DECISION The parties are divorced and have three children-in-common, J.B. (hereinafter “J”), R.B. (hereinafter “R”), and S.B. (hereinafter “S”) (hereinafter collectively “children”). The mother, C.A.B. (hereinafter “Mother” or “Ms. B”) has residential custody of R and S, and the father, D.S.B. (hereinafter “Father” or “Mr. B”) has residential custody of J. On November 30, 2022, Ms. B filed an enforcement petition against Mr. B. See Petition for Enforcement/Violation of an Order of Support (B, 11/29/2022), Nassau County Family Court Docket Number F-5202-22/22B. On February 16, 2023, Mr. B filed an enforcement petition against Ms. B. See Petition for Enforcement/Violation of an Order of Support (B, 02/15/2023), Nassau County Family Court Docket Number F-5202-22/23C. The parties argued that pursuant to the terms and conditions of their divorce documents, each owed add-on expenses arrears to the other. See Judgment of Divorce (Fox-McDonough, J., 07/11/2022), Nassau County Supreme Court Index Number 202128/2019; see also Stipulation of Settlement (B v. B, Oct. 18, 2021), Nassau County Supreme Court Index Number 202128/2019. After diligently working to settle the petitions, the parties agreed to resolve the matter. On June 1, 2023, the cases were settled. However, there remained one issue, which arose after the filing of the petitions, about which the parties wished for the Court to render a decision prior to the filing of any further petitions. The parties agreed to brief the issue. On June 23, 2023, Ms. B’s attorney, Gregory Pandolfo, Esq. (hereinafter “Mr. Pandolfo”) filed her papers. See Mem. of Law (Pandolfo, 06/23/2023), Nassau County Family Court Docket Number F-05202-22/22B. Ms. B sought a determination that Mr. B is responsible for reimbursing her with his pro rata share of their daughter’s sorority costs. See id. On that same date, Mr. B’s attorney, Gregory R. Myers, Esq. (hereinafter “Mr. Myers”) filed opposition papers. See Mem. of Law (Myers, 06/23/2023), Nassau County Family Court Docket Number F-05202-22/22B. After having considered the facts, the parties’ divorce documents, and their arguments, and having applied them to the law, the Court’s determination follows: DISCUSSION A voluntary agreement between parties is a contract. See e.g. Schaff v. Schaff, 172 A.D.3d 1421, 1423 (2d Dep’t 2019) (separation agreement); Fishbein v. Fishbein, 72 A.D.3d 1021, 1021- 022 (2d Dep’t 2010) (stipulation of settlement agreement); Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 50 A.D.3d 851, 851 (2d Dep’t 2008) (marital settlement). A stipulation of settlement is such an agreement. See Glick v. Ruland, 185 A.D.3d 926, 928 (2d Dep’t 2020); see also Abramson v. Hasson, 184 A.D.3d 768, 770 (2d Dep’t 2020); D’Sa v. D’Sa, 182 A.D.3d 535, 536-37 (2d Dep’t 2020); Block-Iaconetti v. Iaconetti, 176 A.D.3d 1051, 1053-054 (2d Dep’t 2019). As such, a stipulation of settlement is subject to the principles of contract construction and interpretation. See Abramson, 184 A.D.3d at 770; see also D’Sa, 182 A.D.3d at 536-37; Schaff, 172 A.D.3d at 1423; Fishbein, 72 A.D.3d at 1021- 022; Herzfeld, 50 A.D.3d at 851-52. A court must determine whether an agreement is clear and unambiguous, or whether more than one interpretation can be drawn from its language. See Blonder v. Blonder, 171 A.D.3d 1043, 1045 (2d Dep’t 2019) (proper inquiry is whether agreement “on its face is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation”); see also Crawley v. Crawley, 152 A.D.3d 510, 511-12(2d Dep’t 2017) (whether contract is ambiguous is matter of law for court); Pellot v. Pellot, 305 A.D.2d 478, 481 (2d Dep’t 2003) (writing ambiguity is question of law resolved by courts). Where the parties’ intent is evinced through express contract terms, its plain meaning should be given effect. See Abramson, 184 A.D.3d at 770 (“‘Where the intention of the parties is clearly and unambiguously set forth, effect must be given to the intent as indicated by the language used.’”); see also Schaff, 172 A.D.3d at 1423 (“[W]here the language of the agreement is clear and unambiguous, the court should determine the intent of the parties based on that language without resorting to extrinsic evidence.”); Fishbein, 72 A.D.3d at 1021-022 (same); Herzfeld, 50 A.D.3d at 851 (“[T]he court should arrive at a construction which will give fair meaning to all of the language employed by the parties to reach a practical interpretation of the expressions of