OPINION & ORDER Michael Vasquez brought this 42 U.S.C. §1983 action, alleging that defendants unlawfully detained and shot him while he was shopping at a Whole Foods supermarket in New York City. Doc. 3 (Compl.). Before the Court is defendant New York City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) with respect to the Monell claim. Doc. 50. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background1 On March 24, 2018, Vasquez was detained by two store security guards while shopping at a Whole Foods supermarket on 125th Street in Manhattan. 16. The security guards called the police, and four New York Police Department officers arrived on the scene shortly thereafter (“the NYPD Officers”).
16-17. The NYPD Officers asked Vasquez whether he had any weapons on him, and Vasquez told them he was carrying a knife. 17. The NYPD Officers then ordered him to remove the knife from his pocket. Id. As Vasquez reached for the knife in his pocket, each of the NYPD Officers drew their firearms and pointed them at him. 18. Vasquez, fearing for his safety, took one step backwards. 19. In response, one officer (whose identity is not known) discharged his firearm, striking Vasquez multiple times, including in the upper right chest, left elbow, and left lower quadrant. Id. Vasquez was taken to a hospital, where he underwent surgery. 20. As a result of the gunshot wounds, Vasquez suffered nerve damage in his shoulder and left arm resulting in the loss of use of his left arm. Id. Vasquez was ultimately convicted of aggravated assault on a police officer in connection with the March 24, 2018 incident.2 22. Vasquez is currently serving a prison sentence for that offense. Id. B. Procedural Background Vasquez brought the instant action on July 2, 2020 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the City of New York (“the City”), the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), and the NYPD Officers who were named as John Doe defendants. Compl. He alleges that the defendants violated his right to: (1) be free from excessive force in the course of an arrest, and to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as required by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (3) be free from cruel and unusual punishment, as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. Vasquez also brought a Monell claim against the City of New York. Id; see also Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The City answered on July 6, 2021. Doc. 16. On May 13, 2022, more than four years after the March 24, 2018 incident, Vasquez filed a first amended complaint identifying the names of the “John Doe” Officer Defendants without first seeking leave from the Court to do so (Doc. 26), a step required by the Court’s discovery plan (Doc. 23). During a conference held on June 10, 2022, the Court granted Vasquez leave to move to file an amended complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Vasquez filed a motion to amend the complaint to include the actual names of the four John Doe defendants on July 7, 2022. Doc. 35. The Court denied Vasquez’s motion to amend his complaint on March 6, 2023 because Vazquez failed to: (1) meet the New York statute of limitations period for personal injury claims when he sought to amend; (2) adequately plead that the amended complaint relates back to the original complaint per Rule 15(c)(1)(C); (3) demonstrate that he exercised due diligence which precluded him from utilizing C.P.L.R §1024 to substitute the John Doe defendants; and (4) show good cause for the delay. Doc. 49 at 5-11. On April 8, 2023, the City brought the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings. Doc. 50. II. LEGAL STANDARD Rule 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The Court applies the same standard of review to a Rule 12(c) motion as it does to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted “if, from the pleadings, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Int’l Union, United Plant Guard Workers of Am. (UPGWA) & Its Local 537, 47 F.3d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam). In adjudicating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court considers “the complaint, the answer, any written documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.” L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Roberts v. Babkiewicz, 582 F.3d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 2009)). The Court also considers any documents incorporated into the complaint by reference or integral to the complaint, provided there is no dispute regarding their authenticity, accuracy, or relevance. Id. Finally, the Court accepts as true the complaint’s factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014). III. DISCUSSION A. The Court Cannot Consider Extrinsic Evidence In ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, “a Court may review only the pleadings, any documents that are attached thereto, incorporated by reference, or those ‘integral’ to the allegations, together with any facts of which a Court may take judicial notice.” Century Sur. Co. v. Marzec, No. 12-cv-5540 (JPO), 2013 WL 3919383, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2013); see also McCoy Assocs., Inc. v. Nulux, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 286, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“As suggested by the name of such a motion, a court analyzing a motion under Rule 12(c) may look only at the ‘pleadings,’ i.e., the complaint, the answer, the counterclaims and replies thereto, the third-party complaint, and the answer to the third-party complaint.”). Parties cannot supplement their pleadings via facts alleged in their briefs. See Shah v. Helen Hayes Hosp., 252 F. App’x 364, 366 (2d Cir. 2007) (summary order) (“A party may not use his or her opposition to a dispositive motion as a means to amend the complaint.”). In his memorandum in opposition, Vasquez cites to the NYPD Misconduct Complaint Database (“the Database”), a source never included in the pleadings, which is a repository of complaints made by the public on record with the Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”).3 Vasquez alleges that the database contains “a very well-documented history of the NYPD and its Officers’ and employees’ use of excessive force.” Doc. 55 at 14. He also argues that the CCRB Officer Disciplinary records (“the Disciplinary Records”) and other sources demonstrate the same. Vasquez references the Database to bolster his argument that the NYPD allowed its officers and employees to “unlawfully use excessive force against individuals being arrested so much so that it has amounted to an unofficial custom.” Id. Vasquez states that the Database contains “unique complaint records” involving thousands of NYPD Officers, but does not specify what conduct the complaints concern. Id. Vasquez also argues that the Database’s descriptions of incidents of excessive force show that the City “has been aware of a multitude of complaints against its NYPD officers for excessive use of force and demonstrated deliberate indifference.” Id. at 17. Vasquez did not refer to the Database, CCRB, or the Disciplinary records in his Complaint, yet relies on these sources as integral support for his Monell claim against the City in his memorandum in opposition. The Court finds that the references to the Database, CCRB, and the Disciplinary records are not properly before the Court on a Rule 12(c) motion. See Shah, 252 F. App’x at 366. B. The Court Grants the City’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Vasquez’s sole remaining claim is against the City pursuant to Monell. He argues that the City, acting through its NYPD Officers, subjected him to excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 in connection with his arrest on March 24, 2018. He alleges that the City is liable pursuant to Monell under both custom or practice theory and as deliberate indifference based on failure to train or supervise. In support of the Monell claim, Vasquez alleges:
