DECISION AND ORDER I. Introduction This is a civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization (“RICO”) and common law fraud action (see Docket No. 65, 2d Am. Compl.) transferred from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by Judge Lorna Schofield (Docket No. 74). Some Defendants (Hylan Asset Management, Andrew Shaevel, Mainbrook Asset Partners I, LLC, Hylan Debt Fund LLC, and Bobalew Ventures (improperly sued as “Bobalaw Ventures,” see Docket No. 78, Movants Memo. at 1)) initially1 moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ three civil RICO counts in the Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiffs’ failure to allege a RICO enterprise or a pattern of racketeering and urged this Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining common law counts for forms of fraud (Docket No. 78). Without the RICO Case Statement (as required by this Court’s Local Civil Rule 9, W.D.N.Y. Loc. Civ. R. 9), that Motion was granted with dismissal of the case without prejudice to Plaintiffs filing their RICO Case Statement (Docket No. 81). On February 20, 2023, Plaintiffs duly submitted their RICO Case Statement (Docket No. 84) reviving their claims. Moving Defendants (Hylan Asset Management, Shaevel, Mainbrook Asset Partners I, LLC, Hylan Debt Fund LLC, and Bobalew Ventures, collectively “Movants”) now filed their present Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 86)2. For the reasons stated below, Movants’ Motion (Docket No. 86) is granted, dismissing the claims alleged against the Movants. II. Background A. Summary of Allegations This Court assumes the truth of the following factual allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (Docket No. 65), see Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustee of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740, 98 S.Ct. 1848, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976), and their RICO Case Statement (Docket No. 84), McLaughlin v. Anderson, 962 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1992) (in Motion to Dismiss, taking facts as true as alleged in the Complaint and as supplemented by the RICO case statement). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants bought and sold what Plaintiffs term “phantom debts,” either fabricated debts from misappropriated customer information or allegedly bogus auto-funded payday loans “foisted upon consumers without their permission” and disputed by the alleged debtor consumers (Docket No. 65, 2d Am. Compl. 26). In the RICO Case Statement, they claim that Defendants in 2014-18 offered for sale or sold delinquent debts when in fact no such debt existed (Docket No. 84, Pls. RICO Case Statement at 1-3), that these so-called debts either were fake or were imposed upon consumers without their knowledge or consent (id. at 4). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants used racketeering means to profit from these fake debt accounts by selling these questionable debts to unwary debt buyers, such as Plaintiffs (id. at 9). Defendants thus violated 18 U.S.C. §1962(b) and (c) and conspired to commit these violations in violation of §1962(d). They claim they paid Defendants a total of over $2.5 million for such phantom debts (id. at 2, 3-4). Plaintiffs allege Shaevel and Hirsh3 Mohindra coordinated the collection of the phantom debts on Prudent’s behalf using debt collectors they always used including Worldwide Defendants (Defendants Worldwide Processing Group and its owner, Frank Ungaro, Jr.) (Docket No. 65, 2d Am. Compl. 44). Further, they claim that Worldwide Defendants collected the other Defendants’ phantom debts (by interstate wires and mail) that the collectors knew were phantom or disputed. Plaintiffs accuse Worldwide Defendants of using deceptive or coercive tactics to collect these debts. (Id.
44-52.) This collection scheme was alleged in another case in this Court, Federal Trade Commission v. Hylan Asset Management, LLC, No. 18CV710 (EAW), in which in 2019 the defendants there stipulated to enjoining their collection activities (id.
