DECISION & ORDER Plaintiff and his now deceased wife, Patricia Jones (hereinafter “the decedent”), commenced the within medical malpractice action arising out of a cervical spinal laminectomy procedure that took place on August 18, 2009 at Good Samaritan Hospital in Suffern, New York (hereinafter “Good Samaritan”). Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that numerous departures from accepted standards of medical treatment and care that the decedent received before, during and after the procedure resulted in decedent’s injuries, including but not limited to quadriplegia. In 2019, a six-month jury trial was held.1 With respect to liability, the jury found as follows: Defendant Percentage of Liability George Alexander Jones, MD 25% Jeffrey W. Degen, MD 0 percent Daniel Evan Spitzer, MD 25 percent Li Huang, PhD 0 percent Aion J. Lumbley, RN 15 percent Caterina Cozzi, RN 5 percent Nurse Practitioner Armstrong (non-party) 30 percent With respect to damages, the jury awarded Plaintiffs $10 million for past pain and suffering, $10 million for future pain and suffering, $5 million for past loss of consortium and $5 million for future loss of consortium. The jury also awarded pecuniary damages in the amounts of $800,000 for past lost earnings, $79,397.72 for future lost earnings (three years) and approximately $15 million for future expenses.2 In total, Plaintiff was awarded approximately $46 million (exclusive of the $11.8 million from the settling Defendants). Claiming, inter alia, that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence, that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and inconsistent, that the trial was fraught with numerous prejudicial errors, and that the monetary awards were excessive, Defendants Daniel Evan Spitzer, MD (hereinafter “Dr. Spitzer”) and Daniel E. Spitzer, M.D., P.C. (collectively referred to as “the Spitzer Defendants”) and George Alexander Jones, MD (hereinafter “Dr. Jones”) separately move pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict, or alternatively for a new trial or for a reduction of the damages award.3 The Court has considered the following papers on the motions, which the Court has consolidated for the purpose of this Decision: 1. Dr. Spitzer’s Notice of Motion (#006), Affirmation in Support and Exhibit E (Part 1-9D) submitted therewith; 2. Dr. Jones’ Notice of Motion (#007), Affirmation in Support and Exhibits A through H submitted therewith; 3. Plaintiff’s Affirmation in Support of Cross-Motion and in Opposition to Defendants’ Post-Trial Motions and Exhibits A through H submitted therewith;4 4. Dr. Jones’ Reply Affirmation (#007) and Exhibit K submitted therewith; 5. The Spitzer Defendants’ Reply Affirmation (#006); 6. Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply Affirmation and Exhibits A through D submitted therewith; and 7. Miscellaneous correspondence with exhibits. Due to the length of the trial, the conflicting evidence presented, the various details surrounding the decedent’s surgery and pre- and post-surgical treatment, and the numerous theories Plaintiffs offered to establish that Defendants departed from good and accepted medical practice, the Court will provide only a limited synopsis of the facts in the simplest of terms as the Court finds necessary for its determination of the within motions.5 Having ongoing pain in her neck and numbness in her fingers and arms, the decedent met with Dr. Lorah, her family physician, in June 2009, who, in turn, referred her to Hudson Valley Neurosurgical Associates, LLC, where Drs. Jones and Spitzer were employed.6 Plaintiff soon thereafter consulted with Dr. Jones, who recommended that Plaintiff undergo an elective cervical laminectomy. The surgery was scheduled just a few weeks later, on August 18, 2009 at Good Samaritan Hospital. Dr. Jones performed a posterior laminectomy and fusion at C4-C6, Dr. Spitzer assisted and Dr. Huang conducted the neurophysiological monitoring, which Dr. Degen supervised off-site. The day following the surgery, Plaintiff (Mr. Jones) testified that the decedent bolted upright in bed, screamed in pain and then fell back onto the bed. (Tr:4009). At 8:00 p.m., the decedent was found to be lethargic, not moving her extremities and had a blood pressure of 50/42. The hospital records indicate that a doctor was called at 8:00 p.m. At 10:15 p.m., Dr. Degen was called. A STAT CT scan was ordered at 11:00 p.m. The CT scan, read by neuroradiologist Dr. Dubovsky, showed “suspicious for epidermal hematoma.” Dr. Degen arrived at the hospital at around that time and at 12:05 a.m. ordered a STAT MRI. The MRI was not done until 9:00 a.m. the following morning. (Tr: 516). It is undisputed that by 8:00 p.m. on August 19, 2009, the decedent was paralyzed and there was a chance to save her spinal cord function at that time, but by 10:15 p.m., it was too late. (Tr:5040, 5048). During the trial, there were numerous topics covered, including but not limited to