OPINION & ORDER Plaintiff Emily Morrison brought this discrimination and harassment action in 2021 against her employer, Scotia Capital (USA), Inc. (“SCUSA”), and Jake Lawrence, SCUSA’s Chief Executive Officer of Global Banking and Markets. Following the Court’s Order on October 4, 2023 dismissing all claims in the First Amended Complaint against Lawrence and certain claims against SCUSA (ECF No. 51), Morrison now seeks leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 59 (“Mot.”).) For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Morrison’s request to add allegations covered by the Adult Survivors Act, but denies her request to add allegations supporting her failure-to-promote and equal pay claims. I. BACKGROUND The procedural history of this case already includes one amended complaint and two sets of motions to dismiss. Morrison initiated this action by filing a summons with notice in the Supreme Court of New York, New York County. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants then removed the action to this Court, where Morrison filed her complaint in September 2021. (ECF No. 16.) Each defendant then moved to dismiss the complaint in November 2021. (ECF Nos. 22, 25.) In the face of these motions to dismiss the complaint by both Lawrence and SCUSA, Morrison chose to file an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 32.) Each defendant then moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF Nos. 34, 37), and the Court subsequently granted in part and denied in part those motions. (ECF Nos. 50-51.) The Court dismissed all claims against defendant Jake Lawrence, leaving SCUSA as the only remaining defendant. (Id.) Morrison then sought leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.1 (Mot.) Morrison’s proposed amendments fall into three categories. First, she seeks to add allegations that, around 2006, a male colleague forcibly touched her. She claims that this conduct now falls within the statute of limitations pursuant to the Adult Survivors Act (“ASA”), N.Y. C.P.L.R. §214-j. Second, Morrison seeks to add allegations supporting her failure-to-promote claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. Third, Morrison seeks to add allegations supporting her claim under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §206(d) et seq. Both Morrison’s equal pay and failure-to-promote claims were dismissed previously in the Court’s October 4, 2023 Order (ECF No. 51), but Morrison writes now that, as to those claims, she “is simply tying together more succinctly allegations already set forth in the amended complaint to provide additional clarity.” (Mot. at 1 (emphasis added).) II. LEGAL STANDARD Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) provides that a Court “should freely give leave [to amend a pleading] when justice so requires.” Although leave to amend is granted liberally, it may properly be denied if the amendment would be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“futility of amendment” is a reason to deny leave to amend); Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (“Where it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, however, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.”). “An amendment to a pleading is futile if the proposed claim could not withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Lucente v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002). In addition, because the relevant court order in this litigation provided that plaintiff’s “last date to amend [the] complaint” was January 5, 2022 (ECF No. 30), Morrison must also satisfy the more restrictive standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) that governs the modification of scheduling orders. See Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Where, as here, a scheduling order governs amendments to the complaint…the lenient standard under Rule 15(a)…must be balanced against the requirement under Rule 16(b)”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Soroof Trading Dev. Co. v. Ge Microgen, Inc., 283 F.R.D. 142, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Where the Court-ordered deadline for amending a complaint has passed, a plaintiff may amend “only up[on] a showing of the ‘good cause’ that is required to modify a scheduling order under Rule 16(b)(4).” Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 115 (2d Cir. 2021). A finding of good cause “depends on the diligence of the moving party,” Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 340 (2d Cir. 2000), and, specifically, the movant’s ability to show that “the applicable deadline could not have been reasonably met.” Int’l Techs. Mktg. v. Verint Sys., No. 1:15-cv-2457, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43838, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2019). In addition to primarily considering the movant’s diligence, “[t]he district court, in the exercise of its discretion under Rule 16(b), also may consider other relevant factors including, in particular, whether allowing the amendment of the pleading at this stage of the litigation will prejudice” the non-moving party. Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir. 2007). III. ADULT SURVIVORS ACT ALLEGATIONS The first proposed amendments relate to conduct that, but for the Adult Survivors Act, would be outside the statute of limitations. The ASA created a year-long window, which expired on November 23, 2023, for plaintiffs to bring certain sexual assault claims occurring in New York, even if those claims would otherwise be time-barred. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §214-j. The conduct covered by the ASA includes “intentional or negligent acts or omissions by a person for physical, psychological, or other injury or condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law.” Id. Morrison’s proposed amendments include the allegation that around 2006, in New York, a male colleague “reached his hand toward [Morrison's] foot and started caressing the bottom of her foot in a sexual manner.” (Proposed SAC
41-42.) In addition, the same colleague “regularly approached her from behind and wrapped his arms around her neck while pushing his body against her backside.” (Id. 46.) Morrison alleges that these incidents constitute forcible touching under N.Y. Penal Law §130.52. (Id. 387.) A. Rule 16(b) Because the ASA only became effective in November 2022, the proposed amendments regarding the ASA would have been time-barred as of January 5, 2022, the Court-ordered deadline for plaintiff to file the First Amended Complaint. Therefore, not including these allegations in the First Amended Complaint does not reflect a lack of diligence by plaintiff since they would have been time-barred before the passage of the ASA. In addition, the proposed inclusion of these allegations in the Second Amended Complaint does not unfairly prejudice SCUSA. Fact discovery is still ongoing, a trial date has not been set, and Morrison does not propose adding any new causes of action. See Anzovino v. Wingate of Dutchess, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209754, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2022). Moreover, the newly added allegations are limited in scope to a single individual’s conduct. Therefore, with regard to the proposed amendments concerning the ASA, Morrison has satisfied the good cause standard under Rule 16(b). B. Rule 15(a) Regarding the Rule 15(a) standard, SCUSA contends that the amendments should be disallowed as futile because the alleged conduct does not constitute forcible touching under the ASA. As set forth in the Penal Law: “A person is guilty of forcible touching when such person intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose[] forcibly touches the sexual or other intimate parts of another person for the purpose of degrading or abusing such person, or for the purpose of gratifying the actor’s sexual desire…For the purposes of this section, forcible touching includes squeezing, grabbing or pinching.” N.Y. Penal Law §130.52. SCUSA maintains that the statute’s elements are not satisfied because (a) caressing Morrison’s foot and “hugging” Morrison from behind are not sufficiently forcible, (b) no sexual or intimate parts of Morrison’s body were touched, and (c) Morrison has not shown intent to degrade her, abuse her, or gratify sexual desire. At the pleading stage, the facts alleged are sufficient to state a claim for forcible touching. First, as the New York Court of Appeals has determined, there is “a low threshold for the forcible component” of this statute and “when done with the relevant mens rea, any bodily contact involving the application of some level of pressure” qualifies. People v. Guaman, 22 N.Y.3d 678, 684 (2014). Morrison’s allegations of “caressing” and “pushing” plausibly entail the requisite force under the statute’s low threshold. (Proposed SAC
