Papers Considered: 1. Defendant’s Notice of Motion (M-99434) filed May 17, 2023; 2. Affirmation of Felice V. Torres, Esq. (AAG), dated May 17, 2023, with exhibits; 3. Claimant’s Notice of Cross Motion (CM-99618) filed June 26, 2023; 4. Affirmation of Nora Constance Marino, Esq., dated June 26, 2023, with exhibits; 5. Affirmation of Felice V. Torres, Esq. (AAG), dated July 26, 2023; 6. Affirmation of Nora Constance Marino, Esq., dated August 10, 2023, with exhibits; and 7. Filed Documents: Claim, Answer and April 28, 2023 Stipulation DECISION AND ORDER In this action relating to an alleged attempted bribe and an alleged sexual assault upon Claimant by an employee of Defendant, Defendant has moved, and Claimant has cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability pursuant to CPLR 3212. Further, the parties previously submitted a stipulation to the Court wherein they agreed to stipulate to the testimony of the Claimant during her Examination Before Trial, while maintaining their ability to challenge the admissibility and relevance of certain evidence. Nonetheless, they agree that a trial on the issue of liability is unnecessary as only questions of law remain in dispute. Upon reviewing the arguments and merits of each parties’ submissions, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on liability is denied and Claimant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on liability is granted. BACKGROUND Previously in this matter, Claimant was given permission to file her claim late. By Decision and Order entered February 25, 2019, the Court (Rivera, W., J.) limited the permission given as follows: Accordingly, movant’s application is GRANTED as follows: 1) movant shall serve and file a claim in accordance with the mandates for the service and filing set forth in the Court of Claims Act, within 45 days of the filed-stamped date of this Decision and Order; 2) the claim served and filed shall be limited to the allegations that: 1) the State was negligent in its failure to monitor the road test conditions and to monitor and supervise its DMV employee, John Doe, by preventing him from directing movant to a remote area and engaging in inappropriate conduct and 2) the State was negligent in retaining John Doe because DMV knew or should have known of his propensity for inappropriate conduct. (Defendant’s Exhibit B: 2/5/19 Decision and Order at 7)(emphasis added).1 Shortly thereafter, Claimant filed her Claim in which she asserted, in relevant part: 31. That at all times hereinafter mentioned, the defendants owed a duty to plaintiff to engage in proper security measures to protect the plaintiff and other examinees of the subject driver’s license examination and failed to do same. 32. …owed a duty to plaintiff to see that its employees, agents, servants, representatives, or other, use reasonable care to protect the plaintiff and others at the subject facility, to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff, and others similarly situated. 33. That the aforementioned occurrence and the results thereof including the injuries sustained by the plaintiff were caused by and due to the negligence, carelessness and recklessness of the aforementioned defendants by failing to properly control their conduct, failing to monitor their conduct and in otherwise being negligent, reckless and careless under the circumstances. 34. That the state was negligent in tis (sic) failure to monitor the road test conditions and to monitor and supervise its DMV employee, John Doe, by preventing him from directing movant to a remote area and engaging in inappropriate conduct. 35. That the state was negligent in retaining John Doe because the State, via DMV, knew, or should have known of his propensity for inappropriate conduct. (Defendant’s Exhibit A — 2/28/19 Verified Claim:
