MEMORANDUM AND ORDER On May 25, 2022, pro se Plaintiff, Zhongsai Xu (“Xu” or “Plaintiff”) commenced this action against the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and the Development Manager of Queens B’nai B’rith House (“BBH”), who Plaintiff refers to as “Carlos.”1 In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Carlos and Defendant HUD (together, “Defendants”) either effectuated or failed to address an increase in his monthly rent, which he contends is a violation of his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and a violation of a national policy, pursuant to Section 202 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1959, 12 U.S.C. §1701q, which purportedly limits rental payments by residents of “elderly housing” to one-third of their monthly income. Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of a reduction in his rent. On February 17, 2023, Defendant HUD moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendant HUD alleges that Plaintiff failed to establish standing because there is no causal connection between Plaintiff’s injury and HUD, that Plaintiff failed to identify a relevant waiver of sovereign immunity as to HUD, and that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against HUD. Defendant HUD also contends that Plaintiff failed to properly serve HUD, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. By order dated April 6, 2023, the Court referred Defendant HUD’s motion to dismiss to Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom for a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b). Presently before the Court is the Report and Recommendation issued on July 20, 2023 by Magistrate Judge Bloom, recommending that this Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant HUD for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). (ECF No. 33, the “R&R”.) Magistrate Judge Bloom also recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Carlos, sua sponte, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R&R at 13.) Also before the Court are Plaintiff’s timely objections to the R&R (ECF Nos. 34, “July 24, 2023 Ptf. Obj.”; 35, “August 2, 2023 Ptf. Obj.”; and 36, “August 4, 2023 Ptf. Obj.”; all together, “Plaintiff’s Objections”) and Defendant HUD’s Response to Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 38, “Defs. Resp.”) Defendant Carlos has not filed any response to Plaintiff’s Objections, nor has Carlos otherwise responded to Plaintiff’s Complaint. For the reasons stated below, upon de novo review, the Court respectfully overrules Plaintiff’s Objections, adopts and affirms Magistrate Judge Bloom’s R&R in its entirety, and accordingly, orders that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants be dismissed without prejudice. BACKGROUND The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the extensive facts thoroughly recounted in the R&R. See (R&R at 1-5.) The Court has reviewed the facts de novo and adapts the detailed facts from the R&R. LEGAL STANDARD In considering the recommendations of a Magistrate Judge, as outlined in an R&R, the Court may “accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the Magistrate with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). When a party makes a timely objection to an R&R, the Court must review de novo those recommendations in the R&R to which the party objects. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1997). However, even “on de novo review, [a district court] will ordinarily refuse to consider arguments, case law and/or evidentiary material which could have been, but [were] not, presented to the Magistrate Judge in the first instance.” Haynes v. Quality Markets, No. 02-CV-0250, 2003 WL 23610575, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2003). As to the portions of the R&R to which no party objects, the Court “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record.” Galvez v. Aspen Corp., 967 F. Supp. 2d 615, 617 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If “the [objecting] party makes only frivolous, conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates [his] original arguments, the Court reviews the report and recommendation only for clear error.” Velez v. DNF Assocs., LLC, No. 19-CV-11138, 2020 WL 6946513, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2020) (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, where the objections are “merely perfunctory responses, argued in an attempt to engage the district court in a rehashing of the same arguments set forth in the original petition, reviewing courts should review [the R&R] for clear error” only. Chen v. New Trend Apparel, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d 406, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Silva v. Peninsular Hotel, 509 F. Supp. 2d 364, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Objections are of a general nature and largely restate his previously articulated arguments, which triggers the Court’s review of the R&R for clear error. Objections that are “conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterate[] [the objecting party's] original arguments” require only clear error review. Barratt v. Joie, No. 96-CV-0324, 2002 WL 335014, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2002). Nevertheless, because the Court must construe pro se complaints liberally and interpret the Complaint to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest, Meadows v. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020), the Court applies both clear error and de novo review to Plaintiff’s Objections. DISCUSSION I. