Appearances at oral argument: Joseph Paukman, Brooklyn, for Plaintiff. Law Offices of Daniel S. Steinberg P.C., New York City (Daniel S. Steinberg of counsel), for Defendant Oceana Holding Corp. The following numbered papers were read on this motion1: Submitted by Defendant Oceana Holding Corp. NYSCEF Doc No. 358 — Notice of Motion NYSCEF Doc No. 359 — Affirmation of Daniel S. Steinberg in Support of Motion NYSCEF Doc No. 360 — Exhibit A: Stay Order of Supreme Court dated Nov. 6, 2017 NYSCEF Doc No. 361 — Exhibit B: Protective Order of Supreme Court dated Oct. 22, 2018 NYSCEF Doc No. 362 — Exhibit C: Appellate Division Order & Opinion dated May 18, 2022 NYSCEF Doc No. 363 — Exhibit D: Printer’s Invoices for Appellate Division Appeal NYSCEF Doc No. 364 — Exhibit E: Order to Show Cause to Hold Plaintiff in Contempt dated Sept. 6, 2018 NYSCEF Doc No. 365 — Affirmation of Legal Services of Daniel S. Steinberg NYSCEF Doc No. 366 — Exhibit A: List of Cases for Daniel S. Steinberg NYSCEF Doc No. 367 — Exhibit B: Invoices of Daniel S. Steinberg P.C. Submitted by Plaintiff NYSCEF Doc No. 368 — Adjournment Request Submitted by Defendant Oceana Holding Corp. NYSCEF Doc No. 369 — Response to Adjournment Request Submitted by Plaintiff NYSCEF Doc No. 373 — Adjournment Request NYSCEF Doc No. 374 — Exhibit A: Appellate Division Order & Opinion dated May 18, 2022 NYSCEF Doc No. 375 — Exhibit B: Stay by Appellate Division Pending Perfection of Appeal dated Dec. 27, 2018 NYSCEF Doc No. 376 — Exhibit C: Notice of Motion to Appellate Division NYSCEF Doc No. 377 — Exhibit D: Motion for Leave to Appeal to Court of Appeals NYSCEF Doc No. 378 — Affirmation of Joseph Paukman in Opposition to Motion NYSCEF Doc No. 379 — Exhibit A: Appellate Division Order & Opinion dated May 18, 2022 NYSCEF Doc No. 380 — Exhibit B: Stay by Appellate Division Pending Perfection of Appeal dated Dec. 27, 2018 NYSCEF Doc No. 381 — Affirmation of Joseph Paukman in Opposition to Motion Submitted by Defendant Oceana Holding Corp. NYSCEF Doc No. 382 — Reply Affirmation of Daniel S. Steinberg in Support of Motion NYSCEF Doc No. 383 — Exhibit A: Order to Show Cause of Appellate Division dated June 3, 2022 NYSCEF Doc No. 384 — Exhibit B: Order to Show Cause of Appellate Division dated Dec. 8, 2022 NYSCEF Doc No. 385 — Exhibit C: Proposed Order to Show Cause Submitted to Court of Appeals NYSCEF Doc No. 386 — Exhibit D: Response to Appeal to Court of Appeals Submitted by Plaintiff NYSCEF Doc No. 387 — Affirmation of Joseph Paukman in Opposition to Motion NYSCEF Doc No. 388 — Affirmation of Joseph Paukman in Opposition to Motion NYSCEF Doc No. 389 — Affirmation of Joseph Paukman in Opposition to Motion Submitted by Defendant Oceana Holding Corp. NYSCEF Doc No. 392 — Letter to Court re Court of Appeals Dismissing Appeals Submitted by Plaintiff NYSCEF Doc No. 393 — Letter to Court re Appeals NYSCEF Doc No. 398 — Adjournment Request NYSCEF Doc No. 399 — Adjournment Request Submitted by Defendant Oceana Holding Corp. NYSCEF Doc No. 400 — Response to Adjournment Request Submitted by Plaintiff NYSCEF Doc No. 401 — Reply in Support of Adjournment Request NYSCEF Doc No. 411 — Letter to Court Reviewing Documents Filed NYSCEF Doc No. 414 — Adjournment Request Submitted by Defendant Oceana Holding Corp. NYSCEF Doc No. 423 — Adjournment Request Submitted by Defendant Oceana Holding Corp. NYSCEF Doc No. 424 — Response to Adjournment Request Submitted by Plaintiff NYSCEF Doc No. 425 — Reply in Support of Adjournment Request NYSCEF Doc No. 426 — Exhibit A: Letter from Korenblit & Vasserman, PLLC to Exclusive Land Services DECISION AND ORDER Introduction Upon remittal from the Appellate Division, Second Department, having read the foregoing papers and heard oral argument at a hearing before this Court on July 6, 2023, and due deliberation having been had thereon, the within motion is determined as follows. Relevant history is provided in the Appellate Division, Second Department’s Decision-Order in this case: In 2001, nonparty Aron Bronstein pleaded guilty to 1 count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and wire fraud and 13 counts of securities fraud in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (hereinafter the Southern District). As part of the disposition of those charges, Bronstein, together with his codefendants, was ordered to pay restitution to the victims of the fraud. The plaintiff’s decedent was among those entitled to restitution pursuant to Bronstein’s judgment of conviction (hereinafter the criminal judgment). In 2003, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Bronstein in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (hereinafter the Georgia judgment) in an action seeking civil damages for the same underlying conduct. The plaintiff commenced litigation in the United States District Courts for the Eastern District of New York (hereinafter the Eastern District) and the Southern District in 2016 and 2018, respectively, for the purpose of enforcing the criminal and the Georgia judgments. In 2017, the plaintiff commenced this action in the Supreme Court, Kings County, against various persons and entities associated with Bronstein, alleging, inter alia, fraudulent conveyance interfering with her ability to enforce the restitution provisions of the criminal judgment. (Madigan v. Berkeley Capital, LLC, 205 AD3d 900, 901-902; NYSCEF Doc No. 362 at 3-4.) This action was commenced via a summons, notice, and subpoena with restraining notice by the plaintiff, Faye T. Madigan (“Plaintiff”), as executor of the Estate of Kenneth Thompson, against various Defendants, including Oceana Holding Corp. (“Oceana”). It was alleged that Plaintiff was a holder of a judgment against Mr. Bronstein, who had been convicted as described above. Plaintiff’s deceased husband was one of those allegedly defrauded by Mr. Bronstein. Plaintiff alleged that certain Defendants, including Oceana, were aiding Mr. Bronstein in concealing his assets, including through his fraudulent conveyance of the money he stole; that in fact they were alter egos for Mr. Bronstein; and that Defendants continued to assist Mr. Bronstein in evading his obligation to pay the judgment. (See NYSCEF Doc No. 2, Summons, Notice & Subpoena with Restraining Notice.) Defendant Oceana Holding Corp. (“Oceana”) moves for relief as follows: 1. Pursuant to (a) the Kings County Supreme Court Order issued by Hon. Justice Kathy J. King, which was dated October 22, 2018 and entered October 25, 2018 (“Protective Order”) (see NYSCEF Doc No. 361); (b) the Decision and Order of the Second Department, dated and entered May 18, 2022 (“Appellate Division Decision-Order”) (see NYSCEF Doc No. 362); and (c) CPLR §8107,2 CPLR §8203 (a)3, and CPLR §8301,4 Oceana seeks a judgment against Plaintiff and her counsel, Joseph Paukman, Esq. (“Plaintiff’s counsel”) for costs and disbursements in the amount of $13,638.45. 2. Based on (a) the Appellate Division Decision-Order finding Plaintiff’s counsel, Joseph Paukman, Esq., in criminal contempt and imposing a criminal sanction of $10,000.00; and (b) Judiciary Law §§7905 and 791,6 Oceana seeks an Order directing the Clerk of the Court to prepare a schedule and issue a warrant with respect to the criminal sanction and commanding the Sheriff of Kings County to collect the sum set forth in the schedule, for payment to the Comptroller of the City of New York. 3. Pursuant to the Protective Order, the Appellate Division Decision-Order, and 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, Oceana seeks a judgment against Plaintiff and her counsel, Joseph Paukman, Esq. for the reasonable attorney’s fees to which Oceana is entitled. To fully grasp the genesis of this motion as well as the nature of Plaintiff and her counsel’s (Mr. Paukman7 actions leading up to it, one is constrained to gain an understanding of previous orders issued in this case. Justice Kathy J. King’s Stay of Proceedings Order Early in this 2017 case, the Kings County Supreme Court, per Hon. Justice Kathy J. King, issued a broad stay of proceedings order, dated November 6, 2017 and entered November 9, 2017 (the “Stay Order”) (see NYSCEF Doc No. 360). In the Stay Order, Justice King granted the motion interposed by Oceana for a stay of the action pursuant to CPLR 2201. The stay pended certain enforcement activity in light of proceedings taking place in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York with respect to the validity and enforceability of the Georgia federal judgment. (Id.) Specifically, in the Stay Order in question, Justice King issued a sweeping stay directive as follows: ORDERED that all proceedings in this action, including those for the domestication and/or enforcement of (i) a foreign judgment originally entered in the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia on April 2, 2003 (the “Georgia Judgment”) and (ii) a judgment in a criminal case entered on March 23, 2001 in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York (the “Criminal Case Judgment”), are stayed[.] (Id. at 2.) In furtherance of the broad Stay Order, Justice