DECISION, ORDER AND JUDGMENT Petitioner — a nonprofit organization located in Dover Plains, Dutchess County — develops and builds affordable housing. In 2016, petitioner received 122 acres of property located in both the Town of Cambridge (hereinafter the Town) and the Village of Cambridge (hereinafter the Village), Washington County, as a charitable donation. This property includes 11 separate buildings and was formerly home to the Mary McClellan Hospital, which closed its doors in 2003. While a nursing home was operated on the property from 2006 to 2008, the buildings have sat dormant since that time and fallen into disrepair. Petitioner plans to develop mixed-use affordable housing on the property and has been engaged in ongoing discussions with Town and Village officials. Construction, however, has not begun. Petitioner is currently allowing the Cambridge Racquet Club to use tennis courts on the property for community tournaments and is also permitting the Village to draw water from a reservoir on the property — all free of charge. The property otherwise remains vacant and unused. Petitioner has been assessed taxes relative to the property since 2017. While petitioner paid these taxes from 2017 to 2021, it declined to do so in 2022.1 Petitioner then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding on November 9, 2022, contending that it is exempt from taxation under RPTL 420-a. Petitioner requests that respondents be directed to reimburse it for those taxes paid from 2017 to 2021, with interest; that the taxes assessed in 2022 be declared null and void; and that respondents be precluded from assessing any future taxes against it with respect to the property. Presently before the Court is respondents’ motion to dismiss the proceeding. Respondents contend that the proceeding must be dismissed because it is barred by the statute of limitations. More specifically, they contend — based upon CPLR 217 (1) — that the proceeding had to be commenced within four months of the date upon which the tax assessments became final. Respondents contend that the proceeding is clearly time barred with respect to the 2017 through 2021 tax assessments, which became final years ago. Insofar as the 2022 tax assessment is concerned, respondents submit (1) the affidavit of William McCarty, the Village assessor, who states that the final assessment date for the Village was April 1, 2022; and (2) the affidavit of Arek Gordon, the Town assessor, who states that the final assessment date for the Town was July 1, 2022. Respondents thus contend that the deadlines to commence the proceeding relative to the 2022 tax assessment against the Village and the Town were August 1, 2022 and November 1, 2022, respectively, both prior to the date of commencement of this proceeding. At the outset, the Court finds that respondents’ analysis is not entirely correct. Petitioner is claiming an exemption from taxation under RPTL 420-a, which statute provides as follows: “Real property owned by a corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for religious, charitable, hospital, educational, or moral or mental improvement of men, women or children purposes, or for two or more such purposes, and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes either by the owning corporation or association or by another such corporation or association…shall be exempt from taxation…” (RPTL 420-a [1] [a]). The statute then further provides: “An exemption may be granted pursuant to [RPTL 420-a] upon application by the owner on a form prescribed by the commissioner or any comparable form, which application may be filed with the assessor of the appropriate county, city, town or village on or before the applicable taxable status date. Where the assessor receives no such application, the assessor may nevertheless grant the exemption provided the assessor personally inspects the property and certifies in writing that it satisfies all of the requirements for exemption set forth in this section. Where property is not granted an exemption pursuant to this section, the owner may seek judicial review pursuant to [RPTL article 7] or [CPLR article 78].” The statute of limitations therefore expired four months from the date of denial of petitioner’s application for an exemption under RPTL 420-a. In this regard, the following are annexed to the petition: Petitioner’s application for an exemption for tax year 2017, dated November 3, 2017; petitioner’s application for an exemption for tax year 2018, dated December 11, 2018; petitioner’s application for an exemption for tax year 2019, dated December 31, 2019; petitioner’s application for an exemption for tax year 2020, dated February 12, 2020; petitioner’s application for an exemption for tax year 2022, dated February 10, 2022; and a letter from the Village denying petitioner’s application for an exemption for tax year 2022, dated March 2, 2022. Insofar as the applications for tax years 2017 through 2020 are concerned, the record does not include denials of these applications — but clearly they were denied, with taxes assessed and paid by petitioner for those years. With regard to tax year 2021, the record does not include either an application for an exemption or a denial — but again, taxes were assessed and paid. In any event, irrespective of whether there was a denial of the applications prior to the final assessment date or petitioner was effectively apprised of the denial on the final assessment date, as respondents have so aptly stated — the statute of limitations has long passed relative to these tax years. The Court therefore finds that respondents have demonstrated their entitlement to dismissal relative to petitioner’s request for reimbursement for