MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION On January 25, 2023, Plaintiff Brian-Richard Vanwyckhouse (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against Defendant Tessy Plastics (“Defendant”) asserting employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e et seq., and common law negligence. See Dkt. No. 1. On March 21, 2023, following permission from the Court, Defendant filed the instant motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. See Dkt. No. 20. Plaintiff opposes the motion and Defendant has filed a reply. See Dkt. Nos. 23-24. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion is granted. II. BACKGROUND According to the complaint, on or around August 9, 2021, Defendant’s “HR Director emailed the new guidance to follow on masks/vaccinations. It stated, ‘If unvaccinated you must wear your mask or will face disciplinary action up to and including termination.’” Dkt. No. 1 at 11. On or about that same day, “Plaintiff was called into HR where the HR representative and the Production Manager were seated.” Id. at 12. Plaintiff communicated that Defendant does not “have the right to make anyone where [sic] the masks” and that “Plaintiff has God given rights to refuse.” Id. Moreover, Plaintiff “questioned the validity of the data that [] Defendant was relying on by the CDC and any other health agency that was involved in the Covid-19 pandemic.” Id. Plaintiff asked “What happens if the information [] Defendant is giving out is wrong?” Id. Plaintiff further “stated that Defendant has an obligation to keep the Plaintiff and all the employees safe.” Id. The meeting ended after “Plaintiff was asked to leave by the HR representative and walked out by the Production Manager.” Dkt. No. 1 at 12. Defendant issued Plaintiff “a 3-day suspension…for failure to follow the CDC guidelines and [] Defendant['s] policy on mask wearing.” Id. The HR representative told Plaintiff “3 different times” that he “was not being fired.” Id. However, on or around August 11, 2021, Defendant informed Plaintiff by phone that “Defendant was not taking Plaintiff back.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff received no stated reason as to why. See id. Days later, on August 16, 2021, “Plaintiff received Separation Notice from Defendant with no mention of why Plaintiff was terminated.” Id. at 14. On or about that same day, “Plaintiff received life insurance information on Plaintiff['s] policy through [] Defendant with ‘Resignation’” cited as the basis for his termination. Id. at 15. On or around November 16, 2021, Plaintiff received a denial letter regarding an application for unemployment benefits. See Dkt. No. 1 at 16. The denial letter stated “Plaintiff failed to follow Defendant['s] Policy as well as the CDC’s guideline on mask wearing. Plaintiff should have known [his] refusal would jeopardize Plaintiff['s] job.” Id. Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on or around April 21, 2022. See id. at 19. Plaintiff received his Right to Sue Letter on or around December 6, 2022. See id. at 22. “Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages within the jurisdictional limits of this court” and “a jury of [his] peers.” Id. at 33. III. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the party’s claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In considering the legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all wellpleaded facts in the pleading and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption of truth, however, does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citation omitted). Although a court’s review of a motion to dismiss is generally limited to the facts presented in the pleading, the court may consider documents that are “integral” to that pleading, even if they are neither physically attached to, nor incorporated by reference into, the pleading. Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual “heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (citation omitted). Under this standard, the pleading’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level,” see id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are “plausible on [their] face,” id. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of the ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Ultimately, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has “not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the [] complaint must be dismissed[,]” id. at 570. “[I]n a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than that accorded to ‘formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)) (other citations omitted). The Second Circuit has held that the court is obligated to “make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants” from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights merely because they lack a legal education. Id. (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). Thus, a “document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’…and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). B. Title VII Discrimination Under Title VII, “[i]t is unlawful for an employer…to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual…because of such individual’s…religion[.]” E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 771-72 (2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2(a), 2000e(j)). “ The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,” and employers must “reasonably accommodate…an employee’s religious observance or practice” absent an “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e(j); Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2002) (“according to this definition, when an employee has a genuine religious practice that conflicts with a requirement of employment, his or her employer, once notified, must offer the aggrieved employee a reasonable accommodation, unless doing so would cause the employer to suffer an undue hardship”). A Title VII plaintiff alleging employment discrimination must make a showing “(1) that she is a member of a protected class, (2) that she was qualified for the position she sought, (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) can sustain a minimal burden of showing facts suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation[.]” Littlejohn v. City of N.Y., 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015). Title VII employment claims are “ subject to the burden-shifting evidentiary framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas.” Id. at 312; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). However, at initial pleading stage, “[t]he facts required by Iqbal to be alleged in the complaint need not give plausible support to the ultimate question of whether the adverse action was attributable to discrimination. They need only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 311. Defendant argues that “the Complaint fails to identify Plaintiff’s religion or any sincerely held religious belief, which is fatal to Plaintiff’s claim.” Dkt. No. 20-1 at 8 (citations omitted). Defendant further asserts that “the Complaint alleges a non-religious reason for Plaintiff’s opposition to the mask requirement, i.e., the validity of CDC data, which is equally fatal to Plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). Defendant states that “it is well-settled law that ‘political, sociological, or philosophical’ beliefs cannot form the basis for a Title VII religious discrimination claim.” Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, Defendant asserts that “Plaintiff’s Title VII claim also fails because the Complaint does not allege that [Defendant] had knowledge of Plaintiff’s religion or any related sincerely held religious beliefs.” Id. (citations omitted). Finally, Defendant contends that “the only allegation in the Complaint even alluding to a purported religious belief — i.e., that ‘Plaintiff has God given rights to refuse’ to comply with the mask mandate — has been found to be insufficient as a matter of law to survive a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 10 (collecting cases). Plaintiff responds, in relevant part, that Title VII’s definition of “religion” includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice as well as belief,” including “religious beliefs that are new, uncommon, not part of a formal church or sect, only subscribed to by a small number of people, or that seem illogical or unreasonable to others.” Dkt. No. 23 at 9. Likewise, Plaintiff asserts that “[a] belief is ‘religious’ for Title VII purposes if it is ‘religious’ in the person’s ‘own scheme of things,’ i.e., it is a ‘sincere and meaningful’ belief[.]” Id. Plaintiff argues that “ [r]eligious beliefs include theistic beliefs as well as non-theistic ‘moral or ethical beliefs as to that [sic] what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.’” Id. at 10. Herein, the Court finds that the complaint fails to plausibly allege that Plaintiff’s employer discriminated against him on the basis of religion. After thoroughly reviewing the complaint’s allegations, and Plaintiff’s opposition to the instant motion, it is obvious that the controversy athand stems from Plaintiff’s objections to the validity of CDC guidelines and government directives regarding COVID-19 — not any sincere religious beliefs. By way of example, Plaintiff adduces numerous authorities concerning “[t]he principle that individuals should not be coerced to receive an unlicensed medical product[.]” Dkt. No. 23 at 7-8 (citing 21 U.S.C. §360bbb-3(e)(1)(A)(ii)(I-III); Doe #1 v. Rumsfeld, 297 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2003); 21 C.F.R. §§50.23, 50.24; 21; Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 184 (2d Cir. 2009)). And as argued by Defendant, Plaintiff’s authorities demonstrate that he is improperly attempting to expand the definition of religion to include political, sociological, or philosophical beliefs. See Dkt. No. 20-1 at 8 (citations omitted). While Plaintiff’s opposition arguments severely undermine his discrimination claim, even when overlooking same, the complaint fails to allege that either vaccination or mask-wearing is offensive to Plaintiff’s religion. Instead, as referenced above, the allegations concern Plaintiff’s belief that Defendant (in reliance on governmental guidelines and/or directives) cannot lawfully compel an unvaccinated employee to wear a mask at work. See Dkt. No. 1 at
