MEMORANDUM & ORDER This action arises from plaintiff Nicholas Weir’s application for naturalization as a United States citizen. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied Weir’s application on the ground that he declined to take the standard oath of allegiance to the United States and did not qualify for a modified oath. In response, Weir brought this suit against USCIS. He also sued two individuals, Thomas Cioppa (a former New York District Director of USCIS) and “I. Bolivar” (an Immigration Services Officer) — both in their official and individual capacities. Weir is proceeding pro se. The amended complaint begins with a list of twenty-one bullet points, each apparently intended to name a cause of action. A separate set of factual allegations follows, but the complaint does not specify which defendants are the subject of which claims, or which facts are pled in support of which. Some of the listed causes of action are recognizable (e.g., 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act). Others are not (e.g., “Tort doctrine of Alternative Liability” and “Negligent Indivisible Harm Caused by Separate Tortfeasors”). Nevertheless, given Weir’s pro se status, the Court reads the complaint to make the strongest arguments that it suggests in support of any colorable claims. Weir seeks money damages and injunctive relief — specifically, an order requiring USCIS to administer the modified oath. The defendants now move to dismiss all claims. They assert that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Weir’s FTCA and civil rights claims due to the government’s sovereign immunity. Accordingly, they seek dismissal of those claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). They also seek dismissal of those claims — and all others, excluding the APA claims — under Rule 12(b)(6). Lastly, they ask for summary judgment on the APA claims based on the administrative record compiled before the agency. For the following reasons, the amended complaint is dismissed in its entirety pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 56.1 I. Background The following facts are taken from the amended complaint, ECF No. 47, and the Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) filed by the government in November 2022. See ECF No. 94. The complaint’s allegations are presumed to be true at this stage. See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2007). Moreover, as discussed below, the Court considers the administrative record for purposes of the summary judgment motion. Weir obtained conditional permanent resident status in 2013 as the spouse of a U.S. citizen. CAR 20-21. In January of 2017, he submitted a Form N-400 Application for Naturalization. Id. at 47. USCIS’s Long Island Field Office received this application later that month. Id. at 21. In the application, Weir indicated that he was not willing to take the “full” oath of allegiance. See id. at 46. Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, an applicant for naturalization must generally affirm that when required by law, he will (a) “bear arms on behalf of the United States,” (b) “perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces,” or (c) “perform work of national importance under civilian direction.” 8 U.S.C. §1448(a). To qualify for a modified oath — one that omits clauses (a) and (b) — the applicant must show by “clear and convincing evidence to the satisfaction of the Attorney General” that he is opposed to those activities based on his “religious training and belief,” id., or “a deeply held moral or ethical code.” USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 12, Part J, Ch. 3. In response to several questions relating to the oath, Weir registered his opposition to bearing arms or serving in a noncombatant role in the military, but not to performing civilian work of national importance. See CAR 46. He stated in an addendum to the application that his “belief system restricts [him] from affirming” that he would perform any military service — in combat or otherwise. Id. at 27. On September 28, 2017, Weir appeared for an interview to determine his eligibility for naturalization. Id. at 21. Tracking the standard oath, Immigration Services Officer Clanton asked Weir if he would be willing to bear arms on behalf of the United States, or to perform noncombatant services in the Armed Forces, when federal law required. Id.; Am. Compl. 6. On the form provided to him, Weir crossed out the clauses of the oath relating to military service, but not the clause regarding the performance of civilian service — consistent with his answers on the application. CAR 50. Following the interview, Clanton gave Weir a supplemental application form (titled “N-400 Request for Evidence”). The form instructed Weir to explain in detail: (1) the nature of his personal beliefs that precluded him from bearing arms, and (2) how serving in even a noncombatant role would violate those beliefs. Id. at 29. In response, Weir declared: Without going into too much details [sic] of my overall belief system, maintaining a moral character is one aspect of my belief system. Another component of my belief system is to have utter free-will in any actions I am engaging in. These two and a few others restrict me from affirming to the clauses to bear arms on behalf of the United States and to perform noncombatant service in the U.S. armed forces when required by law. My belief system does not stem from any particular religious training. Nonetheless, my belief system is deeply held and it is used as a guidance for my life choices.