so hard he would leave bruises all over.” Id. at 3:8-11. At the hearing, Respondent similarly testified that when Petitioner became drunk, “he would treat me very badly,” and it was “his bad habit to bite me frequently and choke me.” Tr. 31:8-11. Respondent asserted that “[m]any times,” other sex workers were “witnesses to these events,” id. at 30:25-31:1, and they would “sometimes…leave the booth [at the strip club or brothel] running thinking that they were going to be strangled too.” Resp’t Aff. 3:11-13. She recalled at the hearing that one such episode like this occurred at a hotel. Tr. 31:8-14. Another biting incident occurred when Petitioner and Respondent were eating at a restaurant with Respondent’s family. Id. at 35:22-36:6. According to Respondent, “all of a sudden,” Petitioner started to bite her on her upper arm in front of her family. Id. at 35:22-36:6, 37:18-38:5. As discussed below, Petitioner admitted to this episode. See id. at 304:14-305:25. Respondent also asserted that the two had “fights” and “altercations” at their Medellin apartment, which on “several occasions…[got] so heated that the neighbors would call the police.” Resp’t Aff. 5:1-2; see Tr. 42:7-9. She testified at the hearing to one of these incidents — a “stronger argument” that occurred just after they had returned from a brothel, during which Petitioner was “pushing,” “grabbing,” “biting,” and “choking” her. Tr. 39:25-40:1, 41:14-42:1. In response, Respondent testified, she began packing her belongings to leave, prompting Petitioner to threaten to jump from the balcony of their seventh-floor apartment. Id. at 40:7-13. The police arrived, and Respondent ended up staying at her mother’s house for two days before returning to the apartment. See id. at 40:13-20. No incident report or arrest was made for this or any other such incident. Resp’t Aff. 5:5; see Tr. 141:21-25. Respondent did not provide specific dates for these incidents, but testified that they occurred between 2011 and 2013. Tr. 34:5-11, 35:12-16, 141:18-22. She also testified that fights and arguments happened frequently during this period: roughly every week. See id. at 42:14-16. In his written testimony, Petitioner denied ever being “abusive or violent, physically or psychologically, toward Respondent.” Pet’r Aff. 47. When asked by his counsel during the hearing about Respondent’s allegations of abuse, however, Petitioner admitted to using physical force against Respondent on two specific instances. He acknowledged that, “at the beginning” in 2011, “we ha[d] a fight” in which he was drunk and “over used [his] force.” Tr. 302:16-303:1. Petitioner elaborated that during this incident, he “create[d] some bruises” by “hold[ing] her…with [his] hand” and also likely bit her. Id. at 303:9-21, 304:7-10. He also admitted to biting Respondent on her arm in front of her family during a dinner party. Id. at 304:14-305:2. Although he first explained that his purpose in biting her “wasn’t to hurt,” id. at 305:7, he acknowledged that it was some sort of outgrowth of an argument with Respondent prior to the dinner. Id. at 305:12-25. Petitioner also did not deny calling Respondent derogatory names such as “bitch” or “ho” but asserted that he “probably” did so “in the same way that she has called me” names. Id. at 306:8-11. Based on the parties’ testimony and evidence submitted at the hearing, the Court finds Respondent’s assertions of Petitioner’s physical and verbal abuse during the early years of their relationship to be credible. The Court’s finding here, however, is necessarily limited with respect to the frequency and severity of such abuse. On the one hand, Respondent described certain specific episodes in some detail, as noted above. When she did so, her testimony was sometimes corroborated by Petitioner’s candid admissions concerning these specific events, even if he did not describe them precisely the same way. As to these specific events, I credit Respondent’s testimony in its entirety.7 At the same time, Respondent often generalized in her live testimony, indicating (for example) that “it was his habit, his bad habit to bite me frequently and choke me”; “every time we would go out…he would start mistreating me”; and “[t]his kind of thing happened frequently.” Id. at 30:24-25, 31:9-11, 42:6-7. In support of this more general testimony, Respondent offered few, if any, specifics, despite ample opportunity to do so, and she introduced little or no corroborating evidence. Respondent’s assertions that Petitioner regularly “choked” and “strangled” her, in particular, are extremely concerning and refer to conduct that, by its nature, can cause serious injury or death.8 For these general allegations of choking, however, Respondent provided minimal insight into their severity; she did not, for example, testify that she could not breath or feared for her life, as might be expected of such events. Other possible avenues to corroborate her testimony were either