the parties so that their reasonable expectations will be realized.”). In other words, a court may not alter the parties’ intent, or the meaning of an agreement. See Abramson, 184 A.D.3d at 770; see also D’Sa, 182 A.D.3d at 537; Block-Iaconetti, 176 A.D.3d at 1054; Crawley, 152 A.D.3d at 511; see also Miller v. Fitzpatrick, 147 A.D.3d 845, 847 (2d Dep’t 2017). Where the writings are unambiguous, a court is not required to hold a hearing. See Schaff, 172 A.D.3d at 1423 (finding hearing unnecessary and upholding supreme court decision). Alternatively, where a court finds an agreement’s language is susceptible to varying but reasonable interpretations, a hearing is necessary and appropriate. See Derasmo v. Derasmo, 190 A.D.2d 655, 656 (2d Dep’t 1993). A court must examine the entire document and contemplate the circumstances under which it was executed as well as the parties’ relationship. See Korosh v. Korosh, 99 A.D.3d 909, 911 (2d Dep’t 2012); see also Berns v. Halberstam, 46 A.D.3d 808, 809 (2d Dep’t 2007). In its determination, a court may consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent. See Pellot, 305 A.D.2d at 481 (finding preclusion of summary judgment given stipulation’s ambiguity); see also Derasmo, 190 A.D.2d at 656 (remitted for hearing about correct interpretation of parties’ stipulation). After having applied contract principles to the parties’ 2021 Stipulation, the Court finds its language to be clear and unequivocal. It is in this context that the Court renders its decision. SORORITY COSTS AS COLLEGE EXPENSES The parties agreed that both parents will share in their children’s college expenses. See Stipulation of Settlement, pp. 39-40 (B v. B, Oct. 18, 2021), Nassau County Supreme Court Index Number 202128/2019. The parties’ 2021 Stipulation, provides, in relevant part: “The parties agree and acknowledge that they shall contribute to the costs and expenses associated with each child’s college or post high school vocational education, with the Husband paying sixty five percent (65%) of such cost and the Wife paying thirty-five (35%) of such cost. The maintenance and child support payments will not be reduced by any expense for college paid by the Father/Husband…[t]he educational expenses referred to as the “Cost of College Education” shall consist of tuition, room and board, required supplies by the school, required fees of the college or university, and reasonable transportation expenses for the child for (4) round trips per year.” Id. The parties’ agreement dictates that college expenses “shall1 consist of” specific costs to be paid by the parties. Sorority costs are not listed in the writing. Thus, the Court finds that under the terms and conditions of the parties’ 2021 Stipulation, Mr. B is not obligated to pay his pro rata share of his daughter’s sorority costs as college expenses. Assuming arguendo that the parties’ 2021 Stipulation contained non-limiting language, the Court would have to decide whether sorority costs are college expenses. The Court considers that question now. Although there appears to be no New York case law on point, other jurisdictions have found that sorority costs are not college expenses. See e.g. Marriage of Larsen, 912 N.W.2d 444, 450-51 (Iowa 2018) (holding sorority dues are not presumptive college expenses to be shared by parents unless agreement exists); Cossitt v. Cossitt, 975 So. 2d 274, 280-81 (Miss. Ct. App., Feb. 19, 2008) (affirming chancellor’s finding; sororities are part of college experience but not necessary to college education); Cooper v. Cooper, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 21, at *13-*14 (Tenn. Ct. App., Jan. 10, 2001) (upholding finding that sororities dues are not college expenses). Moreover, the Court found Federal statutory authority for 529 plans to be instructive. See 26 U.S.C. §529 (2023); see also I.R.C. §529 (2023). A 529 plan is an education savings plans that offers tax advantages to participants. See 26 U.S.C. §529 (2023); see also I.R.C. §529 (2023); https://www.nysaves.org/home.html. The funds may be used to cover qualified higher education expenses. See id. If funds are withdrawn for non-qualified higher education expenses, the owner of the plan could be subject to Federal and state income taxes as well as an additional 10 percent tax penalty on earnings. Id. The Internal Revenue Code defines qualified higher education expenses as tuition and fees, books, supplies, computers and peripheral