DECISION AND ORDER INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs are nonprofit organizations working to protect animals, people, and environments from industrial animal agriculture, and to ensure that laws intended to regulate industrial animal agriculture are properly implemented. They challenge the implementation of the Modernization of Swine Slaughter Inspection, 84 Fed. Reg. 52300, promulgated by defendants the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (“FSIS”), which Plaintiffs allege “will allow nearly all of the pigs slaughtered in the United States to be slaughtered at unlimited speeds with very little federal oversight, posing serious risks to animal welfare, consumer health and safety, and the environment.” (See Dkt. 22 at 1). Presently pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, and responses thereto. (Dkt. 92; Dkt. 93; Dkt. 94; Dkt. 95). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion (Dkt. 93) is granted, Plaintiffs’ motion (Dkt. 92) is denied, and the amended complaint is dismissed. BACKGROUND1 Plaintiffs challenge a Final Rule addressing pig slaughter at swine slaughter establishments in the United States through the New Swine Inspection System (hereinafter, the “NSIS” or the “Final Rule”). The NSIS, which is a voluntary system, has three elements: (1) it requires establishment employees to perform ante-mortem and postmortem sorting activities before federal inspection; (2) it requires establishment employees to trim and identify defects on animal carcasses and parts before post-mortem inspection by FSIS inspectors, reducing the number of online FSIS inspectors to a maximum of three per line; and (3) it revokes maximum line speeds and allows establishments to set their own speeds based on their ability to maintain process control. See USDA, Modernization of Swine Slaughter Inspection, 84 Fed. Reg. 52300 (Oct. 1, 2019) (“The [FSIS]…is amending the Federal meat inspection regulations to establish an optional new inspection system for market hog slaughter establishments that has been demonstrated to provide public health protection at least equivalent to the existing inspection system.”). Plaintiffs’ challenge focuses on the first provision identified; that is, participating establishments’ employees sorting hogs before presenting them for federal ante-mortem inspection. A. Statutory Background Under the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA), 7 U.S.C. §1901, the USDA is required to ensure the humane handling of all animals at slaughterhouses. The HMSA is incorporated by reference into the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), which is a comprehensive statutory inspection scheme that regulates meat from covered species, including swine, entering interstate commerce. See 21 U.S.C. §602. The FMIA has authorized the FSIS to appoint inspectors and public health veterinarians (PHVs) to conduct ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections of carcasses intended for use as human food. Id. at §§602-604. Consistent with the FMIA, FSIS has promulgated regulations governing ante-mortem and post-mortem examinations at swine slaughter establishments. See, e.g., 9 C.F.R. 309 & 9 C.F.R. 310. B. The Traditional System Prior to the institution of the NSIS, swine establishments operated under the “traditional system,” pursuant to which, as relevant to this case, federal inspectors conducted ante-mortem inspections of all livestock offered for slaughter. During these ante-mortem inspections, federal inspectors examined the livestock, and any animals with visible signs of disease or other condemnable conditions were set apart for slaughter separately. See 9 C.F.R. §§309.1, 309.2. Defendants contend that, even prior to the institution of the NSIS and while establishments operated under the traditional system, most market hog slaughter establishments operating under the traditional system voluntarily segregated animals and set apart those showing visible adverse signs before federal inspection occurred. See USDA, Modernization of Swine Slaughter Inspection, 83 Fed. Reg. 4780, at 4783 (Feb. 1, 2018) (“Most establishments under traditional inspection that slaughter only market hogs voluntarily segregate animals that show signs of diseases or conditions from healthy animals before the Agency performs ante-mortem inspection.” (citing FSIS Directive 6100.1)). C. HACCP-Based Inspection Models Project Prior to the institution of the NSIS, the USDA developed a pilot project, termed the HACCP-Based Inspection Models Project (hereinafter, the “HIMP”), to test new inspection models in five volunteer swine slaughter establishments. See USDA, HACCPBased Meat and Poultry Inspection Concepts, 62 Fed. Reg. 31553-02 (June 10, 1997). Among other objectives, the pilot project focused on the “need for resource redeployment,” to reduce slaughter establishments’ overreliance on federal inspectors to sort acceptable from unacceptable products, which caused the USDA to expend resources inefficiently. See id. at 31555 (“FSIS will be unable to meet its food safety goal and other regulatory objectives unless it changes the way it deploys its resources.”). Specifically, under the HIMP: Similar to the voluntary segregation procedures described above in establishments that slaughter only market hogs under traditional inspection, establishment personnel sort animals before they are presented to FSIS ante-mortem inspectors under HIMP. Establishment personnel sort animals that appear to be healthy into “Normal” pens and animals that appear to have condemnable diseases or conditions into “Subject” pens. Establishment personnel remove and dispose of dead and moribund animals and animals suspected