OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Allstar Marketing Group, LLC (“Allstar”) moves for entry of default judgment against all remaining defendants in this action that have not been voluntarily dismissed: flowcarrym_2, hgttech, i_post, loonghead, loosebeads, and xiaobaicai-20 (the “Defaulting Defendants”). (ECF 42.) The motion will be granted. BACKGROUND Allstar is a developer, producer, marketer, and distributor of consumer products that it promotes and sells in the United States and worldwide. (ECF 7 7.) One of its most successful products is Baseboard Buddy, a multi-use cleaning duster (the “Baseboard Buddy Product”). (Id. 8.) Allstar is the exclusive licensee of U.S. Trademark Registration 4,016,645 for “BASEBOARD BUDDY” for “hand-held baseboard cleaning implements, namely, a manually-operated handled implement, namely, a cleaning pad formed with a baseboard cleaning head in Class 21″ (the “Baseboard Buddy Mark”). (Id. at 2, 10.) The Baseboard Buddy Mark is currently in use in commerce in connection with the Baseboard Buddy Product. (Id. 11.) Allstar alleges upon information and belief that the Defaulting Defendants are “individuals and/or businesses” who are located in China but conduct business in the United States and other countries by offering for sale or selling consumer products on eBay. (Id.
6, 25-26.) Allstar claims that the Defaulting Defendants manufacture, import, export, advertise, market, promote, distribute, display, offer for sale and/or sell “Counterfeit Products” to consumers in the United States, including in New York. (Id. 31.) Allstar defines Counterfeit Products as: Products bearing or used in connection with the Baseboard Buddy Mark and/or Baseboard Buddy Works, and/or products in packaging and/or containing labels and/or hang tags bearing the Baseboard Buddy Mark and/or Baseboard Buddy Works, and/or bearing or used in connection with marks and/or artwork that are confusingly or substantially similar to the Baseboard Buddy Mark and/or Baseboard Buddy Works and/or products that are identical or confusingly or substantially similar to the Baseboard Buddy Product. (Id. at 3.) The Counterfeit Products are nearly indistinguishable from Allstar’s Baseboard Buddy Product, with only minor variations that no ordinary consumer would recognize. (Id. 33.) Allstar filed this action on October 29, 2020, asserting claims for trademark infringement, counterfeiting, false designation of origin, passing off and unfair competition, and copyright infringement under federal law, as well as unfair competition under New York State common law. The Court entered a temporary restraining order on November 4, 2020, which authorized service by electronic means. (ECF 4.) On November 11, 2020, Allstar served all defendants except whis3persing5, who was subsequently served on November 19. (ECF 43, Ex. C; ECF 19; ECF 20.) The Court held a preliminary injunction hearing on November 18, 2020. (Minute Entry for Nov. 18, 2020.) No defendant appeared. (Id.) The same day, the Court entered a preliminary injunction applicable to all defendants except whis3persing5, which had not yet been served. (ECF 18.) After Allstar served whis3persing5 and whis3persing5 failed to file a response or enter an appearance in this action, the Court modified the preliminary injunction order to apply to whis3persing5. (ECF 24.) Between December 2020 and April 2021, Allstar voluntarily dismissed several defendants, leaving only the Defaulting Defendants. On April 7, 2023, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause directing Allstar to show cause why the action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (ECF 35.) Allstar responded that it had been engaging in productive settlement discussions with the Defaulting Defendants, but that such discussions had “broken down” and none of the Defaulting Defendants had timely appeared “or indicated any intention of appearing.” (ECF 36.) The Court granted Allstar leave to file a default motion by May 19, 2023. (ECF 37.) On May 16, 2023, Allstar filed a motion for entry of default judgment against the Defaulting Defendants. (ECF 42.) None of the Defaulting Defendants has responded to the motion or otherwise appeared in this action. Allstar filed a proposed Certificate of Default against the Defaulting Defendants on May 16, 2023, and the Clerk entered it the same day. (ECF 39; ECF 41.) LEGAL STANDARD Rule 55, Fed. R. Civ. P., sets forth a two-step process for obtaining a default judgment: the entry of a default and the entry of a default judgment. New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005). The Clerk entered a Certificate of Default on May 16, 2023, (ECF 41), and Allstar now seeks a default judgment on its first and second causes of action, trademark counterfeiting and infringement in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1114, 1116(d), and 1117(b)-(c). On a motion for default judgment, the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as to liability are deemed to be admitted. Vera v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 946 F.3d 120, 135 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1997)). The Court therefore deems the allegations of Allstar’s plausibly alleged complaint to have been admitted by each of the Defaulting Defendants. DISCUSSION I. Personal Jurisdiction “To determine personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary in a case involving a federal question, the Court must engage in a two-step analysis.” Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 243-44 (2d Cir. 2007)). First, the Court must apply the forum state’s long-arm statute. Id. Second, “[i]f the long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction, the second step is to analyze whether personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 164. New York’s long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. §302(a)(1), provides that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary…who in person or through an agent…transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” To establish personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), a plaintiff must meet two requirements: “(1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” Eades v. Kennedy, PC Law Offices, 799 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2013)). “[A] defendant need not be physically present in New York to transact business there…as long as he engages in [p]urposeful activities or volitional acts through which he avails [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities within the…State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Chloe, 616 F.3d at 169 (quotations omitted) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). In cases involving a defendant that conducts business over the internet, such as on Amazon or eBay, “courts apply a ‘sliding scale’ test based on the level of a website’s interactivity.” EnviroCare Technologies, LLC v. Simanovsky, 11-Civ-3458, 2012 WL 2001443, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2012) (Seybert, J.); Best Van Lines, 490 F.3d at 252 (“We think that a website’s interactivity may be useful for analyzing personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), but only insofar as it helps to decide whether the defendant ‘transacts any business’ in New York — that is, whether the defendant, through the website, ‘purposefully avail[ed] himself of the privilege of conducting activities within New York, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” (citations omitted)). At one end of the scale, a “passive” website that “merely provides information that is accessed by individuals in New York is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” EnviroCare Technologies, 2012 WL 2001443, at *3; Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)). By contrast, an “interactive” website “permits the exchange of information between users in another state and the defendant” and “depending on the level and nature of the exchange may be a basis for jurisdiction.” Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). “[C]ourts typically find that” an operator of an interactive website that “allows a buyer in New York to submit an order online…is ‘transacting business’ in New York and is therefore subject to the court’s jurisdiction.” EnviroCare Technologies, 2012 WL 2001443, at *3. In the case of a defendant who transacts business using eBay, “courts have instead focused on the extent to which the website ‘is used as a means for establishing regular business with a remote forum.’” Id. (quoting Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008)). “[J]urisdiction is proper when a sophisticated seller operates a commercial business through eBay or Amazon.” Id. (collecting cases). “If the long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction, the second step is to analyze whether personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. This analysis has two related components: the ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry and the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry.” Chloe, 616 F.3d at 164 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). With respect to minimum contacts, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances to “determine whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state to justify the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.” Id. “The crucial question is whether the defendant has ‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,’…”such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Best Van Lines, 490 F.3d at 242 (citations omitted) (alteration in original) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985)). As to reasonableness, the court must evaluate whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with “‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ — that is, whether it is reasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction under the circumstances of the particular case.” Chloe, 616 F.3d at 164 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). “The Supreme Court has held that courts must evaluate the following factors as part of this ‘reasonableness’ analysis: (1) the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy; and (5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.” Id. at 164-65 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987)). In Licci, the Second Circuit noted that “despite the fact that section 302(a)(1) of New York’s long-arm statute and constitutional due process are not coextensive, and that personal jurisdiction permitted under the long-arm statute may theoretically be prohibited under due process analysis, we would expect such cases to be rare.” 732 F.3d at 170 (“[W]e have been pointed to no such decisions in this Circuit.”). As such, courts in this District have stated that, “[a]s a practical matter, the Due Process Clause permits the exercise of jurisdiction in a broader range of circumstances of N.Y. C.P.L.R. §302, and a foreign defendant meeting the standards of §302 will satisfy the due process standard.” Energy Brands Inc. v. Spiritual Brands, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 458, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Chin, J.); see also Beskrone v. Berlin, 21-Civ-4803, 2023 WL 2023413, at *8 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2023) (Engelmayer, J.); Aritomo v. Rhee, 21-Civ-4875, 2022 WL 17156554, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2022) (Abrams, J.). In this case, Allstar has alleged that the Defaulting Defendants are sophisticated sellers operating commercial businesses on eBay, that the Defaulting Defendants are “currently offering for sale and/or selling Counterfeit Products” via their eBay storefronts, that they each accept payment in U.S. Dollars and offer shipping to New York, and that they have transacted business with consumers located in New York for the sale and shipment of Counterfeit Products. (ECF 7
