DECISION/FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER AFTER TRIAL The parties have one child-in-common, S.B. (hereinafter “daughter” or “child” or “S.”). On March 10, 2023, the mother, K.D.-L. (hereinafter “Mother” or “Ms. D.-L.”) filed a modification petition against the father, C.A.B. (hereinafter “Father” or “Mr. B.”). See Petition for Modification of an Order of Support Made by Family Court (D.-L., 03/09/2023), Nassau County Family Court Docket Number F-06040-17/23F. In her petition, she alleged that three years had passed since the parties’ child support order was issued and that Mr. B.’s income had increased “substantially.” Id. Despite attempts to settle the matter, the parties were unable to resolve the case. Thus, on June 28, 2023, a trial in the matter commenced. Ms. D.-L. was represented by retained counsel, Gail Saul, Esq. (hereinafter “Ms. Saul”); Mr. B. was represented by retained counsel, Adam Moser, Esq. (hereinafter “Mr. Moser”). The Court heard testimony on June 28, 2023, July 18, 2023 and Augus 1, 2023. At the conclusion of the evidence, the parties delivered their closing arguments. The Court reserved decision. After having considered the evidence, the parties’ arguments, and the law, the Court’s determination follows: THE EVIDENCE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE Ms. D.-L.’s Testimony Ms. D.-L. testified that on June 21, 2018, the parties’ final order of custody was issued. She told the Court that the parties were awarded joint legal and residential custody. She explained that the parties’ current parenting schedule allows each parent to have exactly the same amount of time with S. Ms. D.-L. testified that Mr. B. has parenting time on Mondays when he retrieves S. from school until Wednesdays after school and she has parenting time on Wednesdays when she retrieves S. from school until Fridays after school. She told the Court that the parties have S. on alternating weekends from Fridays after school until Mondays when S. is dropped back to school. She stated that the parties alternate parenting time with S. during school breaks and holidays. She told the Court that there are times when Mr. B. is unable to exercise his parenting time, because he is unable to retrieve S. from school, so she has parenting time with S. instead. Ms. D.-L. testified that S. attends P.S. 165 in Flushing, Queens. She told the Court that S. is in a special education class and doing well. She stated that S. has an Individualized Education Plan and receives special services, such as speech therapy. Ms. D.-L. conceded that all of the S.’s special services are paid by New York City. She acknowledged that S.’s activities are paid by New York City. She admitted that S. is attending a full-time summer camp program that costs nothing. Ms. D.-L. testified that she works for Northwell Health and she has no other source of income. She told the Court that is the same job she had when the parties’ original child support order was issued. She stated that at the time that the parties entered into their 2017 consent support order, her gross annual income was $48,701.64 and Mr. B.’s gross annual income was $62,008.56. Ms. D.-L. testified that Mr. B. agreed to pay $374.00 bi-weekly towards S.’s basic support, $24.46 bi-weekly towards S.’s health insurance premiums, and $7.39 bi-weekly towards S.’s dental insurance premiums. She told the Court that Mr. B.’s pro rata share was determined to be 56 percent for unreimbursed medical expenses and child care. Ms. D.-L. testified that when the parties’ 2017 consent child support order was issued, she was S.’s primary residential custodial parent and she was paying for all of S.’s living expenses. She told the Court that in 2018, she married O.M. with whom she has two children, N. and E. She stated that Mr. M. was an insurance broker who earned approximately $60,000.00 annually, but he has been unemployed since the pandemic. She stated that since he lost his job, Mr. M. has been staying home and taking care of the children. Ms. D.-L. testified that Mr. M. received unemployment benefits when he lost his job, but she does not know how much. She told the Court that she files tax returns separately from Mr. M. and they do not have joint bank accounts. She stated that she and Mr. M. do not discuss financial information with each other. She explained that she is from the Caribbean and, culturally, Caribbean people are very private. Ms. D.