the readings of the pre- and post-surgical MRIs on various different images, the readings of the CT scans, the Hounsfield units, the motor evoked potentials, as well as the different notations (or lack thereof) in the operative reports and hospital records. Defendants’ theory at the trial was that the decedent’s quadriplegia was caused by spinal cord infarct, i.e., a stroke (Tr: 4443), and not by any negligent acts of the Defendants. Plaintiffs, however, sought to establish that numerous departures from good and accepted standards of medical care by the Defendants caused the decedent’s injuries. Some of these departures included performing the surgery posteriorly instead of anteriorly, fracturing the lamina during the surgery and not removing a piece of the fractured lamina, failing to determine the cause of the drop-out of the motor evoked potentials (MEPs) during the surgery, failing to properly monitor the decedent after the surgery (e.g., failing to place the decedent in the intensive care unit considering the MEP dropouts during surgery and decedent’s blood pressure), failing to properly and appropriately respond to the 8:00 p.m. nurse’s phone call despite being advised that decedent’s blood pressure dropped to 52/40, and failing to properly rule out epidural hematoma.7 Trial Issues: CPLR 4404(a) provides that after a jury trial, the court may, upon the motion of a party or on its own initiative, set aside a verdict and “direct that judgment be entered in favor of a party entitled to judgment as a matter of law or…order a new trial of a cause of action…where the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence….” CPLR 4404(a). Turning first to Defendants’ motions to set aside the verdict as a matter of law, “[t]o sustain a determination that a jury verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence…there must be no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational men to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial.” Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 132 (2d Dept. 1985), quoting, Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499 (1978); see also, Adamy v. Ziriakus, 92 N.Y.2d 396, 400 (1998); Lolik v. Big v. Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746 (1995). In other words, “in any case in which it can be said that the evidence is such that it would not be utterly irrational for a jury to reach the result it has determined upon, and thus a valid question of fact does exist, the court may not conclude that the verdict is as a matter of law not supported by the evidence.” Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d at 499 (Internal citation omitted). Thus, in deciding whether a jury’s verdict is legally sufficient, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every favorable inference that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. See, Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d 553, 556 (1997). In this regard, where the facts are in dispute, where different inferences may be drawn from the evidence, or where the credibility of the witness is in question, the motion should not be granted. See, Cameron v. City of Long Beach, 297 A.D.2d 773 (2d Dept. 2002). Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court concludes that the jury’s verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence. With respect to Defendants’ contention that the verdict should be set aside as against the weight of the evidence, a trial court should exercise its discretionary power to set aside a verdict, pursuant to CPLR 4404(a), only where the jury could not have reached the verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence. Abdeelkader v. Shahine, 66 A.D.3d 615, 616 (2d Dept. 2009). The determination does not involve a question of law. Nor does it involve a weighing of the evidence. Rather, the Court need only determine whether any rational basis exists for the jury to have found in Plaintiffs’ favor and in doing so, must accord deference to the credibility determinations of the factfinders, who had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. See, Grullon v. Thoracic Surgical, PC, 208 A.D.3d 1163, 1165 (2d Dept. 2022). Moreover, “where conflicting expert testimony is presented, ‘the jury is entitled to accept one expert’s opinion and reject that of another expert.’” Id., quoting, Abbene v. Conetta, 198 A.D.3d 849, 850 (2d Dept. 2021). Applied here, it cannot be said that the evidence so preponderated in favor of the Defendants that the jury could not have reached the verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs on any fair interpretation of the evidence. Similarly, the Court also rejects Defendant Spitzer’s contention that the jury’s verdict as to the apportionment of fault was contrary to the weight of the evidence. As previously set forth, the Court must accord great deference to the fact-finding function of the jury to ascertain whether the verdict was “a fair