King expressly directed Plaintiff to refrain from taking the following actions: ORDERED that plaintiff, her agents and attorneys, are restrained and enjoined from taking further action in this case, or in any other action or proceeding that plaintiff may bring before this Court, to enforce the Georgia Judgment or the Criminal Case Judgment. (Id. at 2.) Critically, Justice King addressed the all-important topic of subpoenas issued by Plaintiff as follows: ORDERED that plaintiff, her agents and attorneys, are restrained and enjoined from issuing subpoenas, restraining notices, executions or other enforcement papers in connection with this case, or any other action or proceeding that plaintiff may bring before this Court, to enforce the Georgia Judgment or the Criminal Case Judgment; and it is further ORDERED that all subpoenas, restraining notices, executions or other enforcement papers previously issued by plaintiff, her agents and attorneys in connection with this case, are hereby vacated and cancelled…. (Id. [emphasis added].) Finally, Justice King provided that ORDERED that, upon the determination by the United States District Court of the issues concerning the validity and enforceability of the Georgia Judgment and/or Criminal Case Judgment, any party may apply for such relief from this order as may be just and proper, including the dismissal of this action[.] (Id. at 3.) Justice Kathy J. King’s Protective Order Plaintiff and her counsel, Joseph Paukman, Esq., repeatedly violated the Stay Order issued by Justice Kathy J. King dated November 6, 2017, by, among other actions, issuing subpoenas in an attempt to locate Aron Bronstein’s allegedly secreted assets. Consequently, Oceana moved for a protective order and to hold Plaintiff and her counsel in contempt of court. By Order dated October 22, 2018 and entered October 25, 2018, Justice King granted Oceana’s motion for a protective order (“Protective Order”), imposed costs of $2,500, directed that payment be made to Oceana’s counsel within thirty days and denied all relief sought by Plaintiff (see NYSCEF Doc No. 361). Justice King’s Protective Order provides invaluable insight into the origin of Plaintiff’s suit, as well as the extent of Plaintiff’s repeated disregard of the Kings County Supreme Court’s directives through the issuance of proscribed subpoenas (see NYSCEF Doc No. 361, Oceana’s Exhibit B, at 2-4). Justice King, in the Protective Order, addressed as follows Plaintiff’s violations of her previously-issued Stay Order: Plaintiff commenced the above captioned matter to compel performance of a judgment granted in the State of Georgia (“the Georgia Judgment”) against Aron Bronstein. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Oceana Holding Corp. (“Oceana”) and Rosa Bronstein have tortiously interfered with plaintiff’s attempt to collect the Georgia Judgment against Aron Bronstein. Oceana is the owner and operator of certain commercial premises. Defendant Rosa Bronstein is the president of Oceana, and mother of Aron Bronstein. Plaintiff seeks to satisfy the judgment from defendants Oceana Holding Corp. and Rosa Bronstein, non-judgment debtors. Pursuant to an order of the Court dated November 14, 2017 which provided that “plaintiff, her agents and attorneys, are restrained and enjoyed from taking further action in this case, or in any other action or proceeding that plaintiff may bring before this Court, to enforce the Georgia Judgment or the Criminal Case Judgment,” plaintiff’s enforcement actions were stayed. Thereafter, on July 18, 2018, Oceana moved for a protective order to stop plaintiff’s abusive of subpoenas,8 and a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was issued in connection with Oceana’s motion for a protective order. Plaintiff and her counsel [i] were enjoined from issuing subpoenas for information and records concerning defendants, their officers, shareholders and/or members, (ii) suspends disclosure with respect to any subpoena issued by plaintiff’s counsel and (iii) required plaintiff to provide within five days a list of all subpoenas issued within the last sixty days as well as copies of each subpoena. (NYSCEF Doc No. 361 at 2 [emphasis added].) In light of Plaintiff’s violation of Justice King’s November 6, 2017 Stay Order, Justice King granted Oceana’s motion for a protective order — the subpoenas were quashed and Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the stay in the Stay Order was denied — and directed Plaintiff to pay costs in the amount of $2,500. Appellate Division, Second Department’s May 18, 2022 Decision in Favor of Oceana Although Justice King granted Oceana’s motion for a protective order and imposed costs of $2,500 on Plaintiff, directing Plaintiff to make payment to Oceana’s counsel within thirty days of the issuance of the October 25, 2018 Protective Order (see NYSCEF Doc No. 361 at 4), Plaintiff never paid the costs. Instead, Plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department. Oceana, for its part, cross-appealed from the denial of its motion to hold Plaintiff and Joseph Paukman, Esq. in contempt. In its Decision-Order, dated and entered May 18, 2022, the Second Department denied Plaintiff’s appeal and granted Oceana’s cross-appeal (see Madigan, 205 AD3d 900; NYSCEF Doc No. 362). Specifically, the Second Department (a) sustained Justice King’s quashing the subpoenas issued by Plaintiff’s counsel; (b) sustained her 2018 determination denying Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the 2017 Stay Order; (c) affirmed the Supreme Court’s imposition of $2,500 in costs against Plaintiff; (d) found Joseph Paukman, Esq. in criminal contempt and imposed on him a criminal sanction of $10,000; (e) awarded Oceana attorney’s fees pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 due to the violations committed by Plaintiff’s counsel in issuing the subpoenas; and (f) remitted the case to the Supreme Court for a determination of the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees (see Madigan, 205 AD3d at 903-907; NYSCEF Doc No. 362 at 5-7). An examination of the rationale underlying the Second Department’s extensive May 18, 2022 Decision-Order is essential to apprehend the full extent of Plaintiff’s counsel’s flouting of Court orders, which led the Second Department to hold him in criminal contempt owing to his flouting of judicial orders: Here, the Supreme Court’s November 6, 2017 order plainly stated, among other things, that the “plaintiff, her agents and attorneys, are restrained and enjoined from taking further action in this case, or in any other action or proceeding that plaintiff may bring before this Court, to enforce the Georgia Judgment or the Criminal Case Judgment,” and that the “plaintiff, her agents and attorneys, are restrained and enjoined from issuing subpoenas, restraining notices, executions or other enforcement papers in connection with this case, or any other action or proceeding that plaintiff may bring before this Court, to enforce the Georgia Judgment or the Criminal Case Judgment.” In light of this clear language, combined with the court’s repeated affirmation of the stay, the plaintiff’s counsel’s conclusory protestation of misunderstanding does not raise an issue requiring a hearing. Notwithstanding this clear prohibition, the plaintiff’s counsel issued subpoenas on six separate occasions. When, in connection with the motion of Oceana and Rosa for certain relief, the Supreme Court reiterated the terms of the stay, both via interim relief granted in the order to show cause and in a separate order, the plaintiff’s counsel did not desist but instead served four more subpoenas and moved to compel the production of subpoenaed documents. This conduct evidences a lack of “respect for judicial orders” and warranted holding the plaintiff’s counsel in criminal contempt (Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v. Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 70 NY2d at 240). Under the circumstances of this case, we deem the statutory maximum sanction of $1,000 per offense warranted and therefore impose a total sanction of $10,000. (Id.; see NYSCEF Doc No. 362.) Moreover, the Second Department found that frivolous conduct had been engaged in pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, warranting an award of attorney’s fees to Oceana: A court, in its discretion, may award a party costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses incurred and reasonable attorney’s fees where an opposing party has engaged in frivolous conduct (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [a]). Conduct is frivolous under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (c) (1) if it is “completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law” or “undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another” (id. §130-1.1 [c] [2]; see Miller v. Falco, 170 AD3d 707, 710 [2019]; Falco v. Miller, 170 AD3d 661, 662-663 [2019]). Here, the plaintiff’s counsel’s repeated issuance of subpoenas in violation of the stay in the November 6, 2017 order and subsequent orders reaffirming that stay was frivolous (see Matter of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 188 AD3d 1211, 1213 [2020]; Gottlieb v. Colonel, 180 AD3d 877, 881 [2020]). However, since the record does not contain evidence sufficient to determine the fees actually incurred by Oceana and Rosa (see Matter of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 188 AD3d at 1213), we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination of the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded to Oceana. (Madigan, 205 AD3d at 907; NYSCEF Doc No. 362 at 6-7.) Oceana Is Entitled to a Judgment for Costs In the October 22, 2018 Protective Order, Justice King, beyond granting Oceana’s motion for a protective order, imposed costs of $2,500 and directed that payment of such sum be made to Oceana’s counsel within thirty days (see NYSCEF Doc No. 361 at 3-4). Moreover, in addition to the costs of $2,500 provided for in the Protective Order, the Second Department awarded “costs to the defendant Oceana Holding Corp” (Madigan, 205 AD3d at 901; NYSCEF Doc No. 362 at 3.) The Second Department’s award entitles Oceana not only to statutory costs of $250 pursuant to CPLR 81079 and 8203 (a)10, but also to necessary disbursements pursuant to CPLR 8301 (a).11 Accordingly, Oceana is entitled to a judgment in the following amount: a. Costs per the Protective Order $2,500.00 b. Statutory interest from November 21, 2018, the deadline for paying the $2500 in costs (see CPLR 5004 [a]) Amount to be determined by the County Clerk c. Costs on appeal pursuant to CPLR 8203 (a) $250.00 d. Printing costs pursuant to CPLR 8301 (a) (6)12 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 363) $9,964.48 e. Sheriff’s fees for receiving and returning one execution (see CPLR 8301 [a] [8], 8011.) $40.00 Total: $12,754.48 In the Absence of Payment of the Criminal Sanction by Joseph Paukman, Esq., the Clerk of the Court Is Directed to Prepare a Schedule and Issue a Warrant Commanding the Sheriff to Collect the Outstanding Amount In its May 18, 2022 Decision-Order, the Second Department held Plaintiff’s counsel, Joseph Paukman, Esq. in criminal contempt, owing to counsel’s lack of respect for judicial orders (see Madigan, 205 AD3d 900 at 907; NYSCEF Doc No. 362 at 6). In doing so, the Court modified Justice King’s Protective Order, as she had denied that portion of Oceana’s motion which sought to hold Mr. Paukman in contempt. “Under the circumstances of this case, we deem the statutory maximum sanction of $1,000 per offense warranted and therefore impose a total sanction of $10,000″ (id.). The collection of the criminal sanction imposed by the Second Department on Joseph Paukman, Esq. is governed by Article 20 of the New York Judiciary Law. As held by the Court of Appeals, “Since no ‘special provision’…has been made for the collection of fines imposed by a court of record for criminal contempt, Section 791 of the Judiciary Law governs the disposition of such funds” (Goodman v. State, 31 NY2d 381, 384 [1972]). Section 790 of the Judiciary Law sets forth the procedure to be used to generate a schedule of the fine imposed as follows: §790. Clerk to make schedule of fines imposed Where a fine has been imposed by a court of record, upon a grand or trial juror, or upon any officer or other person, without being accompanied with an order for the immediate commitment of the person so fined, until the fine is paid, the clerk of the court, immediately after the close of the term at which the fine was imposed, must prepare a schedule, containing, in separate columns, the following matters: 1. The name of each person fined. 2. His place of residence, where it appears, from the papers on file or before the court, to be within the county. 3. The amount of the fine imposed upon him. 4. The cause for which the fine was imposed. The clerk must subjoin to the schedule a certificate, to the effect, that it contains a true abstract of the orders imposing fines, and must annex it to the warrant specified in the next section. Thereafter, the schedule is annexed to a warrant and issued to the sheriff, pursuant to Judiciary Law §791, which provides as follows: §791. Issue and contents of warrant The clerk must immediately issue a warrant, under the seal of the court, directed to the sheriff of the county, and commanding him to collect from each of the persons named in the schedule annexed to the warrant, the sum therein set opposite that person’s name; and to pay over the sum collected to the treasurer of the county. The clerk must include in the said annexed schedule the name of each person who has been fined, prior to the issuing thereof, and whose fine remains then wholly or partly unpaid, and not remitted by the court. The warrant is the process of the court, by which the fines were imposed. If a delinquent resides in another county, a separate warrant, for the collection of the fine imposed upon him, with an appropriate schedule annexed thereto, must be issued, in like manner, to the sheriff of the county where he resides. Oceana concedes that it understandably has no information as to whether Joseph Paukman, Esq., paid the $10,000 criminal sanction (see NYSCEF Doc No. 359 9). However, based on the past conduct of Mr. Paukman in this case, which led the Second Department to hold him in criminal contempt, one may rationally surmise that Mr. Paukman is likely not to have paid it. Significantly, the criminal sanction imposed by the Second Department against Mr. Paukman in its May 18, 2022 Decision-Order, although characterized as a “sanction,” does not arise under Part 130 (Costs and Sanctions) of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge. Although Part 130 addresses sanctions awarded against an attorney and makes them payable to the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.3, the sanction here was not imposed pursuant to Part 130. Rather, the criminal punishment (namely, the fine) was imposed pursuant to the Judiciary Law based on the Second Department’s following determination regarding Joseph Paukman, Esq.’s conduct: “Under the circumstances of this case, we deem the statutory maximum sanction of $1,000 per offense warranted and therefore impose a total sanction of $10,000 (Madigan, 205 AD3d at 907; NYSCEF Doc No. 362 at 6). Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court (Kings County Clerk) shall be directed to generate the appropriate schedule and issue a warrant to the sheriff commanding the latter to collect the $10,000 fine from Joseph Paukman, Esq., to the extent that he has not paid the fine in question. Oceana Is Entitled to a Judgment for Its Reasonable Attorney’s Fees (A) Background & Standards In its motion by order to show cause, signed on September 6, 2018, to hold Plaintiff and her counsel, Joseph Paukman, Esq., in contempt of court, Oceana sought sanctions pursuant to §130-1.1 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge. Specifically, in the order to show cause in question, Oceana sought an order: H. [P]ursuant to section 130-1.1 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, awarding to Oceana and Rosa [Bronstein], against plaintiff and her counsel, costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, resulting from the frivolous conduct of plaintiff and her counsel in refusing to obey the Stay Order and TRO[.]13 (NYSCEF Doc No. 364 at 4.) Although, as set forth above, this relief was initially denied by the Kings County Supreme Court in the October 25, 2018 Protective Order (see NYSCEF Doc No. 361 at 4), the Second Department reached a contrary determination in its May 18, 2022 Decision-Order, holding as follows: [T]he plaintiff’s counsel’s repeated issuance of subpoenas in violation of the stay in the November 6, 2017 order and subsequent orders reaffirming that stay was frivolous. (Madigan, 205 AD3d at 907; NYSCEF Doc No. 362 at 7.) Having found Plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct to have been frivolous, the Second Department modified the Protective Order and remitted the case to the Supreme Court “for a determination of the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded to Oceana” (id.). In short, based on the Second Department’s May 18, 2022 Decision-Order, Oceana is entitled to a judgment for its reasonable attorney’s fees. This Court is constrained to comply with the said Decision-Order, notwithstanding arguments by Mr. Paukman at the July 6, 2023 motion hearing that attorney’s fees should not be assessed against him and his client. Defendant Oceana’s counsel, Daniel S. Steinberg, Esq.14 submitted affirmations attesting to client invoices for this action, averring that the amount of attorney’s fees (including disbursements) his client was entitled to is $202,541.00 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 359 16; NYSCEF Doc No. 365 33). The bills were appended (see NYSCEF Doc No. 367). At oral argument and in Plaintiff’s papers, it was contended that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in order for Defendant Oceana to establish attorney’s fee (see NYSCEF Doc No. 388 at 