-L. testified that she shares the family’s living expenses with Mr. M. She told the Court that Mr. M. contributes “whatever he can.” She elaborated that Mr. M. pays $600.00 monthly towards their rent and, once in a while, he contributes some additional money towards utilities, food expenses, and gasoline. Ms. D.-L. testified that Mr. M. has only applied to “one or two jobs” since he lost his job in 2019. She told the Court that in order for Mr. M. to continue working as an insurance broker, he would have to renew his license. She stated that Mr. M. does not intend to do so because he has a dream of starting his own business, which he will open “any day now.” Ms. D.-L. testified that when the parties entered into their 2017 consent support order, S. was six years old and now she is eleven years old. She told the Court that, in the Fall, S. will be a sixth grader at I.S. 250 Middle School. She stated that the cost of living has increased and so have S.’s expenses, including her food, clothing, and personal care items. Ms. D.-L. asked the Court to recalculate the parties’ support order based upon the parties’ current income. She testified that in 2022, she earned $55,794.12. She told the Court that Mr. B. also earns more money than he had been. Ms. D.-L. maintained that she is responsible for the majority of S.’s needs since S. goes to school where Ms. D.-L. resides. She told the Court that when S. stays with Mr. B., she is responsible for sending S.’s personal care items since Mr. B. does not buy them for S. She told the Court that Mr. B. does not properly provide for S. and when S. comes back from Mr. B.’s home, S. “looks like she’s wearing hand me downs.” Ms. D.-L. asked the Court to order Mr. B. to pay towards S.’s health insurance premiums. She told the Court that she covers all of her children under a family health insurance family plan. She acknowledged that there is no extra cost to cover S.’s health insurance premiums. She stated that she does not incur child care costs at this time. Mr. B.’s Testimony Mr. B. testified that he is S.’s father. He told the Court that he has parenting time with her every other Monday from when he retrieves S. from her school through Wednesday evenings after school. He stated that he also has parenting time every other weekend on Fridays after school until he drops S. to school on Mondays. Mr. B. testified that S. attends P.S. 165 in Flushing, Queens, near where Ms. D.-L. resides. He told the Court that S. needs special services, which are provided at no cost through her school. He stated that S. has an Individualized Education Plan. Mr. B. testified that when he has parenting time with S., he drives her back and forth to school between Nassau County and Queens County. He elaborated that it is approximately twenty-five miles each way and he pays for all of the automobile expenses related to driving her. Mr. B. testified that he paid for S.’s swimming lessons, piano lessons and dance lessons, and he has enrolled her in private tutoring. He acknowledged that S. is attending a camp that offers free tutoring and other special services but stated that, in the past, he has not been impressed with the academic assistance the camp has provided to S. He conceded that he enrolled S. in dance lessons and piano lessons after Ms. D.-L. filed her modification petition. Mr. B. testified that Ms. D.-L. sends S. to his home with feminine care products, but he pays for all of her other daily living expenses while S. is visiting with him. He told the Court that when S. is with him, he either takes her places for dinner, or cooks with her. He stated that S.’s lunches are provided by her school. Mr. B. testified that S. is healthy, but when S. needs medical care, both parents take her to the doctor, depending on who is exercising parenting time with her. He told the Court that Ms. D.-L. pays for S.’s medical insurance and whoever takes S. to the doctor assumes the cost of her co-pays. He stated that S. needs braces, which will cost approximately $4,000.00. He told the Court that he will pay for them and explained that Ms. D.