reflection of the evidence.” See, Sence v. Atoynatan, 142 A.D.3d 600, 603 (2d Dept. 2016). It is not for this Court to substitute it’s own opinion regarding apportionment in place of the jury’s where, as here, the jury’s verdict was supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence. With respect to Defendants’ motions to set aside the verdict which collectively raise issues of attorney misconduct, prejudicial errors, irreconcilable verdicts and interest of justice, the motions are denied. To set aside a verdict and grant a new trial based on attorney misconduct, the Court must find that the attorney’s misconduct “constituted fundamental error that deprived [Defendants] of substantial justice and likely affected the verdict.” Smith v. Rudolph, 151 A.D.3d 58, 63 (1st Dept. 2017)(Internal citations omitted). Of course, “‘[l]itigants are entitled, as a matter of law, to a fair trial free from improper comments by counsel…’” Ortiz v. Jaramillo, 84 A.D.3d 766 (2d Dept. 2011), quoting, Rodriguez v. City of New York, 67 A.D.3d 884, 886 (2009). Having presided over the trial of this action and having reviewed the thousands of pages of trial transcript, this Court would be remiss in finding that Plaintiff’s attorney’s conduct was improper necessitating a new trial. There is no question that all attorneys zealously advocated on behalf of their clients. There is also no question that the Plaintiffs’ attorney’s direct examination of the Defendant Jeffrey Degen, M.D., who was the first witness called by the Plaintiffs and who was on the stand for at least the first nine days of the trial, had “heated” moments. There were also hundreds of objections by the attorneys throughout the trial. However, this Court cannot find that Defendants were deprived of a fair trial as a result of any unprofessional conduct. On the contrary, from the inception of this trial, all of the attorneys acted professionally, and even added a lightness and levity to the proceedings, which can be seen from the comments and banter among them. The instances of Plaintiff’s counsel’s alleged misconduct that Defendants identify, over the course of a six-month trial, even if this Court found them to be problematic (which the Court does not), did not preclude the jury from a fair, partial and passionate consideration of the evidence. See, Scala v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 149 A.D.2d 327, 328 (1st Dept. 1989). The conduct by the attorneys did not go “beyond the limits of permissible vigorous presentation of their [respective] clients’ interests.” Zaulich v. Thompkins Square Holding Co., 10 A.D.2d 492, 497 (1st Dept. 1960). Nor does this Court find that the jury’s verdict is irreconcilable to warrant setting it aside as against the weight of the evidence necessitating a new trial.8 It is well-settled that a plaintiff is permitted to pursue independent and overlapping theories of liability, with each discrete departure requiring separate consideration by a jury. Mackauer v. Parikh, 148 A.D.3d 873 (2d Dept. 2017). Here, however, rather than submit a special verdict sheet to the jury that would have identified upwards of fifty or more departures, the parties consented to the use of a general verdict sheet.9 Since Defendants consented to the use of the general verdict sheet rendering it impossible to determine which theory or theories the jury based their findings, Defendants cannot now complain that the verdicts are irreconcilable. See, Steidel v. County of Nassau, 182 A.D.2d 809 (2d Dept. 1992). Cf., Davis v. Caldwell, 54 N.Y.2d 176 (1981); Tart v. New York Bronx Pediatric Medicine, PC, 116 A.D.3d 515, 516 (1st Dept. 2014).10 Turning next to Defendants’ contention in their post-trial motions that the jury’s award of damages to Plaintiffs is excessive and must be set aside, it is well-settled that “[w]hile the amount of damages to be awarded for personal injuries is primarily a question for the jury, an award may be set aside when it “deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.”11 Miller v. Weisel, 15 A.D.3d 458, 459 (2d Dept. 2005), quoting, Iovine v. City of New York, 286 A.D.2d 372, 373 (2d Dept. 2001); see also, Keany v. City of New York, 63 A.D.3d 794, 795 (2d Dept. 2009). “Since jury awards for personal injury, especially those for pain and suffering, are subjective opinions, formulated without the guidance of precise and detailed guidelines, [the courts] look to comparable cases to determine whether the jury’s verdict deviates materially from what has been found to be reasonable compensation.” Valentine v. Lopez, 283 A.D.2d 739 (3d Dept. 2001). Such a task is by no means an easy one. As described by the Court of Appeals in Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 126-127 (1981): It goes without saying that a court, lacking clairvoyance, in evaluating a verdict intended to compensate for a projected long lifetime of pain, suffering, helplessness and all the other tangible and intangible losses that were sure to follow, faced an unusually difficult judgmental responsibility, for the fulfillment of which no less than a sophisticated elasticity will ever do. In no two cases are the quality and quantity of such damages identical. As has been pointed out by pragmatists and theorists who have wrestled with the problem of how damages in such cases may justly be arrived at, evaluation does not lend itself to neat mathematical calculation. (see James, Damages in Accident Cases, 41 Cornell LQ 582, reprinted in Schreiber, Damages in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Cases, Practicing Law Institute, New York). 