unavailable or not presented to the Court: Respondent did not testify, for example, to seeking medical treatment, nor did she submit any medical records or photographic evidence. She acknowledged that she “never went to the authorities” in response to Petitioner’s abuse during this time. See Tr. 27:9-10, 178:6-11. In the end, the Court finds that the specific instances of abuse to which Respondent testified were not the only such episodes during this time period. Instead, her ability to recount these incidents with greater specificity suggests that they were the most serious or otherwise impactful. The Court does, however, ascribe somewhat less weight to her more generalized testimony that Petitioner “frequently,” “often,” “like always,” and “like usual” choked, bit, and pushed her. Resp’t Aff. 4:10, 7:4-6; Tr. 30:24-25. 2. Evidence Concerning Petitioner’s Coercive Control Respondent also testified that Petitioner exerted “tremendous control” over her, including by monitoring her physical whereabouts and social interactions. Resp’t Aff. 2:7-14; Tr. 16:4-5. Respondent testified, for example, that Petitioner tracked her location and accessed her communications on a phone that he insisted she use. Tr. 47:18-24, 48:14-18. Petitioner, in turn, testified that they both used a “Family Locator” phone application to share their locations, id. at 281:5-16, and that reading each other’s text messages was a “reciprocal” practice. Id. at 292:21-25. B. Petitioner and Respondent Begin to Live Together, and M.P.J. is Born The events described above generally transpired before M.P.J.’s birth, when Respondent lived in Medellin apart from Petitioner. See id. at 34:5-11, 35:14-16, 141:21-22. In approximately 2013, Petitioner and Respondent began living together in Bogota. Id. at 25:16-18.9 Petitioner paid the rent for their shared residence and funded Respondent’s educational expenses at a local university, and he also provided her with a car. Id. at 105:20-106:4. The parties’ testimony provides little specific insight regarding their time in Bogota before M.P.J.’s birth. Respondent testified generally that, after she moved to Bogota and away from her family in Medellin, Petitioner continued his abusive behavior and was able to exert even greater control over her life. Resp’t Aff. 6:17-18; Tr. 50:5-8. According to Respondent, he controlled her movements, allowing her to leave only to attend her university classes, and he did not permit her to work. Resp’t Aff. 6:17-22; Tr. 105:10-12. Respondent testified that Petitioner “had absolute control” over her, and she “had no social life.” Tr. 50:7-8. M.P.J. was born in August 2014. Pet’r Aff. 6. Respondent testified that she underwent an emergency cesarean section. Resp’t Aff. 9:14-15. Petitioner stayed with Respondent during her labor and visited the hospital again the day after delivery. Id. at 9:15-17. According to Respondent, when she was discharged from the hospital two days later, Petitioner dropped her and M.P.J. off at their apartment and then left. Id. at 9:16-21. She testified that Petitioner did not support her or M.P.J. during the first months of the child’s life. Id. at 10:2-4. Instead, she was “left alone” to complete “all of the domestic chores” by herself; she eventually received help — not from Petitioner, nor any of her or Petitioner’s relatives — but from staff members who worked in the apartment building. Id. at 10:5-11:2. According to Respondent, after M.P.J.’s birth, Petitioner turned “aggressive and abusive” when she informed him that she would no longer “accompany him back to the brothels.” Id. at 8:6-9. In her written testimony, she testified that he “pushed [and] shoved me to the side” and “would grab me by the neck and strangle me as usual to shut me up whenever I was complaining or crying.” Id. at 8:10-12. Petitioner would also call Respondent derogatory names, telling her she was “worthless” and a “prostitute,” “whore,” and “bitch.” Id. at 8:12-13. Respondent did not testify to any specific physical altercations during this period at the hearing, and Petitioner denied that any incidents occurred after M.P.J. was born. Tr. 306:3-7. Consistent with the approach taken above, the Court ascribes somewhat less weight to these generalized accounts, but does not credit Petitioner’s claim that the abuse ceased entirely after M.P.J.’s birth. Respondent also testified that, to manipulate and control her, Petitioner “always” threatened to reveal her past involvement in sex work and drugs to her family and others. Id. at 50:24-51:2. This “blackmail,” which began in 2013, became “even scarier” after M.P.J. was born. Id. at 51:2-5. According to Respondent, Petitioner would threaten that “he had everything on me” and “could use all that information” about her prior drug use and sex work to “take my son away from me.” Id. at 106:10-15. Respondent testified that Petitioner would make these threats “every time [she] wanted to leave him.” Id. at 