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendant HUD A. Article III Standing Article III of the U.S. Constitution confers jurisdiction over only “cases” or “controversies” to federal courts. U.S. Const. art. III, §2. This limitation on “the judicial power of the federal courts” requires that plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims. Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 492 F.3d 89, 110 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Article III of the Constitution limits [] judicial power…to the adjudication of ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ Aspects of this generalized limitation are classified in terms of whether a plaintiff has standing”); see also (R&R at 8) (“[i]f a plaintiff lacks standing to bring their claims, a federal court is deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims”) (internal citations omitted). A plaintiff has standing to bring suit where they “satisf[y] Article III’s requirements of injury-in-fact, causation and redressability.” Keepers, Inc. v. City of Milford, 807 F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir. 2015). In her meticulously reasoned R&R, Magistrate Judge Bloom found that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate either causation or redressability, and that Plaintiff’s Complaint should therefore be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court construes Plaintiff’s Objections, which largely focus on the relationship between Defendant HUD and Defendant Carlos, to oppose Magistrate Judge Bloom’s findings with respect to the causation element of Article III standing. The Court therefore reviews the R&R’s standing analysis de novo, and addresses injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability in turn. i. Injury-in-fact Plaintiff’s alleged injury is the March 2019 rental increase from approximately $688 per month to approximately $1,521 per month. (R&R at 2) (citing Compl. at 8, 14.) “Injury-in-fact is a ‘low threshold’” that requires only a showing of “‘a legally protected interest…that is concrete and particularized[.]‘” Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 343 F. Supp. 3d 122, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Plaintiff claims his alleged injury, the rental increase, constitutes a violation of the “national policy that the residents of the elderly housing use one-third of their income that month to pay rent[.]” (Compl. at 12.) Plaintiff points to “ Section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959″ as the source of this alleged “national policy,” which supports his assertion of a legally protected interest in reduced rent. At the motion to dismiss stage, virtually any “identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle” as it relates to an alleged injury-infact. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131, 143 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has alleged an injury-in-fact. ii. Causation As to the cause of Plaintiff’s alleged injury, Magistrate Judge Bloom found that Plaintiff failed to “demonstrate a causal nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the injury” alleged, (R&R at 8) (quoting Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013)) because “plaintiff does not assert any facts establishing a contractual or legally cognizable relationship between himself and HUD.” (R&R at 9.) In Plaintiff’s Objections, he asserts that “[t]he real estate department2 has a certain responsibility for supervision and inspection” and points to the fact that “[t]he document to be signed by [Plaintiff] [to certify his income] was a form uniformly issued in the name of the real estate department” as evidence of Defendant HUD’s involvement in the allegedly illegal rent increase. (July 24, 2023 Ptf. Obj. at 1.) Plaintiff, however, contradicts his own allegations that “the Ministry of Housing” is the “mastermind behind the scenes” and worked with others to commit the “joint crime, gang crime and organized crime” of “defrauding the money of a 65-year-old man,” (Aug. 4, 2023 Ptf. Obj at 1) by repeatedly asserting that Defendant HUD may not have had knowledge of or any direct involvement in the rental increase. (July 25, 2023 Ptf. Obj. at 1) (“it may [be the case that] the real estate department has no direct legal responsibility”); (Id) (“I can withdraw the lawsuit against the real estate department); (Aug. 4, 2023 Ptf. Obj. at 1) (“[i]f we improperly listed the real estate department as the defendant, the court could have given technical help.”) As noted in the R&R, even construing Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, Plaintiff fails to point to any facts supporting his conclusion that Defendant HUD was involved in or responsible for the rental increase. See Drimal v. Tai, 786 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[c]ourts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation…[the motion to dismiss standard] demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, Plaintiff cannot provide any facts supporting his assertion that Defendant HUD was involved in his rental increase, either directly or indirectly, because Defendant HUD “plays no role in determining plaintiff’s rent and [] since 2012, [the Queens B'nai B'rith Housing Development Fund Company, Inc. ("HDFC"), not HUD,] has been exclusively responsible for annually certifying plaintiff’s income and calculating plaintiff’s rent[.]” (R&R at 9) (citing ECF No. 29-1, “ Mot. to Dismiss” at 8.) Under the “Section 202 Use Agreement, HDFC [not Defendant HUD] promised to maintain BBH…[and] assumed responsibility for determining the appropriate rent for each tenant, working with tenants to certify their income…and collect[] rent.” (R&R at 3-4) (citing ECF No. 29-2, “Gioia Decl.”