52 N.Y.2d at 126-127. Thus, in reviewing other cases involving similar and comparable injuries, the court must bear in mind that any given award depends on a unique set of facts and circumstances. See, Nolan v. Union College Trust of Schenectady, 51 A.D.3d 1253, 1256 (3d Dept. 2008); Acton v. Nally, 38 A.D.3d 973, 976 (3d Dept. 2007); Donlan v. City of New York, 284 A.D.2d 13, 15 (1st Dept. 2001). “[F]actors to be considered in evaluating such awards include the nature, extent and permanency of the injuries, extent of past, present and future pain and the long-terms effects of the injury.” Nolan, 51 A.D.3d at 1256. Where the trial court finds the jury’s award to be excessive, the proper procedure requires the court to direct a new trial on the issue of damages unless the plaintiff stipulates to reduce the verdict by the amount found to be excessive. See, CPLR 4404(a); Anderson v. Donis, 150 A.D.2d 414, 416 (2d Dept. 1989). Past and Future Pain and Suffering: Turning first to the $20 million awarded to Plaintiff’s decedent for past pain and suffering and future pain and suffering, i.e., $10 million awarded for each, this Court finds the verdict to be excessive. In making this determination, as well as those to be made infra, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s decedent’s injuries were catastrophic and life-changing.12 This Court by no means intends to downplay their seriousness. In Barnhard v. Cybex Intl., Inc., 89 A.D.3d 1554 (4th Dept. 2011), the 24-year-old plaintiff was a physical therapist involved in a gym accident. She sustained a broken neck rendering her a quadriplegic when an exercise machine tipped over and fell on top of her. The jury award for past pain and suffering and future pain and suffering was reduced by the appellate court to $3 million and $9 million, respectively. In Brown v. City of New York, 275 A.D.2d 726 (2d Dept. 2000), (2d Dept. 2000), the 27-year old plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic from a diving accident. The jury awarded plaintiff $3 million for past pain and suffering and $7 million for future pain and suffering, which the appellate court reduced to $1 million and $3 million, respectively. In Driscoll v. New York City Transit Auth., 262 A.D.2d 271 (2d Dept. 1999), the 19-year-old plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic when he was struck by a non-passenger revenue subway train. The jury awarded him $5 million for past pain and suffering and $5 million for future pain and suffering. The appellate court found that the award deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation and reduced the award to $900,000.00 and $1.1 million, respectively. The case of Coniker v. State of New York involved a 23-year-old who was involved in a motor vehicle accident and rendered a quadriplegic but had chronic pain. In a trial conducted before the Court of Claims, the Court awarded the plaintiff $1 million for past pain and suffering and $2.5 million for future pain and suffering. 2002 N.Y.Misc. LEXIS 1858 (2002). To further conduct the required analysis, this Court has also found several cases involving devastating, life-changing injuries, including brain damage cases, where the plaintiffs required round-the-clock care.13 For example, in Auer v. State, 289 A.D.2d 626 (3d Dept. 2001), the 18-year-old plaintiff sustained “catastrophic physical injuries” in a motor vehicle accident in which she was a passenger. Specifically, she suffered “from a traumatic brain injury which caused her to experience, inter alia, quadriplegia and significant cognitive defects, spasticity and contractures in all four limbs, heterotopic ossification in both hips, the last two of which cause ongoing pain and restriction of motion, requiring 24-hour supervision and care for the rest of her life.” In determining its award, the Court of Claims noted that this case was “`one of the most difficult factual scenarios in which to calculate an appropriate award [since plaintiff] is almost totally physically incapacitated; she is young and, despite her injuries, in reasonably good health…both aware of her condition and its limitations.’” Auer v. State, 289 A.D.2d at 629. The Court of Claims awarded the plaintiff $750,000.00 for future pain and suffering, which the appellate court found to be inadequate and increased the award