4). However, when attorney’s fees are awarded, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary (see Webb v. Greater N.Y. Auto. Dealers Assn., Inc., 144 AD3d 1134, 1135 [2d Dept 2016] ["defendant is directed to submit an affirmation or affidavit as to the amount of such fees and expenses"]). Nonetheless, a reasonable opportunity to be heard is required and the form of a hearing is dependent upon the nature of the conduct and the circumstances of the case (see Strauss v. Strauss, 171 AD3d 596, 597 [1st Dept 2019]; Martinez v. Estate of Carney, 129 AD3d 607, 609 [1st Dept 2015). Affidavits submitted in opposition provide an opportunity to be heard (see Martinez, 129 AD3d at 609). In the instant case, Plaintiff's counsel was afforded an opportunity to argue at the July 6, 2023 motion hearing15 with respect to the affirmations submitted by Oceana's counsel and his bills. Moreover Plaintiff's counsel submitted various affirmations of his own in opposition (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 378, 381, 387-389). This Court finds that no useful purpose would be served by holding an evidentiary hearing concerning the amount of the attorney's fees to which Oceana is entitled. No doubt said Defendant's counsel would merely testify as to what is in his firm's bills. There being several hundred entries in the bills, it is foreseeable that Plaintiff's counsel would insist on cross-examining Defendant's counsel with respect to each and every one of them, unnecessarily prolonging a determination of the compensable amount. Forecasting such action is reasonable in light of Plaintiff's counsel's litigation tactics heretofore in making numerous motions, often requesting the same relief multiple times, and in pursing the asserted right to issue non-party subpoenas despite being ordered by the Supreme Court not to do so. Therefore, this Court deems it appropriate to determine the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded based upon the papers submitted. In using an affirmation or affidavit to calculate attorney's fees, "the court must possess sufficient information upon which to make an informed assessment of the reasonable value of the legal services rendered" (Bankers Fed. Sav. Bank v. Off W. Broadway Devs., 224 AD2d 376, 378 [1996]; cf. People’s United Bank v. Patio Gardens III, LLC, 143 AD3d 689, 691 [2d Dept 2016] ["Here, the affidavit of services rendered submitted by the plaintiff fails to set forth counsel's experience, ability, and reputation, and fails to detail the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community"]). “In determining what is reasonable compensation for an attorney, the court may consider a number of factors, including, inter alia, the time and labor required, the difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to handle the problems presented, the lawyer’s experience, ability, and reputation, the customary fee charged for similar services, and the results obtained (see RMP Capital Corp. v. Victory Jet, LLC, 139 AD3d at 839; Diaz v. Audi of Am., Inc., 57 AD3d 828, 830 [2008]). The determination of reasonable attorney’s fees is generally left to the discretion of the trial court, which is often in the best position to determine those factors integral to the fixing of a reasonable fee (see RMP Capital Corp. v. Victory Jet, LLC, 139 AD3d at 840; Miller Realty Assoc. v. Amendola, 51 AD3d at 990).” (Diggs v. Oscar De La Renta, LLC, 169 AD3d 1003, 1004-1005 [2d Dept 2019]; accord Matter of Freeman, 34 NY2d 1 [1974]; Lancer Indem. Co. v. JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 AD3d 1035, 1035-1036 [2d Dept 2015]). In terms of the customary fee charged for similar services, there should be evidence as to the amount “charged for similar services by lawyers in the community with like experience and of comparable reputation to those by whom the prevailing party was represented” (Kaygreen Realty Co., LLC v. IG Second Generation Partners, L.P., 78 AD3d 1008 [2d Dept 2010], quoting Getty Petroleum Corp. v. G.M. Triple S. Corp., 187 AD2d 483, 483-484 [2d Dept 1992]). However, name partners in the New York City suburbs were found to have reasonably charged $415 and $410 respectively in a case for breach of a factoring and security agreement, such amounts “reflect[ing] the prevailing hourly rate of attorneys in the community with their experience” (RMP Capital Corp. v. Victory Jet, LLC, 139 AD3d 836, 840 [2d Dept 2016], citing Leser v. U.S. Bank N.A., 2013 WL 1952306, 2013 US Dist LEXIS 33168 [ED NY, May 10, 2013, No. 09-CV-2362 (KAM/MDG)]). In M.F. v. Amida Care, Inc. (75 Misc 3d 1209[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50426[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2022]), in a class action lawsuit, the court reduced the hourly rate of $800 for a New York City law firm’s founding partners from $800 to $450, another partner’s $600 rate to $300, and associates’ $450 rate to $300. Absent evidence of the hours expended as a result of a party’s frivolous conduct, a flat award of an attorney’s fees is not supported in the record (see Retained Realty, Inc. v. 1828 51, LLC, 153 AD3d 1438, 1440 [2d Dept 2017]). Where bills are submitted, the Court may consider only those entries which relate to the work concerning which attorney’s fees are to be awarded; work related to other matters must be excluded (see Martinez, 129 AD3d at 610). As was stated in People’s United Bank (143 AD3d at 691 [internal quotation marks omitted]), “Moreover, the plaintiff failed to show which fees relate to work on which of the two parcels that was foreclosed upon and which, if any, fees relate to work on both of the parcels. Absent such a showing, the plaintiff cannot establish that the attorney’s fees are reasonable and warranted for the services actually rendered for each of the parcels foreclosed upon [citation omitted].” Also, if there is block billing, including vague and nonspecific billing entries, the Court may exercise its discretion and adjust the billed amounts with an across-the-board reduction in the hours expended (see RMP Capital Corp., 139 AD3d at 840 [25 percent reduction]). Finally, it is noted that an award of attorney’s fees properly includes fees incurred in substantiating the fee claim itself, i.e., so-called “fees on fees,” as well as documented costs (see Lancer Indem. Co., 127 AD3d at 1036). Daniel S. Steinberg, Oceana’s counsel, submitted a detailed affirmation in support of Defendant Oceana’s application for its attorney’s fees (see NYSCEF Doc No. 365). As noted above (supra at 14), case law has held that in determining how much to award, a court must take into account the time and labor required, the difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to handle the problems presented, the lawyer’s experience, ability, and reputation, the customary fee charged for similar services, and the results obtained (see also Diggs, 169 AD3d 1003). Assessing Mr. Steinberg’s affirmations, in particular the one denoted as “Affirmation of Legal Services” (NYSCEF Doc No. 365)16, this Court shall review them for compliance in establishing these factors. (B) Time and Labor Required To get an idea of the amount of time spent by everyone — including the courts — on this lawsuit which Plaintiff commenced, one needs merely to note the fact that up to the writing of this decision and order, the last NYSCEF Document Number was 435. Twenty motions have been recorded, most of them filed by Plaintiff. A review of the motions is as follows: Motion Sequence No. 1 (filed by proposed order to show cause September 22, 2017): Oceana’s motion to stay all proceedings pending determination by U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 7, 42). Motion Sequence No. 2 (filed by proposed order to show cause September 25, 2017): Plaintiff’s motion to compel delivery of $100,000 by Oceana’s attorney Richard Kaplan to Plaintiff (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 24, 59). Motion Sequence No. 3 (filed by notice of motion April 18, 2018): Plaintiff’s motion to compel Rosa Bronstein’s deposition (see NYSCEF Doc No. 24). Motion Sequence No. 4 (filed by notice of motion April 21, 2018): Plaintiff’s motion to vacate sealing of Bronstein divorce (see NYSCEF Doc No. 71). Motion Sequence No. 5 (filed by notice of motion April 21, 2018): Plaintiff’s motion to restrain transfer of Oceana’s shares (see NYSCEF Doc No. 72). Motion Sequence No. 6 (filed by notice of motion May 4, 2018): Plaintiff’s motion to amend caption and lift stay (see NYSCEF Doc No. 75). Motion Sequence No. 7 (filed by notice of motion May 9, 2018): Plaintiff’s motion to schedule evidentiary hearing and deposition of Raquel Vasserman (see NYSCEF Doc No. 84). Motion Sequence No. 817 (filed by proposed order to show cause June 28, 2018, Court declined to sign): Plaintiff’s motion to declare that Kings County Supreme Court order did not stay U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York abstract of judgment (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 104, 106). Motion Sequence No 9 (filed by notice of motion