…I will assist as best as I can in the midst of a national crisis within the confines of my belief system. Id. at 25. This explanation failed to persuade USCIS that Weir was entitled to a modified oath. The agency denied his application in a decision issued on October 21, 2017. Id. at 20-22. That decision explained that Weir “did not establish that [his] unwillingness is based on religious training and belief or a deeply held moral or ethical code.” Id. at 22. USCIS therefore deemed him to be “ineligible for naturalization,” but explained that he could file a Form N-336 “Request for a Hearing on a Decision in Naturalization Proceedings” — effectively, an administrative appeal — if he believed he could “overcome the grounds for this denial.” Id.2 Weir later sought that hearing. On February 1, 2018, he submitted a Form N-336, see CAR 1; on it, he argued that the information he had already provided was sufficient to qualify for the modified oath. See id. at 10-19.3 Referring back to his prior statement, Weir wrote the following: I noted that my belief system is personal. In the denial statement, this fact was noted as though my belief system cannot be personal (self-contemplation). This is false. My belief system does not have to stemmed [sic] from any religious origin or training. My belief system must be “sincere, meaningful, and deeply held.” I have expressed this on more than one occasions [sic]. My belief system is not based on or “include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views.["] I was opened to questioning by the officer for transparency. Nonetheless, I recently came across the following statement. According to USCIS policy, “an officer must not question the validity of what an applicant believes or the existence or truth of the concepts in which the applicant believes.” CAR 12. USCIS granted Weir a hearing, which occurred on August 29, 2018. Id. at 1. Weir testified, but USCIS determined that he had (once again) “failed to adequately explain in detail the philosophy” that would preclude him from taking an oath to serve any role in the U.S. military. Id.4 Despite that determination, USCIS — in its discretion — offered Weir an additional opportunity to explain his views. Although the regulation requires only that the agency hold “a hearing,” 8 C.F.R. §336.2(b), USCIS scheduled a second hearing for April 5, 2019. CAR 1, 3. The agency sent him a letter dated February 27, 2019 to notify him of the interview date. Id.5 Weir did not attend this extra session, CAR 1; he alleges that he never received the letter. Am. Compl. 18. He says, however, that he received a voicemail from Bolivar on February 27 stating that “she needed him to come in for another interview,” but she “did not state an interview date.” Id. On April 17, USCIS reaffirmed its decision to deny Weir’s application for naturalization. CAR 1. The agency reached this conclusion following a “complete review” of Weir’s file, including the documentation he submitted, his statements at his naturalization interview, and his testimony at the subsequent review hearing. Id. II. Discussion A. Administrative Procedure Act Claims Weir’s complaint does not articulate how, specifically, he believes USCIS violated the Administrative Procedure Act. Nevertheless, the Court construes the complaint to raise two APA claims. 1. Unlawful Delay At one point in his complaint, Weir accuses USCIS of “continued delay” in adjudicating his I-751, N-400, and N-336 applications. Am. Compl. 15. The APA authorizes a federal court to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. §706(1). This claim is moot, however, because USCIS has now adjudicated all three applications. See CAR 1, 20, 65.6 Thus, no relief remains available on this claim: there is no need to compel agency action that has already been taken, see Bibicheff v. Holder, 55 F. Supp. 3d 254, 261 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), and the APA does not provide for monetary relief. See Am. C.L. Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 803 (2d Cir. 2015) (APA “waives sovereign immunity for suits against the United States for relief other than money damages”).7 2. Abuse of Discretion Weir goes on to argue that USCIS “erroneously denied” his naturalization application “without any substantial reason in fact and law solely because [he] requested a modified oath of allegiance.” Am. Compl. 6. In support of this argument, Weir alleges that the agency failed to follow its own Policy Manual’s procedures relating to a request for a modified oath. See id.
19-25.8 Under the APA, a court may set aside an agency action if the action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 658 F.3d 200, 215 (2d Cir. 2011). Agency decisions are arbitrary and capricious if, among other things, the agency “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider” or “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency.” Alzokari v. Pompeo, 973 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2020). Relatedly, an agency abuses its discretion when it issues a decision “made without a rational explanation,” or “inexplicably” departs from its own “established policies.” Pillay v. I.N.S., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Weir fails to establish an APA violation. The Court’s review of an APA claim is “narrow and deferential” and limited to the administrative record. Kakar v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 29 F.4th 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2022). In the end, “so long as the agency examines the relevant data and has set out a satisfactory explanation including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, a reviewing court will uphold the agency action, even a decision that is not perfectly clear, provided the agency’s path to its conclusion may reasonably be discerned.” Karpova v. Snow, 497 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 2007).9 When “an APA-based challenge to an agency’s action presents a pure question of law,” such as whether an agency has acted arbitrarily and capriciously, summary judgment under Rule 56 is