The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document numbers (Motion 002) 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63 were read on this motion for DEFENSE COSTS. DECISION ORDER ON MOTION By decision and order dated June 9, 2022, the court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability on its claims that defendants must reimburse its defense costs in several actions pending in the State of Florida (NYSCEF Doc. No. 47). The reader is referred to that decision for a fuller discussion of the underlying facts of the case. Following the decision, the parties requested to resolve the issue of plaintiff’s defense costs in the Florida actions by submission of papers rather than a damages hearing, which the court allowed. Upon the above listed documents, plaintiff’s instant damages application is granted in accordance with the following memorandum. In its prior order, the court held that defendants were “obligated to pay plaintiff’s defense costs while the claims against plaintiff are being litigated” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 47 at 8). As the prior order further noted, “[f]unds that have been advanced must be repaid if ultimately it is determined that the recipient is not entitled to indemnification” (id.) — in this case, upon a finding by the Florida courts of gross negligence, willful misconduct, or any intentional behavior by plaintiff (see, id., at 6-8). It is undisputed that the Florida actions have now been dismissed against plaintiff without any such finding (Cohn affirmation, NYSCEF Doc. No. 51, 17). Therefore, as per the court’s previous order, defendants herein are obligated to indemnify plaintiff for its defense costs. Defendants assert that the amount of fees and costs claimed by plaintiff is inappropriately excessive for multiple reasons, claiming that: plaintiff’s attorneys charged rates in excess of the reasonable rates for the relevant legal community; the hours expended by counsel were not reasonable; and plaintiff overstaffed the case, as the dispute did not require the involvement of as many attorneys and staff as counsel billed for. “An award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to…a contractual provision may only be enforced to the extent that the amount is reasonable and warranted for the services actually rendered” (Kamco Supply Corp. v. Annex Contr. Inc., 261 AD2d 363, 365 [2d Dept 1999]). “[T]he court must possess sufficient information upon which to make an informed assessment of the reasonable value of the legal services rendered” (SO/Bluestar, LLC v. Canarsie Hotel Corp., 33 AD3d 986, 988 [2d Dept 2006]). In determining the reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees, courts look to several factors: “the time and labor required; the difficulty of the questions involved; the skill required to handle the issues presented; the experience, ability and reputation of counsel; the proposed amount of fees; the benefit resulting to the putative class from the services; the customary fee charged for similar services; the contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the responsibility involved” (Gordon v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 148 AD3d 146, 165 [1st Dept 2017]). Here, the fees incurred by plaintiff in the Florida action are reasonable. Defendants do not meaningfully question the skill required to litigate these matters, nor the experience, ability, and reputation of retained counsel. Given the number of lawsuits, the amount potentially at stake, the novel legal position taken by the Florida plaintiffs — which even defendants herein initially attested to (Def.’s memorandum of law, NYSCEF Doc. No. 35 at 2-3, 8, 16), the amount of pleadings and motion practice that took place in the Florida actions (Cohn affirmation, NYSCEF Doc. No. 51,
6-16), and the complete victory for plaintiff obtained upon dismissal of the Florida actions (id., 17), all of the factors set forth above weigh in plaintiff’s favor (Gordon, 148 AD3d at 165). Defendants object to the rates charged by plaintiff’s counsel. There is no dispute in the record that counsel’s fees are comparable to those of other lawyers of similar expertise and experience in New York. While defendants argue that the relevant rate is that charged in Florida, this argument is inadequately supported. Generally, the relevant rate is the one in the area in which the reviewing court sits (Simmons v. New York City Tr. Auth., 575 F3d 170, 174 [2d Cir 2009], citing Blum v. Stephens, 465 U.S. 886 [1984]; Matter of Gamache v. Steinhaus, 7 AD3d 525, 527 [2d Dept 2004] ["As a general rule, the reasonable hourly rate [for an attorney] should be based on the customary fee charged for similar services by lawyers in the community with like experience and of comparable reputation to those by whom the prevailing party was represented”] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted; brackets in original]). Moreover, defendant presents only the affidavit of one Florida attorney, who does not have personal knowledge of the Florida actions, and attests to the prevailing rates for medical malpractice cases (Humphrey aff., NYSCEF Doc. No. 60). As the court’s prior decision demonstrates, the Florida actions as alleged against plaintiff herein were not simple medical malpractice cases. To the extent that defendants argue that plaintiff retained out-of-state counsel for purely Florida matters unnecessarily, litigants generally have the right to be represented by counsel of their own choosing (see Ferolito v. Vultaggio, 99 AD3d 19, 27 [1st Dept 2012]). Here, where plaintiff chose to be represented by counsel who have represented it for more than 20 years (Cohn reply affirmation, NYSCEF Doc. No. 62, 3), the court will not penalize it for doing so. As set forth in its prior decision, the court also notes that defendants have effectively waived this argument by not objecting to plaintiff’s choice of counsel in the Florida actions, and paying, for a time, plaintiff’s legal fees without objection (NYSCEF Doc. No. 47 at 8-10). Defendants next argue that plaintiff’s counsel accrued unreasonable hours due to the decision: to staff the case with attorneys from outside Florida who were not admitted to the Florida Bar; to hire two local law firms to act as local counsel; and to have numerous attorneys and staff from each office working on the cases. As plaintiff points out, however, it initially retained William Dorsey, Esq., and Kenneth Ottaviano, Esq., when they were at Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (“Katten”) (Cohn reply affirmation, NYSCEF Doc. No. 62, 3). Katten did not then and does not now have any offices in Florida, necessitating the hiring of local counsel (id., 4). Moreover, the geographical distance between the courthouses in which the Florida actions were brought necessitated the hiring of two separate firms (id., 5). After Messrs. Dorsey and Ottaviano moved to Blank Rome LLP, the case transitioned away from one of the local firms and to Blank Rome’s Tampa, Florida, office for local support (id.,