June 28, 2018): Plaintiff’s motion to compel Rosa Bronstein to submit to deposition (see NYSCEF Doc No. 101). Motion Sequence No 10: (filed by proposed order to show cause July 18, 2018): Oceana’s motion for protective order against Plaintiff’s counsel, quashing non-parties’ subpoenas, and awarding Oceana’s costs (see NYSCEF Doc No. 156). Motion Sequence No. 11 (filed by proposed order to show cause September 6, 2018): Oceana’s motion for criminal and civil contempt against Plaintiff and her counsel, to refer Plaintiff’s counsel to the Grievance Committee, to suspend Plaintiff’s counsel’s authority to issue subpoenas, to disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel, and to award Oceana costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees (see NYSCEF Doc No. 191). Motion Sequence No. 1218 (filed by proposed order to show cause October 31, 2018, Court declined to sign): Plaintiff’s motion for permission to submit additional documents (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 275, 280). Motion Sequence No. 1319 (filed by proposed order to show cause January 28, 2019, Court declined to sign): Plaintiff’s motion to declare that the stay did not affect enforcement of a December 19, 2017 judgment (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 283, 300). Motion Sequence No. 14 (filed by proposed order to show cause January 28, 2019): Oceana’s motion for leave to renew prior contempt motion (see NYSCEF Doc No. 286). Motion Sequence No. 1520 (filed by proposed order to show cause May 13, 2019): Plaintiff’s motion for Court to take judicial notice that judge told counsel in court she cannot stop him from enforcing December 19, 2017 judgment and to mark off Oceana’s second motion or contempt (see NYSCEF Doc No. 321). Motion Sequence No. 16 (filed by notice of motion June 17, 2019): Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and attorney’s fees against Oceana’s counsel and to refer said counsel to Grievance Committee (see NYSCEF Doc No. 329). Motion Sequence No. 17 (filed by notice of motion October 7, 2022): Oceana’s motion post-Appellate Division order, for judgment for costs and disbursements and attorney’s fees and for County Clerk to prepare warrant for criminal sanctions (see NYSCEF Doc No. 358 [within motion]). Motion Sequence No. 18 (filed by notice of motion December 7, 2022): Plaintiff’s motion to stay Oceana’s motion pending appeal to Court of Appeals, etc. (see NYSCEF Doc No. 378). Motion Sequence No. 19 (filed by notice of motion March 22, 2023): Plaintiff’s motion to vacate November 2017 order (see NYSCEF Doc No. 407). Motion Sequence No. 20 (filed by notice of motion July 8, 2023): Plaintiff’s motion to renew motion to vacate November 2017 order (see NYSCEF Doc No. 432). The Appellate Division Decision-Order leading to the within motion on remittal to the Supreme Court consumed four pages when printed out from Westlaw. Oceana’s counsel had to spend an inordinate amount of time dealing with Plaintiff’s litigation designed to circumvent the Stay Order and the Protective Order and pursue subpoenas, actions the Appellate Division found sanctionable. It is quite obvious that in order to oppose Plaintiff’s pursuit of the subpoenas in order to locate assets of Aron Bronstein, Oceana’s counsel had to expend an inordinate amount of time as discussed infra at 20-26. This supports the within motion of Oceana’s counsel for legal fees. (C) Difficulty of Questions Involved Usually the difficulty of the questions involved applies to when an award of attorney’s fees is granted because a substantial right was vindicated. Nonetheless, this Court considers this factor. It finds that while on its face, Plaintiff’s violation of the Stay Order — and thereafter the Protective Order — was not difficult to establish factually, the vexatious conduct of Plaintiff compelled Oceana’s counsel to have to litigate an unusual situation; in litigation one will not frequently encounter a situation where an attorney repeatedly ignores a court’s order. This Court concurs with Oceana’s counsel’s statements: At every turn [Paukman] rejected the reasonable course, filing meritless motions and taking the meritless appeal that resulted in the imposition of a criminal sanction upon him. As detailed herein, Oceana did no more than respond and react reasonably to circumstances dictated by plaintiff and her counsel over four years of litigation. (NYSCEF Doc No. 365 2.) The circumstances of the [contempt] motion were novel; while I had encountered and litigated contempt of court situations where clients violated court orders, I never previously had dealt with one where it was the attorney who refused to abide court orders. (NYSCEF Doc No. 365 at 6.) (D) Skill Required to Handle the Problems Presented Concerning vexatious litigation, it has been written: To be sure, public policy mandates free access to the courts and zealous advocacy is an essential component of our legal system (Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Assn., 38 NY2d 397, 404; Burt v. Smith, 181 NY 1)…. Nonetheless, a litigious plaintiff pressing a frivolous claim can be extremely costly to the defendant and can waste an inordinate amount of court time, time that this court and the trial courts can ill afford to lose (see Harrelson v. United States, 613 F2d 114). Thus, when, as here, a litigant is abusing the judicial process by hagriding individuals solely out of ill will or spite, equity may enjoin such vexatious litigation…. (Sassower v. Signorelli, 99 AD2d 358, 359-360 [2d Dept 1984].) It is evident that Oceana’s counsel displayed extensive skill in dealing with the rare instance of an attorney engaging in vexatious conduct to circumvent a court’s orders — conduct deemed to warrant criminal contempt by the Appellate Division. One observes Oceana’s counsel’s skill while reading through the billing he provided. It lays out a chronology of steps undertaken to carefully tread through a plethora of motions and appellate activity in order to represent Oceana’s interests. Some of the appellate activity even entailed having to deal with Plaintiff’s meritless attempt to have the Court of Appeals review the Appellate Division’s determination. Oceana’s counsel dealt with all of this in a professional manner. (E) Lawyer’s Experience, Ability, and Reputation In his Affirmation of Legal Services, Daniel S. Steinberg, Esq. the principle of the firm of Daniel S. Steinberg P.C., detailed his experience and that of his associate who worked on this case, Melissa A. Cohen. Rather than summarize their experience, this Court quotes from Mr. Steinberg’s affirmation for the purpose of relating the wealth of experience that his firm brought to this case: 3. Regarding my experience as an attorney, I was admitted to practice in New York 31 years ago 1991. I am also a member of the bar in Connecticut, and admitted to practice in various courts including the Southern, Eastern and Western Districts of New York, the District of Connecticut, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 4. My entire professional career has been in commercial litigation, representing businesses and individuals in commercial disputes. My initial relationship with Oceana was on account of a shareholder dispute that we successfully resolved through mediation. 5. I started my career with the form of Bondy & Schloss LLP (“Bondy”) in 1990. I became a partner of that firm and, in 2005, we joined the firm of Hodgson Russ LLP (“Hodgson”), becoming that firm’s New York office. I remained a partner at Hodgson until 2012 when I left to open my own law office. 6. I have significant trial and appellate experience. A sampling of cases located via a simple Lexis search for my full name is attached as Exhibit A. This list is far from complete, but is sufficiently representative of the extent of my experience. I also have experience handling arbitrations and have settled countless cases without need of judicial intervention. 7. Melissa A. Cohen, Esq. has worked with me since 2013. I have known Ms. Cohen from the time pf her tenure as an associate at Bondy. Before coming to Bondy in 1993, Ms. Cohen was an associate at the firm of Dewey Ballantine LLP. Ms. Cohen excels at legal research and writing, but also assists with discovery, hearings and trials. 