106:8-15. Although Respondent never saw any “blackmail” videos or photographs depicting her, id. at 53:13-15, 109:5-24, she testified that Petitioner’s videos of sex workers gave her reason to believe that Petitioner had similar materials involving her. Id. 53:7-12. Petitioner denied ever making any recordings of Respondent or threatening her in that way. Id. at 293:19-294:3. Instead, he testified to telling her that if she “ever [went] back to drugs, I will have to try my best to have the custody of my child.” Id. at 293:25-294:3. According to Respondent, Petitioner also used his ability to withhold consent for M.P.J. to travel with her as another means of control. Colombian law requires the non-traveling parent — here, Petitioner — to provide formal written consent for a child to travel outside of the country.10 Respondent testified that, after her family moved to New York in 2014, it took “begging [Petitioner] for almost 2 years” for him to allow M.P.J. to travel to the United States to see them. Resp’t Aff. 13:13-15. Respondent and M.P.J., with Petitioner’s consent, were in the United States for approximately seven weeks in August and September 2016. See Pet’r Hr’g Ex. 7 at 2, ECF No. 51-7; Pet’r Hr’g Ex. 8 at 2, ECF No. 51-8. Of her abusive encounters with Petitioner during this period, Respondent recalled one from November 2017 in the greatest level of detail. According to Respondent, Petitioner insisted that Respondent attend a Halloween “VIP event” with him at the strip club where they had met. Resp’t Aff. 14:4-9. Once at the event, Petitioner had one of “his drunken psychotic outbreaks against [her],” prompting Respondent to leave the club and return home alone. Id. at 14:9-11. Petitioner arrived home the next day, still drunk, and the parties had a “heated argument” during which Respondent told him that she planned to leave him. Id. at 14:11-13. Respondent testified that Petitioner was “[p]ushing and shoving [her] during the argument,” and it became “so extreme that the neighbors had to call the police,” who arrived to “deescalate the situation.” Id. at 14:13-18. During the argument, Respondent testified, Petitioner threatened to withhold his consent for M.P.J. to travel with Respondent to the United States as planned the following week. Id. at 14:14-16. At this, Respondent then “calmed [Petitioner] down to avoid his retaliation with the travel permit,” and Petitioner ultimately provided his consent. Id. at 15:1-3. Respondent’s written direct testimony did not mention Petitioner ever using physical force against their son. At the hearing, however, Respondent testified to a specific incident in which Petitioner “slapped” M.P.J. when he was “still in diapers.” Tr. 55:8-25. On this occasion, the child “acted out because he wanted something.” Id. at 55:15-16. According to Respondent, Petitioner directed her to leave the room, “so as not to see what he was going to do”; he then took off M.P.J.’s diaper and slapped his hind side. Id. at 55:14-25, 56:19-57:7. While she was not in the room to witness the slap, Respondent testified that afterwards, she saw M.P.J. “crying” and further observed “color” and a “hand mark” on his rear. Id. at 57:1-6, 116:1-2. Relatedly, Respondent produced virtually no evidence that M.P.J. witnessed his father physically or verbally abusing his mother. Respondent was questioned at the hearing about whether the child had been exposed to her physical or other abuse by Petitioner. Asked whether M.P.J. had witnessed any of the “acts of violence” against her, Respondent responded, “Yes, but he was a baby and he doesn’t remember.” Id. at 59:25-60:3. She further testified that, when living in Colombia, her son did not witness any of her reactions to incidents with Petitioner; when they happened, she “always tried for [her] son never to realize what was going on.” Id. at 63:22-64:2. Her written direct testimony also omits any mention of the effect that Petitioner’s behavior toward her had on M.P.J.11 Respondent’s written testimony also omitted any indication that she went to the Colombian authorities to report any abuse after M.P.J. was born. At the hearing, however, Respondent testified to making numerous attempts to lodge complaints against Petitioner with the police, as well as with the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (“ICBF”), a child services administrative agency, and the Comisaria de Familia (“Comisaria”), a separate administrative body tasked with protecting victims of intrafamily violence.12 Tr. 20:17-20, 23:13-25:1, 179:2-7. According to Respondent, she went to the ICBF in 2015, see id. at 20:10-14, and to the Comisaria once in 2015 and then two additional times in early 2018. See id. at 24:22-25:1. Respondent testified that these agencies “never paid attention to [her]” or provided any formal assistance; her visits also did not result in any complaints or proceedings relating to Petitioner. Id. at 15:15-17, 54:20-25, 178:22-179:22. Respondent’s