generally the appropriate rubric under which to address the claim. Aleutian Cap. Partners, LLC v. Scalia, 975 F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083-84 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In that context, the district court’s task is to decide the APA claim(s) based on the administrative record “compiled by [the] agency when it made the decision” at issue. Clifford v. U.S. Coast Guard, 915 F. Supp. 2d 299, 307 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 548 F. App’x 23 (2d Cir. 2013). In the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress directed USCIS to consider the “religious training and belief” of an applicant for a modified oath. 8 U.S.C. §1448(a). The statute defines that term as an “individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.” Id. Congress cautioned, however, that the term “does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.” Id. When addressing the phrase “religious training and belief” in a different statute, the Supreme Court held that it includes a “sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by [religion].” Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970) (addressing exemptions from military service under the Universal Military Training and Service Act); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965). USCIS has applied that interpretation to the Immigration and Nationality Act, see USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 12, Part J, Ch. 3 n.2 (citing Welsh and Seeger), as have several lower courts. See, e.g., Rafferty v. United States, 477 F.2d 531, 533 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Thomsen, 324 F. Supp. 1205, 1209-10 (N.D. Ga. 1971). Based on these directives, the USCIS Policy Manual requires an applicant seeking the modified oath to establish that: (1) he is opposed to bearing arms or performing other service in the U.S. military; (2) the objection is grounded in his religious principles or “other belief systems similar to traditional religion or a deeply held moral or ethical code”; and (3) his “beliefs are sincere, meaningful, and deeply held.” USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 12, Part J, Ch. 3. The applicant need not belong to a specific religious denomination or follow a certain theology, but he “must have a sincere and meaningful belief that has a place in [his] life that is equivalent to that of a religious belief.” Id. Ultimately, the applicant bears the burden of proving his eligibility for the modified oath by clear and convincing evidence. Id. The Manual, which is publicly available,10 lists certain types of evidence relevant to the depth and duration of the beliefs at issue. It calls for consideration of the following in determining eligibility for a modified oath: General pattern of pertinent conduct and experiences; Nature of applicant’s objection and principles on which objection is based; Training in the home or a religious organization; Participation in religious or other similar activities; and Whether the applicant gained his or her ethical or moral beliefs through training, study, self-contemplation, or other activities comparable to formulating traditional religious beliefs in the home or through a religious organization. Id. The administrative record reveals no suggestion that USCIS acted arbitrarily or abused its discretion in applying these standards to Weir’s application. Simply put, Weir’s submission in response to the agency’s Request for Evidence form did not provide the agency with the necessary basis to alter the oath. The form instructed him to “[e]xplain how [his] beliefs came about and where they are rooted from,” and “how performing a non combatant role in the military would violate these beliefs.” CAR 29. The instructions twice directed him to provide “detailed” information. Id. Despite those directives, Weir prefaced his statement by stating that he would not be “going into too much details.” Id. at 25. He then proceeded to say virtually nothing specific about his moral beliefs concerning warfare or service in a non-combatant role. Weir did state that his belief system prioritizes “moral character” and obligates him to “have utter free-will in any actions.” Id. But the reference to moral character is highly general, while the need for “utter free-will” could be read to conflict with many obligations of the citizenry, including those contained in the oath. Weir’s statement thus stands in contrast to the one considered by the Second Circuit and later the Supreme Court in Seeger, supra, by way of example.11 Further, while Weir stated that his belief system “originated in 2009″ and “has been gradually developing since,” CAR 25, he proffered no evidence that he has engaged in any conduct pertinent to those beliefs, received any training that gave rise to them, or participated in any activities comparable to religious worship, such as self-contemplation or study. In other words, he pointed to no outward manifestation of his beliefs that would tend to show the centrality of those beliefs in his life. The agency could reasonably have expected that a deeply held belief system would give rise to some such conduct or history, but Weir identified none.12 Weir’s subsequent submission on Form N-336 offered even fewer details. There, he merely offered a series of conclusory statements — legal conclusions, by and large, couched as factual assertions. These include Weir’s assertions that he had “established and passed the three-part test to qualify for [a] modification”; that his beliefs are “sincere, meaningful, and deeply held”; and that they are “not based on…essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views.” Id. Once again, Weir pointed to no evidence of any conduct flowing from his beliefs. In this Court, Weir raises two contentions in support of his argument that the defendants failed to comply with the Manual’s requirements. First, he contends that Officer Bolivar “frivolously question[ed] the existence of his belief system,” Am. Compl. 