taxes paid from 2017 to 2021. Turning now to the taxes assessed in 2022, petitioner does not deny receipt of the March 2, 2022 letter — but there is nothing in the record to establish the date upon which the letter was received. To that end, petitioner was effectively apprised of the denial on the final assessment date, at which time it was clear that petitioner was being charged taxes on the property based upon an assessed value of $627,200.00. Petitioner has failed to submit any evidence to refute that the final assessment dates for the Village and the Town were April 1, 2022 and July 1, 2022, respectively. As such, the Court finds that respondents have demonstrated their entitlement to dismissal relative to petitioner’s request that the taxes assessed in 2022 be declared null and void. Inasmuch as petitioner requests that respondents be precluded from assessing any future taxes against it with respect to the property, petitioner is effectively seeking a declaratory judgment. While declaratory judgment actions are generally governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]), where — as here — the action involves claims that must be brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, then the four-month statute of limitations applies (see Smith v. State of New York, 201 AD3d 1225, 1227 [3d Dept 2022]; Matter of Town of Stony Point v. State of N.Y. Dept. of Fin., Off. of Real Prop. Servs., 107 AD3d 1217, 1218 [3d Dept 2013]; Matter of Capital Dist. Regional Off — Track Betting Corp. v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 97 AD3d 1044, 1045 [3d Dept 2012]; see also Kogut v. Village of Chestnut Ridge, 214 AD3d 777, 779 [2d Dept 2023]). The Court thus find that respondents have demonstrated their entitlement to dismissal relative to petitioner’s request that they be precluded from assessing any future taxes. While the Court need not consider the merits of this proceeding, it nonetheless notes that petitioner has failed to demonstrate its entitlement to an exemption under RPTL 420-a. To qualify for such exemption, “‘(1) [the] petitioner must be organized exclusively for the purposes enumerated in the statute, (2) the property in question must be used primarily for the furtherance of such purposes, (3) no pecuniary profit, apart from reasonable compensation, may inure to the benefit of any officers, members, or employees, and (4) [the] petitioner may not be simply used as a guise for profit-making operations’” (Matter of Catskill Watershed Corp. v. Assessor of the Town of Middletown, 217 AD3d 1090, 1092 [3d Dept 2023], quoting Matter of Maetreum of Cybele, Magna Mater, Inc. v. McCoy, 111 AD3d 1098, 1100 [3d Dept. 2013] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis and citations omitted], affd 24 NY3d 1023 [2014]; see also Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors of Town of Gardiner, 47 NY2d 476, 483 [1979]). Here, there does not appear to be any dispute that petitioner meets the first requirement, having been organized exclusively for a charitable purpose — namely, the development and building of affordable housing. There likewise does not appear to be any dispute that it meets the third and fourth requirements. That being said, petitioner does not meet the second requirement. The property is currently being used for recreation by the Cambridge Racquet Club and as a water source by the Village — with neither of these uses in any way related to affordable housing which is a requirement . Based upon the foregoing, respondents’ motion to dismiss is granted in its entirety and the petition is dismissed. Therefore, having considered the Verified Petition with exhibits attached, dated November 8, 2022; Memorandum of Law of June C.M. Colthirst, Esq., undated; Affirmation of Michael Crowe, Esq. with exhibit attached, dated March 21, 2023; Affidavit of William McCarty with exhibit attached thereto, sworn to March 16, 2023; Affidavit of Arek D. Gordon with exhibit attached thereto, sworn to March 15, 2023; Affidavit of Christopher J. Honeywell, Esq. with exhibit attached thereto, sworn to March 21, 2023; “Reply to Respondent’s Answer to the Plaintiff’s Article 78 Petition” of June C.M. Colthirst, Esq., dated March 27, 2023; “Answer to Respondent Notice of Motion” of June C.M. Colthirst, Esq., dated April 6, 2023; Affidavit of Christopher J. Honeywell, Esq., dated May 1, 2023; Affirmation of Michael Crowe, Esq., dated May 3, 2023; and “Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss” of June C.M. Colthirst, Esq., dated May 31, 2023;2 and oral argument having been held on November 14, 2023 with Robert Chambers, Esq. appearing for petitioner, Michael Crowe, Esq. appearing for respondents Assessor, Village of Cambridge, Assessor, Town of Cambridge, Mayor, Village of Cambridge, Washington County Treasurer, Washington County Real Property Tax Service, and Washington County Board of Supervisors, and Lauren P. McCluskey, Esq. appearing for respondent Central School District of Cambridge, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that respondents’ motion to dismiss is granted in its entirety and the petition is dismissed. The above constitutes the Decision, Order and Judgment of this Court. The original of this Decision, Order and Judgment has been filed by the Court together with the Notice of Motion dated March 21, 2023 and the submissions enumerated above. Counsel for respondents Assessor, Village of Cambridge, Assessor, Town of Cambridge, Mayor, Village of Cambridge, Washington County Treasurer, Washington County Real Property Tax Service, and Washington County Board of Supervisors is hereby directed to serve a copy of the Decision, Order and Judgment with notice of entry. Dated: January 18, 2024
