MEMORANDUM & ORDER On July 27, 2021, a federal grand jury sitting in Central Islip, New York, returned an indictment charging Defendant Uriel Whyte (hereinafter, “Whyte”) with being a felon-in-possession of ammunition on January 26, 2020 in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 3351 et seq. (Count One), and with being a felon-in-possession of a firearm on April 9, 2020, also in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 3351 et seq. (Count Two). (See ECF No. 1.) On August 30, 2021, Whyte was arraigned on the two-count indictment. (See ECF No. 9.) Thereafter, Whyte filed three motions currently pending before the Court. On May 2, 2023, Whyte filed a motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement officers following his arrest on April 9, 2020. (See Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 28.) Whyte contends the statements should be suppressed because they were obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. (See id.) On October 3, 2023, Whyte filed a second motion to suppress physical evidence — specifically, the black Smith and Wesson 9mm pistol recovered by law enforcement on the day of his arrest. (See Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 40.) Whyte seeks suppression of the physical evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the firearm was seized prior to the issuance of a search warrant. (See id.) Also on October 3, 2023, Whyte filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as applied to him, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). (See id.) For the following reasons, Whyte’s motions are DENIED in their entirety, without need for a hearing. I. BACKGROUND A. Facts The following facts are drawn from Whyte’s declaration in support of his motion to suppress statements, (ECF Nos. 28, 41), and the Government’s memorandum in opposition to that motion, (ECF No. 29). Any inconsistencies or conflicts between the two are noted. 1. Whyte’s Relevant Criminal History1 As discussed below, Whyte’s criminal history is relevant to his motion to suppress statements (in the context of Miranda warnings) and to his motion to dismiss the indictment (in the context of as-applied challenges to §922(g)(1)). Prior to his arrest on April 9, 2020, Whyte had a lengthy criminal history dating back to 2004. (See Gov’t Opp’n at 2-4, ECF No. 29.) Most relevant to the instant motions is that Whyte has been convicted of five felonies committed in Nassau County, two of which were violent.2 In August 2005, Whyte was arrested for robbery in the second degree on two separate occasions. In connection with those arrests, Whyte was convicted of robbery in the second degree and sentenced to 3.5 years’ imprisonment. In 2013, Whyte was arrested on felony assault and weapons charges, and later pleaded guilty to the felony weapons charge in August 2016. On the felony weapons charge, Whyte was sentenced to a term of 3 to 6 years’ imprisonment.3 In November 2014, while incarcerated on the felony weapons charge, Whyte was arrested for a felony prison contraband charge, an offense to which he ultimately pleaded guilty and received an indeterminate term of 2 to 4 years’ imprisonment. Prior to Whyte’s felony weapons and felony prison contraband convictions, Whyte was not in custody. While the two cases were pending, Whyte was arrested several more times.4 In December 2015, for example, Whyte was arrested for felony assault and weapons possession. As a result of that arrest, Whyte was convicted of attempted assault in the second degree — a felony — and sentenced to 1.5 to 3 years’ imprisonment. While detained pending the outcome of the charges related to his 2013, 2014, and two 2015 arrests, Whyte was once again arrested on a felony prison contraband charge in March 2016. Whyte ultimately pleaded guilty to the felony charge and received an indeterminate term of 2 to 4 years’ imprisonment. In 2019, Whyte completed his prison terms related to the panoply of felonies described above.5 In sum, Whyte has been convicted of five felonies to date and has been arrested several more times. Thus, when arrested by the Hempstead Village Police Department (“HPD”) on April 9, 2020, Whyte was someone who was well versed in the criminal justice system. 2. Whyte’s Instant Criminal Conduct, Arrest, and Post-Arrest Statements a. The 911 Calls At approximately 1:06 p.m. on April 9, 2020, HPD received a 911 call from a civilian requesting that police be sent to 12 Bernhard Street in Hempstead, New York (“12 Bernhard”). During the call, the civilian stated, “this shit is bananas” and asked “can you send an officer” before hanging up without providing additional information. About two minutes later, at 1:08 p.m., HPD received a second 911 call from the same civilian. On the second call, the civilian identified herself as Priscilla Alexandre (hereinafter, “Alexandre”). Alexandre stated, “there’s a dispute going on,” “my kids are inside,” and the “guy who supposedly owns the house” had “a black gun.” Alexandre provided a description of the clothing the man with the gun was wearing, reported that she was “six months pregnant,” and continued requesting police assistance at 12 Bernhard. Following receipt of the 911 calls, HPD dispatched Police Officers Diana Reyes and Patrick Estelle to 12 Bernhard. b. Police Arrival at 12 Bernhard At approximately 1:12 p.m., the officers arrived at 12 Bernhard and met with Alexandre in front of the residence. Alexandre informed the officers that Whyte — whom she had rented her apartment from — had entered her apartment without her permission, damaged her teenage son’s cellular phone, and pointed a gun at her and her child. Officers Reyes and Estelle also observed Whyte moving within the residence from room to room and acting erratically.6 c. Whyte’s Arrest While outside 12 Bernhard, the