DECISION AND ORDER I. BACKGROUND This case involves an alleged illegal gambling business operated at 565 Blossom Road in Rochester, New York, and an alleged illegal bookmaking business operated through the website sport700.com. Seven defendants have been named in a five-count indictment returned on June 29, 2023, including defendant Jeffrey Boscarino (“Boscarino”), who is charged with three counts: (1) conspiracy to transmit wagering information in interstate commerce and conduct of an illegal gambling business — bookmaking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371; (2) transmission of wagering information in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1084(a), 2, and pursuant to Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); and (3) conduct of an illegal gambling business — bookmaking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1955, 2 and pursuant to Pinkerton. (Dkt. 50). Boscarino is alleged to have acted as a sub-agent, under defendant Louis P. Ferrari II (“Ferrari”), in the illegal bookmaking business operated through sport700.com. (Id. at 6). Even before the indictment was returned in this case, Boscarino was seeking to “invoke his speedy trial rights” and proceed immediately with a trial. (See Dkt. 44; Dkt. 46; Dkt. 48; Dkt. 55). Currently pending before the Court is Boscarino’s motion for severance. (Dkt. 73). The government opposes the motion. (Dkt. 77). Oral argument was held before the undersigned on August 25, 2023 (Dkt. 81) and after a further status conference on September 25, 2023, the motion was taken under advisement (see Dkt. 106). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied without prejudice. II. DISCUSSION Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, “[i]f the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a).1 The decision to sever a trial pursuant to Rule 14 is “confided to the sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Feyrer, 333 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2003). A trial court’s decision concerning severance is considered “virtually unreviewable,” and the denial of such a motion “will not be reversed unless appellants establish that the trial court abused its discretion.” United States v. Cardascia, 951 F.2d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). In order to successfully challenge the denial of a request for severance, a defendant “must establish prejudice so great as to deny him a fair trial.” Id. “When defendants properly have been joined under Rule 8(b),2 a district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” United States v. Astra Motor Cars, 352 F. Supp. 2d 367, 369-70 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (alteration omitted and quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993)); see also Cardascia, 951 F.2d at 482 (in order to successfully challenge the denial of a request for severance, a defendant “must establish prejudice so great as to deny him a fair trial”); United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 563 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he defendant must show that he or she suffered prejudice so substantial as to amount to a ‘miscarriage of justice.’” (quoting United States v. Bari, 750 F.2d 1169, 1177 (2d Cir. 1984)). “[D]iffering levels of culpability and proof are inevitable in any multi-defendant trial and, standing alone, are insufficient grounds for separate trials.” United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 557 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). “That the defendant would have had a better chance of acquittal at a separate trial does not constitute substantial prejudice.” United States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351, 366 (2d Cir. 1983). There is a powerful presumption in favor of joint trials of defendants indicted together based upon the underlying policies of efficiency, avoiding inconsistent verdicts, providing a “more accurate assessment of relative culpability,” avoiding victims and witnesses having to testify repeatedly, and avoiding the random favoring of “the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of knowing the prosecutor’s case beforehand.” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (citation omitted); see also Cardascia, 951 F.2d at 482 (“The deference given by an appellate court to a trial court’s severance decision reflects the policy favoring joinder of trials, especially when the underlying crime involves a common plan or scheme and defendants have been jointly indicted.”). The Second Circuit has instructed that “[c]onsiderations of efficiency and consistency militate in favor of trying jointly defendants who were indicted together. . . .” United States v. Spinelli, 352 F.3d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Van Sichem, No. SS 89 CR. 813 (KMW), 1990 WL 41746, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1990) (“There is a strong presumption in favor of joint trials for jointly indicted defendants, particularly where, as here, the ‘crimes charged involve a common scheme or plan.’”) (alteration omitted and quoting United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)). Applying these standards here, there is no reasonable argument that Boscarino’s case should be severed. Boscarino argues that he played a minimal role with the allegations in this case — and at best, only had interactions with Ferrari with whom he simply placed bets for himself. (Dkt. 73-1 at
