The following numbered papers were read on this motion: NYSCEF Document Nos. 44-54 (notice of motion, affirmation in support, exhibits, statement of material facts, and affidavit of service NYSCEF Document Nos. 56-61 (affirmation in opposition and exhibits) NYSCEF Document Nos. 62-63 (reply affirmation and affidavit of service) DECISION AND ORDER Introduction Plaintiffs Yvonne Bishop (“YB” hereinafter) and Tyshon Bishop (“TB” hereinafter”) assert in this action that they sustained personal injuries while occupying a vehicle driven by YB on April 17, 2020, as a result of the negligent operation of another vehicle driven by Defendant Jeffrey Estevez and owned by Defendant Jose Estevez.1 Said Defendants now move for summary judgment, claiming that both Plaintiffs failed to meet the “serious injury” threshold of Insurance Law §5104 (a), as defined in §5102 (d). There are nine categories of serious injury, per Insurance Law §5102 (d). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be granted only if no triable issues of fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]). The issue of whether a claimed injury falls within the statutory definition of “serious injury” is a question of law for the Court, which may be decided on a motion for summary judgment (see Licari v. Elliott, 57 NY2d 230 [1982]). The moving Defendants bear the initial burden of establishing, by the submission of evidentiary proof in admissible form, a prima facie case that Plaintiffs have not suffered a serious injury from the subject motor vehicle accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]. A failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [2016]). If Defendants have made such a showing that Plaintiffs have not suffered a serious injury from the subject motor vehicle accident as a matter of law, i.e., Plaintiffs failed to establish that they qualified under the relevant serious injury threshold categories, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to submit evidence in admissible form, rebutting the presumption that there are no material issues of fact (see Franchini v. Palmieri, 1 NY3d 536 [2003]; Grasso v. Angerami, 79 NY2d 813 [1991]). Bill of Particulars In Plaintiffs’ bill of particulars, YB (57 years old when the accident occurred) claimed injuries to the right shoulder (including arthroscopic surgery), left shoulder, cervical spine (including disc herniations), thoracic spine (including a disc herniation), and lumbar spine (including disc herniations). She asserted that she was confined to bed/home for a period of approximately two weeks except for necessary and essential excursions for required purposes, and that she was totally disabled for a period of approximately three weeks and partially disabled since the accident date. As for serious injury threshold categories, YB claimed, “permanent injury, a disabling injury for a period in excess of 90 out of the first 180 days following this occurrence,…a significant limitation of use of a bodily function or system;…a significant disfigurement;…[and] a permanent consequential limitation of use of a bodily organ and/or member…” (NYSCEF Doc No. 49, bill of particulars