officers repeatedly requested that Whyte exit the residence, but Whyte refused. After several minutes, Whyte came to the front door, and the HPD officers again asked him to come outside.7 Whyte did not comply. Based on the information Alexandre had reported on the 911 calls and outside 12 Bernhard, the officers attempted to place Whyte under arrest for menacing Alexandre with a firearm. Whyte resisted arrest. The officers, unaware if Whyte possessed a firearm at that point, attempted to subdue him by deploying a single taser shot before he could close the door. Whyte was then placed under arrest at approximately 1:40 p.m. The officers never saw Whyte with a firearm or any other weapon. In keeping with standard practice when a taser is deployed during an arrest, Whyte was transported to Nassau University Medical Center Hospital (“NUMC”), where he was found to be fit for confinement. (See Gov’t Opp’n, Ex. A, ECF No. 29-1.) Thereafter, NUMC discharged Whyte to the custody of HPD officers, who transported him to the HPD for arrest processing. d. Search of 12 Bernhard While Whyte was being taken to NUMC, members of law enforcement secured the scene at 12 Bernhard and simultaneously applied for a warrant to search the premises for the firearm Whyte reportedly pointed at Alexandre.8 At approximately 7:07 p.m., the Honorable Tammy S. Robbins, an Acting Nassau County Supreme Court Justice, authorized the search warrant for 12 Bernhard. Law enforcement then conducted a search of 12 Bernhard and recovered a black Smith and Wesson 9mm pistol (the “Firearm”) in a crawl space inside the residence. e. Whyte Signs First Rights Card While in custody at the HPD, at approximately 6:00 p.m., HPD detectives Anthony Cousins and Juan Miranda advised Whyte of his Miranda rights by reading them from a standard, preprinted form used by the Nassau County police agencies. (See Gov’t Opp’n, Ex. B, ECF No. 29-2 (“First Rights Card”).) After being verbally advised of his Miranda rights, Whyte was given the First Rights Card to review and sign. Whyte verbally, and in writing, indicated his understanding of his rights and his willingness to speak to law enforcement. (See id.) f. Whyte Signs Second Rights Card Later that evening, at approximately 10:15 p.m. — after law enforcement had completed the search of 12 Bernhard and retrieved the Firearm — detectives from the Nassau County Police Department (“NCPD”) Gang Investigations Squad (“GIS”) reported to HPD to interview Whyte. Before the interview, Whyte was once again read Miranda warnings from a separate copy of the same pre-printed form (“Second Rights Card”). After verbally advising Whyte of his Miranda rights, the NCPD GIS detectives gave Whyte the Second Rights Card to review and sign. Again, Whyte verbally and in writing indicated his understanding of his rights and his willingness to speak with law enforcement. (See Gov’t Opp’n, Ex. C, ECF No. 29-3.9) However, unlike when he reviewed the First Rights Card, Whyte was not willing to provide or sign a written statement. (See Gov’t Opp’n at 7, ECF No. 29.) g. Whyte’s Post-Arrest Statements According to the Government, following Whyte’s second agreement to waive his Miranda rights, the NCPD GIS detectives questioned him about the events of April 9, 2020. The NCPD GIS detectives also questioned Whyte about the events of a January 26, 2020, shooting they were investigating.10 During the ensuing conversation, Whyte made several statements about the incident on April 9, 2020. Specifically, Whyte told the detectives that: (i) he rented rooms out at 12 Bernhard for a friend and was paid a piece of the rent; (ii) he got into an argument with a female tenant over overdue rent; (iii) the female tenant showed up with another male who acted aggressively towards him; and (iv) he told the female tenant, “I will shoot him if he comes near me.” (Gov’t Opp’n at 7-8, ECF No. 29.) When discussing the January 26, 2020, shooting, Whyte told the NCPD GIS detectives that: (i) on the day of the shooting, he got into an argument with an individual at a deli and put his hands on the individual outside in the parking lot; and (ii) he left the deli and shot at the car containing the individual. (See Gov’t Opp’n at 8, ECF No. 29.) When the NCPD GIS detectives asked Whyte if the firearm recovered from 12 Bernhard was the same firearm that was used in the January 26, 2020, shooting, Whyte answered “yes.”11 Whyte also told the detectives that the Firearm was not loaded. B. Procedural History On July 27, 2021, a federal grand jury sitting in Central Islip, New York, returned an indictment charging Whyte with being a felon-in-possession of ammunition on January 26, 2020, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 3351 et seq. (Count One) and with being a felon-in-possession of a firearm on April 9, 2020, also in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 3351 et seq. (Count Two). (See ECF No. 1.) On August 30, 2021, Whyte was arraigned on the two-count indictment. (See ECF No. 9.) Thereafter, Whyte filed three motions currently pending before the Court. On May 2, 2023, Whyte filed a motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement officers following his arrest on April 9, 2020. (See Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 28.) The Government filed its memorandum in opposition on May 12, 2023. (See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 29.) Whyte filed a reply on May 19, 2023. (See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 30.) Whyte submitted a signed declaration in support of his motion on October 3, 2023. (See Def’s Decl., Ex. A, ECF No. 41.) Also on October 3, 2023, Whyte filed, simultaneously, a second motion to suppress evidence and a motion to dismiss the indictment. (See Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 40.) The Government filed its memorandum in opposition on October 19, 2023. (See Gov’t Opp’n, ECF No. 42.) Whyte filed a reply on November 17, 2023. (See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 43.) Whyte did not submit a signed declaration in support of his motion to suppress the physical evidence and his motion to dismiss the indictment. II. DISCUSSION A. Motion to Suppress Statements Whyte asks the Court to suppress his post-arrest statements made at the HPD on the basis that they were obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Alternatively, he asks the Court to grant a hearing on the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues raised. The Government opposes Whyte’s requests. The Court addresses the parties’ arguments according to the submissions provided. 