-L. does not pay for those types of things for S. Mr. B. testified that when S. is staying with him, he likes to introduce her to new experiences. He told the Court that he takes her to Skyzone, and on road trips to lighthouses and aquariums. He stated that he also takes S. on vacations. Mr. B. testified that he has taken S. to New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Disney World in Orlando. He stated that he wants to take S. to Jamaica, West Indies, but he is “getting some pushback” from Ms. D.-L. Mr. B. testified that he has recently been taking S. to a cabin in Ulster County, which belongs to his associate. He told the Court that he supervises work being done on the property so there is no charge for him to stay there with S. Mr. B. testified that he is a Mortgage Loan Originator for Nationwide Mortgage Bankers. He told the Court that in 2022, he was working full-time at Nationwide Mortgage Bankers and he earned $144,226.44. He stated that his income is commission-based so his income fluctuates from year to year. He explained that in 2020, there was a “big boom in the mortgage industry” and he was doing very well. Mr. B. testified that the industry has changed for the worse. He explained that mortgage rates have doubled since 2020. He told the Court that, as a result, he does not expect to earn as much as he did in the past. He stated that he has already earned between $40,000.00 and $50,000.00 this year. He estimated that his gross income will be approximately $90,000.00 in 2023. Mr. B. told the Court that his income tax returns are true and accurate. Mr. B. testified that he is also a Certified Public Accountant who sometimes does taxes for his family and friends. He told the Court that he used to have a company called Accounting Solutions Network that offered bookkeeping services, profit and loss services, payroll services and tax preparation services. He stated that he was the sole shareholder of Accounting Solutions Network, but he has not owned that company since 2019. He told the Court that he transferred that company to his business associate, W.T., for five hundred dollars, because the company was not profitable under his tutelage. Mr. B. testified that since he sold Accounting Solutions Network, he has been focusing on real estate projects. He told the Court that he is the President of CAB Ventures, Inc., which was incorporated in December, 2020. He acknowledged that in 2021, CAB Ventures, Inc.’s gross receipts were $154,829.00. Mr. B. testified that he was the sole shareholder of that company until this year when his brother became a second shareholder. He told the Court that he added his brother to CAB Ventures, Inc. for business reasons, but conceded that he did so after Ms. D.-L. filed her modification petition. He stated that CAB Ventures, Inc. currently does not own any properties. Mr. B. testified that he bought a house in 2019 in which he resides with his brother. He told the Court that his brother contributes to the utilities. Mr. B. stated that he pays the mortgage on the home, and the rest of the living expenses there. He testified that he owns multiple properties. He told the Court in addition to the home where he lives with his brother, he owns the house where his parents and younger brothers reside, the property where his father runs a business, the property where Accounting Solutions Network is located, and a vacation premises which he owns with his father. He stated that he does not derive rental income from any of the properties. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE Ms. D.-L. admitted the parties’ Final Order of Custody and Visitation, dated June 5, 2018, as issued by the Honorable Ayesha K. Brantley, into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 1. Ms. D.-L. admitted her signed and notarized financial disclosure affidavit, dated April 17, 2023, along with three of her 2023 pay stubs, her 2022 W-2 and tax return, and her 2021 W-2 and tax return, into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 2. Ms. D.-L. admitted her health insurance documentation into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 3. Ms. D.