to $1.5 million.14 In Bissell v. Town of Amherst, 56 A.D.3d 1144 (4th Dept. 2008), the plaintiff sustained a burst facture of his L1 vertebrae and a transverse fracture of his L5 vertebra which resulted in the top of his spine no longer being connected by bone to the bottom of his spine. As such, he suffered from paraplegia, incontinence of his bladder and bowel and sexual dysfunction and despite having no motor function below the knee, he still had some sensation and felt excruciating pain at all times. Although the plaintiff’s age is not stated within the decision, the plaintiff was married and following the accident, the plaintiff’s wife took over most of his care. The plaintiff was awarded $5 million for past pain and suffering (for a period of 5.25 years) and $15 million for future pain and suffering (for a period of 32.7 years). The appellate court found that these awards “deviated materially from what would be [considered] reasonable compensation and reduced the awards to $3 million for past pain and suffering and $7 million for future pain and suffering. In Ruby v. Budget Rent A Car Corp., 23 A.D.3d 257 (1st Dept. 2005), the 25-year-old plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident severing his spine at T-6 and resulting in paraplegia and associated complications, including constant and severe pain. The jury awarded the plaintiff $3 million for past pain and suffering and $12 million for future pain and suffering (for a period of 44.6 years). On a motion such as this one, the supreme court reduced the award for future pain and suffering to $9 million. On appeal, finding the awards for past pain and suffering and future pain and suffering to deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation, the appellate court reduced the awards to $2 million and $8 million, respectively. In Lopez v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 278 A.D.2d 65 (1st Dept. 2000), the infant plaintiff suffered from brain damage, spinal cord damage and nerve damage caused by the defendant’s negligence in delaying the infant plaintiff’s birth by Caesarean section. As a result, the infant plaintiff suffered from mental retardation, cerebral palsy, spastic quadriplegia, inability to sit, walk, talk and use his arms purposefully, incontinence and total dependence on others for all needs. The infant plaintiff had also had 17 hospitalizations by the time the trial was conducted. The verdict for future pain and suffering was $8 million (for a period of 30 years). Finding the award to materially deviate from what was reasonable compensation under the circumstances, the appellate court reduced the award for future pain and suffering to $3.1 million. In Rappold v. Snorac, Inc., 289 A.D.2d 1044 (4th Dept. 2001), the 22-year-old plaintiff, a law school student, was injured in a motor vehicle accident. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff suffered a severe brain injury that impaired his cognitive function and most of his physical functions and left him almost completely paralyzed on the left side of his body. He required around-the-clock care as he was unable to feed or groom himself, walk or use a motorized wheelchair. In addition, he communicated non-verbally (blinking eyes, hand gestures, head shakes) as he only could speak a few words. The plaintiff, however, was well aware of the effect that his injuries had on his life. Although the jury awarded the plaintiff $3 million for past pain and suffering and $12 million dollars for future pain and suffering, the appellate court reduced the award to $1 million and $6 million, respectively. Another case involving a traumatic brain injury is Hedges v. Planned Sec. Serv. Inc., 190 A.D.3d 485 (1st Dept. 2021). Plaintiff suffered from an organic brain injury when she was struck in the head by a shopping cart that two twelve-year old boys threw over the fourth-floor railing in a shopping mall. Not only did the plaintiff nearly die after she was struck by the shopping cart, but she suffered from a very complex brain injury that severely diminished her ability to function, both cognitively (difficulties with coordination and speech, inability to control strong emotions or make decisions on her own and memory loss) and physically (difficulties with vision and balance, incontinence and headaches). For future pain and suffering, the jury awarded the plaintiff $29 million, which the trial court reduced to $14.5 million. On appeal, the appellate court further reduced the award to $10 million noting that “[i]n essence, [the plaintiff] is no longer the person she used to be.” Furthermore, in Turturro v. City of New York, 127 A.D.3d 732 (2d Dept. 2015), the 12-year-old plaintiff was struck by a motor vehicle while riding his bicycle. He was in a coma for approximately five months having sustained numerous injuries, including a severe head and brain injury with multiple skull and bone fractures, subdural hematomas and a collapsed lung. As a