25, in violation of the Manual’s prohibition on questioning “the validity of what an applicant believes or the existence or truth of the concepts in which the applicant believes.” Id. 21 (quoting USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 12, Part J, Ch. 3). But Weir points to no particular question that disputed the wisdom (as opposed to the genuine nature) of Weir’s beliefs. To the extent that Bolivar’s questions addressed the evidentiary factors set forth in the Manual, they were not “frivolous” and they were not a detour from the prescribed inquiry. Indeed, the Manual expressly invites the reviewing officer to “ask an applicant questions” about those factors to assist the officer in determining whether the applicant qualifies for modification. USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 12, Part J, Ch. 3. Bolivar was authorized to probe the origins, contours, and outward manifestations of those beliefs, and the record reflects no evidence that she did anything beyond that. Second, Weir invokes the N-336 decision’s reference to his belief system as a “philosophy” as evidence of the defendants’ improper devaluation of his beliefs. Am. Compl. 18. But USCIS gave Weir several opportunities to explain his beliefs in detail and demonstrate his eligibility for the modified oath. For the reasons discussed above, however, the agency reasonably concluded that he had not proffered sufficient evidence to prove that his belief system was a deeply held moral or ethical code. Thus, Weir has identified no basis to conclude that USCIS acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused its discretion. B. Constitutional Claims Weir also invokes the First, Seventh, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Again, he does not explain the basis for these claims, and none can survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, these claims are dismissed against all defendants under Rule 12(b)(6). 1. First Amendment Weir fails to allege a First Amendment violation against any of the defendants. The First Amendment “mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.” McCreary Cnty. v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005). Weir does not invoke religion (or atheism) as a basis for relief; indeed, he does not invoke any particular clause of the First Amendment at all. As discussed above, Weir asserts that Officer Bolivar improperly questioned the “existence” of his belief system, Am. Compl. 25, but he provides no additional details bearing on this accusation. Moreover, he takes issue with USCIS’s labeling of his “belief system” as a “philosophy.” Id. 18. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Weir must allege sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). His threadbare allegations do not meet this standard, even affording him the “special solicitude” due a pro se litigant. Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010). Therefore, his First Amendment claim must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). 2. Due Process Weir’s complaint lists the Fourteenth Amendment in his litany of legal authorities, and he argues that he “never receive[d]” the letter that USCIS mailed on February 27, 2019 directing him to return for a second interview with Officer Bolivar regarding his naturalization application. Am. Compl. 18; CAR 1, 3. On that basis, and because the “actions of the Federal Government and its officers are beyond the purview of the [Fourteenth] Amendment,” District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 (1973), I construe the complaint to allege a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment. A procedural due process claim requires proof of (1) the deprivation of a liberty or property interest (2) without due process. See Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 692 F.3d 202, 218 (2d Cir. 2012). As set forth below, Weir has failed to plead a colorable due process violation because he has not established either element. A person seeking citizenship has no constitutionally protected property interest in obtaining relief that resides within USCIS’s discretion. See Krasniqi v. Holder, 316 F. App’x 7, 8 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Krasniqi did not have a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in a grant of adjustment of status because it is a discretionary form of relief.”); see also Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2008); Islam v. Barr, 394 F. Supp. 3d 279, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). And the agency clearly exercises discretion as to requests for a modified oath. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an applicant for a modified oath must prove his eligibility by “clear and convincing evidence to the satisfaction of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. §1448(a) (emphasis added). The Second Circuit has held that when a statute requires an applicant to establish eligibility for relief to “the satisfaction of the Attorney General,” such a statute “specifically render[s]” the determination at issue “ to be within the agency’s discretion.” Ruiz v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 269, 275 (2d Cir. 2009). Thus, pursuant to Section 1448(a), the decision to grant a modified oath is discretionary; Weir therefore has no property interest in obtaining a modification. In any event, Weir received notice and a hearing — the same process that he would have received if he had such a property interest. In connection with his naturalization application, he interviewed with Officer Clanton regarding his eligibility for citizenship. See Am. Compl.