-L. admitted the parties’ Order of Support on Consent, dated November 27, 2017, as issued by Support Magistrate Elizabeth A. Bloom, into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 4. Ms. D.-L. admitted Mr. B.’s pay stub, dated February 3, 2023, into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 5. Ms. D.-L. admitted Mr. B.’s 2022 W-2 and tax return into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 6. Ms. D.-L. admitted Mr. B.’s 2021 W-2 and tax return into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 7. Ms. D.-L. admitted Mr. B.’s 2021 corporate tax return for CAB Ventures, Inc., into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 8. Ms. D.-L. admitted a computer printout about Accounting Solutions Network, Inc. into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 9. Ms. D.-L. admitted a copy of Mr. B.’s bargain and sale deed, dated September 10, 2019, conveying title of 1125 H. Place, Baldwin Harbor, New York to him, into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 10. Ms. D.-L. admitted a copy of Mr. B.’s quitclaim deed, dated December 22, 2020, transferring title of 3 L. Street, East Rockaway, New York from him to CAB Ventures, Inc., into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 11. Ms. D.-L. admitted a copy of Mr. B.’s quitclaim deed, dated October 13, 2018, transferring title of 95 M. Road, Baldwin, New York from C.C. and himself solely to himself, into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 12. Ms. D.-L. admitted a copy of Mr. B.’s quitclaim deed, dated May 17, 2019, transferring title of 1639 C.S. Road, Glen Head, New York from Accounting Solutions Network, Inc. to him, into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 13. Ms. D.-L. admitted a copy of Mr. B.’s deed, dated August 12, 2019, transferring title of 3263 M. Avenue, Baldwin, New York from him to E. and J. S., into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 13. Ms. D.-L. admitted a copy of Mr. B.’s special warranty deed, dated December 22, 2020, transferring title of 3 L. Street, Far Rockaway, New York from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to him, into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 15. Ms. D.-L. admitted a New York State Post-Divorce Maintenance and Child Support Online Calculator worksheet using the parties’ incomes, into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 16. Mr. B. admitted his signed and notarized financial disclosure affidavit, dated March 6, 2023, into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit A. Mr. B. admitted his 2021 corporate tax return for CAB Ventures, Inc. into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit B. Mr. B. admitted his 2021 personal tax return into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit C. Mr. B. admitted his 2022 personal tax return into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit D. Mr. B. admitted his 2022 corporate tax return for CAB Ventures, Inc. into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit E. Mr. B. admitted two of his 2023 pay stubs into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit F. Mr. B. admitted a New World Music Center letter, dated December 16, 2022 and a New World Music Center receipt, dated February 14, 2023, relating to S.’s piano lessons, into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit G. Mr. B. admitted the parties’ Final Order of Custody and Visitation, dated June 5, 2018, as issued by the Honorable Ayesha K. Brantley, into evidence as Respondent’s Exhibit H. DISCUSSION The Family Court has the authority to modify child support orders on grounds set forth within New York State Family Court Act’s Section 4511 (hereinafter “§451″). See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §451 (McKinney’s 2023). Until 2010, the Family Court could modify an existing child support order based only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §451(3)(a) (McKinney’s 2023); see also Lopez v. Campoverde, 201 A.D.3d 719, 720 (2d Dep’t 2022); Castelli v. Maiuri-Castelli, 198 A.D.3d 752, 753 (2d Dep’t 2021); Funaro v. Kudrick, 128 A.D.3d 695, 696 (2d Dep’t 2015); Radday v. McLoughlin, 106 A.D.3d 1015, 1015-16 (2d Dep’t 2013); Kasun v. Peluso, 82 A.D.3d 769, 771 (2d Dep’t 2011); Ish-Shalom v. Wittman, 81 A.D.3d 648, 648 (2d