result, the infant plaintiff’s cognitive and motor functioning were permanently diminished. The jury awarded the infant plaintiff $6 million for past pain and suffering and $15 million for future pain and suffering, and the latter was reduced by the trial court to $10 million. Finding that the damages awarded for past and future pain and suffering deviated materially from what would be reasonable under the circumstances, the appellate court reduced the awards to $3 million and $7 million, respectively. After reviewing the testimony in this action and having compared it to the jury awards in these other cases, and taking into consideration the Plaintiff’s decedent’s age, health and other factors as compared to the plaintiffs in the above-mentioned cases, this Court finds that the jury’s damages award in the amount of $10 million for past pain and suffering and $10 million for future pain and suffering deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation and was excessive. See, CPLR 5501(c). As such, the Court finds that a reduction of the awards to $2 million for past pain and suffering and $4 million for future pain and suffering to be reasonable. Past and Future Loss of Consortium: The Court must now conduct the same comparative analysis with respect to the jury’s award to Plaintiff/Husband of $5 million for past loss of consortium and $5 million for future loss of consortium. Again, the Court finds that these awards deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation. In Bissell, discussed supra, the plaintiff’s wife, whose husband became a paraplegic after a roofing accident, was awarded $1 million for past loss of consortium and $2 million for future loss of consortium by the jury. On appeal, the appellate court reduced the award to $250,000 and $750,000, respectively. In Hedges, also discussed supra where the plaintiff was struck in the head by a falling shopping cart, the plaintiff’s husband was awarded a total of $2 million for past and future loss of consortium, which the appellate court found to be reasonable. In Capwell v. Muslim, 80 A.D.3d 722 (2d Dept. 2011), a medical malpractice/wrongful death action, plaintiff’s decedent was awarded $4 million for loss of consortium. On a motion to set aside the verdict, the supreme court granted the motion to set aside the verdict unless, as is relevant here, the plaintiff stipulated to a reduction of the loss of consortium damages to the sum of $1 million. On appeal, the appellate court held that the reduction of the award to $1 million “did not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation.”15 Although there are numerous other cases addressing the reasonableness of loss of consortium awards, this Court’s research indicates that the awards for both past and future loss of consortium that are found to be reasonable compensation are generally less than $1 million. See, e.g., Aguilar v. NYC Transit, 81 A.D.3d 509 (1st Dept. 2011)(amputation); Gregware v. City of New York, 132 A.D.3d 51 (1st Dept. 2015)(severe and debilitating injuries to legs, knees, pelvis, shoulder and ribs); Loga v. Lavelle, 132 A.D.3d 637 (2d Dept. 2015)(amputation); Moran v. New York, 153 A.D.2d 607 (2d Dept. 1989)(quadriplegia); Reed v. City of New York, 304 A.D.2d 1 (1st Dept. 2003)(permanent and progressive brain damage). Thus, based on this Court’s comparative analysis of awards for past and future loss of consortium, this Court finds that the jury verdict awarding Plaintiff/Husband the amount of $5 million for past pain and suffering and $5 million for future pain and suffering to deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation. As such, the Court reduces the award to $500,000 and $1 million, respectively. Defendants’ Motion for a Collateral Source Hearing: Defendants Jones and Spitzer both move for a collateral source hearing pursuant to CPLR 4545(c). The Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of establishing their entitlement to such a hearing. Conclusion: Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ motions are granted to the extent that: (1) the verdict is set aside to the extent that a new trial shall be held on the question of damages (limited to pain and suffering and loss of consortium) unless, within 30 days of entry of this Decision and Order, Plaintiff files a written stipulation consenting to a reduction of the amount of damages for past and future pain and suffering to $2 million and $4 million, respectively, and for past and future loss of consortium to $500,000 and $1 million, respectively; and (2) a hearing shall be conducted for the purpose of identifying collateral sources and structuring a settlement pursuant to CPLR 4545; and it is further ORDERED that counsel shall appear for a conference on September 7, 2023 at 11:00 a.m.; and it is further ORDERED that all other relief not herein specifically addressed is denied. The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court. Dated: July 10, 2023
