ADDITIONAL CASES Jayne Fisher, Plaintiff v. Village Of Hempstead, et al., Defendants; 22-CV-03805 ORDER Plaintiffs Kristen Wilkie, and Jayne Fisher (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) each bring actions against Defendants Village of Hempstead, Village of Hempstead Police Department, Village of Hempstead Police Chief Paul Johnson, and Jack Guevrekian. Plaintiffs’ claims stem from the alleged sexual assaults committed by Guevrekian against Plaintiffs from 2013 to 2019. There are five cases currently on a joint discovery track before the undersigned: 20-cv-02117; 21-cv-04268, 22-cv-00920, 22-cv-03671, and 22-cv-03805. Before the Court are two motions by The Russell Friedman Law Group, LLP (“Firm”) for leave to withdraw as counsel of record, one in 22-cv-00920 at Docket Entry 35 (“DE 35″), and one in 22-cv-03805 at Docket Entry 30 (“DE 30″). These motions are unopposed. Plaintiffs are represented by Pablo A. Fernandez and Charles H. Horn from the Firm. The former filed these motions on behalf of the Firm seeking withdrawal on the same grounds — lack of communication. Accordingly, the Court addresses these motions concomitantly. For the reasons below, the subject motions are granted, and Pablo A. Fernandez and Charles H. Horn are hereby terminated as counsel of record. DISCUSSION The grounds advanced seeking permissive withdrawal here are Plaintiffs’ persistent lack of communication with counsel which has resulted in counsel’s inability to properly represent Plaintiffs. (DE 30-2 at 2-3; DE 35-2 at 2-3.) Rule 1.4 of the Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York governs the displacement of counsel who have appeared: An attorney who has appeared as attorney of record for a party may be relieved or displaced only by order of the Court and may not withdraw from a case without leave of the Court granted by order. Such an order may be granted only upon a showing by affidavit or otherwise of satisfactory reasons for withdrawal or displacement and the posture of the case, including its position, if any, on the calendar, and whether or not the attorney is asserting a retaining or charging lien. All applications to withdraw must be served upon the client and (unless excused by the Court) upon all other parties. E.D.N.Y. Local R. 1.4. “Whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw as counsel is within the sound discretion of the district court.” Finkel v. Fraterrelli Brothers, Inc., No. 05-CV-1551 (ADS)(AKT), 2006 WL 8439497, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2006) (citing Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1999)). New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct (“NYRPC”)1 neatly divide the bases for withdrawal into two broad categories, namely, mandatory (see NYRPC rule 1.16[b]) and permissive (see NYRPC rule 1.16[c]). The grounds proffered here — a breakdown in attorneyclient relationship — fall within the permissive bucket (see NYRPC rules 1.16[c][7]2). The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility (“Model Code”) provides further guidance on permissive withdrawal of an attorney.3 Such circumstances include when “the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled,” Model Code 1.16(b)(5), or when “the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client.” Id. at 1.16(b)(6). Both the Model Code and the NYRPC lend guidance as to what grounds constitute good cause to grant such a motion. See Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317, 321 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing among others Joseph Brenner Assocs. v. Starmaker Ent., Inc., 82 F.3d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1996)). The Firm represents that both Plaintiffs have “repeatedly failed to communicate with and maintain contact with the Firm an assist in the prosecution of [their] case.” (DE 30-2 at 2; DE 35-2 at 2.) Further, the Firm notes that because of this behavior, the Firm is “no longer in a position to be able to perform work” on behalf of Plaintiffs. (Id.) A review of the declarations filed in support of the motions reflect that Plaintiffs have indeed failed to maintain reasonable contact with their counsel, and thus, have frustrated the Firm’s ability to prosecute these actions on their behalf. First, Plaintiff Fisher (1) engaged in sporadic communication, (2) failed to keep multiple appointments, and (3) could not be reached for long stretches of time without explanation. (DE 30-1 at