Dep’t 2011); Aranova v. Aranova, 77 A.D.3d 740, 40 (2d Dep’t 2010). In making the determination, the Family Court considers: (1) the children’s increased needs; (2) any cost of living increase if it creates greater expenses for the children, (3) a parent’s substantial financial improvement; (4) a parent’s loss of income or assets; and, (5) the children’s current and prior lifestyles. See Castelli, 198 A.D.3d at 753; see also Bishop v. Bishop, 170 A.D.3d 642, 644 (2d Dep’t 2019); Baumgardner v. Baumgardner, 126 A.D.3d 895, 896-97 (2d Dep’t 2015); Fantel v. Stamatatos, 59 A.D.3d 717, 717-18 (2d Dep’t 2009). The 2010 amendments to §451 added additional criteria2 from which the Family Court may modify child support orders as follows: (1) three years passage of time since the parties’ last order was entered, modified, or adjusted; or, (2) a party’s gross income changed by at least fifteen per cent since the last order was entered, modified, or adjusted; or, (3) a party’s gross income reduced due to employment termination through no fault of their own and that party made a good faith effort to find a new job corresponding to his or her qualifications, education, and experience. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §451(3)(b) (McKinney’s 2023); see also Castelli, 198 A.D.3d at 753-754; Bishop, 170 A.D.3d at 644. The relevant time period for the purposes of determining a modification application is the time frame between when the order sought to be modified was issued and the filing of the petition. See Lopez, 201 A.D.3d at 720 (change measured by comparing parties’ financial situation at time of application with time of order to be modified); see also Bishop, 170 A.D.3d at 644 (same); Tomassi v. Suffolk Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 144 A.D.3d 930, 931 (2d Dep’t 2016); Saraguard v. Saraguard, 125 A.D.3d 982, 983 (2d Dep’t 2015); Kasun, 82 at 771. The Court finds that Ms. D.-L. met her burden of proving that the parties’ 2017 consent support order was entered more than three years ago3 and that Mr. B.’s income has increased by more than fifteen percent4 since the issuance of that order as will be explained more fully hereinafter: Where a petition has been filed, the Family Court must order a non-custodial parent to pay child support to a custodial parent. See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1) (f)(10) (McKinney’s 2023). For child support purposes, a custodial parent is a parent who has physical custody for a majority of the time. See Bast v. Rossoff, 91 N.Y.2d 723, 728 (1998); see also Watson v. Maragh, 147 A.D.3d 769, 769 (2d Dep’t 2017); Conway v. Gartmond, 144 A.D.3d 795, 796 (2d Dep’t 2016); Ambrose v. Felice, 45 A.D.3d 581, 582 (2d Dep’t 2007). In 2017, when the parties’ child support order was entered, Ms. D.-L. had custody of S. for a majority of the time. In 2018, the parties custodial arrangement changed. The parties’ 2018 custody and visitation order awarded the parties equal parenting time with S. See Final Order of Custody and Visitation (Brantley, J., 06/21/2018), Nassau County Family Court Docket Number V-06498-17. It is well-settled in the Second Department that the Child Support Standards Act (“CSSA”) must be applied in shared custody cases. See Bast, 91 N.Y.2d at 732; see also Alliger-Bograd v. Bograd, 180 A.D.3d 975, 979 (2d Dep’t 2020). Under the CSSA’s three-step formula, the Family Court must first determine the parties’ combined parental income by adding both parents’ incomes. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(c)(1) (McKinney’s 2023); Bast, 91 N.Y.2d at 726 (citing Cassano v. Cassano, 85 N.Y2d 649, 653 (1995)). The parties’ combined income is then multiplied by the statutory child support percentage and allocated between the parents as each parent’s income is to the combined parental income. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(c)(2) (McKinney’s 2023); Bast, 91 N.Y.2d at 726-27 (citing Cassano v. Cassano, 85 N.Y2d 649, 653 (1995)). The Family Court has discretion to deviate from the presumptive child support amount based upon the factors within New York State Family Court Act’s Section 413(1)(f) (hereinafter “§413(1)(f))”) if a non-custodial parent’s obligation is found to be “unjust or inappropriate.” N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413 (1)(f) (McKinney’s 2023) (setting forth statutory factors); see also Bast, 91 N.Y.2d at 729 (citing Cassano v. Cassano, 85 N.Y2d 649, 653 (1995)); Alliger-Bograd, 180 A.D.3d at 979; Moore v. Aban, 72 A.D.3d 970, 971-72 (2d Dep’t 2010). Finally, where the parents’ combined income is greater than the statutory cap, the Family Court has discretion to determine an amount in excess of the cap by considering the §413(1)(f) factors. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(c)(3) (McKinney’s 2023); see also §413(1)(f) (McKinney’s 2023); N.Y. SOC. SERV. L. §111-i (McKinney’s 2023); Good v. Ricardo, 189 A.D.3d 830, 831 (2d Dep’t 2020); Pandis v. Lapas, 176 A.D.3d 837, 842 (2d Dep’t 2019); Levin v. Blum, 167 A.D.3d 609, 611 (2d Dep’t 2018). In either case, the Family Court must issue a written order setting forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its departure from the basic child support obligation. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(c)(3) (McKinney’s 2023); see also §413(1)(f) (McKinney’s 2023); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(g) (McKinney’s 2023); Butta v. Realbuto, 214 A.D.3d 973, 975 (2d Dep’t 2023); Moore, 72 A.D.3d at 972. Where, as here, neither parent has residential custody of the parties’ child for a majority of the time,5 the non-custodial parent is deemed to be the parent having the greater pro rata share after having applied the CSSA’s three-step statutory formula. See Cotter v. Meng, 212 A.D.3d 610, 612 (2d Dep’t 2023); Smisek v. DeSantis, 209 A.D.3d 142, 151-52 (2d Dep’t 2022) (citing Baraby v. Baraby, 250 A.D.2d 201, 204 (3d Dep’t 1998)); Cazar v. Browder, 191 A.D.3d 837, 838 (2d Dep’t 2021). Based upon the financial evidence admitted at trial, Ms. D.-L.’s current annual income is $55,794.12 as reflected on her 2022 W-2 and Mr. B.’s current annual income is $144,226.44 as reflected on his 2022 W-2.6 Since Mr. B. earns more income than Ms. D.-L., his pro rata share is greater. Thus, Ms. D.-L. is S.’s custodial parent in the eyes of the law. See Cotter v. Meng, 212 A.D.3d 610, 613 (2d Dep’t 2023); Smisek v. DeSantis, 209 A.D.3d 142, 151-52 (2d Dep’t 2022) (citing Baraby v. Baraby, 250 A.D.2d 201, 204 (3d Dep’t 1998); Cazar v. Browder, 191 A.D.3d 837, 838 (2d Dep’t 2021). That is to say, the “reality of the situation” requires a finding that Mr. B. be identified as S.’s non-custodial parent. Smisek v. DeSantis, 209 A.D.3d 142, 148 (2d Dep’t 2022) (citing Bast v. Rosoff, 91 N.Y.2d 723, 728 (1998). Since Mr. B. is S.’s non-custodial parent, the Court now calculates his child support obligation to Ms. D.-L.7 The parties’ combined gross income is $200,020.56 annually and the parties’ combined adjusted gross income is $183,041.38 annually. The CSSA dictates that for one child, parents have a duty to pay 17 percent of their incomes. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(b)(3)(i) (McKinney’s 2023). 17 percent of $183,041.38 yields a $31,117.03 per year child support obligation, or a $1,196.81 bi-weekly child support obligation for both parents. Based upon their respective incomes, Ms. D.-L.’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is 27 percent and Mr. B.’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is 73 percent. Since Mr. B.’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation is 73 percent, his bi-weekly child support obligation up the statutory cap is $778.00 and his bi-weekly child support obligation over the statutory cap is $874.00. The Court finds that Mr. B. is responsible to pay child support up to the statutory cap. In light of the evidence presented, the Court finds that Ms. D.-L. failed to establish a reason to pierce the statutory cap. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §413(1)(f)(2) (McKinney’s 2023); see also Hepheastou v. Spaliaras, 201 A.D.3d 793, 795 (2d Dep’t 2022) (“[W]hen determining an appropriate amount of child support, a court should consider the children’s actual needs and the amount required for them to live an appropriate lifestyle”); Pandis v. Lapas, 176 A.D.3d 837, 842 (2d Dep’t 2019) (“The test generally applied is whether the child is receiving enough to meet his or her actual needs and the amount required…to live an appropriate lifestyle.”). Ms. D.