of having central nervous system disorders (CNS) or pyrexia. Under HIMP, FSIS inspectors examine all animals found by the establishment to be normal at rest, and five to ten percent of those animals in motion. If any animals exhibit signs of condemnable conditions, FSIS inspectors direct establishment employees to move the animals to the “U.S. Suspect” pens for final disposition by the FSIS PHV. FSIS PHVs examine all animals in the establishment’s “Subject” pens, and direct establishment employees to move animals to “U.S. Suspect” pens for final disposition by the FSIS PHV. The FSIS PHV determines if any animals must be identified as “U.S. Condemned” and disposed of in accordance with 9 CFR 309.13 (9 CFR 309.2). While establishment personnel sort and remove animals unfit for slaughter, only FSIS inspectors have the authority to condemn an animal. FSIS inspectors observe establishment employees performing sorting procedures at least twice per shift under HIMP compared to at least once per month under the voluntary segregation procedures permitted under traditional inspection of market hogs. 83 Fed. Reg. at 4787-88. In 2014, USDA analyzed data from establishments participating in the HIMP from 2006 to 2013, and published a HIMP Report, which compared the performance of HIMP participants with comparable establishments operating under the traditional inspection system. See id. at 4788-89. USDA found that federal inspectors performed more offline verification activities for the HIMP participants, and those participants had no more incidents of food-safety defects — and in some cases had fewer food safety defects — than establishments operating under the traditional system. Id. at 4789 (“The HIMP Report concluded that this increased level of offline inspection activities provides increased assurance that HIMP establishments are maintaining OCP and food safety defects at levels that are to or less than the levels in non-HIMP establishments.”). USDA also conducted a risk assessment, which indicated that as federal inspectors increased offline procedures, the prevalence of salmonella in market hog carcasses decreased. Id. at 4791. In terms of humane handling, USDA analyzed the data collected by participating HIMP establishments from 2013 through 2015 and, based on its Humane Activities Tracking System (HATS), the USDA “found that FSIS inspectors spent more time verifying that specific humane handling and slaughter requirements were met in HIMP market hog establishments than in non-HIMP market hog establishments.” Id. at 4790. D. The NSIS Based on the results of the HIMP, in February 2018, USDA published a notice of proposed rulemaking, to amend the system for inspecting market hogs offered for slaughter by allowing qualifying establishments to operate under a new optional inspection system, called the NSIS. Id. at 4780; see also Administrative Record (AR) 100207-50. As noted above, the key elements of NSIS include the following, which were tested during the HIMP: (1) requiring establishment employees to perform ante-mortem and post-mortem sorting activities before federal ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection; (2) requiring establishment employees to trim and identify defects on animal carcasses and parts before post-mortem inspection by FSIS inspectors, reducing the number of online FSIS inspectors to a maximum of three per line, and enabling the USDA to shift some resources from online inspection to offline inspection activities; and (3) revoking maximum line speeds and allowing establishments to set their own speeds based on their ability to maintain process control. 83 Fed. Reg. at 4781. In October 2019, the USDA published the Final Rule, effective December 2, 2019, which adopted the three key elements set out in the Proposed Rule. See 84 Fed. Reg. 52300; see also AR100251. Under the NSIS, establishment personnel sort animals appearing to be healthy into “Normal” pens, and animals with diseases or abnormal conditions into “Subject” pens. 83 Fed. Reg. at 4792. Establishment personnel also sort and remove animals with localized conditions (such as arthritis or abscesses), or animals that do not meet establishment specifications (such as swine that were the wrong size or underweight), to be diverted to another official establishment for slaughter. Id. FSIS inspectors then inspect all animals in the “Normal” pens at rest, and five to ten percent of those animals in motion. Id. If any animals exhibit signs of condemnable conditions, FSIS inspectors direct establishment employees to move the animals to the “U.S. Suspect” pens for final disposition by the FSIS PHV. Id. The FSIS PHV inspects all animals in the “Subject” and “U.S. Suspect” pens to render a final disposition decision. Id. USDA considered how many qualifying establishments might opt-in to the NSIS. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52322. It expected that, due to economic constraints associated with an establishment’s training and costs, only large and small high-volume establishments that exclusively slaughter market hogs would choose to participate in the optional NSIS. Id. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiffs filed their complaint on December 18, 2019. (Dkt. 1). On February 18, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ consent motion to file an amended complaint (Dkt. 20; Dkt. 21), which Plaintiffs filed that same day (Dkt. 22). Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleged three causes of action, including: (1) violation of the FMIA, the HMSA and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), for Defendants’ failure to conduct an ante-mortem inspection; (2) violation of the HMSA, FMIA, and APA, for Defendants’ revocation of maximum line speeds; and (3) violation of the National Environmental Policy Act and the APA, for Defendants’ failure to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement or an Environmental Assessment. (Id. at 43-47). After the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss (see Dkt. 50), Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their second and third causes of action by stipulation (Dkt. 80).2 The AR was filed on November 10, 2021. (Dkt. 58; Dkt. 59; Dkt. 60; see also Dkt. 65 (additions to AR filed on January 26, 2022)). Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkt. 92; Dkt. 93), and responses to the motions (Dkt. 94; Dkt. 95).3 On April 17, 2023, following its ruling in Farm Sanctuary v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 6:20-cv-06081 EAW, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2023 WL 2673141 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2023) (hereinafter, “the downed pigs case”), the Court directed the parties to provide further briefing on the issue of whether Plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims. (See Dkt. 101). The parties submitted supplemental briefing on the issue of standing. (Dkt. 102; Dkt. 103; Dkt. 104). Plaintiffs raise three arguments in support of their motion for summary judgment. They contend that the NSIS violates the FMIA and the HMSA, which require that government inspectors examine all animals before slaughter, for both animal welfare and food safety purposes. Plaintiffs further argue that under the NSIS, Defendants are handing over their oversight authority to establishment employees, which they are tasked with regulating. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that in promulgating the Final Rule, Defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously by departing from decades-long policy emphasizing the need for stringent oversight of ante-mortem inspection, and ignoring voluminous record evidence demonstrating how animals will suffer under the NSIS. (Dkt. 92-1 at 8-9). Defendants oppose each of these arguments, and they also argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims. (See Dkt. 93-1; Dkt. 103). DISCUSSION I. Standard on Motion for Summary Judgment Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted if the moving party establishes “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court should grant summary judgment if, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no rational jury could find in favor of that party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts…. [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586-87). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment….” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). II. Standing The Court turns first to the issue of standing.4 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack both organizational and associational standing because their “assertions of injury-infact hinge on their misunderstanding of the final rule” — namely, that contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, the NSIS does not subdelegate authority for conducting ante-mortem inspections to establishment employees — and that it is “not possible to be harmed by a program that does not exist.” (Dkt. 103 at 9). Defendants further argue that even if the Court took Plaintiffs’ allegations about the NSIS at face value, Plaintiffs still lack organizational standing under Second Circuit precedent — including this Court’s decision in the downed pigs case — because “a decision by an advocacy group to voluntarily re-order their spending priorities is not an ‘involuntary material burden.’” (Dkt. 103 at 10 (“Plaintiffs are advocacy groups: they exist to advocate for their cause. Although Plaintiffs must prioritize some issues over others, they are not actually injured in a particular way when they decide to advocate for one issue at the expense of another.”)). With respect to associational standing, Defendants similarly argue that Plaintiffs misconceive that the NSIS subdelegates authority for conducting ante-mortem inspections to establishment employees, and therefore their concerns about food safety risks are unfounded. (Id. at 10-11). Defendants further argue that even if Plaintiffs’ arguments about the NSIS were accurate, they would still lack standing because their members’ claims about food safety are too speculative. (Id. at 11-12). “The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (citations omitted). “To satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate ‘(1) [an] injury-in-fact, which is a concrete and particularized harm to a legally protected interest; (2) causation in the form of a fairly traceable connection between the asserted injury-infact and the alleged actions of the defendant; and (3) redressability, or a non-speculative likelihood that the injury can be remedied by the requested relief.’” Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 2013)). Plaintiffs in this case are organizations, and “[a]n organization can have standing to sue in one of two ways. It may sue on behalf of its members, in which case it must show, inter alia, that some particular member of the organization would have had standing to bring the suit individually.” N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Trans. Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 2012). This is often referred to as “associational” standing. Id. An organization may show associational standing by demonstrating “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); see also Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 649 (2d Cir. 1998) (same). “In addition, an organization can ‘have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy.’” N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, 684 F.3d at 294 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). “Under this theory of ‘organizational’ standing, the organization is just another person — albeit a legal person — seeking to vindicate a right. To qualify, the organization itself must meet the same standing test that applies to individuals.” Id. (quotations and alteration omitted); see also Irish Lesbian & Gay Org., 143 F.3d at 649 (explaining that it is “well established that organizations are entitled to sue on their own behalf for injuries they have sustained,” and to make such a showing, “the organization must meet the same standing test that applies to individuals…by showing actual or threatened injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the alleged illegal action and likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision.” (quotations, citation, and alterations omitted)). Finally, “standing is not dispensed in gross” and “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim [it] seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017) (quotations omitted). Defendants’ first argument — that Plaintiffs’ allegations about NSIS are incorrect — does not support a finding that Plaintiffs lack standing. That argument goes to the merits of the case; specifically, whether Defendants are in compliance with the FMIA and HSMA by permitting establishment employees to sort swine once they arrive at a slaughter establishment, and the Court does not consider the merits when deciding standing. See Dubuisson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., 887 F.3d 567, 574 (2d Cir. 2018) (“we must avoid conflating the requirement for an injury in fact with the validity of [a plaintiff's] claim”) (citation omitted); Knife Rights, Inc. v. Vance, 802 F.3d 377, 380 (2d Cir. 2015) (“On this appeal, we do not consider the merits of plaintiffs’ vagueness claim, but only their standing to pursue it.”); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Perdue, No. 20-cv-00256-JSW, 2022 WL 4793438, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2022) (explaining that the defendants’ argument that “Plaintiffs’ declarations rest on the erroneous assertion that NSIS-produced pork is ‘higher risk’ than pork produced under the traditional inspection system,” was “effectively an argument on the merits, and ‘the Court cannot consider the merits when deciding standing’” (citation omitted)). In the downed pigs case, which involved almost all of the same parties, the Court found that the plaintiffs lacked both organizational and associational standing to bring their claims. Plaintiffs there challenged the alleged failure of the USDA and the FSIS to prohibit the slaughter of downed pigs, which plaintiffs alleged contributed to increased levels of inhumane handling during the slaughter process, as well as increased levels of food-borne illness. With respect to organizational standing, the Court noted that “an organization cannot show a ‘perceptible impairment’ to its activities where the defendant’s actions ‘merely perpetuated the status quo.’” Farm Sanctuary, 2023 WL 2673141, at *9 (quoting Animal Welfare Inst. v. Vilsack, No. 20-CV-6595 (CJS), 2022 WL 16553395, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2022)). Relying on the Second Circuit’s decision in Connecticut Parents Union v. Russel-Tucker, 8 F.4th 167 (2d Cir. 2021), where the Second Circuit rejected an expansive concept of an organizational injury for standing purposes, this Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ expending funds to investigate and report on downed pigs, which amounted to no more than a decision to embark on new activities, “is precisely what Connecticut Parents Union says is insufficient to establish organizational standing.” Id. at *10. In other words, the downed pigs defendants’ failure to take some action that the plaintiffs wanted them to take did not give the plaintiffs standing to pursue their claims. Plaintiffs distinguish the downed pigs case, arguing that they are challenging agency-initiated rulemaking that modified the status quo between the parties — in other words, that Plaintiffs were “already engaged in core programmatic activities to advance the humane treatment of pigs and strengthen the HMSA before the challenged rulemaking.” (Dkt. 102 at 13). Defendants do not address this argument, or the distinction Plaintiffs draw between the instant case and the downed pigs case. (See generally Dkt. 103). Unlike in the downed pigs case, Defendants in this case have not merely perpetuated the status quo. Rather, Defendants have implemented the NSIS, which expands the HIMP from five slaughterhouses to an industrywide standard — and Plaintiffs claim that they are injured by this new system. In support of this claim, Plaintiffs submit declarations from their members demonstrating that they had already engaged in efforts to combat the impacts of the HIMP, which were subsequently burdened by the passage of the NSIS. (See, e.g., Declaration of Mark Walden, Dkt. 30-11 at 15 (“ALDF began advocating against the HIMP pilot program in 2017, drafting communications pieces condemning it as inhumane, unsafe, and violative of federal law. In 2018, when the FSIS announced the proposed Rule, threatening to expand the disastrous pilot program across the country, ALDF was forced to expend further resources drafting additional communications pieces and detailed regulatory comments opposing the Rule, shifting staff time and funding away from our existing work to fight the expansion of the pilot program.”)); see also Declaration of Cheryl Leahy, Dkt. 30-2 at