equipment, room and board (if a child is attending school more than half of the time) and for special needs beneficiaries, special needs services expenses in connection with enrollment and attendance. Id. That is to say, sorority costs are not considered to be qualified higher education expenses for the purposes of participating in the 529 program. See 26 U.S.C. §529 (2023); see also I.R.C. §529 (2023); https://www.nysaves.org/home.html. Accordingly, the Court finds that sorority costs are not college expenses and, unless expressly agreed to by divorced parties in a stipulation, those parents have no responsibility to contribute their pro rata share towards such costs as college expenses. SORORITY COSTS AS EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES Many parents agree in their divorce stipulation to share in the cost of extracurricular activities in their children’s best interests. The payment of such supplemental activities is typically addressed in an add-on expenses provision. In the case at bar, the parties agreed to contribute towards their children’s extracurricular expenses. See Stipulation of Settlement, p. 36 (B v. B, Oct. 18, 2021), Nassau County Supreme Court Index Number 202128/2019. The parties’ 2021 Stipulation, provides, in relevant part: “Simultaneously with the execution of this Agreement, the Husband shall be responsible for 65 percent and the Wife shall be responsible for 35 percent of the cost of any extracurricular expenses, including gymnastics, tutoring, financial aid applications, college planning activities, college preparation activities, college applications and fees for examinations for College admission and placement, and the parties shall share, 65 percent Husband, 35 percent Wife in the cost of the children’s car insurance.” Id. Since the parties used the word “including” in their add-on expenses clause, the Court finds that the parties intended their list of extracurriculars to be non-exhaustive. See e.g. 10 U.S.C. §101(f) (2023) (“includes” means “includes but is not limited to”); 11 U.S.C. §102(3) (2023) (in rules of construction, including is not limiting); Empire Mut. Ins. Co. v. Applied Systems Dev. Corp., 121 A.D.2d 956, 960 (1st Dep’t 1986) (noting contextual usage of word ‘including’ not term of limitation but rather illustrative); People v. Shafer, 74 Misc. 3d 405, 413 (Ulster Cty. Ct., Dec. 21, 2021) (finding in common English, legal usage and canons of statutory construction, use of word ‘including’ means incomplete list) (citing authority). Notwithstanding, the Court finds that the parties did not intend sorority costs to be paid as extracurriculars. That is to say, the parties’ 2021 Stipulation refers to extracurricular activities through college admission and placement, but not beyond. Had the parties intended to include sorority costs within their extracurriculars provision, they would have included language about on-college-campus and off-college-campus activities. Thus, the Court finds that the parties did not intend to share in the payment of sorority costs as extracurricular activities should one or more of their children elect to join one. The Court finds Mr. Pandolfo’s argument, that Mr. B’s pro rata payment towards sorority costs aligns with the parties’ intention to maintain their children’s pre-divorce standard of living, to be unpersuasive. There was nothing stated in, or attached to, the papers demonstrating how membership in a sorority is analogous to their daughter’s pre-divorce standard of living. Moreover, other than Mr. Pandolfo’s assertion, there was nothing stated in, or attached to, the papers to establish that had the parties remained married, they would have paid for their daughter’s sorority fees. Further, there is no mechanism under the law supporting a finding that Mr. B should pay his pro rata share towards sorority costs simply because he can afford to do so. This is especially so given that the parties’ clear and unambiguous divorce stipulation was a result of serious contemplation and negotiation, and the Court is not permitted to alter the parties’ intent or the meaning of their agreement. See Abramson, 184 A.D.3d at 770; see also D’Sa, 182 A.D.3d at 537; Block-Iaconetti, 176 A.D.3d at 1054; Crawley, 152 A.D.3d at 511; see also Miller v. Fitzpatrick, 147 A.D.3d 845, 847 (2d Dep’t 2017). Nevertheless, there is nothing within the parties’ agreement preventing Mr. B from voluntarily committing to pay towards