-L. failed to show that S. has unfairly borne the economic burden of her parent’s separation. To that end, the record is devoid of evidence regarding the child’s pre-separation lifestyle or establishing that her needs are not being met. There was no proof presented of a significant disparity in the standard of living in S.’s parents’ households. There was scant testimonial evidence, and no documentary evidence, demonstrating that S.’s needs have increased. Instead, the record showed that S.’s special services, camp, and extracurricular activities are being paid by New York City, that Ms. D.-L.’s husband contributes towards the family’s expenses and provides child care for S., and that each of S.’s parents pay for S.’s needs when they have parenting time with her. Thus, given the parties’ equally shared physical custody arrangement,8 the parties’ financial circumstances, the non-monetary contributions the father makes towards S.’s care and well-being, the lack of any extraordinary expenses for the child, and the fact that S.’s actual needs will be met by Mr. B.’s increased child support obligation up to the statutory cap as well as his increased pro rata share, the Court orders Mr. B. to pay $778.00 bi-weekly towards S.’s support, through the Support Collection Unit, retroactive to Ms. D.-L.’s modification petition’s filing date.9 See Butta, 214 A.D.3d at 975 (finding record established, based upon certain factors including parties’ disparity in income and child’s standard of living, child support obligation should be calculated on combined parental income up to statutory cap); see also Hepheastou, 201 A.D.3d at 795 (finding child support award up to statutory cap appropriate based upon no excessive expenses, no child care costs, minimal costs for education and extracurricular activities, and mother was living rent-free with parents) see also Elizabeth B. v. Scott B., 189 A.D.3d 1833, 1837-838 (3d Dep’t 2020) (finding no abuse of discretion in court’s downward deviation of father’s basic child support obligation based upon financial circumstances of parties, equal physical custody arrangement, and non-monetary contributions of father to child). Ms. D.-L.’s application for Mr. B. to contribute towards S.’s health insurance premiums is hereby denied. Since the evidence established that S. is covered under Ms. D.-L.’s family plan and there is no separate cost for S.’s health insurance, Mr. B. is not obligated to pay towards S.’s health insurance coverage. There is no mechanism under the law that allows a Court to order a parent to pay what health insurance could cost when there is no actual cost for health insurance for a child. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §416(c) (McKinney’s 2023). CONCLUSION ADJUDGED, that Ms. D.-L. has met her burden of proving that a substantial change in circumstances exists; to wit, that three years have passed since the parties’ last child support order was issued and that Mr. B.’s income has increased by at least 15 percent; and it is further, ADJUDGED, that Ms. D.-L. is S.’s custodial parent; and it is further, ADJUDGED, that Ms. D.-L. is entitled to an upward modification, but failed to meet her burden of showing that the Court should pierce the statutory cap; and it is therefore, ORDERED, that Mr. B. shall pay $778.00 bi-weekly towards the support of the parties’ child, S., through the Support Collection Unit, effective August 21, 2023, commencing August 28, 2023 and retroactive to the filing of the petition on March 10, 2023. Ms. D.-L.’s pro rata share shall be 27 percent and Mr. B.’s pro rata share shall be 73 percent for unreimbursed medical expenses and child care, retroactive to the filing of the petition on March 10, 2023. Ms. D.