testimony on her attempts to seek help from the Colombian authorities was high-level at best; for none of these instances did she specify when she went, to whom she spoke, or what specifically she went to report. She also produced no paperwork, created during or reflecting the contents of, these alleged interactions. C. Petitioner and Respondent Separate in Early 2018 and Share Custody of M.P.J. In or around early 2018, Respondent broke off the relationship, and Petitioner moved out to a separate residence. Pet’r Aff. 7; Tr 25:3-4. Despite Petitioner’s apparent threats to reveal information about Respondent’s past if she were to leave him, she acknowledged that “no embarrassing publications or any other kind of consequences” resulted from this separation. Tr. 106:8-25. Instead, Respondent testified, Petitioner continued to use “blackmail” to set the conditions of their separation. Resp’t Aff. 16:13-17:9. Respondent did not testify to any incidents of physical or verbal abuse from Petitioner after the two separated. The parties never established a formal custody arrangement for M.P.J. Tr. 97:18-21.13 Nevertheless, they shared custody according to a consistent schedule: M.P.J. primarily lived with Respondent. Every two weeks, Petitioner would pick up M.P.J. on Saturday in the early afternoon and drop him off with Respondent on the following day (Sunday) in the evening. Id. at 98:3-5. The parties also equally shared “vacation periods for the child.” Id. at 98:6-8. Under this arrangement, Petitioner saw M.P.J. for approximately sixty days a year. Id. at 97:12-13. Respondent testified that Petitioner dictated these terms as “he wanted,” id. at 97:19-21, but she did not present evidence indicating that she sought, formally or informally, any alternative arrangement. Nor did Respondent testify to any incidents with Petitioner, involving herself or M.P.J., in connection with his visits with the child. Instead, the parties apparently followed this visitation schedule without incident. During this period, Petitioner continued to support Respondent and M.P.J. financially. He paid the rent and utility bills for the apartment to which Respondent and M.P.J. moved. Id. at 143:1-3, 313:2-3. He also arranged and directly paid for M.P.J.’s education, health insurance, and medical care, see Pet’r Aff. 9, Tr. 313:11-15, and gave Respondent a car to use and money for additional expenses. Pet’r Aff. 47. Respondent acknowledged that Petitioner provided financial support, but again testified that Petitioner forced her into a position of economic dependence and used it to maintain control over her after their separation. Resp’t Aff. 16:13-20; Tr. 142:22-143:6, 227:13-19.14 Petitioner, in turn, asserted that she “had complete control of her time and activities.” Pet’r Aff. 47. Respondent’s testimony on this point stood in tension with her other acknowledgments: that she had opportunities to work and receive money, for example, from sources other than Petitioner. Shortly after their separation, Respondent received a job offer to work as a secretary for a trash collection company in Bogota, although she did not accept the position because she could not arrange childcare for M.P.J. Tr. 215:16-216:25. Around the end of 2018, Respondent and a friend created a small business on Instagram that sold nuts, which provided “enough [income] to pay for my son’s expenses.” Id. at 218:2-16. Respondent’s family in the United States would also send her money, a practice that began when she was “still with” Petitioner. Id. at 218:18-22. Between 2018 and 2020, moreover, Respondent traveled outside Colombia on numerous occasions, often leaving M.P.J. with Petitioner for days or weeks at a time. She visited the United States for five days in August 2018, for seven weeks from November to December 2018, and for another seven weeks from June to August 2019. Pet’r Hr’g Ex. 7 at 2. Respondent also took a four-day trip to Barcelona in December 2019, which her father’s family funded, and a weekend trip to Mexico in January 2020, which she paid for herself. Tr. 220:4-221:7. Of her travels, M.P.J. accompanied Respondent on only one — her 2019 trip to the United States. See id. at 219:16-18; Pet’r Hr’g Ex. 8 at 2.15 For the rest, the child stayed with Petitioner. Tr. 96:16-97:1, 147:5-20. Respondent did not testify to any concerns in leaving their son with Petitioner for extended periods of time. During this time, Respondent also maintained an onagain, off-again, long-distance relationship with a U.S.