DECISION AND ORDER On September 30, 2022, indictment 73836-22 was filed against defendants, charging them with one count each of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, in violation of Penal Law (“P.L.”) §265.03(3); Criminal Possession of a Firearm, in violation of P.L. §265.01-b(1); Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree, in violation of P.L. §265.01(1); and Possession of Ammunition, in violation of Administrative Code (“A.C.”) §10-131(i)(3). Defendants were arraigned upon that indictment on October 6, 2022 and an omnibus motion schedule was set. On January 24, 2023, the Honorable Steven Hornstein dismissed count one (Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree) and count four (Possession of Ammunition), finding that insufficient proof was presented to the Grand Jury to sustain those counts. The court also granted Huntley, Mapp, Ingle, and Dunaway hearings. The case was adjourned for the People to re-present the dismissed charges to another Grand Jury. On March 31, 2023, indictment 71331-23 was filed against defendants, charging each of them with one count of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, in violation of P.L. §265.03(3). On April 12, 2023, defendants were arraigned on the new indictment and the court deemed that indictment 73836-22 was dismissed and superseded by indictment 71331-23. On April 18, 2023, however, the case was recalled and the court indicated that it had mistakenly dismissed indictment 73836-22 as superseded. The court reinstated the dismissed indictment and consolidated the indictments under the original indictment number, 73836-22. The court also ordered a new omnibus motion schedule on the re-presented count. Defendants submitted their omnibus motions and the People responded. Defendants’ omnibus motion with respect to the re-presented count is decided as follows: Grand Jury Defendants’ motion to inspect the Grand Jury minutes is granted to the extent that the Court will conduct an in camera inspection of the minutes. Upon inspection, the Court concludes that the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally sufficient to support the sole count set forth in the re-presented indictment. See C.P.L. ”190.65, 210.30; People v. Jensen, 86 N.Y.2d 248, 251-52 (1995). The minutes also reveal that A[t]he prosecutor=s legal instructions were adequate and contained no defects rising to the level of impairing the integrity of the proceeding, as would be required for dismissal.@ People v. Hopkins, 276 A.D.2d 256, 257 (1st Dept. 2000). Defendants’ remaining arguments relating to the Grand Jury proceedings have been reviewed and found to be without merit. Defendants’ motion to dismiss or reduce the charge in the indictment is therefore denied. Defendants’ application for the release of the Grand Jury minutes is denied. See C.P.L. ’210.30(3); People v. Robinson, 98 N.Y.2d 755, 757 (2002). Nevertheless, to the extent that the People have not already done so, the People are reminded of their discovery obligations, under C.P.L. §245.20(1)(b), to provide the defense with the portions of the Grand Jury minutes that contain witness testimony. Constitutional Challenge under Bruen In the re-presented indictment, defendants are each charged with one count of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree pursuant to Penal Law (“P.L.”) § 265.03(3). Defendants ask this Court, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022), to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the charges violate their Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The People filed a response in opposition. Defendants’ arguments misconstrue “both Bruen and the Second Amendment as conferring an unqualified entitlement to possess deadly weapons in public places without restriction.” People v. Rodriguez, 76 Misc. 3d 494 (Sup. Ct. NY County 2022). In fact, Bruen reaffirmed that “there is no Second Amendment right ‘to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.’” People v. Brown, Sup. Ct Bronx County, July 15, 2022, Fabrizio, J., Ind. No. 71673/22, 2022 WL 2821817 (citing Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2128) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Bruen merely struck down the “proper cause” requirement for “law-abiding” concealed carry permit applicants; it did not address who may lawfully possess a gun, “the requirements that must be met to buy a gun…[or the] restrictions that may be imposed on the possession or carrying of guns.” Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2157 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 US 570 (2008), and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 US 742 (2010)). Like other constitutionally protected rights, the right to bear arms is “subject to certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions.” Bruen, 142 S.Ct at 2156 (citation omitted). As such, the Bruen decision has no bearing on the constitutionality of the charges in this case. While P.L. § 400.00(1)(a) prohibits people between the ages of 18 and 20 from obtaining a firearms license, and defendants fall within that age range, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen did not overturn those restrictions. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2157-58 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Our decision, as noted, does not expand the categories of people who may lawfully possess a gun, and federal law generally forbids the possession of a handgun by a person who is under the age of 18, and bars the sale of a handgun to anyone under the age of 21.” (internal citation omitted)). As noted previously, the Bruen court recognized that there are “certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions” on the right to bear arms. Bruen, 142 S.Ct at 2156 (citation omitted). Age-based restrictions are “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation” and therefore permissible under the Second Amendment. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2126; see Reese v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms & Explosives, __ F. Supp. 3d ___-, 2022 WL 17859138 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2022) (finding, post-Bruen, that a federal statute restricting sale of firearms was constitutional where age-based restrictions were consistent with a “longstanding, historical tradition…of age-based and safety-based restrictions on the ability to access arms”); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 204 (5th Cir. 2012), abrogated by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (analyzing various colonial statutes to demonstrate that, historically, States had “the discretion to impose age qualification on service, and several States chose to enroll only persons age 21 or over, or required parental consent for persons under 21,” such that States were permitted under the Second Amendment to regulate the age of a person permitted to bear arms); Mitchell v. Atkins, 483 F. Supp. 3d 985, 992 (W.D. Wash. 2020), vacated and remanded, No. 20- 35827, 2022 WL 17420766 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022) (“At common law and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the age of majority was 21 years…. It was not until the 1970s that states lowered the age of majority to 18.”); Lara v. Evanchick, 534 F. Supp. 3d 478, 489 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (“The established consensus of federal appellate and district courts from around the country is that age-based restrictions limiting the rights of 18-20-year-old adults to keep and bear arms fall under the ‘longstanding’ and ‘presumptively lawful’ measures recognized by the Supreme Court in Heller as evading Second Amendment scrutiny”).1 For these reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment as a violation of their Second Amendment rights is denied. Bill of Particulars, C.P.L. §245, and Brady Defendants’ request for a bill of particulars is denied. The criminal court complaint, indictment, police paperwork, and affirmation in response to defendant’s motion “adequately apprise defendant of the charges against him with sufficient specificity to enable him to prepare and conduct a defense.” People v. Elliot, 299 A.D.2d 731, 732 (3d Dept. 2002); C.P.L. §200.95. To the extent the People have not previously done so, the People are directed to preserve and provide pre-trial disclosure of all materials subject to C.P.L. §245.20 and C.P.L. §200.95 that are not subject to delayed disclosure. The People’s request for reciprocal discovery is granted. Defendants are ordered to comply with the reciprocal discovery requirements set forth in C.P.L. §245.20(4) and file a Certificate of Compliance pursuant to C.P.L. §245.50(2). The People are reminded of their Brady/Vilardi obligations. Statement Evidence Defendants’ motion to suppress statement evidence for which notice was served or, in the alternative, for a Huntley/Dunaway hearing is granted to the extent that a Huntley/Dunaway hearing is ordered. With respect to defendants’ motion to preclude statement evidence for which notice was required under C.P.L. §710.30, but not served, the People are directed to advise the Court and the defense of any such evidence and whether good cause exists for the delay in such notice, so that a proper determination of their admissibility can be made before trial. Physical Evidence Defendants’ motion to suppress physical evidence or, in the alternative, for a Mapp/Ingle hearing is granted to the extent that a Mapp/Ingle hearing is ordered. Identification Evidence With respect to defendants’ motion to preclude identification evidence for which notice was required under C.P.L. §710.30, but not served, the People are directed to advise the Court and the defense of any such evidence and whether good cause exists for the delay in such notice, so that a proper determination of their admissibility can be made before trial. Severance Defendant Santana’s motion for severance is deferred to the trial court for decision after the above-ordered suppression hearings have been held. Sandoval To the extent the People have not already done so, the People are directed to notify defendants, within the time periods required by statute, of all specific instances of defendants’ prior criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct, whether charged or uncharged, of which the prosecutor has knowledge and which the prosecutor intends to use at trial for purposes of impeaching defendants’ credibility at trial. See C.P.L. §245.20. Defendants’ request for a Sandoval hearing is deferred to the trial court. This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. Dated: June 2, 2023