-L. shall continue to cover S. through her employer’s health insurance. ATTORNEYS’ FEES APPLICATIONS At trial, both parties’ attorneys made application for permission to file a counsel fees motion. Having received the Court’s decision and order, and in light of the Court’s determination, should either party wish to pursue attorneys’ fees as against the other, such motion schedule is as follows: Attorneys’ fees motions by August 31, 2023. Opposition papers by September 8, 2023. Reply papers, if any, by September 13, 2023. This constitutes the decision, opinion and order of the Court. YOUR WILLFUL FAILURE TO OBEY THIS ORDER MAY, AFTER COURT HEARING, RESULT IN YOUR COMMITMENT TO JAIL FOR A TERM NOT TO EXCEED SIX MONTHS FOR CRIMINAL NON-SUPPORT OR CONTEMPT OF COURT; YOUR FAILURE TO OBEY THIS ORDER MAY RESULT IN SUSPENSION OF YOUR DRIVER’S LICENSES, STATEISSUED PROFESSIONAL, TRADE, BUSINESS AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSES AND RECREATIONAL AND SPORTING LICENSES AND PERMITS; AND IMPOSITION OF REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY LIENS. PURSUANT TO SECTION 1113 OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, AN APPEAL MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THE ORDER BY APPELLANT IN COURT, 35 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAILING OF THE ORDER TO APPELLANT BY THE CLERK OF COURT, OR 30 DAYS AFTER SERVICE BY A PARTY OR THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD UPON APPELLANT, WHICHEVER IS EARLIEST. INFORMATION CONCERNING COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENTS AND MODIFICATIONS NOTE: (1) THIS ORDER OF CHILD SUPPORT SHALL BE ADJUSTED BY THE APPLICATION OF A COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENT AT THE DIRECTION OF THE SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT NO EARLIER THAN TWENTY-FOUR MONTHS AFTER THIS ORDER IS ISSUED, LAST MODIFIED OR LAST ADJUSTED, UPON THE REQUEST OF ANY PARTY TO THE ORDER OR PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH (2) BELOW. UPON APPLICATION OF A COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENT AT THE DIRECTION OF THE SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT, AN ADJUSTED ORDER SHALL BE SENT TO THE PARTIES WHO, IF THEY OBJECT TO THE COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENT, SHALL HAVE THIRTY-FIVE (35) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAILING TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN OBJECTION TO THE COURT INDICATED ON SUCH ADJUSTED ORDER. UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH WRITTEN OBJECTION, THE COURT SHALL SCHEDULE A HEARING AT WHICH THE PARTIES MAY BE PRESENT TO OFFER EVIDENCE WHICH THE COURT WILL CONSIDER IN ADJUSTING THE CHILD SUPPORT ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT. (2) A RECIPIENT OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE SHALL HAVE THE CHILD SUPPORT ORDER REVIEWED AND ADJUSTED AT THE DIRECTION OF THE SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT NO EARLIER THAN TWENTY-FOUR MONTHS AFTER SUCH ORDER IS ISSUED, LAST MODIFIED OR LAST ADJUSTED WITHOUT FURTHER APPLICATION OF ANY PARTY. ALL PARTIES WILL RECEIVE NOTICE OF ADJUSTMENT FINDINGS. (3) WHERE ANY PARTY FAILS TO PROVIDE, AND UPDATE UPON ANY CHANGE, THE SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT WITH A CURRENT ADDRESS TO WHICH AN ADJUSTED ORDER CAN BE SENT, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 443 OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, THE SUPPORT OBLIGATION AMOUNT CONTAINED THEREIN SHALL BECOME DUE AND OWING ON THE DATE THE FIRST PAYMENT IS DUE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE ORDER OF SUPPORT WHICH WAS REVIEWED AND ADJUSTED OCCURRING ON OR AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ORDER REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT THE PARTY HAS RECEIVED A COPY OF THE ADJUSTED ORDER. NOTE: EACH PARTY HAS A RIGHT TO SEEK A MODIFICATION OF THE CHILD SUPPORT ORDER UPON A SHOWING OF: (I) A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES; OR (II) THAT THREE YEARS HAVE PASSED SINCE THE ORDER WAS ENTERED, LAST MODIFIED OR ADJUSTED; OR (III) THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE IN EITHER PARTY’S GROSS INCOME BY FIFTEEN PERCENT OR MORE SINCE THE ORDER WAS ENTERED, LAST MODIFIED, OR ADJUSTED; HOWEVER, IF THE PARTIES HAVE SPECIFICALLY OPTED OUT OF SUBPARAGRAPH (II) OR (III) OF THIS PARAGRAPH IN A VALIDLY EXECUTED AGREEMENT OR STIPULATION, THEN THAT BASIS TO SEEK MODIFICATION DOES NOT APPLY. Check applicable box: Order mailed on [specify date(s) and to whom mailed]: Order received in court on [specify date(s) and to whom given] Dated: August 21, 2023
