Julie Cianca, Public Defender, Rochester (Drew R. Dubrin of Counsel), for Defendant-Appellant. Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Scott Myles of Counsel), for Respondent. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Judith A. Sinclair, J.), rendered March 27, 2018. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his guilty plea, of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]). As defendant contends and the People correctly concede, the record does not establish that defendant validly waived his right to appeal. Supreme Court’s “oral waiver colloquy and the written waiver signed by defendant together ‘mischaracterized the nature of the right that defendant was being asked to cede, portraying the waiver as an absolute bar to defendant taking an appeal and the attendant rights to counsel and poor person relief, as well as a bar to all postconviction relief, and there is no clarifying language in either the oral or written waiver indicating that appellate review remained available for certain issues’ ” (People v. Johnson, 192 AD3d 1494, 1495 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 965 [2021]; see People v. Dearmas, 218 AD3d 1165, 1165 [4th Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 996 [2023]; People v. McCracken, 217 AD3d 1543, 1543 [4th Dept 2023]). We thus conclude that defendant’s purported waiver is not enforceable inasmuch as the totality of the circumstances fails to reveal that defendant “understood the nature of the appellate rights being waived” (People v. Thomas, 34 NY3d 545, 559 [2019], cert denied — US —, 140 S Ct 2634 [2020]). Although we are thus not precluded from reviewing defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence, we nevertheless conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.