8. My firm bills for its services on an hourly basis measured in tenths of an hour. My current hourly rate is $480 per hour; Ms. Cohen’s current rate is $350 per hour. Upon information and belief, these billing rates are typical of, if not less than, those charged by attorneys with comparable skill and experience. (NYSCEF Doc No. 365 at 3-4.) This Court reviewed the affirmation’s Exhibit A — the list of 28 cases where decisions were written in cases handled by Mr. Steinberg, starting in 1990 — and is impressed by his litigation experience. While he has not detailed his firm’s reputation, it suffices that he has proved to this Court’s satisfaction that he is a capable attorney with much experience. There could have been more written concerning the associate, Ms. Cohen, but what was included sufficed to establish her experience too. (F) Customary Fee Charged for Similar Services No survey of fees charged by comparable firms was included by Mr. Steinberg. Plaintiff did not submit any fee analysis of comparables either. However, this Court takes notice that in RMP Capital Corp. (139 AD3d 836), cited supra at 14, the Appellate Division, Second Department, sustained payment for name partners’ services at $415 and $410 per hour. This appellate decision was issued in 2016. The billed services here span a timeframe of May 2018 to July 2022. Taking into account that the $415 and $410 per hour were for a suburban law firm and that Oceana’s counsel is in Manhattan, a more expensive market — and moreover, that there has been inflation since mid-2021 due in part to aftermath effects of the Covid-19 pandemic economic disruption and the war resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (see 2021-2023 inflation surge, Wikipedia, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021 percent E2 percent 80 percent 932023_inflation_surge#:~:text=A percent 20worldwide percent 20increase percent 20in percent 20inflation,highest percent 20inflation percent 20rates percent 20in percent 20decades [last accessed August 23, 2023]) — this Court finds that $450 is reasonable and also in line with the $450 awarded to founding partners in 2022 in M.F. v. Amida Care, Inc. (75 Misc 3d 1209[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50426[U]), cited supra at 14. Hence, rather than allowing the $480 per hour billed for Mr. Steinberg, this Court awards $450 per hour — again, in the absence of comparables from him. As for the services of Ms. Cohen, the associate, in the absence of comparables, this Court awards $300 per hour — as ordered in M.F. — instead of the $350 mentioned by Mr. Steinberg. (G) Results Obtained So far, Oceana’s counsel achieved perfect success in repelling Plaintiff’s efforts to probe into Oceana’s finances in an attempt to locate assets of Aron Bronstein for the purposes of satisfying a judgment against him. This includes the attempts of Plaintiff’s counsel to obtain information through the issuance of subpoenas in the time period between the Stay Order and the Protective Order (successfully obtained from Justice King by Ocean’s counsel), and what transpired afterwards. Despite Mr. Paukman’s efforts to make good in locating Aron Bronstein’s assets perhaps hidden somewhere, Mr. Steinberg has thwarted him at every turn. Not only did the latter persuade the courts to deny Plaintiff’s counsel’s efforts to probe into Oceana’s finances by obtaining a stay from Justice Kings, said counsel persuaded the Appellate Division to impose substantial sanctions. Oceana’s successes pertaining to Plaintiff’s counsel’s issuance of non-party subpoenas are set forth in Mr. Steinberg’s affirmation, which detailed the litigation as follows: 11. As detailed by the Appellate Division, plaintiff and Paukman did not obey the Stay Order. Initially Paukman issued subpoenas on six separate occasions and then, in violation of a temporary restraining order that reiterated the terms of the Stay Order, “served four more subpoenas and moved to compel the production of subpoenaed documents.” Madigan, 205 A.D.3d at 907. 12. Oceana did not rush to motion practice. At first, in May 2018, we telephoned and corresponded with the recipients of subpoenas, explaining to them that a stay was in place and that compliance was not required.21 See DSSPC [Daniel S. Steinberg, P.C.] Invoices, at 1-2. Paukman insisted otherwise. Eventually, motion practice was unavoidable; we moved for a protective order. (NYSCEF Doc No. 365 at 4-5.) Mr. Steinberg then described the initial move he made to deal with Plaintiff’s counsel’s issuance of the subpoenas: (1) Motion for a Protective Order 13. Work on Oceana’s motion for a proactive order began at the end of May 2018. DSSPC Invoices, at 3. I prepared the motion, which was brought by order to show cause. One of the difficulties that we faced was the uncertainly of how many subpoenas Paukman had issued and to whom they had been issued. His practice was to disregard the requirement of giving notice to the parties when issuing subpoenas. The initial papers in support of the motion included a 17 page affirmation with extensive exhibits. Preparing the motion papers and a court appearance at which a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) was issued involved 30.7 hours of my time at a total cost of $14,736. DSSPC Invoices, at 3-5. 14. As noted by the Appellate Division, Paukman was not deterred by the TRO. He also was not deterred by the Court’s harsh words with regard to his continued misconduct. Paukman issued additional subpoenas and we invested an additional 13 hours, at a cost of $6,240, going to court and dealing with Paukman’s ongoing antics. DSSPC Invoices, at 5-6. (2) Motion for Contempt 15. The decision to move to hold plaintiff and Paukman in contempt of court was made only after Paukman ignored the TRO and failed to comply with the Court’s order that he provide a list of the subpoenas that he had issued. The circumstances of the motion were novel; while I had encountered and litigated contempt of court situations where clients violated court orders, I never previously had dealt with one where it was the attorney who refused to abide court orders. 16. The decision to seek contempt and related relief was made in early August 2018. As on the prior motion, the process again was complicated by Paukman’s practice of not giving notice of the subpoenas that he had served and continued to serve. In addition to our efforts to seek out and compile that documentation, we also amassed and presented documents respecting Paukman’s frivolous activities in other related cases. We compiled all of this information, Ms. Cohen and I conducted appropriate research, and I drafted the papers. My affirmation in support of the motion ended up being 39 pages, detailing each violation and explaining the appropriate remedies. Annexed to the affirmation were 32 exhibits demonstrating the contemptuous conduct. The motion was completed and filed on September 6, 2018. We appeared on the motion and the Court signed the order to show cause that included a further TRO. Through that date, the invoices reflect an additional 58.8 hours of my time and 3.50 hours by Ms. Cohen, for total billings of $29,379. DSSPC Invoices, at 6-9. Following the issuance of the order to show cause, I arranged for service copies to be printed and for service of the papers on the plaintiff in Georgia. The printing disbursement was $230.77; the process server’s fees totaled $839.41. DSSPC Invoices, at 12, 20. 17. In October 2018, I prepared reply papers on the motion for a protective order and the motion for contempt. Throughout this period, Paukman filed various motions of his own. The Court decided Oceana’s two motions together with four others made by Paukman in a single Decision/Order dated October 22, 2018 (the “Protective Order”). My additional time invested through the granting of the protective order was 23.30 hours or $11,184. DSSPC Invoices, at 9-11. 18. Following the issuance of the Protective Order, the skirmishing with Paukman continued. At first, he tried to have the Court sign an order to show cause, which the Court declined to sign. Appearing in court in opposition and related communications with counsel at Bank of America consumed 4.50 hours amounting to fees of $2,160. Notably, he and plaintiff steadfastly refused to pay the fees of $2,500 ordered by the Court. Ultimately, Paukman took an appeal. (NYSCEF Doc No. 365 at 5-7.) As evidenced by Justice King’s Protective Order of October 22, 2018, Mr. Steinberg was successful in getting the subpoenas quashed. He also was successful in persuading Justice King to impose $2,500 in costs. While she did not impose contempt, this issue was dealt with by the Appellate Division later on. (See NYSCEF Doc No. 361.) Thereafter, more maneuvering ensued: (3) The Appeal and Cross-Appeal 19. After filing a notice of appeal from the Protective Order, Paukman moved the Appellate Division in November 2018 for a stay. Initially, that court granted a stay of one month, giving Paukman the choice of paying the costs of $2,500 or perfecting the appeal. Rather than do either, Paukman sought a further stay, which the Appellate Division granted. Oceana filed opposition to the motions at the Appellate Division and, on the chance that Paukman actually might perfect plaintiff’s appeal rather than pay the award of costs, it also filed a notice of crossappeal from the denial of its motion to hold plaintiff and Paukman in contempt. 20. Apart from seeking the stays, Paukman filed a variety of motions at the Appellate Division. He filed a motion for In Forma Pauperis relief and sought a TRO. The motion required an appearance at the Appellate Division. The TRO was denied; the motion was briefed and, thereafter, it too was denied. Then, in February 2019, Paukman filed a motion asking the Appellate Division to grant immediately the relief that plaintiff sought on appeal. We prepared and filed opposition to the motion, which the court denied.22 21. Next, Paukman moved in March 2019 to restore a prior appeal that he had noticed following entry of the Stay Order. That appeal had not been perfected, resulting in its dismissal. We prepared and filed opposition. The Appellate Division denied the motion. 