1. Fourth Amendment Claim Whyte argues that his stationhouse statements are subject to exclusion as the “fruit” of a Fourth Amendment violation — that being: his warrantless arrest inside 12 Bernhard despite having a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence. (See Def.’s Mem. at 9, ECF No. 28 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963)).) The Government argues that Whyte’s Fourth Amendment claim is without merit because his arrest was supported by probable cause. The Court agrees with the Government. For reasons that follow, the Court denies Whyte’s motion to suppress his statements on Fourth Amendment grounds, without need for a hearing. a. Applicable Law The Fourth Amendment protects “‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures’ and prohibits the issuance of warrants without ‘probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’” United States v. Jones, 43 F.4th 94, 108 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). “To safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally, the Supreme Court has crafted the exclusionary rule, requiring the exclusion of evidence when the police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights.” United States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In Payton v. New York, the Supreme Court held that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers “from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a routine felony arrest.” 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980); see also United States v. Allen, 813 F.3d 76, 77-78 (2d Cir. 2016). However, ten years later in New York v. Harris, the Supreme Court stated that the “rule in Payton was designed to protect the physical integrity of the home; it was not intended to grant criminal suspects…protection for statements made outside their premises where the police have probable cause to arrest the suspect for committing a crime.” 495 U.S. 14, 17 (1990). Thus, “[w]here the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State’s use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of [the Fourth Amendment].” Id. at 14. Here, Whyte made his post-arrest statements inside the HPD stationhouse, not inside 12 Bernhard. Accordingly, New York v. Harris controls this case, so long as probable cause supported Whyte’s arrest.12 If New York v. Harris applies, Whyte’s challenge to the admissibility of his post-arrest statements on Fourth Amendment grounds would be foreclosed. It is well-settled that “a warrantless arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless the arresting officer has probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed.” United States v. Delossantos, 536 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004)). “Probable cause exists if a law enforcement official, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, has sufficient knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information to justify a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” United States v. Steppello, 664 F.3d 359, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted). The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the probable cause standard is “a practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, “[b]ecause the standard is fluid and contextual, a court must examine the totality of the circumstances of a given arrest.” Delossantos, 536 F.3d at 159 (citing Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371)). b. Discussion Here, the undisputed facts make clear that the officers had probable cause to believe Whyte committed a crime when they arrested him. As explained above, Alexandre called 911 twice, each time requesting police officers be sent to 12 Bernhard. During her first 911 call, Alexandre reported “this shit is bananas.” (Gov’t Opp’n at 4, ECF No. 29.) During her second 911 call, about two minutes later, she reported that “there’s a dispute going on,” “my kids are inside,” and that the “guy that supposedly owns the house” had “a black gun.” (Id.) Alexandre also provided a description of the clothing the man with the gun was wearing. (See id. at 4-5.) Additionally, upon arrival at 12 Bernhard, the HPD officers met Alexandre outside the residence, where she further reported that Whyte had entered her apartment without her permission, damaged her teenage son’s cellular phone, and pointed a gun at her and her child.13 (See id. at 5.) While outside 12 Bernhard, the officers were able to identify Whyte moving from room to room within the residence and acting erratically, based on Alexandre’s description of his clothing.14 (See id.) Considering the totality of these circumstances — specifically, Alexandre’s reports to 911 and the HPD officers, coupled with the officers’ own observations at 12 Bernhard — the officers undoubtedly had probable cause to arrest Whyte. See Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006) (“‘[I]t is well-established that a law enforcement official has probable cause to arrest if he received his