sorority costs in his daughter’s best interests. The Court now considers whether sororities are extracurricular activities for child support purposes. This question appears to be one of first impression as the Court was unable to locate statutory authority or relevant case law in any jurisdiction that speaks to this query. Therefore, the Court turned to secondary sources for guidance. The term “extracurricular” is defined in one dictionary after another as absolute. See https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/extracurricular; https://www.dictionary.com/browse/extra curricular; https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/extra curricular; https://www.wordreference.com/definition/extracurricular. Extracurriculars are activities outside of the regular school curriculum. See id. Extracurricular activities provide a way to use free time productively as such activities are fun, build confidence, and expand skills and talents. Such activities are generally considered to be optional and include dance, athletics, art, music, language, hobbies, clubs, cultural, volunteer, and community organizations, and academic competitions. A sorority is a club or organization on a college campus comprised of female students. See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sorority; https://www.dictionary.com/browse/sororit; https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/sorority; https://www.wordreference.com/definition/sorority. Sororities foster friendship, community, service, and leadership by, inter alia, hosting meetings, mixers, galas, and fundraisers. https://www.uopeople.edu/blog/category/getting-into-college. Sororities recruit members by hosting “rush” parties and interview female students through a formal process. See https://www.campusexplorer.com/student-resources/fraternity-rush-week. Sororities then send invitations to those chosen as potential members. See id. After female students determine which house or houses may share their philosophies, they pick one sorority to pledge. Id. Those students who complete pledging become part of the sorority they chose. Id. Colleges do not require students to join a sorority so it is each student’s personal decision about whether or not to become a member. By its very definition, then, a sorority is an extracurricular activity as this type of organization is freely joined as part of the college experience, but is not part of the college curriculum. Thus, the Court finds that for child support purposes, a sorority is an extracurricular activity. Accordingly, the Court finds that where clear language exists within a divorce stipulation setting forth that such activities are intended to be paid through college, parents must provide their pro rata share. CONCLUSION Joining a sorority can be a beneficial part of a female student’s college life. The Court finds that the election to do so comes at the cost of a child’s own wallet should her divorced parents not provide for contribution, within their divorce stipulation, towards the expenses associated with such membership. ADJUDGED that the parties did not intend to share in the cost of sorority fees within their divorce documents; and it is therefore, ORDERED that Mr. B shall not obligated to pay his pro rata share towards sorority costs. This constitutes the decision, opinion and order of the Court. YOUR WILLFUL FAILURE TO OBEY THIS ORDER MAY, AFTER COURT HEARING, RESULT IN YOUR COMMITMENT TO JAIL FOR A TERM NOT TO EXCEED SIX MONTHS FOR CRIMINAL NON-SUPPORT OR CONTEMPT OF COURT; YOUR FAILURE TO OBEY THIS ORDER MAY RESULT IN SUSPENSION OF YOUR DRIVER’S LICENSES, STATE-ISSUED PROFESSIONAL, TRADE, BUSINESS AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSES AND RECREATIONAL AND SPORTING LICENSES AND PERMITS; AND IMPOSITION OF REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY LIENS. PURSUANT TO SECTION 1113 OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, AN APPEAL MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THE ORDER BY APPELLANT IN COURT, 35 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAILING OF THE ORDER TO APPELLANT BY THE CLERK OF COURT, OR 30 DAYS AFTER SERVICE BY A PARTY OR THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD UPON APPELLANT, WHICHEVER IS EARLIEST. Check applicable box: Order mailed on [specify date(s) and to whom mailed]: Order received in court on [specify date(s) and to whom given]: Dated: July 7, 2023