-based individual named Ryan Portela. Id. at 158:20-21; Resp’t Aff. 17:10-11. Respondent spent time with Portela during her trips to the United States, and Portela visited Respondent in Colombia twice, in May and October 2018. Resp’t Aff. 17:12-18:9. Respondent herself testified that Petitioner “knew nothing about [her] private life” during this period. See id. at 19:20-20:2. D. Respondent and M.P.J. Travel to the United States in September 2020 and Do Not Return In September 2020, Respondent traveled with M.P.J. to the United States. According to Respondent, her mother’s family had sent her money for this travel, given the “complicated” situation during the COVID-19 pandemic and her ongoing “financial struggles.” Id. at 18:16-18. Petitioner provided his written consent authorizing M.P.J. to leave the country with Respondent from September 2, 2020 to October 7, 2020. Pet’r Hr’g Ex. 12, ECF No. 51-12. Due to disruptions in airline flight schedules caused by the pandemic, the departure was delayed until September 19, 2020. Pet’r Aff. 15. Respondent and M.P.J. did not return to Colombia in October as scheduled. Respondent originally told Petitioner that their flight home had been cancelled and would need to be rescheduled. See Pet’r Aff. 16; Resp’t Hr’g Ex. E at 6, ECF No. 45-5. Petitioner apparently accepted this explanation, and Respondent and M.P.J. remained in the United States for weeks after their anticipated return to Colombia. During this time, unbeknownst to Petitioner, Respondent enrolled M.P.J. in a school in New York. Resp’t Aff. 19:17-18. Respondent also became engaged to Portela, and the two were married in early December 2020. Id. at 19:15-20. In a series of text messages sent on December 12 and 13, 2020, Petitioner asked Respondent when she planned to reschedule M.P.J.’s return. Resp’t Hr’g Ex. E at 2-4. In response, Respondent informed Petitioner for the first time that she intended to remain in the United States with the child. Pet’r Hr’g Ex. 3 at 3, ECF No. 51-3. Among other text messages, Respondent wrote: Now I am telling you something Edgar, I will never take away the right that you have as [M.P.J.'s] Father to see him and share time with him, off [sic] course not. But seeing this entire economic situation in which we have to live over there in Bogota, which is not good and that all these years I have to count coins all the time and now is worst with this virus. I have decided to live here (USA). [M.P.J.] already has a school. He is studying and happy. I already have a Health insurance here. And I have already submit my papers (immigration documents) This means very soon [M.P.J.] is going to be legal. And I see no reason why we should not give ourselves this opportunity in this country. We are doing fine, thanks to God I am studying and I am working or what were you thinking? That all this time I have been doing nothing. That my family is taking care of me, No I have a son and I am willing to go ahead and I will not allow that your stubbornness and selfishness will stop me, that everything has to be done as you say. Id.16 Respondent proposed a visitation schedule for Petitioner to see M.P.J. — during his summer vacations — that would be roughly equal in aggregate time to the parties’ prior schedule. Resp’t Hr’g Ex. E at 9-10. 1. Petitioner’s Attempts to Locate M.P.J. Petitioner then began to take steps to secure M.P.J.’s return to Colombia. In January 2021, Petitioner prepared and filed an application (the “Hague Application”) with the ICBF, the Colombian Central Authority for the Hague Convention.17 See Pet’r Aff. 24; Pet’r Hr’g Ex. 5. In the application field for the “place where the child is thought to be,” Petitioner listed an address in Queens, New York that he had looked up on Google Maps after “[M.P.J.] shared his [W]hatsapp location.” Pet’r Hr’g Ex. 5 at 3. Around the same time, Respondent’s relationship with Portela deteriorated.18 Respondent testified that on February 8, 2021, Portela beat and strangled her, causing her to flee their residence with M.P.J., seek treatment at a hospital for her injuries, and file a complaint against Portela with the New York Police Department. Resp’t Aff. 21:4-22:7. Respondent asserted that Petitioner told Portela “about [her] past as a prostitute or sex worker,” prompting Portela to attack her. Id. at 23:3-5. Petitioner disputes that he had anything to do with this incident. Pet’r Aff. 56. He testified that he received a call “from an American guy” — Portela — after the February 8 episode of violence, on February 10, 2021. Tr. 296:22-25. According to Petitioner, he had never before communicated with Portela and did not know of his existence or relationship with Respondent prior to this contact. Pet’r Aff.
52-53. The record on this issue is murky at best, and the Court cannot conclude, based on the evidence presented, that Petitioner bears any responsibility for Portela’s actions. Also on February 10, Respondent and Petitioner exchanged text messages regarding the incident with Portela. Pet’r Hr’g Ex. 6 at 5-6, 8, ECF No. 51-6. Petitioner testified that these communications — including Respondent’s account of Portela’s attack and what he understood to be her suggestion that she might leave the United States for Barcelona — prompted him to file an additional “[urgent] request” with the ICBF, to prevent M.P.J. from leaving the United States. Id. at 1; Pet’r Aff.