22. All told, the five motions filed by Paukman post-entry of the Protective Order (four at the Appellate Division and two in this Court) through the filing of plaintiff’s appellant’s brief and appendix in April 2019, consumed approximately 58.50 hours of my time and 2.90 hours of Ms. Cohen’s time, for fees totaling $29,037. DSSPC Invoices, at 13-22. (NYSCEF Doc No. 365 at 7-8.) As is evident from the documents filed on NYSCEF, this aspect of Plaintiff’s counsel’s maneuvering to pursue Aron Bronstein’s assets based on the allegation that Oceana was a front for concealing them were stymied; again, Mr. Steinberg was successful (e.g. NYSCEF Doc Nos. 275, 276, 280, 283.) With argument at the Appellate Division still to take place, Plaintiff’s counsel continued with his endeavors and Oceana’s counsel responded in kind: (4) The Second Contempt Motion 23. Apart from the antics at the Appellate Division, Paukman apparently was emboldened by the Court’s denial of Oceana’s motion to hold him in contempt. Thus, he began anew to violate the Stay Order, issuing subpoenas under a different caption and filing a separate lawsuit in Richmond County wherein he named me as a defendant. Oceana responded by filing a second motion to hold plaintiff and Paukman in contempt. That motion was filed in late January 2019. The Court issued a TRO and ultimately granted the motion. Preparing the motion entailed 2.90 hours of Ms. Cohen’s time for research and 29.40 hours of my time for drafting and appearing in court in connection with the order to show cause. Initially, Paukman failed to oppose Oceana’s motion, necessitating two further appearances on the motion — one resulting in an adjournment and a second for argument of the motion. Paukman also dragged me to court on an order to show cause wherein he asked to be excused from filing opposition and, when that motion was rebuffed, filed instead a cross-motion for sanctions. We opposed the cross-motion and filed reply papers in further support of Oceana’s second contempt motion, in the process incurring an additional 19.40 hours of my time. The total fees incurred by Oceana in connection with the second contempt motion were $24,381. Service of the papers on plaintiff in Georgia cost $825.30. DSSPC Invoices, at 15-16, 21-22, 25. (NYSCEF Doc No. 365 at 8-9.) In this aspect of the skirmishing, Mr. Steinberg again successfully foiled Plaintiff’s counsel, including by persuading Justice King to remove the Queens and Richmond actions to Kings County and dismiss them as “[P]laintiff mistakenly commenced [them] in the wrong courts in contravention to the November 14, 2018 stay order.” Justice King also permanently enjoined Plaintiff’s counsel from “commencing or prosecuting any action concerning the facts and circumstances at issue” except in Kings County Supreme Court. “Plaintiff’s contentions regarding opposing counsel’s aiding and abetting forgery of documents submitted to the Court is unfounded and meritless.” The Stay Order remained in effect. (NYSCEF Doc No. 348; e.g. NYSCEF Doc Nos. 286, 300, 314, 329.) One might think that with the appeal to the Appellate Division, there might have been a time out while the parties awaited oral argument. This was not to be: (5) The Defective Appendices 24. The brief and appendix that Paukman filed at the Appellate Division in April 2019 were deficient. Paukman frivolously omitted from the appendix papers that Oceana had filed in opposition to plaintiff’s motions. Oceana responded by moving in May 2019 to strike. The Appellate Division granted Oceana’s motion to the extent of affording plaintiff the opportunity to file a supplemental appendix. DSSPC Invoices, at 24-25. 25. Plaintiff filed a supplemental appendix in August 2019. This one too was deficient in that it did not include any of the motion papers concerning Oceana’s cross-appeal. After reviewing the brief filed by Paukman, Oceana determined in late August 2019 that it would perfect the cross-appeal respecting the denial of its motion for contempt. I contacted Paukman to obtain his consent to the filing of a second supplemental appendix to include the documents relevant to the crossappeal. Without basis, he refused to consent, thereby necessitating the filing of a motion by Oceana with the Appellate Division. DSSPC Invoices, at 27-28. The Appellate Division granted Oceana’s motion in December 2019. 26. The motion practice on account of Paukman’s failure to prepare a proper joint appendix involved 35.90 hours of my time and 1.30 hours of Ms. Cohen’s time, for fees totaling $17,661.00. DSSPC Invoices, at 24-29. (6) The Appellate Briefing 27. Once the Appellate Division authorized the filing of the second supplemental appendix, we provided the documents to the appellate printer, Counsel Press, and then researched and drafted Oceana’s appellate brief. The work involved 34.5 hours of my time and 5.90 hours for Ms. Cohen, resulting in fees of $18,507. DSSPC Invoices, at 30-31. Although the printing costs were substantial, they have been addressed elsewhere as part of the Appellate Division’s award of costs on the appeal. 28. Once again, Paukman added cost to the process, this time moving the Appellate Division to strike Oceana’s brief and supplemental appendix for failure to include certain documents which Oceana properly had excluded because they had not been considered below. Paukman’s meritless motion was denied, but consumed an additional 11.20 hours of my time, or fees of $5,376.00. DSSPC Invoices, at 31-35[.] 29. Then, Paukman essentially made the motion a second time by seeking leave of the Appellate Division to file a third supplemental appendix containing the documents that he previously claimed had improperly been omitted by Oceana. This motion too was denied, but only after Oceana was put to the expense of filing opposition that entailed 10.80 hours of my time and 0.30 hours of Ms. Cohen’s time, for a total cost of $5,283.00. DSSPC Invoices, at 35-36. 30. Once Paukman finally filed plaintiff’s reply brief, we proceeded to prepare and file Oceana’s reply brief on September 3, 2020. I invested 34.00 hours preparing the brief and Ms. Cohen’s editing of the brief required 0.50 hours, for a total fee of $16,485.00. DSSPC Invoices, at 36-38. (NYSCEF Doc No. 365 at 9-10.) The results of this work performed by Mr. Steinberg are quite evident from this Court’s perusal of the orders issued by the Appellate Division (see 2018 NY Slip Op 91799[U] [2d Dept 2018] [stay of $2500 costs imposed on Plaintiff pending determination of appeal conditioned on perfecting appeal by date certain; costs eventually affirmed]; 2019 NY Slip Op 65471[U] [2d Dept 2019] [Plaintiff's motion to vacate appeal dismissal, to extend time to perfect appeal, to consolidate appeal with appeal from other order, to prosecute appeals on original papers, and for poor person relief denied]; 2019 NY Slip Op 65472[U] [2d Dept 2019] [Plaintiff's motion to prosecute appeal on original record and for poor person relief denied]; 2019 NY Slip Op 76059[U] [2d Dept 2019] [Plaintiff ordered to include additional papers in a supplemental joint appendix]; 2019 NY Slip Op 86246[U] [2d Dept 2019] [Oceana granted leave to file second supplemental joint appendix]; 2020 NY Slip Op 66741[U] [2d Dept 2020] [Plaintiff's motion to dismiss Oceana's cross-appeal denied]; 2020 NY Slip Op 68766[U] [2d Dept 2020] [Plaintiff's motion to enlarge record denied]; 2021 NY Slip Op 60346[U] [2d Dept 2021] [Plaintiff's motion for sanction on Oceana's counsel denied]). The appeal was argued on January 7, 2021, but after losing — the Appellate Division issuing its decision-order on May 18, 2022 — Plaintiff’s counsel continued the barrage of motions: (7) Oral Argument 31. On January 7, 2021, more than a year after briefing was completed, the parties orally argued the appeal and cross-appeal. The argument was remote on account of the Covid pandemic. In preparing for and conducting Oceana’s argument, I worked 8.70 hours at a cost of $4,176.00. DSSPC Invoices, at 41-42. (8) Decision and Post-Appeal Motions 32. The Appellate Division decided the appeal and cross-appeal on May 18, 2022. We served notice of entry. In response, Paukman: a. Filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, which the Court treated as an attempt to take an appeal as of right. b. Filed a motion to the Appellate Division for leave to reargue, including an application for a stay pending the determination of the motion, which application was denied. c. Withdrew the first motion to reargue and filed a new one at the Appellate Division. d. Filed a motion at the Appellate Division for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Oceana opposed the application for a stay and filed opposition to the two motions on which Paukman