DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff Bernice Curry-Malcolm (“plaintiff”), a former employee of the Rochester City School District (“District”), brought this action against the District and its Superintendent. Plaintiff has alleged, inter alia, age-based and race-based discrimination and relation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000 et seq. (“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §621 et seq. (“ADEA”). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Familiarity with the labyrinthine history of this case, summarized in relevant part below, is presumed. On October 19, 2021, this Court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. #59). Plaintiff appealed, and on May 30, 2023, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed that decision in part, remanding the Court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA retaliation claims against the District for further consideration. See Curry-Malcolm v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 13239 (2d Cir. 2023). By Decision and Order entered September 28, 2023, this Court dismissed plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA retaliation claims arising prior to plaintiff’s recall employment in November 2017, but permitted plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claims arising on or after that date to proceed. (Dkt. #48). The District now moves to dismiss plaintiff’s remaining retaliation claims (Dkt. #49). For the reasons that follow, that motion is granted in part, and denied in part. DISCUSSION I. Standard On a Motion To Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) In deciding whether a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), a court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. See Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1994). However, “a plaintiff’s obligation…requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court’s consideration is limited to the four corners of the complaint, any documents attached to it or incorporated by reference therein, and any matters of which the Court may take judicial notice. See Savino v. Lloyds TSB Bank, 499 F. Supp. 2d 306, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43284 at *10-*11 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). To the extent that plaintiff’s submissions in opposition to the present motion purport to raise new claims, accuse new individual defendants, resurrect previously-adjudicated claims against the District, reargue matters that were fully and finally determined in agency proceedings, assert unrelated claims against the Honeoye-Falls Lima School District (a non-party to this action), or to introduce other extraneous or irrelevant matters, the Court cannot consider those portions of plaintiff’s submissions in determining the motion at hand.1 II. Plaintiff’s Remaining Title VII and ADEA Retaliation Claims Against the District As the Court previously determined (Dkt. #48), plaintiff’s retaliation claims arising in and after November 2017 do not appear to have been substantively raised before, or considered by, the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”) as part of plaintiff’s prior proceedings, or her appeals from the NYSDHR’s determination. (2d Cir. Docket, 21-2683, Dkt. #84 at A-207 — A-221). Accordingly, the Court found that they were not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. See Curry-Malcolm v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 199 A.D.3d 1394 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2021), leave to app. den., 203 A.D.3d 1645 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2022), app. dismissed, 38 N.Y.3d 1050 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2022), cert. den., 143 S. Ct. 733 (2023). Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint contains several vague, boilerplate allegations that the District “continued in its pattern and practice of discrimination against the Plaintiff up to [and] including retaliating against her” during her recall employment from November 2017 through April 2018. (17-CV-6878, Dkt. #43 at
464, 474). Such allegations do not identify or describe any specific adverse employment action, and thus cannot form the basis for a plausible retaliation claim. Plaintiff alleges only one discrete, adverse act by the District arising out of her recall employment. Plaintiff contends that in June 2019, the District informed the New York State Teachers Retirement System (“NYSTRS”) that plaintiff had been recalled in November 2017, had been placed on paid administrative leave from December 8, 2017 through April 23, 2018 (the effective date of her termination), and was considered separated from employment thereafter. Plaintiff alleges that this description of her employment history was inaccurate in unspecified ways, was made “[i]n retaliation” for her prior administrative charges and/or lawsuits against the District, and adversely impacted her retirement benefit calculations by the NYSTRS (Second Amended Complaint, 18-CV-6878, Dkt. #43 at
