The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 006) 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 164, 165, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 183, 184, 185 were read on this motion to VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION Pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a)(1), (3) and (4), and CPLR 317, Defendant MS Global Funding LLC (“MS Global”) moves for an order vacating the May 6, 2019 Default Judgment (the “Default Judgment”) (NYSCEF 79) entered in this matter. Plaintiffs Zaklady Tytoniowe W Lublinie SA (“ZTL”), Biosyntec SA (“Biosyntec”), and Imam Emami (“Emami”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) oppose the motion by principally arguing MS Global admits to intentionally defaulting, this Court has jurisdiction over MS Global, no fraud was committed in obtaining the Default Judgment, and MS Global has no meritorious defenses to the complaint. For the following reasons, MS Global’s motion is granted. CPLR 5015 enables the court “which rendered a judgment or order [to] relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just…upon the ground of: (1) excusable default, if such motion is made within one year after service of a copy of the judgment or order with written notice of its entry upon the moving party;” “(3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; or (4) lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order.” Alternatively, CPLR 317 permits a defendant “to defend the action within one year after he obtains knowledge of the entry of the judgment, but in no event more than five years after such entry, upon a finding of the court that he did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a meritorious defense.” “A defendant seeking to vacate its default pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) on the ground of excusable default must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action” (Global Liberty Ins. Co. v. Shahid Mian, M.D., P.C., 172 AD3d 1332, 1332 [2d Dept 2019]). Similarly, when “a CPLR 5015(a)(3) motion alleges intrinsic fraud, i.e., that the plaintiff’s allegations are false” the defendant must also “provide a reasonable excuse for the default” (Bank of N.Y. v. Stradford, 55 AD3d 765, 765-66 [2d Dept 2008]). However, when a “defendant asserts that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him or her, the defendant should seek dismissal of the action under CPLR 5015(a)(4)…a motion that has no stated time limit and can be made at any time” (Caba v. Rai, 63 AD3d 578, 580 [1st Dept 2009]). “When a defendant seeking to vacate a default judgment raises a jurisdictional objection pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4), the court is required to resolve the jurisdictional question before determining whether it is appropriate to grant a discretionary vacatur of the default under CPLR 5015(a)(1)” (Emigrant Mtge. Co., Inc. v. Westervelt, 105 AD3d 896, 897 [2d Dept 2013]). Finally, “[i]n addition to the grounds set forth in section 5015(a), a court may vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice” (Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 68 [2003]). The Court finds the current record insufficient to warrant vacatur of the Default Judgment for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4). Here, the Complaint relies exclusively on general jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 301 as the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction (NYSCEF 2