proceeded. With regard to the notice of appeal, the Court of Appeals directed Oceana to file a “Jurisdictional Response” addressing whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which it obviously did not. We also investigated the mechanisms for enforcing the costs and fines imposed on plaintiff and Paukman by the Appellate Division. The post appeal efforts required 33.20 hours for me and 0.30 hours of Ms. Cohen’s time, at a total cost of $16,041.00. DSSPC Invoices, at 43-45. (NYSCEF Doc No. 365 at 11.) Plaintiff’s post-Appellate Division decision-order motions were all to no avail, resulting in further success for Mr. Steinberg (see 2023 NY Slip Op 63302[U] [2d Dept] [Plaintiff's motions to reargue court's decision-order, for leave to appeal to Court of Appeals from court's decision-order, and to stay enforcement of court's decision-order denied]; 39 NY3d 927 [2022] [Plaintiff's appeal dismissed]; 39 NY3d 1056 [2023] [Plaintiff's appeal dismissed]; 39 NY3d 1150 [2023] [Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of dismissal order denied]; 39 NY3d 1180 [2023] [Plaintiff's appeal and motion for leave to appeal dismissed]). Needless to say, these successful results obtained for his client — as described above — strongly boosted Oceana’s counsel’s application for attorney’s fees. (H) Opposition by Plaintiff Plaintiff’s counsel filed various affirmations in opposition to this motion by Oceana, much of it combined with his arguments in support of additional motions he made here in Supreme Court. Rather than focus on how this Court should approach calculating costs and attorney’s fees or how criminal sanctions are to be imposed, Plaintiff’s counsel offered arguments repeatedly rejected by Justice King and/or the Appellate Division or which were designed to delay the inevitable. Included among the arguments advanced were: Nothing should proceed until the appeals to the Court of Appeals are exhausted23 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 378 at 3-4). Justice King told him in July 2018 he could proceed with the December 19, 2017 abstract of judgment against Aron Bronstein (see id. at 3, 6). Being held in criminal contempt after she told him this is unconstitutional; it is the same as being arrested for trespassing when one has a license to enter the property; it is like a licensed attorney being arrested for practicing law without a license; it is like being arrested for marijuana in a state where it is legal (see id. at 6). There is no standing for a contempt order since Mr. Steinberg does not represent parties allegedly aggrieved by Plaintiff’s request for a subpoena (see id. at 9). Counsel’s goal was legitimate — to obtain information to collect the judgment on behalf of Plaintiff (see id. at 10). “Oceana Holding Corp pay rolled and/ upon information and belief colluded with my employer where my notary was forged to notarize the signature of William Goodman who was dead at the time forgery” (NYSCEF Doc No. 387 at 4). Plaintiff’s counsel is unemployed and has no money; his last job was a sham employment where his employer was on Oceana’s payroll (see NYSCEF Doc No. 388 at 4). “I have documentary evidence to prove Oceana Holding Corp. pay rolled my employer and also witness that will be able to testify if this Court so wishes” (NYSCEF Doc No. 389 at 5). The closest Plaintiff came to offering arguments over what this Court must decide on remittal from the Appellant Division — making calculations — were the following statements: The amount of attorney fees that Mr. Steinberg seeks is unreasonable considering Oceana is not an aggrieved party and there for Mr. Steinberg is not entitled to receive attorney fees for a client that never retained him. See the email below evidencing that I only subpoenaed parties that are not Daniel [S]teinberg’s clients[.] (NYSCEF Doc No. 381 at 2.) The amount of attorney fees, costs and disbursements in Steinberg affirmation of legal services are unreasonable because it includes billable hours, costs and disbursements for work outside the scope of the 6 subpoenas mentioned by the appellate Court. See below (May 18, 2022 appellate Court order page 6). (NYSCEF Doc No. 387 at 2.) This ignores the fact that Plaintiff’s counsel issued a total of ten subpoenas, not just six (see Madigan, 205 AD3d at 907; NYSCEF Doc No. 362 at 6). Also amount of attorney fees, costs and disbursements are unreasonable because Mr. Steinberg fails to provide all receipts for his costs and charges for an unreasonable time and unreasonable billable hour. (NYSCEF Doc No. 388 at 2.) Steinberg seeking attorneys fees at an unreasonable rate and at an unreasonable time, are excessive…. (Id. at 4.) The amount of attorney fees, costs and disbursements in Steinberg affirmation of legal services are unreasonable because Daniel Steinberg Misrepresented that he receives money from Rosa Bronstein. See Docket 367 where it lists Judgment debtor Aron O. Bronstein and not Rosa Bronstein as receiving Daniel Steinberg’s bills. See below affidavit of expert showing that judgment debtor Aron O. Bronstein runs Oceana Holding Corp by forging Rosa Bronstein signatures. (NYSCEF Doc No. 389 at 5.) It includes billable hours, costs and disbursements for work outside the scope of the 6 subpoenas mentioned by the appellate Court. (Id. at 6.) Again, it is noted that Plaintiff’s counsel issued more than six subpoenas. Also, as for the claim that certain work was “outside the scope” of the subpoenas, this Court notes that any work related to Oceana’s efforts to maintain the stay and quash the subpoenas, including responding to Plaintiff’s vexatious motions not dealing directing with the subpoenas but seeking relief which would affect them is compensable. An example is Plaintiff’s motion to have the Court declare that the stay did not affect enforcement of a December 19, 2017 judgment. The reason is because if said judgment were not affected by the stay, the subpoenas could then be used with respect to that judgment. Justice King notably ordered inter alia that “All subpoenas previously issued by plaintiff’s counsel are [ ]quashed including, but not limited to, all those issued…whether under the caption of this case or any other related caption” (NYSCEF Doc No. 361 at 3-4). This Court finds it irrelevant that Mr. Steinberg represents Oceana and not the persons or entities who received subpoenas. In opposing these subpoenas he was protecting Oceana’s financial interests inasmuch as the purpose of the subpoenas was to obtain information tending to support Plaintiff’s claim that Aron Bronstein’s assets were hidden within Oceana’s books. Further, even if Mr. Steinberg was also representing Rosa Bronstein (Aron Bronstein’s mother) or even Aron Bronstein, it would not matter. Mr. Steinberg was retained to protect the interests of Oceana. He successfully proved that Plaintiff, by pursuing information about whether Oceana hid Mr. Bronstein’s assets, violated the Stay Order and the Protective Order. All of these actions were stayed pending a determination by the U.S. District Court into the validity and enforceability of the federal judgments. It matters not whether Mr. Paukman’s signature was forged at this point in the litigation. Whether Oceana concealed money stolen by Aron Bronstein cannot be pursued through post-judgment discovery here and now. The facts remain that court orders prevented Plaintiff from pursuing its efforts to locate Aron Bronstein’s assets by fishing into Oceana’s financial business at this stage, and that Plaintiff violated the court orders. Once the U.S. District Court determines “the issues concerning the validity and enforceability of the Georgia Judgment and/or Criminal Case Judgment, any party may apply for such relief from [Justice King's] order as may be just and proper….” (NYSCEF Doc No. 360, Stay Order at 3 [emphasis added]). What Plaintiff and her counsel do not understand is that orders of courts must be obeyed, even if she or her counsel feel aggrieved, and that is why the Appellate Division remitted this case back to this Court — to make financial calculations as to how much they must pay for disobeying the Supreme Court’s orders issued by Justice King. Regarding the attorney’s fees, before this Court is merely the issue of how to calculate the payments that must be made by Plaintiff and her counsel pursuant to the directive of the Appellate Division. As for Plaintiff’s counsel’s arguments concerning the unreasonableness of the amounts sought by Oceana’s counsel, this Court’s response has been to scrutinize the billing of Oceana’s counsel (see below). (I) Calculation of Attorney’s Fees A problem which this Court encountered in calculating the amount of the attorney’s fees to award Oceana was that the totals of the individual bills submitted (see NYSCEF Doc No. 367) exceeded the total amount (divided by categories) set forth in Daniel S. Steinberg’s affirmation of legal services (see NYSCEF Doc No. 365 33 at 12). At oral argument, counsel argued that the bills were pruned to eliminate various entries. However, the sums of the categories (see id.