information from some person, normally the putative victim or eyewitness….’” (quoting Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000))). At the time the officers arrested Whyte, they had sufficient probable cause to believe that he committed several crimes, including weapons possession, menacing, and trespassing, among others. (See Gov’t Opp’n at 12, ECF No. 29.) Accordingly, the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of Whyte’s post-arrest statements at the HPD because the officers arrested Whyte with probable cause. See Mosby v. Senkowski, 470 F.3d 515, 521 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Harris, 495 U.S. at 21)). This is true regardless of any Payton violation that may have occurred during Whyte’s warrantless arrest within 12 Bernhard. Therefore, Whyte’s Fourth Amendment claim is without merit. c. Whyte Does Not Create a Factual Dispute to Warrant a Hearing In the alternative to an order suppressing his post-arrest statements, Whyte requests the Court grant a hearing on the Fourth Amendment issues raised. (See Def.’s Mem. at 9, ECF No. 28.) “[A]n evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress ordinarily is required if the moving papers are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact…are in question.” United States v. Watson, 404 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Moreover, if facts urged in support of a hearing would not entitle the moving party to relief as a matter of law, no evidentiary hearing is required.” Gentile v. Cty. of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted). Ultimately, “the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing is committed to the court’s discretion.” United States v. Hamilton, 487 F. Supp. 3d 140, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). Based on these standards and the information provided in Whyte’s signed declaration, the Court concludes that Whyte has not alleged sufficiently definite disputed facts to necessitate a hearing on his Fourth Amendment claim. As set forth above, any factual dispute about Whyte’s reasonable expectation of privacy in 12 Bernhard is irrelevant because New York v. Harris controls this case. Additionally, there are sufficient uncontested material facts in the papers supporting probable cause for Whyte’s arrest to permit the Court to decide the Fourth Amendment issue without a hearing. For example, Whyte does not dispute that — upon arrival at 12 Bernhard — the HPD officers met Alexandre outside the residence, where she reported that Whyte had entered her apartment without her permission, damaged her teenage son’s cellular phone, and pointed a gun at her and her child. Whyte also does not dispute that — while outside 12 Bernhard — the officers identified him moving from room to room within the residence and acting erratically, based on Alexandre’s description of his clothing. It was the totality of these circumstances that provided the officers with probable cause to arrest Whyte, and critically Whyte does not dispute them — even under his account of the facts. Accordingly, no evidentiary hearing is required on Whyte’s Fourth Amendment claim. 2. Fifth Amendment Claim Whyte next argues his post-arrest statements must be suppressed because he did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waive his Fifth Amendment rights. (See Def.’s Mem. at 5, ECF No. 28.) The Government disagrees. (See Gov’t Opp’n at 4, ECF No. 29.) For reasons that follow, the Court denies Whyte’s motion to suppress his statements on Fifth Amendment grounds, without need for a hearing. a. Applicable Law The Court applies standards that are well-traveled. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that a “defendant may waive effectuation of” the rights conveyed in Miranda warnings “provided that waiver is made is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). “The inquiry has two distinct dimensions.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). First, “the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id. Second, “the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that Miranda rights have been waived. See id. (citing Fare v. Michael C, 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)). These circumstances include “the accused’s characteristics, the conditions of interrogation, and the conduct of law enforcement officials.” United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Lynch, 92 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying the same totality of circumstances analysis to determine “[w]hether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights”). Indeed, “the voluntariness of a waiver of [the Fifth Amendment] privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on ‘free choice’ in any broader sense of the word.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) (citing Moran, 475 U.S. at 421). When a defendant contests his Miranda waiver, “the government bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant waived his constitutional rights.” Lynch, 92 F.3d at 65. Though a defendant’s signed waiver of his Miranda rights is “highly probative” of voluntariness, United States v. Williams, 681 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985)), it is “not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). b. Discussion In this case, there is no dispute that Whyte was in custody or that he was subject to interrogation at the HPD. The sole question is whether Whyte knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Whyte contends his waiver was involuntary because, at the HPD, (i) he does not remember the police telling him anything about Miranda; (ii) he does not remember signing anything about Miranda; (iii) he remembers not feeling well; and (iv) he remembers falling asleep at one point. (See Def’s Decl., Ex. A,
