MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER In this case, familiarity with which is presumed, China Construction Bank (Asia) Corporation Limited (“CCBA”) filed an ex parte application seeking discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782 (“Section 1782″), which the Court granted on January 23, 2023. ECF No. 9. On March 6, 2023, the Court granted the unopposed motion of Zhang Kangyang (“Zhang”) and Suning Sports International Limited (collectively, “Intervenors”) to intervene. ECF No. 13. Intervenors now move to quash the subpoenas CCBA issued pursuant to its Section 1782 application. ECF No. 27. For the reasons that follow, Intervenors’ motion is DENIED, but the Court will hold a conference — after the parties meet and confer — to address the breadth of the subpoenas. Intervenors’ principal argument is that the discovery CCBA seeks is not “for use” in a foreign proceeding, as required by Section 1782. See ECF No. 28 (“Intervenors’ Mem.”), at 8; see also Fed. Republic of Nigeria v. VR Advisory Servs., Ltd., 27 F.4th 136, 148 (2d Cir. 2022) (listing the statutory requirements for a Section 1782 application). In its Application, CCBA alleged that there are four pending or contemplated foreign proceedings in which it intends to use the discovery: a debtor examination of Zhang in Hong Kong; a committal proceeding against Zhang in Hong Kong; a civil proceeding in Italy to invalidate a shareholder resolution of Inter Milan Football Club, of which Zhang is the president; and a proceeding to enforce a Hong Kong judgment against Zhang in Italy. ECF No. 4 (“Pet.’s 1782 Mem.”), at 2-3. At least three of these proceedings qualify as foreign proceedings within the meaning of Section 1782 and the discovery CCBA seeks will plainly be of some use in each of these proceedings. First, substantially for the reasons discussed in CCBA’s opposition, see ECF No. 34 (“Pet.’s Opp’n”), at 15-19, the Court holds that the Hong Kong debtor examination is “adjudicative,” as required to constitute a Section 1782 proceeding. See Euromepa, S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 154 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1998). Although it is a post-judgment proceeding, and a Hong Kong court has already found that Zhang is liable for a debt owed to CCBA, see Intervenors’ Mem. 9, the debtor examination will involve judicial factfinding, see, e.g., In re YS GM Marfin II LLC, No. 20-MC-182 (PGG), 2022 WL 624291, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2022) (explaining that a post-judgment proceeding involving a court hearing at which the judgment debtor would be questioned about its assets was adjudicative). In fact, based on the information revealed during the debtor examination, the Hong Kong court could even order Zhang to be imprisoned if it concludes that he willfully failed to satisfy the underlying judgment or failed to make complete disclosure. See ECF No. 5 (“1st Ip Decl.”), 39; see also ECF No. 5-30.1 Accordingly, CCBA will have “some means of actually using the evidence” it seeks in its subpoenas — including information related to Zhang’s assets and his potentially unlawful dissipation of those assets, see Pet.’s 1782 Mem. 19-20, ECF No. 7-2 (“Wire Transfer Subpoena”),
1, 4 — in the Hong Kong debtor examination. Certain Funds, Accts. &/or Inv. Vehicles v. KPMG, L.L.P., 798 F.3d 113, 122 n.11 (2d Cir. 2015); see also In re Accent Delight Int’l Ltd., 869 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting that, in assessing the “for use” requirement, the Second Circuit has “focused in each on the practical ability of an applicant to place a beneficial document…before a foreign tribunal”; it has “never required…that an applicant be pursuing a certain type of relief in that tribunal” (emphasis in original)). Second, although CCBA had not commenced the Italian recognition proceeding at the time it filed the Section 1782 Application, Pet.’s Opp’n 20-21, the Court finds that it was “within reasonable contemplation,” Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258-59 (2004), which is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. In its Application, CCBA provided “some objective indicium that the action [wa]s being contemplated,” and that the proceeding was not “merely speculative.” Certain Funds, 798 F.3d at 123-24. Among other things, it identified concrete steps it had taken to initiate the proceeding: It applied for certified copies of the Hong Kong judgment and certifications stating that the judgment was final, both of which are necessary to commence the proceeding. Pet.’s 1782 Mem. 11; see also ECF No. 6 (“1st D’Andrea Decl.”),